Message ID | 1447598396-6678-1-git-send-email-mst@redhat.com (mailing list archive) |
---|---|
State | New, archived |
Headers | show |
2015-11-15 18:00+0200, Michael S. Tsirkin: > This patch adds a new parameter: eptp_switching_test, which enables > > testing EPT switching on VMX if supported by hardware. All EPT entries > are initialized to the same value so this adds no useful functionality > by itself, but can be used to test VMFUNC performance, and serve as a > basis for future features based on EPTP switching. > > Support for nested virt is not enabled. > > This was tested using the following code within guest: > #define VMX_VMFUNC ".byte 0x0f,0x01,0xd4" > static void vmfunc(unsigned int nr, unsigned int ept) > { > asm volatile(VMX_VMFUNC > : > : "a"(nr), "c"(ept) > : "memory"); > } > > VMFUNC instruction cost was measured at ~122 cycles. > (Note: recent versions of gnu toolchain support > the vmfunc instruction - removing the need for writing > the bytecode manually). > > Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> > --- > > I think I'd like to put this upstream so future eptp switching work can > be implemented on top. Comments? I'd wait for the future. Patch is already on the list so people interested in benchmarking VMFUNC can quickly compile a kernel and developers will need to overwrite the code anyway. (And I think that eptp switching is expected to be used in conjuction with #VE, so it'd then make sense to implement a nop for it as well.) > diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h > @@ -3011,6 +3035,7 @@ static __init int setup_vmcs_config(struct vmcs_config *vmcs_conf) > SECONDARY_EXEC_PAUSE_LOOP_EXITING | > SECONDARY_EXEC_RDTSCP | > SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_INVPCID | > + SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_VM_FUNCTIONS | The VMFUNC vmexit should be handled to prevent guests from triggering a WARN_ON on the host. (VMFUNC did just #UD before this patch.) After that, it's ok for KVM. -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe kvm" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
On Mon, Nov 16, 2015 at 06:51:06PM +0100, =?UTF-8?q?Radim=20Kr=C4=8Dm=C3=A1=C5=99?= wrote: > 2015-11-15 18:00+0200, Michael S. Tsirkin: > > This patch adds a new parameter: eptp_switching_test, which enables > > > > testing EPT switching on VMX if supported by hardware. All EPT entries > > are initialized to the same value so this adds no useful functionality > > by itself, but can be used to test VMFUNC performance, and serve as a > > basis for future features based on EPTP switching. > > > > Support for nested virt is not enabled. > > > > This was tested using the following code within guest: > > #define VMX_VMFUNC ".byte 0x0f,0x01,0xd4" > > static void vmfunc(unsigned int nr, unsigned int ept) > > { > > asm volatile(VMX_VMFUNC > > : > > : "a"(nr), "c"(ept) > > : "memory"); > > } > > > > VMFUNC instruction cost was measured at ~122 cycles. > > (Note: recent versions of gnu toolchain support > > the vmfunc instruction - removing the need for writing > > the bytecode manually). > > > > Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> > > --- > > > > I think I'd like to put this upstream so future eptp switching work can > > be implemented on top. Comments? > > I'd wait for the future. Patch is already on the list so people > interested in benchmarking VMFUNC can quickly compile a kernel and > developers will need to overwrite the code anyway. It'll bitrot though. But I'll let Paolo decide that. > (And I think that eptp switching is expected to be used in conjuction > with #VE, so it'd then make sense to implement a nop for it as well.) No idea how would I even test it, so I'm not interested in #VE at this point. If you are - go ahead and post a patch for that on top though, why not. > > diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h > > @@ -3011,6 +3035,7 @@ static __init int setup_vmcs_config(struct vmcs_config *vmcs_conf) > > SECONDARY_EXEC_PAUSE_LOOP_EXITING | > > SECONDARY_EXEC_RDTSCP | > > SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_INVPCID | > > + SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_VM_FUNCTIONS | > > The VMFUNC vmexit should be handled to prevent guests from triggering a > WARN_ON on the host. (VMFUNC did just #UD before this patch.) Do you mean VMFUNC other than EPTP switch 0? True, thanks! > > After that, it's ok for KVM. -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe kvm" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
2015-11-16 19:59+0200, Michael S. Tsirkin: > On Mon, Nov 16, 2015 at 06:51:06PM +0100, =?UTF-8?q?Radim=20Kr=C4=8Dm=C3=A1=C5=99?= wrote: >> 2015-11-15 18:00+0200, Michael S. Tsirkin: >> (And I think that eptp switching is expected to be used in conjuction >> with #VE, so it'd then make sense to implement a nop for it as well.) > > No idea how would I even test it, so I'm not interested in #VE at this > point. If you are - go ahead and post a patch for that on top though, > why not. I thought that it's going to be simpler to provide functionality (that utilizes eptp switching) to the guest through #VE, which probably isn't true as I think more about it. (Not interested in implementing it :]) -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe kvm" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
On Mon, Nov 16, 2015 at 10:18 AM, =?UTF-8?q?Radim=20Kr=C4=8Dm=C3=A1=C5=99?= <rkrcmar@redhat.com> wrote: > 2015-11-16 19:59+0200, Michael S. Tsirkin: >> On Mon, Nov 16, 2015 at 06:51:06PM +0100, =?UTF-8?q?Radim=20Kr=C4=8Dm=C3=A1=C5=99?= wrote: >>> 2015-11-15 18:00+0200, Michael S. Tsirkin: >>> (And I think that eptp switching is expected to be used in conjuction >>> with #VE, so it'd then make sense to implement a nop for it as well.) >> >> No idea how would I even test it, so I'm not interested in #VE at this >> point. If you are - go ahead and post a patch for that on top though, >> why not. > > I thought that it's going to be simpler to provide functionality (that > utilizes eptp switching) to the guest through #VE, which probably isn't > true as I think more about it. (Not interested in implementing it :]) I'm willing to review a #VE stub. I'm not likely to implement it. --Andy -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe kvm" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
TWljaGFlbCBTLiBUc2lya2luIHdyb3RlIG9uIDIwMTUtMTEtMTY6DQo+IFRoaXMgcGF0Y2ggYWRk cyBhIG5ldyBwYXJhbWV0ZXI6IGVwdHBfc3dpdGNoaW5nX3Rlc3QsIHdoaWNoIGVuYWJsZXMNCj4g dGVzdGluZyBFUFQgc3dpdGNoaW5nIG9uIFZNWCBpZiBzdXBwb3J0ZWQgYnkgaGFyZHdhcmUuICBB bGwgRVBUDQo+IGVudHJpZXMgYXJlIGluaXRpYWxpemVkIHRvIHRoZSBzYW1lIHZhbHVlIHNvIHRo aXMgYWRkcyBubyB1c2VmdWwNCj4gZnVuY3Rpb25hbGl0eSBieSBpdHNlbGYsIGJ1dCBjYW4gYmUg dXNlZCB0byB0ZXN0IFZNRlVOQyBwZXJmb3JtYW5jZSwNCj4gYW5kIHNlcnZlIGFzIGEgYmFzaXMg Zm9yIGZ1dHVyZSBmZWF0dXJlcyBiYXNlZCBvbiBFUFRQIHN3aXRjaGluZy4NCj4gDQo+IFN1cHBv cnQgZm9yIG5lc3RlZCB2aXJ0IGlzIG5vdCBlbmFibGVkLg0KPiANCj4gVGhpcyB3YXMgdGVzdGVk IHVzaW5nIHRoZSBmb2xsb3dpbmcgY29kZSB3aXRoaW4gZ3Vlc3Q6DQo+IAkjZGVmaW5lIFZNWF9W TUZVTkMgIi5ieXRlIDB4MGYsMHgwMSwweGQ0Ig0KPiAJc3RhdGljIHZvaWQgdm1mdW5jKHVuc2ln bmVkIGludCBuciwgdW5zaWduZWQgaW50IGVwdCkNCj4gCXsNCj4gCQlhc20gdm9sYXRpbGUoVk1Y X1ZNRlVOQw0KPiAJCQkgICAgIDoNCj4gCQkJICAgICA6ICJhIihuciksICJjIihlcHQpDQo+IAkJ CSAgICAgOiAibWVtb3J5Iik7DQo+IAl9DQo+IA0KPiBWTUZVTkMgaW5zdHJ1Y3Rpb24gY29zdCB3 YXMgbWVhc3VyZWQgYXQgfjEyMiBjeWNsZXMuDQo+IChOb3RlOiByZWNlbnQgdmVyc2lvbnMgb2Yg Z251IHRvb2xjaGFpbiBzdXBwb3J0ICB0aGUgdm1mdW5jDQo+IGluc3RydWN0aW9uIC0gcmVtb3Zp bmcgdGhlIG5lZWQgZm9yIHdyaXRpbmcgIHRoZSBieXRlY29kZSBtYW51YWxseSkuDQo+IA0KPiBT aWduZWQtb2ZmLWJ5OiBNaWNoYWVsIFMuIFRzaXJraW4gPG1zdEByZWRoYXQuY29tPg0KPiAtLS0N Cj4gDQo+IEkgdGhpbmsgSSdkIGxpa2UgdG8gcHV0IHRoaXMgdXBzdHJlYW0gc28gZnV0dXJlIGVw dHAgc3dpdGNoaW5nIHdvcmsNCj4gY2FuIGJlIGltcGxlbWVudGVkIG9uIHRvcC4gQ29tbWVudHM/ DQoNCldlIGhhdmUgYSBkaWZmZXJlbnQgdmVyc2lvbiBpbiBoYW5kIHdoaWNoIGlzIHVzaW5nIHNl cGFyYXRlIEVQVFAuIEFzIHlvdSBrbm93biwgdGhlIHBhdGNoIHdpbGwgYmUgbW9yZSBjb21wbGV4 IGlmIHVzaW5nIHNlcGFyYXRlIEVQVFAuIEFuZCB0aGVyZSBhcmUgc3RpbGwgbG90cyBvZiB0aGlu ZyBuZWVkIHRvIGRvIGluIG91ciB2ZXJzaW9uLiBXZSB3aWxsIHNlbmQgb3V0IGZvciBjb21tZW50 cyBzb29uLg0KDQpCZXN0IHJlZ2FyZHMsDQpZYW5nDQoNCg0K -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe kvm" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
On 16/11/2015 19:18, =?UTF-8?q?Radim=20Kr=C4=8Dm=C3=A1=C5=99?= wrote: >> > No idea how would I even test it, so I'm not interested in #VE at this >> > point. If you are - go ahead and post a patch for that on top though, >> > why not. > I thought that it's going to be simpler to provide functionality (that > utilizes eptp switching) to the guest through #VE, which probably isn't > true as I think more about it. (Not interested in implementing it :]) #VE and EPTP switching are distinct features, one does not imply the other. Unfortunately, EPTP switching is designed for a very specific use case where the hypervisor is effectively part of the kernel, and the kernel is trusted to some extent. Examples include antivirus software and virtual machines. Antiviruses do use VMFUNC, that's as far as I know the only current use case of it (https://embedded.communities.intel.com/community/en/applications/blog/2013/06/13/roving-reporter-enhancing-retail-security-and-manageability-with-4th-generation-intel-core-processors). So I'm against this patch, but only because I'm not sure why KVM would ever use EPTP switching in its current incarnation. The guest kernel is absolutely not trusted by KVM. Paolo -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe kvm" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
On 17/11/2015 02:45, Zhang, Yang Z wrote:
> We have a different version in hand which is using separate EPTP.
Can you say in advance what you are using EPTP switching for? Offlist
if necessary.
Paolo
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe kvm" in
the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
T24gMTcvMTEvMjAxNSAxODoxOCwgIFBhb2xvIEJvbnppbmkgd3JvdGU6DQo+IE9uIDE3LzExLzIw MTUgMDI6NDUsIFpoYW5nLCBZYW5nIFogd3JvdGU6DQo+ID4gV2UgaGF2ZSBhIGRpZmZlcmVudCB2 ZXJzaW9uIGluIGhhbmQgd2hpY2ggaXMgdXNpbmcgc2VwYXJhdGUgRVBUUC4NCj4gDQo+IENhbiB5 b3Ugc2F5IGluIGFkdmFuY2Ugd2hhdCB5b3UgYXJlIHVzaW5nIEVQVFAgc3dpdGNoaW5nIGZvcj8g IE9mZmxpc3QgaWYNCj4gbmVjZXNzYXJ5Lg0KDQpIaSBQYW9sbywNCg0KV2UgYXJlIHVzaW5nIEVQ VFAgc3dpdGNoaW5nIGZvciBhIHByb3RlY3RlZCBpbnRlci1WTSBjb21tdW5pY2F0aW9uIGRlc2ln biwgYXMgc2hvd24gaW4gdGhlIHNsaWRlcyAoIzIzKSBoZXJlOiBodHRwOi8vZXZlbnRzLmxpbnV4 Zm91bmRhdGlvbi5vcmcvc2l0ZXMvZXZlbnRzL2ZpbGVzL3NsaWRlcy9KdW5fTmFrYWppbWFfTkZW X0tWTSUyMDIwMTVfZmluYWwucGRmDQoNCg0KQmVzdCwNCldlaQ0K -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe kvm" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
On 17/11/2015 11:44, Wang, Wei W wrote: > On 17/11/2015 18:18, Paolo Bonzini wrote: >> On 17/11/2015 02:45, Zhang, Yang Z wrote: >>> We have a different version in hand which is using separate >>> EPTP. >> >> Can you say in advance what you are using EPTP switching for? >> Offlist if necessary. > > Hi Paolo, > > We are using EPTP switching for a protected inter-VM communication > design, as shown in the slides (#23) here: > http://events.linuxfoundation.org/sites/events/files/slides/Jun_Nakajima_NFV_KVM%202015_final.pdf [offlist, adding virt-intel-list@redhat.com] If the EPTP switch is only adding extra data pages (e.g. mapping another guest's memory inside a PCI BAR), this can work. However, slides 24 and 25 suggest that the executable pages change between the two EPTP views, similar to Jun's KVM Forum 2014 presentation. Michael and I explained in Seattle that this only works if the guest is trusted. I am a bit disappointed that Intel continued developing this feature without contacting us or without urging us to present our issues more formally. I think I should make this very clear: I am not going to accept in KVM a feature that requires the guest to be trusted. A trusted guest kernel may make sense for other applications of VMFUNC (e.g. McAfee memory scan) but not for virtualization; if the guest is trusted, you don't have virtualization anymore. Michael and I are going to present our findings to Intel soon. This will hopefully clarify why the guest has to be trusted. We will also present possible extensions to VMFUNC that enable its usage with untrusted guests, albeit only at CPL=0. Asit Mallick is going to contact Jun about this so we can organize the meeting. Unfortunately it is going to be hard for everyone to attend since we have people in Europe, US and China, but we will share the slides. Thanks, Paolo -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe kvm" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h index 448b7ca..ceb68d9 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h @@ -69,10 +69,13 @@ #define SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUAL_INTR_DELIVERY 0x00000200 #define SECONDARY_EXEC_PAUSE_LOOP_EXITING 0x00000400 #define SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_INVPCID 0x00001000 +#define SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_VM_FUNCTIONS 0x00002000 #define SECONDARY_EXEC_SHADOW_VMCS 0x00004000 #define SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_PML 0x00020000 #define SECONDARY_EXEC_XSAVES 0x00100000 +/* Definitions for VM-function controls */ +#define VM_FUNCTION_EPTP_SWITCHING 0x00000001 #define PIN_BASED_EXT_INTR_MASK 0x00000001 #define PIN_BASED_NMI_EXITING 0x00000008 @@ -153,6 +156,8 @@ enum vmcs_field { APIC_ACCESS_ADDR_HIGH = 0x00002015, POSTED_INTR_DESC_ADDR = 0x00002016, POSTED_INTR_DESC_ADDR_HIGH = 0x00002017, + VM_FUNCTION_CTRL = 0x00002018, + VM_FUNCTION_CTRL_HIGH = 0x00002019, EPT_POINTER = 0x0000201a, EPT_POINTER_HIGH = 0x0000201b, EOI_EXIT_BITMAP0 = 0x0000201c, @@ -163,6 +168,8 @@ enum vmcs_field { EOI_EXIT_BITMAP2_HIGH = 0x00002021, EOI_EXIT_BITMAP3 = 0x00002022, EOI_EXIT_BITMAP3_HIGH = 0x00002023, + EPTP_LIST_ADDRESS = 0x00002024, + EPTP_LIST_ADDRESS_HIGH = 0x00002025, VMREAD_BITMAP = 0x00002026, VMWRITE_BITMAP = 0x00002028, XSS_EXIT_BITMAP = 0x0000202C, diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c index 6a8bc64..3d1f613 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c @@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ #include <asm/debugreg.h> #include <asm/kexec.h> #include <asm/apic.h> +#include <asm/page.h> #include "trace.h" #include "pmu.h" @@ -105,6 +106,9 @@ static u64 __read_mostly host_xss; static bool __read_mostly enable_pml = 1; module_param_named(pml, enable_pml, bool, S_IRUGO); +static bool __read_mostly enable_eptp_switching = 0; +module_param_named(eptp_switching_test, enable_eptp_switching, bool, S_IRUGO); + #define KVM_GUEST_CR0_MASK (X86_CR0_NW | X86_CR0_CD) #define KVM_VM_CR0_ALWAYS_ON_UNRESTRICTED_GUEST (X86_CR0_WP | X86_CR0_NE) #define KVM_VM_CR0_ALWAYS_ON \ @@ -547,6 +551,10 @@ struct vcpu_vmx { /* Support for PML */ #define PML_ENTITY_NUM 512 struct page *pml_pg; + + /* Support for EPTP switching */ +#define EPTP_LIST_NUM 512 + struct page *eptp_list_pg; }; enum segment_cache_field { @@ -1113,6 +1121,22 @@ static inline bool cpu_has_vmx_pml(void) return vmcs_config.cpu_based_2nd_exec_ctrl & SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_PML; } +static inline bool cpu_has_vmx_vm_functions(void) +{ + return vmcs_config.cpu_based_2nd_exec_ctrl & + SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_VM_FUNCTIONS; +} + +/* check if the cpu supports writing EPTP switching */ +static inline bool cpu_has_vmx_eptp_switching(void) +{ + u64 vmx_msr; + + rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_VMX_VMFUNC, vmx_msr); + /* This MSR has same format as VM-function controls */ + return vmx_msr & VM_FUNCTION_EPTP_SWITCHING; +} + static inline bool report_flexpriority(void) { return flexpriority_enabled; @@ -3011,6 +3035,7 @@ static __init int setup_vmcs_config(struct vmcs_config *vmcs_conf) SECONDARY_EXEC_PAUSE_LOOP_EXITING | SECONDARY_EXEC_RDTSCP | SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_INVPCID | + SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_VM_FUNCTIONS | SECONDARY_EXEC_APIC_REGISTER_VIRT | SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUAL_INTR_DELIVERY | SECONDARY_EXEC_SHADOW_VMCS | @@ -3600,6 +3625,13 @@ static void vmx_set_cr3(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr3) guest_cr3 = cr3; if (enable_ept) { eptp = construct_eptp(cr3); + if (to_vmx(vcpu)->eptp_list_pg) { + u64 *eptp_list = phys_to_virt(page_to_phys(to_vmx(vcpu)->eptp_list_pg)); + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < EPTP_LIST_NUM; ++i) + eptp_list[i] = eptp; + } vmcs_write64(EPT_POINTER, eptp); if (is_paging(vcpu) || is_guest_mode(vcpu)) guest_cr3 = kvm_read_cr3(vcpu); @@ -6089,6 +6121,13 @@ static __init int hardware_setup(void) if (!enable_ept || !enable_ept_ad_bits || !cpu_has_vmx_pml()) enable_pml = 0; + /* + * Only enable EPT switching when hardware supports EPT switching, and EPT + * and VM functions are enabled -- EPT switching depends on these to work. + */ + if (!enable_ept || !cpu_has_vmx_vm_functions() || !cpu_has_vmx_eptp_switching()) + enable_eptp_switching = 0; + if (!enable_pml) { kvm_x86_ops->slot_enable_log_dirty = NULL; kvm_x86_ops->slot_disable_log_dirty = NULL; @@ -7590,6 +7629,26 @@ static int vmx_enable_pml(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx) return 0; } +static int vmx_enable_ept_switching(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx) +{ + struct page *eptp_list_pg; + u64 vm_function_control; + + eptp_list_pg = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO); + if (!eptp_list_pg) + return -ENOMEM; + + vmx->eptp_list_pg = eptp_list_pg; + + vmcs_write64(EPTP_LIST_ADDRESS, page_to_phys(vmx->eptp_list_pg)); + + vm_function_control = vmcs_read64(VM_FUNCTION_CTRL); + vm_function_control |= VM_FUNCTION_EPTP_SWITCHING; + vmcs_write64(VM_FUNCTION_CTRL, vm_function_control); + + return 0; +} + static void vmx_disable_pml(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx) { u32 exec_control; @@ -7603,6 +7662,21 @@ static void vmx_disable_pml(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx) vmcs_write32(SECONDARY_VM_EXEC_CONTROL, exec_control); } +static void vmx_disable_ept_switching(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx) +{ + u64 vm_function_control; + + ASSERT(vmx->eptp_list_pg); + __free_page(vmx->eptp_list_pg); + vmx->eptp_list_pg = NULL; + + vmcs_write64(EPTP_LIST_ADDRESS, 0); + + vm_function_control = vmcs_read64(VM_FUNCTION_CTRL); + vm_function_control &= ~VM_FUNCTION_EPTP_SWITCHING; + vmcs_write64(VM_FUNCTION_CTRL, vm_function_control); +} + static void vmx_flush_pml_buffer(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu); @@ -8476,6 +8550,8 @@ static void vmx_free_vcpu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu); + if (enable_eptp_switching) + vmx_disable_ept_switching(vmx); if (enable_pml) vmx_disable_pml(vmx); free_vpid(vmx); @@ -8564,8 +8640,16 @@ static struct kvm_vcpu *vmx_create_vcpu(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned int id) goto free_vmcs; } + if (enable_eptp_switching) { + err = vmx_enable_ept_switching(vmx); + if (err) + goto disable_pml; + } + return &vmx->vcpu; +disable_pml: + vmx_disable_pml(vmx); free_vmcs: free_loaded_vmcs(vmx->loaded_vmcs); free_msrs:
This patch adds a new parameter: eptp_switching_test, which enables testing EPT switching on VMX if supported by hardware. All EPT entries are initialized to the same value so this adds no useful functionality by itself, but can be used to test VMFUNC performance, and serve as a basis for future features based on EPTP switching. Support for nested virt is not enabled. This was tested using the following code within guest: #define VMX_VMFUNC ".byte 0x0f,0x01,0xd4" static void vmfunc(unsigned int nr, unsigned int ept) { asm volatile(VMX_VMFUNC : : "a"(nr), "c"(ept) : "memory"); } VMFUNC instruction cost was measured at ~122 cycles. (Note: recent versions of gnu toolchain support the vmfunc instruction - removing the need for writing the bytecode manually). Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> --- I think I'd like to put this upstream so future eptp switching work can be implemented on top. Comments? arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h | 7 ++++ arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c | 84 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 91 insertions(+)