| Message ID | 56dc3195-dccb-cd2d-0de0-320f9c4b3672@schaufler-ca.com (mailing list archive) |
|---|---|
| State | New, archived |
| Headers | show |
On Fri, Jun 24, 2016 at 7:29 PM, Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> wrote: > Subject: [PATCH v4 3/3] LSM: Add context interface for proc attrs > > The /proc/.../attr/current interface is used by all three > Linux security modules (SELinux, Smack and AppArmor) to > report and modify the process security attribute. This is > all fine when there is exactly one of these modules active > and the userspace code knows which it module it is. > It would require a major change to the "current" interface > to provide information about more than one set of process > security attributes. Instead, a "context" attribute is > added, which identifies the security module that the > information applies to. The format is: > > lsmname='context-value' > > When multiple concurrent modules are supported the > /proc/.../attr/context interface will include the data > for all of the active modules. > > lsmname1='context-value1',lsmname2='context-value2' > > The module specific subdirectories under attr contain context > entries that report the information for that specific module > in the same format. > > Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> > > --- > Documentation/security/LSM.txt | 8 +++ > fs/proc/base.c | 4 ++ > security/apparmor/lsm.c | 35 +++++++++++-- > security/security.c | 108 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ > security/selinux/hooks.c | 20 +++++++- > security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 20 ++++---- > 6 files changed, 180 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-) Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> > diff --git a/Documentation/security/LSM.txt b/Documentation/security/LSM.txt > index 125c489..af3eb11 100644 > --- a/Documentation/security/LSM.txt > +++ b/Documentation/security/LSM.txt > @@ -36,6 +36,14 @@ for SELinux would be in /proc/.../attr/selinux. Using the files > found directly in /proc/.../attr (e.g. current) should be avoided. > These files remain as legacy interfaces. > > +The files named "context" in the attr directories contain the > +same information as the "current" files, but formatted to > +identify the module it comes from. > + > +if selinux is the active security module: > + /proc/self/attr/context could contain selinux='unconfined_t' > + /proc/self/attr/selinux/context could contain selinux='unconfined_t' > + > Based on https://lkml.org/lkml/2007/10/26/215, > a new LSM is accepted into the kernel when its intent (a description of > what it tries to protect against and in what cases one would expect to > diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c > index 182bc28..df94f26 100644 > --- a/fs/proc/base.c > +++ b/fs/proc/base.c > @@ -2532,6 +2532,7 @@ static const struct pid_entry selinux_attr_dir_stuff[] = { > ATTR("selinux", "fscreate", S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO), > ATTR("selinux", "keycreate", S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO), > ATTR("selinux", "sockcreate", S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO), > + ATTR("selinux", "context", S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO), > }; > LSM_DIR_OPS(selinux); > #endif > @@ -2539,6 +2540,7 @@ LSM_DIR_OPS(selinux); > #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK > static const struct pid_entry smack_attr_dir_stuff[] = { > ATTR("smack", "current", S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO), > + ATTR("smack", "context", S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO), > }; > LSM_DIR_OPS(smack); > #endif > @@ -2548,6 +2550,7 @@ static const struct pid_entry apparmor_attr_dir_stuff[] = { > ATTR("apparmor", "current", S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO), > ATTR("apparmor", "prev", S_IRUGO), > ATTR("apparmor", "exec", S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO), > + ATTR("apparmor", "context", S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO), > }; > LSM_DIR_OPS(apparmor); > #endif > @@ -2559,6 +2562,7 @@ static const struct pid_entry attr_dir_stuff[] = { > ATTR(NULL, "fscreate", S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO), > ATTR(NULL, "keycreate", S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO), > ATTR(NULL, "sockcreate", S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO), > + ATTR(NULL, "context", S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO), > #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX > DIR("selinux", S_IRUGO|S_IXUGO, > proc_selinux_attr_dir_inode_ops, proc_selinux_attr_dir_ops), > diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c > index fb0fb03..5cac15f 100644 > --- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c > +++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c > @@ -476,9 +476,13 @@ static int apparmor_getprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name, > const struct cred *cred = get_task_cred(task); > struct aa_task_cxt *cxt = cred_cxt(cred); > struct aa_profile *profile = NULL; > + char *vp; > + char *np; > > if (strcmp(name, "current") == 0) > profile = aa_get_newest_profile(cxt->profile); > + else if (strcmp(name, "context") == 0) > + profile = aa_get_newest_profile(cxt->profile); > else if (strcmp(name, "prev") == 0 && cxt->previous) > profile = aa_get_newest_profile(cxt->previous); > else if (strcmp(name, "exec") == 0 && cxt->onexec) > @@ -486,9 +490,29 @@ static int apparmor_getprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name, > else > error = -EINVAL; > > - if (profile) > - error = aa_getprocattr(profile, value); > + if (profile == NULL) > + goto put_out; > + > + error = aa_getprocattr(profile, &vp); > + if (error < 0) > + goto put_out; > + > + if (strcmp(name, "context") == 0) { > + *value = kasprintf(GFP_KERNEL, "apparmor='%s'", vp); > + if (*value == NULL) { > + error = -ENOMEM; > + goto put_out; > + } > + np = strchr(*value, '\n'); > + if (np != NULL) { > + np[0] = '\''; > + np[1] = '\0'; > + } > + error = strlen(*value); > + } else > + *value = vp; > > +put_out: > aa_put_profile(profile); > put_cred(cred); > > @@ -530,7 +554,7 @@ static int apparmor_setprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name, > return -EINVAL; > > arg_size = size - (args - (char *) value); > - if (strcmp(name, "current") == 0) { > + if (strcmp(name, "current") == 0 || strcmp(name, "context") == 0) { > if (strcmp(command, "changehat") == 0) { > error = aa_setprocattr_changehat(args, arg_size, > !AA_DO_TEST); > @@ -552,7 +576,10 @@ static int apparmor_setprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name, > else > goto fail; > } else > - /* only support the "current" and "exec" process attributes */ > + /* > + * only support the "current", context and "exec" > + * process attributes > + */ > return -EINVAL; > > if (!error) > diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c > index 1e9cb55..f97f0d9 100644 > --- a/security/security.c > +++ b/security/security.c > @@ -1186,8 +1186,47 @@ int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, const char *lsm, char *name, > char **value) > { > struct security_hook_list *hp; > + char *vp; > + char *cp = NULL; > int rc = -EINVAL; > + int trc; > > + /* > + * "context" requires work here in addition to what > + * the modules provide. > + */ > + if (strcmp(name, "context") == 0) { > + *value = NULL; > + list_for_each_entry(hp, > + &security_hook_heads.getprocattr, list) { > + if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsm)) > + continue; > + trc = hp->hook.getprocattr(p, "context", &vp); > + if (trc == -ENOENT) > + continue; > + if (trc <= 0) { > + kfree(*value); > + return trc; > + } > + rc = trc; > + if (*value == NULL) { > + *value = vp; > + } else { > + cp = kasprintf(GFP_KERNEL, "%s,%s", *value, vp); > + if (cp == NULL) { > + kfree(*value); > + kfree(vp); > + return -ENOMEM; > + } > + kfree(*value); > + kfree(vp); > + *value = cp; > + } > + } > + if (rc > 0) > + return strlen(*value); > + return rc; > + } > > list_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.getprocattr, list) { > if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsm)) > @@ -1204,7 +1243,76 @@ int security_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, const char *lsm, char *name, > { > struct security_hook_list *hp; > int rc = -EINVAL; > + char *local; > + char *cp; > + int slen; > + int failed = 0; > + > + /* > + * If lsm is NULL look at all the modules to find one > + * that processes name. If lsm is not NULL only look at > + * that module. > + * > + * "context" is handled directly here. > + */ > + if (strcmp(name, "context") == 0) { > + /* > + * First verify that the input is acceptable. > + * lsm1='v1'lsm2='v2'lsm3='v3' > + * > + * A note on the use of strncmp() below. > + * The check is for the substring at the beginning of cp. > + * The kzalloc of size + 1 ensures a terminated string. > + */ > + local = kzalloc(size + 1, GFP_KERNEL); > + memcpy(local, value, size); > + cp = local; > + list_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.setprocattr, > + list) { > + if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsm)) > + continue; > + if (cp[0] == ',') { > + if (cp == local) > + goto free_out; > + cp++; > + } > + slen = strlen(hp->lsm); > + if (strncmp(cp, hp->lsm, slen)) > + goto free_out; > + cp += slen; > + if (cp[0] != '=' || cp[1] != '\'' || cp[2] == '\'') > + goto free_out; > + for (cp += 2; cp[0] != '\''; cp++) > + if (cp[0] == '\0') > + goto free_out; > + cp++; > + } > > + cp = local; > + list_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.setprocattr, > + list) { > + if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsm)) > + continue; > + if (cp[0] == ',') > + cp++; > + cp += strlen(hp->lsm) + 2; > + for (slen = 0; cp[slen] != '\''; slen++) > + ; > + cp[slen] = '\0'; > + > + rc = hp->hook.setprocattr(p, "context", cp, slen); > + if (rc < 0) > + failed = rc; > + cp += slen + 1; > + } > + if (failed != 0) > + rc = failed; > + else > + rc = size; > +free_out: > + kfree(local); > + return rc; > + } > list_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.setprocattr, list) { > if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsm)) > continue; > diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c > index ed3a757..6397721 100644 > --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c > +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c > @@ -5711,6 +5711,8 @@ static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, > > if (!strcmp(name, "current")) > sid = __tsec->sid; > + else if (!strcmp(name, "context")) > + sid = __tsec->sid; > else if (!strcmp(name, "prev")) > sid = __tsec->osid; > else if (!strcmp(name, "exec")) > @@ -5728,7 +5730,19 @@ static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, > if (!sid) > return 0; > > - error = security_sid_to_context(sid, value, &len); > + if (strcmp(name, "context")) { > + error = security_sid_to_context(sid, value, &len); > + } else { > + char *vp; > + > + error = security_sid_to_context(sid, &vp, &len); > + if (!error) { > + *value = kasprintf(GFP_KERNEL, "selinux='%s'", vp); > + if (*value == NULL) > + error = -ENOMEM; > + } > + } > + > if (error) > return error; > return len; > @@ -5768,6 +5782,8 @@ static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, > error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE); > else if (!strcmp(name, "current")) > error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETCURRENT); > + else if (!strcmp(name, "context")) > + error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETCURRENT); > else > error = -EINVAL; > if (error) > @@ -5827,7 +5843,7 @@ static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, > tsec->keycreate_sid = sid; > } else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate")) { > tsec->sockcreate_sid = sid; > - } else if (!strcmp(name, "current")) { > + } else if (!strcmp(name, "current") || !strcmp(name, "context")) { > error = -EINVAL; > if (sid == 0) > goto abort_change; > diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c > index 3577009..92e66f8 100644 > --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c > +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c > @@ -3574,18 +3574,20 @@ static int smack_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, char **value) > { > struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task_struct(p); > char *cp; > - int slen; > > - if (strcmp(name, "current") != 0) > + if (strcmp(name, "current") == 0) { > + cp = kstrdup(skp->smk_known, GFP_KERNEL); > + if (cp == NULL) > + return -ENOMEM; > + } else if (strcmp(name, "context") == 0) { > + cp = kasprintf(GFP_KERNEL, "smack='%s'", skp->smk_known); > + if (cp == NULL) > + return -ENOMEM; > + } else > return -EINVAL; > > - cp = kstrdup(skp->smk_known, GFP_KERNEL); > - if (cp == NULL) > - return -ENOMEM; > - > - slen = strlen(cp); > *value = cp; > - return slen; > + return strlen(cp); > } > > /** > @@ -3622,7 +3624,7 @@ static int smack_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, > if (value == NULL || size == 0 || size >= SMK_LONGLABEL) > return -EINVAL; > > - if (strcmp(name, "current") != 0) > + if (strcmp(name, "current") != 0 && strcmp(name, "context") != 0) > return -EINVAL; > > skp = smk_import_entry(value, size); >
On 06/29/2016 10:04 AM, Paul Moore wrote: > On Fri, Jun 24, 2016 at 7:29 PM, Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> wrote: >> Subject: [PATCH v4 3/3] LSM: Add context interface for proc attrs >> >> The /proc/.../attr/current interface is used by all three >> Linux security modules (SELinux, Smack and AppArmor) to >> report and modify the process security attribute. This is >> all fine when there is exactly one of these modules active >> and the userspace code knows which it module it is. >> It would require a major change to the "current" interface >> to provide information about more than one set of process >> security attributes. Instead, a "context" attribute is >> added, which identifies the security module that the >> information applies to. The format is: >> >> lsmname='context-value' >> >> When multiple concurrent modules are supported the >> /proc/.../attr/context interface will include the data >> for all of the active modules. >> >> lsmname1='context-value1',lsmname2='context-value2' >> >> The module specific subdirectories under attr contain context >> entries that report the information for that specific module >> in the same format. >> >> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> >> >> --- >> Documentation/security/LSM.txt | 8 +++ >> fs/proc/base.c | 4 ++ >> security/apparmor/lsm.c | 35 +++++++++++-- >> security/security.c | 108 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ >> security/selinux/hooks.c | 20 +++++++- >> security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 20 ++++---- >> 6 files changed, 180 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-) > > Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> > >> diff --git a/Documentation/security/LSM.txt b/Documentation/security/LSM.txt >> index 125c489..af3eb11 100644 >> --- a/Documentation/security/LSM.txt >> +++ b/Documentation/security/LSM.txt >> @@ -36,6 +36,14 @@ for SELinux would be in /proc/.../attr/selinux. Using the files >> found directly in /proc/.../attr (e.g. current) should be avoided. >> These files remain as legacy interfaces. >> >> +The files named "context" in the attr directories contain the >> +same information as the "current" files, but formatted to >> +identify the module it comes from. >> + >> +if selinux is the active security module: >> + /proc/self/attr/context could contain selinux='unconfined_t' >> + /proc/self/attr/selinux/context could contain selinux='unconfined_t' >> + >> Based on https://lkml.org/lkml/2007/10/26/215, >> a new LSM is accepted into the kernel when its intent (a description of >> what it tries to protect against and in what cases one would expect to >> diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c >> index 182bc28..df94f26 100644 >> --- a/fs/proc/base.c >> +++ b/fs/proc/base.c >> @@ -2532,6 +2532,7 @@ static const struct pid_entry selinux_attr_dir_stuff[] = { >> ATTR("selinux", "fscreate", S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO), >> ATTR("selinux", "keycreate", S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO), >> ATTR("selinux", "sockcreate", S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO), >> + ATTR("selinux", "context", S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO), >> }; >> LSM_DIR_OPS(selinux); >> #endif >> @@ -2539,6 +2540,7 @@ LSM_DIR_OPS(selinux); >> #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK >> static const struct pid_entry smack_attr_dir_stuff[] = { >> ATTR("smack", "current", S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO), >> + ATTR("smack", "context", S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO), >> }; >> LSM_DIR_OPS(smack); >> #endif >> @@ -2548,6 +2550,7 @@ static const struct pid_entry apparmor_attr_dir_stuff[] = { >> ATTR("apparmor", "current", S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO), >> ATTR("apparmor", "prev", S_IRUGO), >> ATTR("apparmor", "exec", S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO), >> + ATTR("apparmor", "context", S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO), >> }; >> LSM_DIR_OPS(apparmor); >> #endif >> @@ -2559,6 +2562,7 @@ static const struct pid_entry attr_dir_stuff[] = { >> ATTR(NULL, "fscreate", S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO), >> ATTR(NULL, "keycreate", S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO), >> ATTR(NULL, "sockcreate", S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO), >> + ATTR(NULL, "context", S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO), >> #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX >> DIR("selinux", S_IRUGO|S_IXUGO, >> proc_selinux_attr_dir_inode_ops, proc_selinux_attr_dir_ops), >> diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c >> index fb0fb03..5cac15f 100644 >> --- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c >> +++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c >> @@ -476,9 +476,13 @@ static int apparmor_getprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name, >> const struct cred *cred = get_task_cred(task); >> struct aa_task_cxt *cxt = cred_cxt(cred); >> struct aa_profile *profile = NULL; >> + char *vp; >> + char *np; >> >> if (strcmp(name, "current") == 0) >> profile = aa_get_newest_profile(cxt->profile); >> + else if (strcmp(name, "context") == 0) >> + profile = aa_get_newest_profile(cxt->profile); >> else if (strcmp(name, "prev") == 0 && cxt->previous) >> profile = aa_get_newest_profile(cxt->previous); >> else if (strcmp(name, "exec") == 0 && cxt->onexec) >> @@ -486,9 +490,29 @@ static int apparmor_getprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name, >> else >> error = -EINVAL; >> >> - if (profile) >> - error = aa_getprocattr(profile, value); >> + if (profile == NULL) >> + goto put_out; >> + >> + error = aa_getprocattr(profile, &vp); >> + if (error < 0) >> + goto put_out; >> + >> + if (strcmp(name, "context") == 0) { >> + *value = kasprintf(GFP_KERNEL, "apparmor='%s'", vp); >> + if (*value == NULL) { >> + error = -ENOMEM; >> + goto put_out; >> + } >> + np = strchr(*value, '\n'); >> + if (np != NULL) { >> + np[0] = '\''; >> + np[1] = '\0'; >> + } >> + error = strlen(*value); >> + } else >> + *value = vp; >> >> +put_out: >> aa_put_profile(profile); >> put_cred(cred); >> >> @@ -530,7 +554,7 @@ static int apparmor_setprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name, >> return -EINVAL; >> >> arg_size = size - (args - (char *) value); >> - if (strcmp(name, "current") == 0) { >> + if (strcmp(name, "current") == 0 || strcmp(name, "context") == 0) { >> if (strcmp(command, "changehat") == 0) { >> error = aa_setprocattr_changehat(args, arg_size, >> !AA_DO_TEST); >> @@ -552,7 +576,10 @@ static int apparmor_setprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name, >> else >> goto fail; >> } else >> - /* only support the "current" and "exec" process attributes */ >> + /* >> + * only support the "current", context and "exec" >> + * process attributes >> + */ >> return -EINVAL; >> >> if (!error) >> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c >> index 1e9cb55..f97f0d9 100644 >> --- a/security/security.c >> +++ b/security/security.c >> @@ -1186,8 +1186,47 @@ int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, const char *lsm, char *name, >> char **value) >> { >> struct security_hook_list *hp; >> + char *vp; >> + char *cp = NULL; >> int rc = -EINVAL; >> + int trc; >> >> + /* >> + * "context" requires work here in addition to what >> + * the modules provide. >> + */ >> + if (strcmp(name, "context") == 0) { >> + *value = NULL; >> + list_for_each_entry(hp, >> + &security_hook_heads.getprocattr, list) { >> + if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsm)) >> + continue; >> + trc = hp->hook.getprocattr(p, "context", &vp); >> + if (trc == -ENOENT) >> + continue; >> + if (trc <= 0) { >> + kfree(*value); >> + return trc; >> + } >> + rc = trc; >> + if (*value == NULL) { >> + *value = vp; >> + } else { >> + cp = kasprintf(GFP_KERNEL, "%s,%s", *value, vp); >> + if (cp == NULL) { >> + kfree(*value); >> + kfree(vp); >> + return -ENOMEM; >> + } >> + kfree(*value); >> + kfree(vp); >> + *value = cp; >> + } >> + } >> + if (rc > 0) >> + return strlen(*value); >> + return rc; >> + } >> >> list_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.getprocattr, list) { >> if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsm)) >> @@ -1204,7 +1243,76 @@ int security_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, const char *lsm, char *name, >> { >> struct security_hook_list *hp; >> int rc = -EINVAL; >> + char *local; >> + char *cp; >> + int slen; >> + int failed = 0; >> + >> + /* >> + * If lsm is NULL look at all the modules to find one >> + * that processes name. If lsm is not NULL only look at >> + * that module. >> + * >> + * "context" is handled directly here. >> + */ >> + if (strcmp(name, "context") == 0) { >> + /* >> + * First verify that the input is acceptable. >> + * lsm1='v1'lsm2='v2'lsm3='v3' >> + * >> + * A note on the use of strncmp() below. >> + * The check is for the substring at the beginning of cp. >> + * The kzalloc of size + 1 ensures a terminated string. >> + */ >> + local = kzalloc(size + 1, GFP_KERNEL); >> + memcpy(local, value, size); >> + cp = local; >> + list_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.setprocattr, >> + list) { >> + if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsm)) >> + continue; >> + if (cp[0] == ',') { >> + if (cp == local) >> + goto free_out; >> + cp++; >> + } >> + slen = strlen(hp->lsm); >> + if (strncmp(cp, hp->lsm, slen)) >> + goto free_out; >> + cp += slen; >> + if (cp[0] != '=' || cp[1] != '\'' || cp[2] == '\'') >> + goto free_out; >> + for (cp += 2; cp[0] != '\''; cp++) >> + if (cp[0] == '\0') >> + goto free_out; >> + cp++; >> + } >> >> + cp = local; >> + list_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.setprocattr, >> + list) { >> + if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsm)) >> + continue; >> + if (cp[0] == ',') >> + cp++; >> + cp += strlen(hp->lsm) + 2; >> + for (slen = 0; cp[slen] != '\''; slen++) >> + ; >> + cp[slen] = '\0'; >> + >> + rc = hp->hook.setprocattr(p, "context", cp, slen); >> + if (rc < 0) >> + failed = rc; >> + cp += slen + 1; >> + } >> + if (failed != 0) >> + rc = failed; >> + else >> + rc = size; >> +free_out: >> + kfree(local); >> + return rc; >> + } >> list_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.setprocattr, list) { >> if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsm)) >> continue; >> diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c >> index ed3a757..6397721 100644 >> --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c >> +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c >> @@ -5711,6 +5711,8 @@ static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, >> >> if (!strcmp(name, "current")) >> sid = __tsec->sid; >> + else if (!strcmp(name, "context")) >> + sid = __tsec->sid; >> else if (!strcmp(name, "prev")) >> sid = __tsec->osid; >> else if (!strcmp(name, "exec")) >> @@ -5728,7 +5730,19 @@ static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, >> if (!sid) >> return 0; >> >> - error = security_sid_to_context(sid, value, &len); >> + if (strcmp(name, "context")) { >> + error = security_sid_to_context(sid, value, &len); >> + } else { >> + char *vp; >> + >> + error = security_sid_to_context(sid, &vp, &len); >> + if (!error) { >> + *value = kasprintf(GFP_KERNEL, "selinux='%s'", vp); >> + if (*value == NULL) >> + error = -ENOMEM; >> + } >> + } >> + >> if (error) >> return error; >> return len; >> @@ -5768,6 +5782,8 @@ static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, >> error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE); >> else if (!strcmp(name, "current")) >> error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETCURRENT); >> + else if (!strcmp(name, "context")) >> + error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETCURRENT); >> else >> error = -EINVAL; >> if (error) >> @@ -5827,7 +5843,7 @@ static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, >> tsec->keycreate_sid = sid; >> } else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate")) { >> tsec->sockcreate_sid = sid; >> - } else if (!strcmp(name, "current")) { >> + } else if (!strcmp(name, "current") || !strcmp(name, "context")) { >> error = -EINVAL; >> if (sid == 0) >> goto abort_change; >> diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c >> index 3577009..92e66f8 100644 >> --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c >> +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c >> @@ -3574,18 +3574,20 @@ static int smack_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, char **value) >> { >> struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task_struct(p); >> char *cp; >> - int slen; >> >> - if (strcmp(name, "current") != 0) >> + if (strcmp(name, "current") == 0) { >> + cp = kstrdup(skp->smk_known, GFP_KERNEL); >> + if (cp == NULL) >> + return -ENOMEM; >> + } else if (strcmp(name, "context") == 0) { >> + cp = kasprintf(GFP_KERNEL, "smack='%s'", skp->smk_known); >> + if (cp == NULL) >> + return -ENOMEM; >> + } else >> return -EINVAL; >> >> - cp = kstrdup(skp->smk_known, GFP_KERNEL); >> - if (cp == NULL) >> - return -ENOMEM; >> - >> - slen = strlen(cp); >> *value = cp; >> - return slen; >> + return strlen(cp); >> } >> >> /** >> @@ -3622,7 +3624,7 @@ static int smack_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, >> if (value == NULL || size == 0 || size >= SMK_LONGLABEL) >> return -EINVAL; >> >> - if (strcmp(name, "current") != 0) >> + if (strcmp(name, "current") != 0 && strcmp(name, "context") != 0) >> return -EINVAL; >> >> skp = smk_import_entry(value, size); >> > > > -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Subject: [PATCH v5 0/3] LSM: security module information improvements I have added Acks. James, would you like me to add this to the Smack tree? Changes from v4: Use kasprintf instead of kzalloc() ... sprintf in more places. More in the documentation. Separate module information in contexts with ",". (not yet visible) Changes from v3: Use kasprintf instead of kzalloc() ... sprintf. Create interfaces that make it possible to deal with process attributes in the face of multiple "major" security modules. Patch 1/3 adds /sys/kernel/security/lsm, which provides a list of the active security modules on the system. $ cat /sys/kernel/security/lsm capability,yama,loadpin,smack Patch 2/3 adds a subdirectory in /proc/.../attr for each security module that exports process attribute data. This allows a program in easily differentiate between the "current" value for Smack and AppArmor. $ cat /proc/self/attr/smack/current System $ cat /proc/self/attr/apparmor/current unconfined Patch 3/3 adds an interface that provides module identified information that otherwise matches the "current" attr. This allows a system with multiple modules to provide the complete security "context" in one place. A (future) system with both Smack and AppArmor might report: $ cat /proc/self/attr/context smack='System',apparmor='unconfined' Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> --- Documentation/security/LSM.txt | 34 ++++++-- fs/proc/base.c | 95 +++++++++++++++++++--- fs/proc/internal.h | 1 + include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 12 +-- include/linux/security.h | 15 ++-- security/apparmor/lsm.c | 38 +++++++-- security/commoncap.c | 3 +- security/inode.c | 26 +++++- security/loadpin/loadpin.c | 2 +- security/security.c | 177 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- security/selinux/hooks.c | 22 ++++- security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 22 ++--- security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c | 2 +- security/yama/yama_lsm.c | 2 +- 14 files changed, 395 insertions(+), 56 deletions(-) -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
On Tue, 5 Jul 2016, Casey Schaufler wrote: > Subject: [PATCH v5 0/3] LSM: security module information improvements > > I have added Acks. James, would you like me to add this to the > Smack tree? > I'd like this code to spend longer in -next, so I'll accept it after the 4.8 merge window closes.
On 7/8/2016 3:05 AM, James Morris wrote: > On Tue, 5 Jul 2016, Casey Schaufler wrote: > >> Subject: [PATCH v5 0/3] LSM: security module information improvements >> >> I have added Acks. James, would you like me to add this to the >> Smack tree? >> > I'd like this code to spend longer in -next, so I'll accept it after the > 4.8 merge window closes. Good idea. I will plan accordingly. Thank you. -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
diff --git a/Documentation/security/LSM.txt b/Documentation/security/LSM.txt index 125c489..af3eb11 100644 --- a/Documentation/security/LSM.txt +++ b/Documentation/security/LSM.txt @@ -36,6 +36,14 @@ for SELinux would be in /proc/.../attr/selinux. Using the files found directly in /proc/.../attr (e.g. current) should be avoided. These files remain as legacy interfaces. +The files named "context" in the attr directories contain the +same information as the "current" files, but formatted to +identify the module it comes from. + +if selinux is the active security module: + /proc/self/attr/context could contain selinux='unconfined_t' + /proc/self/attr/selinux/context could contain selinux='unconfined_t' + Based on https://lkml.org/lkml/2007/10/26/215, a new LSM is accepted into the kernel when its intent (a description of what it tries to protect against and in what cases one would expect to diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c index 182bc28..df94f26 100644 --- a/fs/proc/base.c +++ b/fs/proc/base.c @@ -2532,6 +2532,7 @@ static const struct pid_entry selinux_attr_dir_stuff[] = { ATTR("selinux", "fscreate", S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO), ATTR("selinux", "keycreate", S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO), ATTR("selinux", "sockcreate", S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO), + ATTR("selinux", "context", S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO), }; LSM_DIR_OPS(selinux); #endif @@ -2539,6 +2540,7 @@ LSM_DIR_OPS(selinux); #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK static const struct pid_entry smack_attr_dir_stuff[] = { ATTR("smack", "current", S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO), + ATTR("smack", "context", S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO), }; LSM_DIR_OPS(smack); #endif @@ -2548,6 +2550,7 @@ static const struct pid_entry apparmor_attr_dir_stuff[] = { ATTR("apparmor", "current", S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO), ATTR("apparmor", "prev", S_IRUGO), ATTR("apparmor", "exec", S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO), + ATTR("apparmor", "context", S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO), }; LSM_DIR_OPS(apparmor); #endif @@ -2559,6 +2562,7 @@ static const struct pid_entry attr_dir_stuff[] = { ATTR(NULL, "fscreate", S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO), ATTR(NULL, "keycreate", S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO), ATTR(NULL, "sockcreate", S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO), + ATTR(NULL, "context", S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO), #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX DIR("selinux", S_IRUGO|S_IXUGO, proc_selinux_attr_dir_inode_ops, proc_selinux_attr_dir_ops), diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c index fb0fb03..5cac15f 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c +++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c @@ -476,9 +476,13 @@ static int apparmor_getprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name, const struct cred *cred = get_task_cred(task); struct aa_task_cxt *cxt = cred_cxt(cred); struct aa_profile *profile = NULL; + char *vp; + char *np; if (strcmp(name, "current") == 0) profile = aa_get_newest_profile(cxt->profile); + else if (strcmp(name, "context") == 0) + profile = aa_get_newest_profile(cxt->profile); else if (strcmp(name, "prev") == 0 && cxt->previous) profile = aa_get_newest_profile(cxt->previous); else if (strcmp(name, "exec") == 0 && cxt->onexec) @@ -486,9 +490,29 @@ static int apparmor_getprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name, else error = -EINVAL; - if (profile) - error = aa_getprocattr(profile, value); + if (profile == NULL) + goto put_out; + + error = aa_getprocattr(profile, &vp); + if (error < 0) + goto put_out; + + if (strcmp(name, "context") == 0) { + *value = kasprintf(GFP_KERNEL, "apparmor='%s'", vp); + if (*value == NULL) { + error = -ENOMEM; + goto put_out; + } + np = strchr(*value, '\n'); + if (np != NULL) { + np[0] = '\''; + np[1] = '\0'; + } + error = strlen(*value); + } else + *value = vp; +put_out: aa_put_profile(profile); put_cred(cred); @@ -530,7 +554,7 @@ static int apparmor_setprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name, return -EINVAL; arg_size = size - (args - (char *) value); - if (strcmp(name, "current") == 0) { + if (strcmp(name, "current") == 0 || strcmp(name, "context") == 0) { if (strcmp(command, "changehat") == 0) { error = aa_setprocattr_changehat(args, arg_size, !AA_DO_TEST); @@ -552,7 +576,10 @@ static int apparmor_setprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name, else goto fail; } else - /* only support the "current" and "exec" process attributes */ + /* + * only support the "current", context and "exec" + * process attributes + */ return -EINVAL; if (!error) diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index 1e9cb55..f97f0d9 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -1186,8 +1186,47 @@ int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, const char *lsm, char *name, char **value) { struct security_hook_list *hp; + char *vp; + char *cp = NULL; int rc = -EINVAL; + int trc; + /* + * "context" requires work here in addition to what + * the modules provide. + */ + if (strcmp(name, "context") == 0) { + *value = NULL; + list_for_each_entry(hp, + &security_hook_heads.getprocattr, list) { + if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsm)) + continue; + trc = hp->hook.getprocattr(p, "context", &vp); + if (trc == -ENOENT) + continue; + if (trc <= 0) { + kfree(*value); + return trc; + } + rc = trc; + if (*value == NULL) { + *value = vp; + } else { + cp = kasprintf(GFP_KERNEL, "%s,%s", *value, vp); + if (cp == NULL) { + kfree(*value); + kfree(vp); + return -ENOMEM; + } + kfree(*value); + kfree(vp); + *value = cp; + } + } + if (rc > 0) + return strlen(*value); + return rc; + } list_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.getprocattr, list) { if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsm)) @@ -1204,7 +1243,76 @@ int security_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, const char *lsm, char *name, { struct security_hook_list *hp; int rc = -EINVAL; + char *local; + char *cp; + int slen; + int failed = 0; + + /* + * If lsm is NULL look at all the modules to find one + * that processes name. If lsm is not NULL only look at + * that module. + * + * "context" is handled directly here. + */ + if (strcmp(name, "context") == 0) { + /* + * First verify that the input is acceptable. + * lsm1='v1'lsm2='v2'lsm3='v3' + * + * A note on the use of strncmp() below. + * The check is for the substring at the beginning of cp. + * The kzalloc of size + 1 ensures a terminated string. + */ + local = kzalloc(size + 1, GFP_KERNEL); + memcpy(local, value, size); + cp = local; + list_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.setprocattr, + list) { + if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsm)) + continue; + if (cp[0] == ',') { + if (cp == local) + goto free_out; + cp++; + } + slen = strlen(hp->lsm); + if (strncmp(cp, hp->lsm, slen)) + goto free_out; + cp += slen; + if (cp[0] != '=' || cp[1] != '\'' || cp[2] == '\'') + goto free_out; + for (cp += 2; cp[0] != '\''; cp++) + if (cp[0] == '\0') + goto free_out; + cp++; + } + cp = local; + list_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.setprocattr, + list) { + if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsm)) + continue; + if (cp[0] == ',') + cp++; + cp += strlen(hp->lsm) + 2; + for (slen = 0; cp[slen] != '\''; slen++) + ; + cp[slen] = '\0'; + + rc = hp->hook.setprocattr(p, "context", cp, slen); + if (rc < 0) + failed = rc; + cp += slen + 1; + } + if (failed != 0) + rc = failed; + else + rc = size; +free_out: + kfree(local); + return rc; + } list_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.setprocattr, list) { if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsm)) continue; diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index ed3a757..6397721 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -5711,6 +5711,8 @@ static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, if (!strcmp(name, "current")) sid = __tsec->sid; + else if (!strcmp(name, "context")) + sid = __tsec->sid; else if (!strcmp(name, "prev")) sid = __tsec->osid; else if (!strcmp(name, "exec")) @@ -5728,7 +5730,19 @@ static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, if (!sid) return 0; - error = security_sid_to_context(sid, value, &len); + if (strcmp(name, "context")) { + error = security_sid_to_context(sid, value, &len); + } else { + char *vp; + + error = security_sid_to_context(sid, &vp, &len); + if (!error) { + *value = kasprintf(GFP_KERNEL, "selinux='%s'", vp); + if (*value == NULL) + error = -ENOMEM; + } + } + if (error) return error; return len; @@ -5768,6 +5782,8 @@ static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE); else if (!strcmp(name, "current")) error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETCURRENT); + else if (!strcmp(name, "context")) + error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETCURRENT); else error = -EINVAL; if (error) @@ -5827,7 +5843,7 @@ static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, tsec->keycreate_sid = sid; } else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate")) { tsec->sockcreate_sid = sid; - } else if (!strcmp(name, "current")) { + } else if (!strcmp(name, "current") || !strcmp(name, "context")) { error = -EINVAL; if (sid == 0) goto abort_change; diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c index 3577009..92e66f8 100644 --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c @@ -3574,18 +3574,20 @@ static int smack_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, char **value) { struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task_struct(p); char *cp; - int slen; - if (strcmp(name, "current") != 0) + if (strcmp(name, "current") == 0) { + cp = kstrdup(skp->smk_known, GFP_KERNEL); + if (cp == NULL) + return -ENOMEM; + } else if (strcmp(name, "context") == 0) { + cp = kasprintf(GFP_KERNEL, "smack='%s'", skp->smk_known); + if (cp == NULL) + return -ENOMEM; + } else return -EINVAL; - cp = kstrdup(skp->smk_known, GFP_KERNEL); - if (cp == NULL) - return -ENOMEM; - - slen = strlen(cp); *value = cp; - return slen; + return strlen(cp); } /** @@ -3622,7 +3624,7 @@ static int smack_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, if (value == NULL || size == 0 || size >= SMK_LONGLABEL) return -EINVAL; - if (strcmp(name, "current") != 0) + if (strcmp(name, "current") != 0 && strcmp(name, "context") != 0) return -EINVAL; skp = smk_import_entry(value, size);
Subject: [PATCH v4 3/3] LSM: Add context interface for proc attrs The /proc/.../attr/current interface is used by all three Linux security modules (SELinux, Smack and AppArmor) to report and modify the process security attribute. This is all fine when there is exactly one of these modules active and the userspace code knows which it module it is. It would require a major change to the "current" interface to provide information about more than one set of process security attributes. Instead, a "context" attribute is added, which identifies the security module that the information applies to. The format is: lsmname='context-value' When multiple concurrent modules are supported the /proc/.../attr/context interface will include the data for all of the active modules. lsmname1='context-value1',lsmname2='context-value2' The module specific subdirectories under attr contain context entries that report the information for that specific module in the same format. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> --- Documentation/security/LSM.txt | 8 +++ fs/proc/base.c | 4 ++ security/apparmor/lsm.c | 35 +++++++++++-- security/security.c | 108 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ security/selinux/hooks.c | 20 +++++++- security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 20 ++++---- 6 files changed, 180 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-) -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html