Message ID | 1465483638-9489-11-git-send-email-dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov (mailing list archive) |
---|---|
State | New, archived |
Headers | show |
>>> On 09.06.16 at 16:47, <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov> wrote: > --- a/xen/include/public/xsm/flask_op.h > +++ b/xen/include/public/xsm/flask_op.h > @@ -70,20 +70,6 @@ struct xen_flask_transition { > uint32_t newsid; > }; > > -struct xen_flask_userlist { > - /* IN: starting SID for list */ > - uint32_t start_sid; > - /* IN: size of user string and output buffer > - * OUT: number of SIDs returned */ > - uint32_t size; > - union { > - /* IN: user to enumerate SIDs */ > - XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(char) user; > - /* OUT: SID list */ > - XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(uint32) sids; > - } u; > -}; No known users or not, we don't normally allow breaking code that may be consuming any of our public headers. I.e. conventionally, for interfaces not restricted to the tool stack we keep everything, but guard it with a __XEN_INTERFACE_VERSION__ conditional. Whether making an exception here is okay I'm not certain; in any event would you imo need to bump XEN_FLASK_INTERFACE_VERSION. Jan
On 06/09/2016 12:07 PM, Jan Beulich wrote: >>>> On 09.06.16 at 16:47, <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov> wrote: >> --- a/xen/include/public/xsm/flask_op.h >> +++ b/xen/include/public/xsm/flask_op.h >> @@ -70,20 +70,6 @@ struct xen_flask_transition { >> uint32_t newsid; >> }; >> >> -struct xen_flask_userlist { >> - /* IN: starting SID for list */ >> - uint32_t start_sid; >> - /* IN: size of user string and output buffer >> - * OUT: number of SIDs returned */ >> - uint32_t size; >> - union { >> - /* IN: user to enumerate SIDs */ >> - XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(char) user; >> - /* OUT: SID list */ >> - XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(uint32) sids; >> - } u; >> -}; > > No known users or not, we don't normally allow breaking code that > may be consuming any of our public headers. I.e. conventionally, > for interfaces not restricted to the tool stack we keep everything, > but guard it with a __XEN_INTERFACE_VERSION__ conditional. > > Whether making an exception here is okay I'm not certain; in any > event would you imo need to bump XEN_FLASK_INTERFACE_VERSION. > > Jan OK, then I'll drop this patch.
>>> On 09.06.16 at 18:43, <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov> wrote: > On 06/09/2016 12:07 PM, Jan Beulich wrote: >>>>> On 09.06.16 at 16:47, <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov> wrote: >>> --- a/xen/include/public/xsm/flask_op.h >>> +++ b/xen/include/public/xsm/flask_op.h >>> @@ -70,20 +70,6 @@ struct xen_flask_transition { >>> uint32_t newsid; >>> }; >>> >>> -struct xen_flask_userlist { >>> - /* IN: starting SID for list */ >>> - uint32_t start_sid; >>> - /* IN: size of user string and output buffer >>> - * OUT: number of SIDs returned */ >>> - uint32_t size; >>> - union { >>> - /* IN: user to enumerate SIDs */ >>> - XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(char) user; >>> - /* OUT: SID list */ >>> - XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(uint32) sids; >>> - } u; >>> -}; >> >> No known users or not, we don't normally allow breaking code that >> may be consuming any of our public headers. I.e. conventionally, >> for interfaces not restricted to the tool stack we keep everything, >> but guard it with a __XEN_INTERFACE_VERSION__ conditional. >> >> Whether making an exception here is okay I'm not certain; in any >> event would you imo need to bump XEN_FLASK_INTERFACE_VERSION. > > OK, then I'll drop this patch. Well, no, please don't drop it, make it add aforementioned #if-s. (And after thinking about it again, bumping the interface version doesn't seem to make sense for a plain removal.) Jan
On 06/10/2016 02:51 AM, Jan Beulich wrote: >>>> On 09.06.16 at 18:43, <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov> wrote: >> On 06/09/2016 12:07 PM, Jan Beulich wrote: >>>>>> On 09.06.16 at 16:47, <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov> wrote: >>>> --- a/xen/include/public/xsm/flask_op.h >>>> +++ b/xen/include/public/xsm/flask_op.h >>>> @@ -70,20 +70,6 @@ struct xen_flask_transition { >>>> uint32_t newsid; >>>> }; >>>> >>>> -struct xen_flask_userlist { >>>> - /* IN: starting SID for list */ >>>> - uint32_t start_sid; >>>> - /* IN: size of user string and output buffer >>>> - * OUT: number of SIDs returned */ >>>> - uint32_t size; >>>> - union { >>>> - /* IN: user to enumerate SIDs */ >>>> - XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(char) user; >>>> - /* OUT: SID list */ >>>> - XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(uint32) sids; >>>> - } u; >>>> -}; >>> >>> No known users or not, we don't normally allow breaking code that >>> may be consuming any of our public headers. I.e. conventionally, >>> for interfaces not restricted to the tool stack we keep everything, >>> but guard it with a __XEN_INTERFACE_VERSION__ conditional. >>> >>> Whether making an exception here is okay I'm not certain; in any >>> event would you imo need to bump XEN_FLASK_INTERFACE_VERSION. >> >> OK, then I'll drop this patch. > > Well, no, please don't drop it, make it add aforementioned #if-s. > (And after thinking about it again, bumping the interface version > doesn't seem to make sense for a plain removal.) Ah, I misunderstood your comment - I read the conditional as belonging to the code instead of the header, which makes a lot more sense. Does the value of __XEN_LATEST_INTERFACE_VERSION__ need to be bumped to 0x00040800 after the branching process?
>>> On 10.06.16 at 15:08, <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov> wrote: > On 06/10/2016 02:51 AM, Jan Beulich wrote: >>>>> On 09.06.16 at 18:43, <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov> wrote: >>> On 06/09/2016 12:07 PM, Jan Beulich wrote: >>>>>>> On 09.06.16 at 16:47, <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov> wrote: >>>>> --- a/xen/include/public/xsm/flask_op.h >>>>> +++ b/xen/include/public/xsm/flask_op.h >>>>> @@ -70,20 +70,6 @@ struct xen_flask_transition { >>>>> uint32_t newsid; >>>>> }; >>>>> >>>>> -struct xen_flask_userlist { >>>>> - /* IN: starting SID for list */ >>>>> - uint32_t start_sid; >>>>> - /* IN: size of user string and output buffer >>>>> - * OUT: number of SIDs returned */ >>>>> - uint32_t size; >>>>> - union { >>>>> - /* IN: user to enumerate SIDs */ >>>>> - XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(char) user; >>>>> - /* OUT: SID list */ >>>>> - XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(uint32) sids; >>>>> - } u; >>>>> -}; >>>> >>>> No known users or not, we don't normally allow breaking code that >>>> may be consuming any of our public headers. I.e. conventionally, >>>> for interfaces not restricted to the tool stack we keep everything, >>>> but guard it with a __XEN_INTERFACE_VERSION__ conditional. >>>> >>>> Whether making an exception here is okay I'm not certain; in any >>>> event would you imo need to bump XEN_FLASK_INTERFACE_VERSION. >>> >>> OK, then I'll drop this patch. >> >> Well, no, please don't drop it, make it add aforementioned #if-s. >> (And after thinking about it again, bumping the interface version >> doesn't seem to make sense for a plain removal.) > > Ah, I misunderstood your comment - I read the conditional as belonging > to the code instead of the header, which makes a lot more sense. > > Does the value of __XEN_LATEST_INTERFACE_VERSION__ need to be bumped to > 0x00040800 after the branching process? Whenever that's first needed. One of the patches I have in the works does so, but if yours lands earlier it should do the update. Jan
diff --git a/tools/flask/policy/modules/dom0.te b/tools/flask/policy/modules/dom0.te index d228b24..2d982d9 100644 --- a/tools/flask/policy/modules/dom0.te +++ b/tools/flask/policy/modules/dom0.te @@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ allow dom0_t dom0_t:resource { add remove }; # that does not have its own security server to make access decisions based on # Xen's security policy. allow dom0_t security_t:security { - compute_av compute_create compute_member compute_relabel compute_user + compute_av compute_create compute_member compute_relabel }; # Allow string/SID conversions (for "xl list -Z" and similar) diff --git a/xen/include/public/xsm/flask_op.h b/xen/include/public/xsm/flask_op.h index c76359c..cf53f2c 100644 --- a/xen/include/public/xsm/flask_op.h +++ b/xen/include/public/xsm/flask_op.h @@ -70,20 +70,6 @@ struct xen_flask_transition { uint32_t newsid; }; -struct xen_flask_userlist { - /* IN: starting SID for list */ - uint32_t start_sid; - /* IN: size of user string and output buffer - * OUT: number of SIDs returned */ - uint32_t size; - union { - /* IN: user to enumerate SIDs */ - XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(char) user; - /* OUT: SID list */ - XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(uint32) sids; - } u; -}; - struct xen_flask_boolean { /* IN/OUT: numeric identifier for boolean [GET/SET] * If -1, name will be used and bool_id will be filled in. */ @@ -167,7 +153,7 @@ struct xen_flask_op { #define FLASK_ACCESS 6 #define FLASK_CREATE 7 #define FLASK_RELABEL 8 -#define FLASK_USER 9 +#define FLASK_USER 9 /* No longer implemented */ #define FLASK_POLICYVERS 10 #define FLASK_GETBOOL 11 #define FLASK_SETBOOL 12 @@ -193,7 +179,6 @@ struct xen_flask_op { struct xen_flask_access access; /* FLASK_CREATE, FLASK_RELABEL, FLASK_MEMBER */ struct xen_flask_transition transition; - struct xen_flask_userlist userlist; /* FLASK_GETBOOL, FLASK_SETBOOL */ struct xen_flask_boolean boolean; struct xen_flask_setavc_threshold setavc_threshold; diff --git a/xen/include/xlat.lst b/xen/include/xlat.lst index 23befb3..801a1c1 100644 --- a/xen/include/xlat.lst +++ b/xen/include/xlat.lst @@ -129,4 +129,3 @@ ? flask_setenforce xsm/flask_op.h ! flask_sid_context xsm/flask_op.h ? flask_transition xsm/flask_op.h -! flask_userlist xsm/flask_op.h diff --git a/xen/xsm/flask/flask_op.c b/xen/xsm/flask/flask_op.c index ea903a7..3ad4bdc 100644 --- a/xen/xsm/flask/flask_op.c +++ b/xen/xsm/flask/flask_op.c @@ -86,43 +86,6 @@ static int domain_has_security(struct domain *d, u32 perms) perms, NULL); } -#endif /* COMPAT */ - -static int flask_security_user(struct xen_flask_userlist *arg) -{ - char *user; - u32 *sids; - u32 nsids; - int rv; - - rv = domain_has_security(current->domain, SECURITY__COMPUTE_USER); - if ( rv ) - return rv; - - user = safe_copy_string_from_guest(arg->u.user, arg->size, PAGE_SIZE); - if ( IS_ERR(user) ) - return PTR_ERR(user); - - rv = security_get_user_sids(arg->start_sid, user, &sids, &nsids); - if ( rv < 0 ) - goto out; - - if ( nsids * sizeof(sids[0]) > arg->size ) - nsids = arg->size / sizeof(sids[0]); - - arg->size = nsids; - - if ( _copy_to_guest(arg->u.sids, sids, nsids) ) - rv = -EFAULT; - - xfree(sids); - out: - xfree(user); - return rv; -} - -#ifndef COMPAT - static int flask_security_relabel(struct xen_flask_transition *arg) { int rv; @@ -714,10 +677,6 @@ ret_t do_flask_op(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xsm_op_t) u_flask_op) rv = flask_security_relabel(&op.u.transition); break; - case FLASK_USER: - rv = flask_security_user(&op.u.userlist); - break; - case FLASK_POLICYVERS: rv = POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX; break; @@ -831,7 +790,6 @@ CHECK_flask_transition; #define flask_security_load compat_security_load #define xen_flask_userlist compat_flask_userlist -#define flask_security_user compat_security_user #define xen_flask_sid_context compat_flask_sid_context #define flask_security_context compat_security_context diff --git a/xen/xsm/flask/include/security.h b/xen/xsm/flask/include/security.h index 34bbe62..2b00177 100644 --- a/xen/xsm/flask/include/security.h +++ b/xen/xsm/flask/include/security.h @@ -78,8 +78,6 @@ int security_sid_to_context(u32 sid, char **scontext, u32 *scontext_len); int security_context_to_sid(char *scontext, u32 scontext_len, u32 *out_sid); -int security_get_user_sids(u32 callsid, char *username, u32 **sids, u32 *nel); - int security_irq_sid(int pirq, u32 *out_sid); int security_iomem_sid(unsigned long, u32 *out_sid); diff --git a/xen/xsm/flask/policy/access_vectors b/xen/xsm/flask/policy/access_vectors index 7e69ede..49c9a9e 100644 --- a/xen/xsm/flask/policy/access_vectors +++ b/xen/xsm/flask/policy/access_vectors @@ -484,8 +484,6 @@ class security load_policy # use the security server to compute an object relabel compute_relabel -# use the security server to list the SIDs reachable by a given user - compute_user # allow switching between enforcing and permissive mode setenforce # allow changing policy booleans diff --git a/xen/xsm/flask/ss/mls.c b/xen/xsm/flask/ss/mls.c index bbe7a49..f2fa560 100644 --- a/xen/xsm/flask/ss/mls.c +++ b/xen/xsm/flask/ss/mls.c @@ -396,55 +396,6 @@ static inline int mls_range_set(struct context *context, return rc; } -int mls_setup_user_range(struct context *fromcon, struct user_datum *user, - struct context *usercon) -{ - if ( flask_mls_enabled ) - { - struct mls_level *fromcon_sen = &(fromcon->range.level[0]); - struct mls_level *fromcon_clr = &(fromcon->range.level[1]); - struct mls_level *user_low = &(user->range.level[0]); - struct mls_level *user_clr = &(user->range.level[1]); - struct mls_level *user_def = &(user->dfltlevel); - struct mls_level *usercon_sen = &(usercon->range.level[0]); - struct mls_level *usercon_clr = &(usercon->range.level[1]); - - /* Honor the user's default level if we can */ - if ( mls_level_between(user_def, fromcon_sen, fromcon_clr) ) - { - *usercon_sen = *user_def; - } - else if ( mls_level_between(fromcon_sen, user_def, user_clr) ) - { - *usercon_sen = *fromcon_sen; - } - else if ( mls_level_between(fromcon_clr, user_low, user_def) ) - { - *usercon_sen = *user_low; - } - else - return -EINVAL; - - /* Lower the clearance of available contexts - if the clearance of "fromcon" is lower than - that of the user's default clearance (but - only if the "fromcon" clearance dominates - the user's computed sensitivity level) */ - if ( mls_level_dom(user_clr, fromcon_clr) ) - { - *usercon_clr = *fromcon_clr; - } - else if ( mls_level_dom(fromcon_clr, user_clr) ) - { - *usercon_clr = *user_clr; - } - else - return -EINVAL; - } - - return 0; -} - /* * Convert the MLS fields in the security context * structure `c' from the values specified in the diff --git a/xen/xsm/flask/ss/mls.h b/xen/xsm/flask/ss/mls.h index b3a015e..39572bd 100644 --- a/xen/xsm/flask/ss/mls.h +++ b/xen/xsm/flask/ss/mls.h @@ -32,8 +32,5 @@ int mls_convert_context(struct policydb *oldp, struct policydb *newp, int mls_compute_sid(struct context *scontext, struct context *tcontext, u16 tclass, u32 specified, struct context *newcontext); -int mls_setup_user_range(struct context *fromcon, struct user_datum *user, - struct context *usercon); - #endif /* _SS_MLS_H */ diff --git a/xen/xsm/flask/ss/services.c b/xen/xsm/flask/ss/services.c index 9da358b..c9b27a0 100644 --- a/xen/xsm/flask/ss/services.c +++ b/xen/xsm/flask/ss/services.c @@ -1721,117 +1721,6 @@ out: return rc; } -#define SIDS_NEL 25 - -/** - * security_get_user_sids - Obtain reachable SIDs for a user. - * @fromsid: starting SID - * @username: username - * @sids: array of reachable SIDs for user - * @nel: number of elements in @sids - * - * Generate the set of SIDs for legal security contexts - * for a given user that can be reached by @fromsid. - * Set *@sids to point to a dynamically allocated - * array containing the set of SIDs. Set *@nel to the - * number of elements in the array. - */ - -int security_get_user_sids(u32 fromsid, char *username, u32 **sids, u32 *nel) -{ - struct context *fromcon, usercon; - u32 *mysids, *mysids2, sid; - u32 mynel = 0, maxnel = SIDS_NEL; - struct user_datum *user; - struct role_datum *role; - struct av_decision avd; - struct ebitmap_node *rnode, *tnode; - int rc = 0, i, j; - - if ( !ss_initialized ) - { - *sids = NULL; - *nel = 0; - goto out; - } - - POLICY_RDLOCK; - - fromcon = sidtab_search(&sidtab, fromsid); - if ( !fromcon ) - { - rc = -EINVAL; - goto out_unlock; - } - - user = hashtab_search(policydb.p_users.table, username); - if ( !user ) - { - rc = -EINVAL; - goto out_unlock; - } - usercon.user = user->value; - - mysids = xzalloc_array(u32, maxnel); - if ( !mysids ) - { - rc = -ENOMEM; - goto out_unlock; - } - - ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(&user->roles, rnode, i) - { - role = policydb.role_val_to_struct[i]; - usercon.role = i+1; - ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(&role->types, tnode, j) { - usercon.type = j+1; - - if ( mls_setup_user_range(fromcon, user, &usercon) ) - continue; - - rc = context_struct_compute_av(fromcon, &usercon, - SECCLASS_DOMAIN, - DOMAIN__TRANSITION, - &avd); - if ( rc || !(avd.allowed & DOMAIN__TRANSITION) ) - continue; - rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab, &usercon, &sid); - if ( rc ) - { - xfree(mysids); - goto out_unlock; - } - if ( mynel < maxnel ) - { - mysids[mynel++] = sid; - } - else - { - maxnel += SIDS_NEL; - mysids2 = xzalloc_array(u32, maxnel); - if ( !mysids2 ) - { - rc = -ENOMEM; - xfree(mysids); - goto out_unlock; - } - memcpy(mysids2, mysids, mynel * sizeof(*mysids2)); - xfree(mysids); - mysids = mysids2; - mysids[mynel++] = sid; - } - } - } - - *sids = mysids; - *nel = mynel; - -out_unlock: - POLICY_RDUNLOCK; -out: - return rc; -} - int security_devicetree_sid(const char *path, u32 *out_sid) { struct ocontext *c;
This operation has no known users, and is primarily useful when an MLS policy is in use (which has never been shipped with Xen). The information it provides is only useful for policy analysis and does not actually depend on hypervisor state, so an application that needs it should compute the results without needing to involve the hypervisor. Signed-off-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov> --- tools/flask/policy/modules/dom0.te | 2 +- xen/include/public/xsm/flask_op.h | 17 +----- xen/include/xlat.lst | 1 - xen/xsm/flask/flask_op.c | 42 -------------- xen/xsm/flask/include/security.h | 2 - xen/xsm/flask/policy/access_vectors | 2 - xen/xsm/flask/ss/mls.c | 49 ---------------- xen/xsm/flask/ss/mls.h | 3 - xen/xsm/flask/ss/services.c | 111 ------------------------------------ 9 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 227 deletions(-)