| Message ID | 1468235672-3745-1-git-send-email-toiwoton@gmail.com (mailing list archive) |
|---|---|
| State | New, archived |
| Headers | show |
Quoting Topi Miettinen (toiwoton@gmail.com): > There are many basic ways to control processes, including capabilities, > cgroups and resource limits. However, there are far fewer ways to find > out useful values for the limits, except blind trial and error. > > Currently, there is no way to know which capabilities are actually used. > Even the source code is only implicit, in-depth knowledge of each > capability must be used when analyzing a program to judge which > capabilities the program will exercise. > > Generate an audit message at system call exit, when capabilities are used. > This can then be used to configure capability sets for services by a > software developer, maintainer or system administrator. > > Test case demonstrating basic capability monitoring with the new > message types 1330 and 1331 and how the cgroups are displayed (boot to > rdshell): Thanks, Topi, I'll find time this week to look this over in detail. How much chattier does this make the syslog/journald during a regular boot? I was thinking "this is audit, we can choose what messages will show up", but I guess that' sonly what auditd actually listens to, not what kernel emits? (sorry i've not looked at audit in a long time). Drat, that makes it seem like tracepoints would be better after all. But let's see how much it addes to the noise. > BusyBox v1.22.1 (Debian 1:1.22.0-19) built-in shell (ash) > Enter 'help' for a list of built-in commands. > > (initramfs) cd /sys/fs > (initramfs) mount -t cgroup2 cgroup cgroup > [ 12.343152] audit_printk_skb: 5886 callbacks suppressed > [ 12.355214] audit: type=1300 audit(1468234317.100:518): arch=c000003e syscall=165 success=yes exit=0 a0=7fffe1e9ae2d a1=7fffe1e9ae34 a2=7fffe1e9ae25 a3=8000 items=0 ppid=469 pid=470 auid=4294967295 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 tty=ttyS0 ses=4294967295 comm="mount" exe="/bin/mount" key=(null) > [ 12.414853] audit: type=1327 audit(1468234317.100:518): proctitle=6D6F756E74002D74006367726F757032006367726F7570006367726F7570 > [ 12.438338] audit: type=1330 audit(1468234317.100:518): cap_used=0000000000200000 > [ 12.453893] audit: type=1331 audit(1468234317.100:518): cgroups=:/; > (initramfs) cd cgroup > (initramfs) mkdir test; cd test > [ 17.335625] audit: type=1300 audit(1468234322.092:519): arch=c000003e syscall=83 success=yes exit=0 a0=7ffddfd75e29 a1=1ff a2=0 a3=1e2 items=0 ppid=469 pid=471 auid=4294967295 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 tty=ttyS0 ses=4294967295 comm="mkdir" exe="/bin/mkdir" key=(null) > [ 17.392686] audit: type=1327 audit(1468234322.092:519): proctitle=6D6B6469720074657374 > [ 17.409404] audit: type=1330 audit(1468234322.092:519): cap_used=0000000000000002 > [ 17.425404] audit: type=1331 audit(1468234322.092:519): cgroups=:/; > (initramfs) echo $$ >cgroup.procs > (initramfs) mknod /dev/z_$$ c 1 2 > [ 28.385681] audit: type=1300 audit(1468234333.144:520): arch=c000003e syscall=133 success=yes exit=0 a0=7ffe16324e11 a1=21b6 a2=102 a3=5c9 items=0 ppid=469 pid=472 auid=4294967295 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 tty=ttyS0 ses=4294967295 comm="mknod" exe="/bin/mknod" key=(null) > [ 28.443674] audit: type=1327 audit(1468234333.144:520): proctitle=6D6B6E6F64002F6465762F7A5F343639006300310032 > [ 28.465888] audit: type=1330 audit(1468234333.144:520): cap_used=0000000008000000 > [ 28.482080] audit: type=1331 audit(1468234333.144:520): cgroups=:/test; > (initramfs) chown 1234 /dev/z_* > [ 34.772992] audit: type=1300 audit(1468234339.532:521): arch=c000003e syscall=92 success=yes exit=0 a0=7ffd0b563e17 a1=4d2 a2=0 a3=60a items=0 ppid=469 pid=473 auid=4294967295 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 tty=ttyS0 ses=4294967295 comm="chown" exe="/bin/chown" key=(null) > [ 34.828569] audit: type=1327 audit(1468234339.532:521): proctitle=63686F776E0031323334002F6465762F7A5F343639 > [ 34.848747] audit: type=1330 audit(1468234339.532:521): cap_used=0000000000000001 > [ 34.864404] audit: type=1331 audit(1468234339.532:521): cgroups=:/test; > > Signed-off-by: Topi Miettinen <toiwoton@gmail.com> > --- > include/linux/audit.h | 4 +++ > include/linux/cgroup.h | 2 ++ > include/uapi/linux/audit.h | 2 ++ > kernel/audit.c | 7 +++--- > kernel/audit.h | 1 + > kernel/auditsc.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++- > kernel/capability.c | 5 ++-- > kernel/cgroup.c | 62 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ > 8 files changed, 105 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h > index e38e3fc..971cb2e 100644 > --- a/include/linux/audit.h > +++ b/include/linux/audit.h > @@ -438,6 +438,8 @@ static inline void audit_mmap_fd(int fd, int flags) > __audit_mmap_fd(fd, flags); > } > > +extern void audit_log_cap_use(int cap); > + > extern int audit_n_rules; > extern int audit_signals; > #else /* CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL */ > @@ -545,6 +547,8 @@ static inline void audit_mmap_fd(int fd, int flags) > { } > static inline void audit_ptrace(struct task_struct *t) > { } > +static inline void audit_log_cap_use(int cap) > +{ } > #define audit_n_rules 0 > #define audit_signals 0 > #endif /* CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL */ > diff --git a/include/linux/cgroup.h b/include/linux/cgroup.h > index a20320c..b5dc8aa 100644 > --- a/include/linux/cgroup.h > +++ b/include/linux/cgroup.h > @@ -100,6 +100,8 @@ char *task_cgroup_path(struct task_struct *task, char *buf, size_t buflen); > int cgroupstats_build(struct cgroupstats *stats, struct dentry *dentry); > int proc_cgroup_show(struct seq_file *m, struct pid_namespace *ns, > struct pid *pid, struct task_struct *tsk); > +struct audit_buffer; > +void audit_cgroup_list(struct audit_buffer *ab); > > void cgroup_fork(struct task_struct *p); > extern int cgroup_can_fork(struct task_struct *p); > diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h > index d820aa9..c1ae016 100644 > --- a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h > +++ b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h > @@ -111,6 +111,8 @@ > #define AUDIT_PROCTITLE 1327 /* Proctitle emit event */ > #define AUDIT_FEATURE_CHANGE 1328 /* audit log listing feature changes */ > #define AUDIT_REPLACE 1329 /* Replace auditd if this packet unanswerd */ > +#define AUDIT_CAPABILITY 1330 /* Record showing capability use */ > +#define AUDIT_CGROUP 1331 /* Record showing cgroups */ > > #define AUDIT_AVC 1400 /* SE Linux avc denial or grant */ > #define AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR 1401 /* Internal SE Linux Errors */ > diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c > index 8d528f9..98dd920 100644 > --- a/kernel/audit.c > +++ b/kernel/audit.c > @@ -54,6 +54,7 @@ > #include <linux/kthread.h> > #include <linux/kernel.h> > #include <linux/syscalls.h> > +#include <linux/cgroup.h> > > #include <linux/audit.h> > > @@ -1682,7 +1683,7 @@ void audit_log_cap(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *prefix, kernel_cap_t *cap) > { > int i; > > - audit_log_format(ab, " %s=", prefix); > + audit_log_format(ab, "%s=", prefix); > CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(i) { > audit_log_format(ab, "%08x", > cap->cap[CAP_LAST_U32 - i]); > @@ -1696,11 +1697,11 @@ static void audit_log_fcaps(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct audit_names *name) > int log = 0; > > if (!cap_isclear(*perm)) { > - audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_fp", perm); > + audit_log_cap(ab, " cap_fp", perm); > log = 1; > } > if (!cap_isclear(*inh)) { > - audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_fi", inh); > + audit_log_cap(ab, " cap_fi", inh); > log = 1; > } > > diff --git a/kernel/audit.h b/kernel/audit.h > index a492f4c..680e8b5 100644 > --- a/kernel/audit.h > +++ b/kernel/audit.h > @@ -202,6 +202,7 @@ struct audit_context { > }; > int fds[2]; > struct audit_proctitle proctitle; > + kernel_cap_t cap_used; > }; > > extern u32 audit_ever_enabled; > diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c > index 2672d10..32c3813 100644 > --- a/kernel/auditsc.c > +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c > @@ -197,7 +197,6 @@ static int audit_match_filetype(struct audit_context *ctx, int val) > * References in it _are_ dropped - at the same time we free/drop aux stuff. > */ > > -#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE > static void audit_set_auditable(struct audit_context *ctx) > { > if (!ctx->prio) { > @@ -206,6 +205,7 @@ static void audit_set_auditable(struct audit_context *ctx) > } > } > > +#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE > static int put_tree_ref(struct audit_context *ctx, struct audit_chunk *chunk) > { > struct audit_tree_refs *p = ctx->trees; > @@ -1439,6 +1439,18 @@ static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, struct task_struct *ts > > audit_log_proctitle(tsk, context); > > + ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CAPABILITY); > + if (ab) { > + audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_used", &context->cap_used); > + audit_log_end(ab); > + } > + ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CGROUP); > + if (ab) { > + audit_log_format(ab, "cgroups="); > + audit_cgroup_list(ab); > + audit_log_end(ab); > + } > + > /* Send end of event record to help user space know we are finished */ > ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_EOE); > if (ab) > @@ -2428,3 +2440,17 @@ struct list_head *audit_killed_trees(void) > return NULL; > return &ctx->killed_trees; > } > + > +void audit_log_cap_use(int cap) > +{ > + struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; > + > + if (context) { > + cap_raise(context->cap_used, cap); > + audit_set_auditable(context); > + } else { > + audit_log(NULL, GFP_NOFS, AUDIT_CAPABILITY, > + "cap_used=%d pid=%d no audit_context", > + cap, task_pid_nr(current)); > + } > +} > diff --git a/kernel/capability.c b/kernel/capability.c > index 45432b5..d45d5b1 100644 > --- a/kernel/capability.c > +++ b/kernel/capability.c > @@ -366,8 +366,8 @@ bool has_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t, int cap) > * @ns: The usernamespace we want the capability in > * @cap: The capability to be tested for > * > - * Return true if the current task has the given superior capability currently > - * available for use, false if not. > + * Return true if the current task has the given superior capability > + * currently available for use, false if not. Write an audit message. > * > * This sets PF_SUPERPRIV on the task if the capability is available on the > * assumption that it's about to be used. > @@ -380,6 +380,7 @@ bool ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap) > } > > if (security_capable(current_cred(), ns, cap) == 0) { > + audit_log_cap_use(cap); > current->flags |= PF_SUPERPRIV; > return true; > } > diff --git a/kernel/cgroup.c b/kernel/cgroup.c > index 75c0ff0..1931679 100644 > --- a/kernel/cgroup.c > +++ b/kernel/cgroup.c > @@ -63,6 +63,7 @@ > #include <linux/nsproxy.h> > #include <linux/proc_ns.h> > #include <net/sock.h> > +#include <linux/audit.h> > > /* > * pidlists linger the following amount before being destroyed. The goal > @@ -5789,6 +5790,67 @@ out: > return retval; > } > > +/* > + * audit_cgroup_list() > + * - Print task's cgroup paths with audit_log_format() > + * - Used for capability audit logging > + * - Otherwise very similar to proc_cgroup_show(). > + */ > +void audit_cgroup_list(struct audit_buffer *ab) > +{ > + char *buf, *path; > + struct cgroup_root *root; > + > + buf = kmalloc(PATH_MAX, GFP_NOFS); > + if (!buf) > + return; > + > + mutex_lock(&cgroup_mutex); > + spin_lock_irq(&css_set_lock); > + > + for_each_root(root) { > + struct cgroup_subsys *ss; > + struct cgroup *cgrp; > + int ssid, count = 0; > + > + if (root == &cgrp_dfl_root && !cgrp_dfl_visible) > + continue; > + > + if (root != &cgrp_dfl_root) > + for_each_subsys(ss, ssid) > + if (root->subsys_mask & (1 << ssid)) > + audit_log_format(ab, "%s%s", > + count++ ? "," : "", > + ss->legacy_name); > + if (strlen(root->name)) > + audit_log_format(ab, "%sname=%s", count ? "," : "", > + root->name); > + audit_log_format(ab, ":"); > + > + cgrp = task_cgroup_from_root(current, root); > + > + if (cgroup_on_dfl(cgrp) || !(current->flags & PF_EXITING)) { > + path = cgroup_path_ns_locked(cgrp, buf, PATH_MAX, > + current->nsproxy->cgroup_ns); > + if (!path) > + goto out_unlock; > + } else > + path = "/"; > + > + audit_log_format(ab, "%s", path); > + > + if (cgroup_on_dfl(cgrp) && cgroup_is_dead(cgrp)) > + audit_log_format(ab, " (deleted);"); > + else > + audit_log_format(ab, ";"); > + } > + > +out_unlock: > + spin_unlock_irq(&css_set_lock); > + mutex_unlock(&cgroup_mutex); > + kfree(buf); > +} > + > /* Display information about each subsystem and each hierarchy */ > static int proc_cgroupstats_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) > { > -- > 2.8.1 -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
On 07/11/16 15:25, Serge E. Hallyn wrote: > Quoting Topi Miettinen (toiwoton@gmail.com): >> There are many basic ways to control processes, including capabilities, >> cgroups and resource limits. However, there are far fewer ways to find >> out useful values for the limits, except blind trial and error. >> >> Currently, there is no way to know which capabilities are actually used. >> Even the source code is only implicit, in-depth knowledge of each >> capability must be used when analyzing a program to judge which >> capabilities the program will exercise. >> >> Generate an audit message at system call exit, when capabilities are used. >> This can then be used to configure capability sets for services by a >> software developer, maintainer or system administrator. >> >> Test case demonstrating basic capability monitoring with the new >> message types 1330 and 1331 and how the cgroups are displayed (boot to >> rdshell): > > Thanks, Topi, I'll find time this week to look this over in detail. > > How much chattier does this make the syslog/journald during a regular > boot? I was thinking "this is audit, we can choose what messages > will show up", but I guess that' sonly what auditd actually listens to, > not what kernel emits? (sorry i've not looked at audit in a long > time). Drat, that makes it seem like tracepoints would be better > after all. But let's see how much it addes to the noise. For example "loadkeys" causes thousands of entries. :-( I'm checking how to avoid audit message rate limiting, now some messages are lost. It's still too easy to drown the logs with noise. That could be limited a lot by emitting a message only when the capability is used for the first time. But the question is how to define where to start counting (fork, exec, and/or setpcap?). I'm also not sure if that is the right way to log, since the first use of a capability could be expected and an innocent one, but then the 100th one could be malicious. It's also very complex and error-prone to collect a capability mask from audit logs, which was my original goal. -Topi > >> BusyBox v1.22.1 (Debian 1:1.22.0-19) built-in shell (ash) >> Enter 'help' for a list of built-in commands. >> >> (initramfs) cd /sys/fs >> (initramfs) mount -t cgroup2 cgroup cgroup >> [ 12.343152] audit_printk_skb: 5886 callbacks suppressed >> [ 12.355214] audit: type=1300 audit(1468234317.100:518): arch=c000003e syscall=165 success=yes exit=0 a0=7fffe1e9ae2d a1=7fffe1e9ae34 a2=7fffe1e9ae25 a3=8000 items=0 ppid=469 pid=470 auid=4294967295 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 tty=ttyS0 ses=4294967295 comm="mount" exe="/bin/mount" key=(null) >> [ 12.414853] audit: type=1327 audit(1468234317.100:518): proctitle=6D6F756E74002D74006367726F757032006367726F7570006367726F7570 >> [ 12.438338] audit: type=1330 audit(1468234317.100:518): cap_used=0000000000200000 >> [ 12.453893] audit: type=1331 audit(1468234317.100:518): cgroups=:/; >> (initramfs) cd cgroup >> (initramfs) mkdir test; cd test >> [ 17.335625] audit: type=1300 audit(1468234322.092:519): arch=c000003e syscall=83 success=yes exit=0 a0=7ffddfd75e29 a1=1ff a2=0 a3=1e2 items=0 ppid=469 pid=471 auid=4294967295 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 tty=ttyS0 ses=4294967295 comm="mkdir" exe="/bin/mkdir" key=(null) >> [ 17.392686] audit: type=1327 audit(1468234322.092:519): proctitle=6D6B6469720074657374 >> [ 17.409404] audit: type=1330 audit(1468234322.092:519): cap_used=0000000000000002 >> [ 17.425404] audit: type=1331 audit(1468234322.092:519): cgroups=:/; >> (initramfs) echo $$ >cgroup.procs >> (initramfs) mknod /dev/z_$$ c 1 2 >> [ 28.385681] audit: type=1300 audit(1468234333.144:520): arch=c000003e syscall=133 success=yes exit=0 a0=7ffe16324e11 a1=21b6 a2=102 a3=5c9 items=0 ppid=469 pid=472 auid=4294967295 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 tty=ttyS0 ses=4294967295 comm="mknod" exe="/bin/mknod" key=(null) >> [ 28.443674] audit: type=1327 audit(1468234333.144:520): proctitle=6D6B6E6F64002F6465762F7A5F343639006300310032 >> [ 28.465888] audit: type=1330 audit(1468234333.144:520): cap_used=0000000008000000 >> [ 28.482080] audit: type=1331 audit(1468234333.144:520): cgroups=:/test; >> (initramfs) chown 1234 /dev/z_* >> [ 34.772992] audit: type=1300 audit(1468234339.532:521): arch=c000003e syscall=92 success=yes exit=0 a0=7ffd0b563e17 a1=4d2 a2=0 a3=60a items=0 ppid=469 pid=473 auid=4294967295 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 tty=ttyS0 ses=4294967295 comm="chown" exe="/bin/chown" key=(null) >> [ 34.828569] audit: type=1327 audit(1468234339.532:521): proctitle=63686F776E0031323334002F6465762F7A5F343639 >> [ 34.848747] audit: type=1330 audit(1468234339.532:521): cap_used=0000000000000001 >> [ 34.864404] audit: type=1331 audit(1468234339.532:521): cgroups=:/test; >> >> Signed-off-by: Topi Miettinen <toiwoton@gmail.com> >> --- >> include/linux/audit.h | 4 +++ >> include/linux/cgroup.h | 2 ++ >> include/uapi/linux/audit.h | 2 ++ >> kernel/audit.c | 7 +++--- >> kernel/audit.h | 1 + >> kernel/auditsc.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++- >> kernel/capability.c | 5 ++-- >> kernel/cgroup.c | 62 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ >> 8 files changed, 105 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) >> >> diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h >> index e38e3fc..971cb2e 100644 >> --- a/include/linux/audit.h >> +++ b/include/linux/audit.h >> @@ -438,6 +438,8 @@ static inline void audit_mmap_fd(int fd, int flags) >> __audit_mmap_fd(fd, flags); >> } >> >> +extern void audit_log_cap_use(int cap); >> + >> extern int audit_n_rules; >> extern int audit_signals; >> #else /* CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL */ >> @@ -545,6 +547,8 @@ static inline void audit_mmap_fd(int fd, int flags) >> { } >> static inline void audit_ptrace(struct task_struct *t) >> { } >> +static inline void audit_log_cap_use(int cap) >> +{ } >> #define audit_n_rules 0 >> #define audit_signals 0 >> #endif /* CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL */ >> diff --git a/include/linux/cgroup.h b/include/linux/cgroup.h >> index a20320c..b5dc8aa 100644 >> --- a/include/linux/cgroup.h >> +++ b/include/linux/cgroup.h >> @@ -100,6 +100,8 @@ char *task_cgroup_path(struct task_struct *task, char *buf, size_t buflen); >> int cgroupstats_build(struct cgroupstats *stats, struct dentry *dentry); >> int proc_cgroup_show(struct seq_file *m, struct pid_namespace *ns, >> struct pid *pid, struct task_struct *tsk); >> +struct audit_buffer; >> +void audit_cgroup_list(struct audit_buffer *ab); >> >> void cgroup_fork(struct task_struct *p); >> extern int cgroup_can_fork(struct task_struct *p); >> diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h >> index d820aa9..c1ae016 100644 >> --- a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h >> +++ b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h >> @@ -111,6 +111,8 @@ >> #define AUDIT_PROCTITLE 1327 /* Proctitle emit event */ >> #define AUDIT_FEATURE_CHANGE 1328 /* audit log listing feature changes */ >> #define AUDIT_REPLACE 1329 /* Replace auditd if this packet unanswerd */ >> +#define AUDIT_CAPABILITY 1330 /* Record showing capability use */ >> +#define AUDIT_CGROUP 1331 /* Record showing cgroups */ >> >> #define AUDIT_AVC 1400 /* SE Linux avc denial or grant */ >> #define AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR 1401 /* Internal SE Linux Errors */ >> diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c >> index 8d528f9..98dd920 100644 >> --- a/kernel/audit.c >> +++ b/kernel/audit.c >> @@ -54,6 +54,7 @@ >> #include <linux/kthread.h> >> #include <linux/kernel.h> >> #include <linux/syscalls.h> >> +#include <linux/cgroup.h> >> >> #include <linux/audit.h> >> >> @@ -1682,7 +1683,7 @@ void audit_log_cap(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *prefix, kernel_cap_t *cap) >> { >> int i; >> >> - audit_log_format(ab, " %s=", prefix); >> + audit_log_format(ab, "%s=", prefix); >> CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(i) { >> audit_log_format(ab, "%08x", >> cap->cap[CAP_LAST_U32 - i]); >> @@ -1696,11 +1697,11 @@ static void audit_log_fcaps(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct audit_names *name) >> int log = 0; >> >> if (!cap_isclear(*perm)) { >> - audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_fp", perm); >> + audit_log_cap(ab, " cap_fp", perm); >> log = 1; >> } >> if (!cap_isclear(*inh)) { >> - audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_fi", inh); >> + audit_log_cap(ab, " cap_fi", inh); >> log = 1; >> } >> >> diff --git a/kernel/audit.h b/kernel/audit.h >> index a492f4c..680e8b5 100644 >> --- a/kernel/audit.h >> +++ b/kernel/audit.h >> @@ -202,6 +202,7 @@ struct audit_context { >> }; >> int fds[2]; >> struct audit_proctitle proctitle; >> + kernel_cap_t cap_used; >> }; >> >> extern u32 audit_ever_enabled; >> diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c >> index 2672d10..32c3813 100644 >> --- a/kernel/auditsc.c >> +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c >> @@ -197,7 +197,6 @@ static int audit_match_filetype(struct audit_context *ctx, int val) >> * References in it _are_ dropped - at the same time we free/drop aux stuff. >> */ >> >> -#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE >> static void audit_set_auditable(struct audit_context *ctx) >> { >> if (!ctx->prio) { >> @@ -206,6 +205,7 @@ static void audit_set_auditable(struct audit_context *ctx) >> } >> } >> >> +#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE >> static int put_tree_ref(struct audit_context *ctx, struct audit_chunk *chunk) >> { >> struct audit_tree_refs *p = ctx->trees; >> @@ -1439,6 +1439,18 @@ static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, struct task_struct *ts >> >> audit_log_proctitle(tsk, context); >> >> + ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CAPABILITY); >> + if (ab) { >> + audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_used", &context->cap_used); >> + audit_log_end(ab); >> + } >> + ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CGROUP); >> + if (ab) { >> + audit_log_format(ab, "cgroups="); >> + audit_cgroup_list(ab); >> + audit_log_end(ab); >> + } >> + >> /* Send end of event record to help user space know we are finished */ >> ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_EOE); >> if (ab) >> @@ -2428,3 +2440,17 @@ struct list_head *audit_killed_trees(void) >> return NULL; >> return &ctx->killed_trees; >> } >> + >> +void audit_log_cap_use(int cap) >> +{ >> + struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; >> + >> + if (context) { >> + cap_raise(context->cap_used, cap); >> + audit_set_auditable(context); >> + } else { >> + audit_log(NULL, GFP_NOFS, AUDIT_CAPABILITY, >> + "cap_used=%d pid=%d no audit_context", >> + cap, task_pid_nr(current)); >> + } >> +} >> diff --git a/kernel/capability.c b/kernel/capability.c >> index 45432b5..d45d5b1 100644 >> --- a/kernel/capability.c >> +++ b/kernel/capability.c >> @@ -366,8 +366,8 @@ bool has_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t, int cap) >> * @ns: The usernamespace we want the capability in >> * @cap: The capability to be tested for >> * >> - * Return true if the current task has the given superior capability currently >> - * available for use, false if not. >> + * Return true if the current task has the given superior capability >> + * currently available for use, false if not. Write an audit message. >> * >> * This sets PF_SUPERPRIV on the task if the capability is available on the >> * assumption that it's about to be used. >> @@ -380,6 +380,7 @@ bool ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap) >> } >> >> if (security_capable(current_cred(), ns, cap) == 0) { >> + audit_log_cap_use(cap); >> current->flags |= PF_SUPERPRIV; >> return true; >> } >> diff --git a/kernel/cgroup.c b/kernel/cgroup.c >> index 75c0ff0..1931679 100644 >> --- a/kernel/cgroup.c >> +++ b/kernel/cgroup.c >> @@ -63,6 +63,7 @@ >> #include <linux/nsproxy.h> >> #include <linux/proc_ns.h> >> #include <net/sock.h> >> +#include <linux/audit.h> >> >> /* >> * pidlists linger the following amount before being destroyed. The goal >> @@ -5789,6 +5790,67 @@ out: >> return retval; >> } >> >> +/* >> + * audit_cgroup_list() >> + * - Print task's cgroup paths with audit_log_format() >> + * - Used for capability audit logging >> + * - Otherwise very similar to proc_cgroup_show(). >> + */ >> +void audit_cgroup_list(struct audit_buffer *ab) >> +{ >> + char *buf, *path; >> + struct cgroup_root *root; >> + >> + buf = kmalloc(PATH_MAX, GFP_NOFS); >> + if (!buf) >> + return; >> + >> + mutex_lock(&cgroup_mutex); >> + spin_lock_irq(&css_set_lock); >> + >> + for_each_root(root) { >> + struct cgroup_subsys *ss; >> + struct cgroup *cgrp; >> + int ssid, count = 0; >> + >> + if (root == &cgrp_dfl_root && !cgrp_dfl_visible) >> + continue; >> + >> + if (root != &cgrp_dfl_root) >> + for_each_subsys(ss, ssid) >> + if (root->subsys_mask & (1 << ssid)) >> + audit_log_format(ab, "%s%s", >> + count++ ? "," : "", >> + ss->legacy_name); >> + if (strlen(root->name)) >> + audit_log_format(ab, "%sname=%s", count ? "," : "", >> + root->name); >> + audit_log_format(ab, ":"); >> + >> + cgrp = task_cgroup_from_root(current, root); >> + >> + if (cgroup_on_dfl(cgrp) || !(current->flags & PF_EXITING)) { >> + path = cgroup_path_ns_locked(cgrp, buf, PATH_MAX, >> + current->nsproxy->cgroup_ns); >> + if (!path) >> + goto out_unlock; >> + } else >> + path = "/"; >> + >> + audit_log_format(ab, "%s", path); >> + >> + if (cgroup_on_dfl(cgrp) && cgroup_is_dead(cgrp)) >> + audit_log_format(ab, " (deleted);"); >> + else >> + audit_log_format(ab, ";"); >> + } >> + >> +out_unlock: >> + spin_unlock_irq(&css_set_lock); >> + mutex_unlock(&cgroup_mutex); >> + kfree(buf); >> +} >> + >> /* Display information about each subsystem and each hierarchy */ >> static int proc_cgroupstats_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) >> { >> -- >> 2.8.1 -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Hello, On Mon, Jul 11, 2016 at 02:14:31PM +0300, Topi Miettinen wrote: > [ 28.443674] audit: type=1327 audit(1468234333.144:520): proctitle=6D6B6E6F64002F6465762F7A5F343639006300310032 > [ 28.465888] audit: type=1330 audit(1468234333.144:520): cap_used=0000000008000000 > [ 28.482080] audit: type=1331 audit(1468234333.144:520): cgroups=:/test; Please don't put additions of the two different audit types into one patch and I don't think the cgroup audit logging makes much sense. Without logging all migrations, it doesn't help auditing all that much. Also, printing all cgroup membership like that can be problematic for audit it can be arbitrarily long. Thanks.
On 07/11/16 16:05, Topi Miettinen wrote: > On 07/11/16 15:25, Serge E. Hallyn wrote: >> Quoting Topi Miettinen (toiwoton@gmail.com): >>> There are many basic ways to control processes, including capabilities, >>> cgroups and resource limits. However, there are far fewer ways to find >>> out useful values for the limits, except blind trial and error. >>> >>> Currently, there is no way to know which capabilities are actually used. >>> Even the source code is only implicit, in-depth knowledge of each >>> capability must be used when analyzing a program to judge which >>> capabilities the program will exercise. >>> >>> Generate an audit message at system call exit, when capabilities are used. >>> This can then be used to configure capability sets for services by a >>> software developer, maintainer or system administrator. >>> >>> Test case demonstrating basic capability monitoring with the new >>> message types 1330 and 1331 and how the cgroups are displayed (boot to >>> rdshell): >> >> Thanks, Topi, I'll find time this week to look this over in detail. >> >> How much chattier does this make the syslog/journald during a regular >> boot? I was thinking "this is audit, we can choose what messages >> will show up", but I guess that' sonly what auditd actually listens to, >> not what kernel emits? (sorry i've not looked at audit in a long >> time). Drat, that makes it seem like tracepoints would be better >> after all. But let's see how much it addes to the noise. > > For example "loadkeys" causes thousands of entries. :-( I'm checking how > to avoid audit message rate limiting, now some messages are lost. > > It's still too easy to drown the logs with noise. That could be limited > a lot by emitting a message only when the capability is used for the > first time. But the question is how to define where to start counting > (fork, exec, and/or setpcap?). I'm also not sure if that is the right > way to log, since the first use of a capability could be expected and an > innocent one, but then the 100th one could be malicious. > > It's also very complex and error-prone to collect a capability mask from > audit logs, which was my original goal. What if only a summary of capabilities was logged at task exit? That should make the log volume reasonable. -Topi > > -Topi > >> >>> BusyBox v1.22.1 (Debian 1:1.22.0-19) built-in shell (ash) >>> Enter 'help' for a list of built-in commands. >>> >>> (initramfs) cd /sys/fs >>> (initramfs) mount -t cgroup2 cgroup cgroup >>> [ 12.343152] audit_printk_skb: 5886 callbacks suppressed >>> [ 12.355214] audit: type=1300 audit(1468234317.100:518): arch=c000003e syscall=165 success=yes exit=0 a0=7fffe1e9ae2d a1=7fffe1e9ae34 a2=7fffe1e9ae25 a3=8000 items=0 ppid=469 pid=470 auid=4294967295 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 tty=ttyS0 ses=4294967295 comm="mount" exe="/bin/mount" key=(null) >>> [ 12.414853] audit: type=1327 audit(1468234317.100:518): proctitle=6D6F756E74002D74006367726F757032006367726F7570006367726F7570 >>> [ 12.438338] audit: type=1330 audit(1468234317.100:518): cap_used=0000000000200000 >>> [ 12.453893] audit: type=1331 audit(1468234317.100:518): cgroups=:/; >>> (initramfs) cd cgroup >>> (initramfs) mkdir test; cd test >>> [ 17.335625] audit: type=1300 audit(1468234322.092:519): arch=c000003e syscall=83 success=yes exit=0 a0=7ffddfd75e29 a1=1ff a2=0 a3=1e2 items=0 ppid=469 pid=471 auid=4294967295 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 tty=ttyS0 ses=4294967295 comm="mkdir" exe="/bin/mkdir" key=(null) >>> [ 17.392686] audit: type=1327 audit(1468234322.092:519): proctitle=6D6B6469720074657374 >>> [ 17.409404] audit: type=1330 audit(1468234322.092:519): cap_used=0000000000000002 >>> [ 17.425404] audit: type=1331 audit(1468234322.092:519): cgroups=:/; >>> (initramfs) echo $$ >cgroup.procs >>> (initramfs) mknod /dev/z_$$ c 1 2 >>> [ 28.385681] audit: type=1300 audit(1468234333.144:520): arch=c000003e syscall=133 success=yes exit=0 a0=7ffe16324e11 a1=21b6 a2=102 a3=5c9 items=0 ppid=469 pid=472 auid=4294967295 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 tty=ttyS0 ses=4294967295 comm="mknod" exe="/bin/mknod" key=(null) >>> [ 28.443674] audit: type=1327 audit(1468234333.144:520): proctitle=6D6B6E6F64002F6465762F7A5F343639006300310032 >>> [ 28.465888] audit: type=1330 audit(1468234333.144:520): cap_used=0000000008000000 >>> [ 28.482080] audit: type=1331 audit(1468234333.144:520): cgroups=:/test; >>> (initramfs) chown 1234 /dev/z_* >>> [ 34.772992] audit: type=1300 audit(1468234339.532:521): arch=c000003e syscall=92 success=yes exit=0 a0=7ffd0b563e17 a1=4d2 a2=0 a3=60a items=0 ppid=469 pid=473 auid=4294967295 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 tty=ttyS0 ses=4294967295 comm="chown" exe="/bin/chown" key=(null) >>> [ 34.828569] audit: type=1327 audit(1468234339.532:521): proctitle=63686F776E0031323334002F6465762F7A5F343639 >>> [ 34.848747] audit: type=1330 audit(1468234339.532:521): cap_used=0000000000000001 >>> [ 34.864404] audit: type=1331 audit(1468234339.532:521): cgroups=:/test; >>> >>> Signed-off-by: Topi Miettinen <toiwoton@gmail.com> >>> --- >>> include/linux/audit.h | 4 +++ >>> include/linux/cgroup.h | 2 ++ >>> include/uapi/linux/audit.h | 2 ++ >>> kernel/audit.c | 7 +++--- >>> kernel/audit.h | 1 + >>> kernel/auditsc.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++- >>> kernel/capability.c | 5 ++-- >>> kernel/cgroup.c | 62 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ >>> 8 files changed, 105 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) >>> >>> diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h >>> index e38e3fc..971cb2e 100644 >>> --- a/include/linux/audit.h >>> +++ b/include/linux/audit.h >>> @@ -438,6 +438,8 @@ static inline void audit_mmap_fd(int fd, int flags) >>> __audit_mmap_fd(fd, flags); >>> } >>> >>> +extern void audit_log_cap_use(int cap); >>> + >>> extern int audit_n_rules; >>> extern int audit_signals; >>> #else /* CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL */ >>> @@ -545,6 +547,8 @@ static inline void audit_mmap_fd(int fd, int flags) >>> { } >>> static inline void audit_ptrace(struct task_struct *t) >>> { } >>> +static inline void audit_log_cap_use(int cap) >>> +{ } >>> #define audit_n_rules 0 >>> #define audit_signals 0 >>> #endif /* CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL */ >>> diff --git a/include/linux/cgroup.h b/include/linux/cgroup.h >>> index a20320c..b5dc8aa 100644 >>> --- a/include/linux/cgroup.h >>> +++ b/include/linux/cgroup.h >>> @@ -100,6 +100,8 @@ char *task_cgroup_path(struct task_struct *task, char *buf, size_t buflen); >>> int cgroupstats_build(struct cgroupstats *stats, struct dentry *dentry); >>> int proc_cgroup_show(struct seq_file *m, struct pid_namespace *ns, >>> struct pid *pid, struct task_struct *tsk); >>> +struct audit_buffer; >>> +void audit_cgroup_list(struct audit_buffer *ab); >>> >>> void cgroup_fork(struct task_struct *p); >>> extern int cgroup_can_fork(struct task_struct *p); >>> diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h >>> index d820aa9..c1ae016 100644 >>> --- a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h >>> +++ b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h >>> @@ -111,6 +111,8 @@ >>> #define AUDIT_PROCTITLE 1327 /* Proctitle emit event */ >>> #define AUDIT_FEATURE_CHANGE 1328 /* audit log listing feature changes */ >>> #define AUDIT_REPLACE 1329 /* Replace auditd if this packet unanswerd */ >>> +#define AUDIT_CAPABILITY 1330 /* Record showing capability use */ >>> +#define AUDIT_CGROUP 1331 /* Record showing cgroups */ >>> >>> #define AUDIT_AVC 1400 /* SE Linux avc denial or grant */ >>> #define AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR 1401 /* Internal SE Linux Errors */ >>> diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c >>> index 8d528f9..98dd920 100644 >>> --- a/kernel/audit.c >>> +++ b/kernel/audit.c >>> @@ -54,6 +54,7 @@ >>> #include <linux/kthread.h> >>> #include <linux/kernel.h> >>> #include <linux/syscalls.h> >>> +#include <linux/cgroup.h> >>> >>> #include <linux/audit.h> >>> >>> @@ -1682,7 +1683,7 @@ void audit_log_cap(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *prefix, kernel_cap_t *cap) >>> { >>> int i; >>> >>> - audit_log_format(ab, " %s=", prefix); >>> + audit_log_format(ab, "%s=", prefix); >>> CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(i) { >>> audit_log_format(ab, "%08x", >>> cap->cap[CAP_LAST_U32 - i]); >>> @@ -1696,11 +1697,11 @@ static void audit_log_fcaps(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct audit_names *name) >>> int log = 0; >>> >>> if (!cap_isclear(*perm)) { >>> - audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_fp", perm); >>> + audit_log_cap(ab, " cap_fp", perm); >>> log = 1; >>> } >>> if (!cap_isclear(*inh)) { >>> - audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_fi", inh); >>> + audit_log_cap(ab, " cap_fi", inh); >>> log = 1; >>> } >>> >>> diff --git a/kernel/audit.h b/kernel/audit.h >>> index a492f4c..680e8b5 100644 >>> --- a/kernel/audit.h >>> +++ b/kernel/audit.h >>> @@ -202,6 +202,7 @@ struct audit_context { >>> }; >>> int fds[2]; >>> struct audit_proctitle proctitle; >>> + kernel_cap_t cap_used; >>> }; >>> >>> extern u32 audit_ever_enabled; >>> diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c >>> index 2672d10..32c3813 100644 >>> --- a/kernel/auditsc.c >>> +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c >>> @@ -197,7 +197,6 @@ static int audit_match_filetype(struct audit_context *ctx, int val) >>> * References in it _are_ dropped - at the same time we free/drop aux stuff. >>> */ >>> >>> -#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE >>> static void audit_set_auditable(struct audit_context *ctx) >>> { >>> if (!ctx->prio) { >>> @@ -206,6 +205,7 @@ static void audit_set_auditable(struct audit_context *ctx) >>> } >>> } >>> >>> +#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE >>> static int put_tree_ref(struct audit_context *ctx, struct audit_chunk *chunk) >>> { >>> struct audit_tree_refs *p = ctx->trees; >>> @@ -1439,6 +1439,18 @@ static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, struct task_struct *ts >>> >>> audit_log_proctitle(tsk, context); >>> >>> + ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CAPABILITY); >>> + if (ab) { >>> + audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_used", &context->cap_used); >>> + audit_log_end(ab); >>> + } >>> + ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CGROUP); >>> + if (ab) { >>> + audit_log_format(ab, "cgroups="); >>> + audit_cgroup_list(ab); >>> + audit_log_end(ab); >>> + } >>> + >>> /* Send end of event record to help user space know we are finished */ >>> ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_EOE); >>> if (ab) >>> @@ -2428,3 +2440,17 @@ struct list_head *audit_killed_trees(void) >>> return NULL; >>> return &ctx->killed_trees; >>> } >>> + >>> +void audit_log_cap_use(int cap) >>> +{ >>> + struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; >>> + >>> + if (context) { >>> + cap_raise(context->cap_used, cap); >>> + audit_set_auditable(context); >>> + } else { >>> + audit_log(NULL, GFP_NOFS, AUDIT_CAPABILITY, >>> + "cap_used=%d pid=%d no audit_context", >>> + cap, task_pid_nr(current)); >>> + } >>> +} >>> diff --git a/kernel/capability.c b/kernel/capability.c >>> index 45432b5..d45d5b1 100644 >>> --- a/kernel/capability.c >>> +++ b/kernel/capability.c >>> @@ -366,8 +366,8 @@ bool has_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t, int cap) >>> * @ns: The usernamespace we want the capability in >>> * @cap: The capability to be tested for >>> * >>> - * Return true if the current task has the given superior capability currently >>> - * available for use, false if not. >>> + * Return true if the current task has the given superior capability >>> + * currently available for use, false if not. Write an audit message. >>> * >>> * This sets PF_SUPERPRIV on the task if the capability is available on the >>> * assumption that it's about to be used. >>> @@ -380,6 +380,7 @@ bool ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap) >>> } >>> >>> if (security_capable(current_cred(), ns, cap) == 0) { >>> + audit_log_cap_use(cap); >>> current->flags |= PF_SUPERPRIV; >>> return true; >>> } >>> diff --git a/kernel/cgroup.c b/kernel/cgroup.c >>> index 75c0ff0..1931679 100644 >>> --- a/kernel/cgroup.c >>> +++ b/kernel/cgroup.c >>> @@ -63,6 +63,7 @@ >>> #include <linux/nsproxy.h> >>> #include <linux/proc_ns.h> >>> #include <net/sock.h> >>> +#include <linux/audit.h> >>> >>> /* >>> * pidlists linger the following amount before being destroyed. The goal >>> @@ -5789,6 +5790,67 @@ out: >>> return retval; >>> } >>> >>> +/* >>> + * audit_cgroup_list() >>> + * - Print task's cgroup paths with audit_log_format() >>> + * - Used for capability audit logging >>> + * - Otherwise very similar to proc_cgroup_show(). >>> + */ >>> +void audit_cgroup_list(struct audit_buffer *ab) >>> +{ >>> + char *buf, *path; >>> + struct cgroup_root *root; >>> + >>> + buf = kmalloc(PATH_MAX, GFP_NOFS); >>> + if (!buf) >>> + return; >>> + >>> + mutex_lock(&cgroup_mutex); >>> + spin_lock_irq(&css_set_lock); >>> + >>> + for_each_root(root) { >>> + struct cgroup_subsys *ss; >>> + struct cgroup *cgrp; >>> + int ssid, count = 0; >>> + >>> + if (root == &cgrp_dfl_root && !cgrp_dfl_visible) >>> + continue; >>> + >>> + if (root != &cgrp_dfl_root) >>> + for_each_subsys(ss, ssid) >>> + if (root->subsys_mask & (1 << ssid)) >>> + audit_log_format(ab, "%s%s", >>> + count++ ? "," : "", >>> + ss->legacy_name); >>> + if (strlen(root->name)) >>> + audit_log_format(ab, "%sname=%s", count ? "," : "", >>> + root->name); >>> + audit_log_format(ab, ":"); >>> + >>> + cgrp = task_cgroup_from_root(current, root); >>> + >>> + if (cgroup_on_dfl(cgrp) || !(current->flags & PF_EXITING)) { >>> + path = cgroup_path_ns_locked(cgrp, buf, PATH_MAX, >>> + current->nsproxy->cgroup_ns); >>> + if (!path) >>> + goto out_unlock; >>> + } else >>> + path = "/"; >>> + >>> + audit_log_format(ab, "%s", path); >>> + >>> + if (cgroup_on_dfl(cgrp) && cgroup_is_dead(cgrp)) >>> + audit_log_format(ab, " (deleted);"); >>> + else >>> + audit_log_format(ab, ";"); >>> + } >>> + >>> +out_unlock: >>> + spin_unlock_irq(&css_set_lock); >>> + mutex_unlock(&cgroup_mutex); >>> + kfree(buf); >>> +} >>> + >>> /* Display information about each subsystem and each hierarchy */ >>> static int proc_cgroupstats_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) >>> { >>> -- >>> 2.8.1 > -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
On 07/11/16 17:09, Tejun Heo wrote: > Hello, > > On Mon, Jul 11, 2016 at 02:14:31PM +0300, Topi Miettinen wrote: >> [ 28.443674] audit: type=1327 audit(1468234333.144:520): proctitle=6D6B6E6F64002F6465762F7A5F343639006300310032 >> [ 28.465888] audit: type=1330 audit(1468234333.144:520): cap_used=0000000008000000 >> [ 28.482080] audit: type=1331 audit(1468234333.144:520): cgroups=:/test; > > Please don't put additions of the two different audit types into one > patch and I don't think the cgroup audit logging makes much sense. > Without logging all migrations, it doesn't help auditing all that > much. Also, printing all cgroup membership like that can be > problematic for audit it can be arbitrarily long. > > Thanks. > It's really critical to be able to associate a task in the logs to cgroups which were valid that time. Or can we infer somehow what cgroups a task was taking part, long time after task exit? Perhaps task cgroup membership changes and changes in available cgroups should be logged too? Some kind of cgroup IDs could be logged instead of long paths. Then these IDs should be reliably resolvable to paths offline somehow. How usual migrations between cgroups are? Why would a task ever move from (say) systemd/system.slice/smartd.service to anywhere else? -Topi -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Topi Miettinen <toiwoton@gmail.com> writes: > There are many basic ways to control processes, including capabilities, > cgroups and resource limits. However, there are far fewer ways to find > out useful values for the limits, except blind trial and error. > > Currently, there is no way to know which capabilities are actually used. > Even the source code is only implicit, in-depth knowledge of each > capability must be used when analyzing a program to judge which > capabilities the program will exercise. > > Generate an audit message at system call exit, when capabilities are used. > This can then be used to configure capability sets for services by a > software developer, maintainer or system administrator. > > Test case demonstrating basic capability monitoring with the new > message types 1330 and 1331 and how the cgroups are displayed (boot to > rdshell): You totally miss the interactions with the user namespace so this won't give you the information you are aiming for. Eric -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
On 07/11/16 21:57, Eric W. Biederman wrote: > Topi Miettinen <toiwoton@gmail.com> writes: > >> There are many basic ways to control processes, including capabilities, >> cgroups and resource limits. However, there are far fewer ways to find >> out useful values for the limits, except blind trial and error. >> >> Currently, there is no way to know which capabilities are actually used. >> Even the source code is only implicit, in-depth knowledge of each >> capability must be used when analyzing a program to judge which >> capabilities the program will exercise. >> >> Generate an audit message at system call exit, when capabilities are used. >> This can then be used to configure capability sets for services by a >> software developer, maintainer or system administrator. >> >> Test case demonstrating basic capability monitoring with the new >> message types 1330 and 1331 and how the cgroups are displayed (boot to >> rdshell): > > You totally miss the interactions with the user namespace so this won't > give you the information you are aiming for. Please correct me if this is not right: There are two cases: a) real capability use as seen outside the namespace b) use of capabilities granted by the namespace Both cases could be active independently. For auditing purposes, we're mostly interested in a) and log noise from b) could be even seen a distraction. For configuration purposes, both cases can be interesting, a) for the configuration of services and b) in case where the containerized configuration is planned to be deployed outside. I'd still only log a). The same logic should apply with cgroup namespaces. -Topi > > Eric > -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Topi Miettinen <toiwoton@gmail.com> writes: > On 07/11/16 21:57, Eric W. Biederman wrote: >> Topi Miettinen <toiwoton@gmail.com> writes: >> >>> There are many basic ways to control processes, including capabilities, >>> cgroups and resource limits. However, there are far fewer ways to find >>> out useful values for the limits, except blind trial and error. >>> >>> Currently, there is no way to know which capabilities are actually used. >>> Even the source code is only implicit, in-depth knowledge of each >>> capability must be used when analyzing a program to judge which >>> capabilities the program will exercise. >>> >>> Generate an audit message at system call exit, when capabilities are used. >>> This can then be used to configure capability sets for services by a >>> software developer, maintainer or system administrator. >>> >>> Test case demonstrating basic capability monitoring with the new >>> message types 1330 and 1331 and how the cgroups are displayed (boot to >>> rdshell): >> >> You totally miss the interactions with the user namespace so this won't >> give you the information you are aiming for. > > Please correct me if this is not right: > > There are two cases: > a) real capability use as seen outside the namespace > b) use of capabilities granted by the namespace > Both cases could be active independently. > > For auditing purposes, we're mostly interested in a) and log noise from > b) could be even seen a distraction. > > For configuration purposes, both cases can be interesting, a) for the > configuration of services and b) in case where the containerized > configuration is planned to be deployed outside. I'd still only log > a). > > > The same logic should apply with cgroup namespaces. Not logging capabilities outside of the initial user namespace is certainly the conservative place to start, and what selinux does. You should also be logging capability use from cap_capable. Not ns_capable. You are missing several kinds of capability use as a quick review of kernel/capability.c should have shown you. Eric -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
On Mon, Jul 11, 2016 at 07:47:44PM +0000, Topi Miettinen wrote: > It's really critical to be able to associate a task in the logs to > cgroups which were valid that time. Or can we infer somehow what cgroups When is "that time"? Without logging all operations, this is meaningless. > a task was taking part, long time after task exit? Perhaps task cgroup > membership changes and changes in available cgroups should be logged too? > > Some kind of cgroup IDs could be logged instead of long paths. Then > these IDs should be reliably resolvable to paths offline somehow. I don't think that's doable. That pretty much requires the kernel to remember paths of all past cgroups. > How usual migrations between cgroups are? Why would a task ever move > from (say) systemd/system.slice/smartd.service to anywhere else? In most cases, they won't move once set up initially but that's not the point of audit subsystem. Logging this once one exit isn't gonna help anything for auditing the system. Thanks.
On Mon, Jul 11, 2016 at 7:14 AM, Topi Miettinen <toiwoton@gmail.com> wrote: > There are many basic ways to control processes, including capabilities, > cgroups and resource limits. However, there are far fewer ways to find > out useful values for the limits, except blind trial and error. > > Currently, there is no way to know which capabilities are actually used. > Even the source code is only implicit, in-depth knowledge of each > capability must be used when analyzing a program to judge which > capabilities the program will exercise. > > Generate an audit message at system call exit, when capabilities are used. > This can then be used to configure capability sets for services by a > software developer, maintainer or system administrator. > > Test case demonstrating basic capability monitoring with the new > message types 1330 and 1331 and how the cgroups are displayed (boot to > rdshell): NOTE: additional comments inline with the patch. I can understand the desire to audit the capabilities, but I'm a little uncertain about the value of auditing cgroups at this point in time. The audit subsystem focuses primarily on security relevant information, and while you could make an argument for cgroups here, I think it is a relatively weak argument at the moment. Also, please continue to work on reducing the impact of this on the audit logs (your discussion with Serge). > diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h > index e38e3fc..971cb2e 100644 > --- a/include/linux/audit.h > +++ b/include/linux/audit.h > @@ -438,6 +438,8 @@ static inline void audit_mmap_fd(int fd, int flags) > __audit_mmap_fd(fd, flags); > } > > +extern void audit_log_cap_use(int cap); > + > extern int audit_n_rules; > extern int audit_signals; > #else /* CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL */ > @@ -545,6 +547,8 @@ static inline void audit_mmap_fd(int fd, int flags) > { } > static inline void audit_ptrace(struct task_struct *t) > { } > +static inline void audit_log_cap_use(int cap) > +{ } > #define audit_n_rules 0 > #define audit_signals 0 > #endif /* CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL */ > diff --git a/include/linux/cgroup.h b/include/linux/cgroup.h > index a20320c..b5dc8aa 100644 > --- a/include/linux/cgroup.h > +++ b/include/linux/cgroup.h > @@ -100,6 +100,8 @@ char *task_cgroup_path(struct task_struct *task, char *buf, size_t buflen); > int cgroupstats_build(struct cgroupstats *stats, struct dentry *dentry); > int proc_cgroup_show(struct seq_file *m, struct pid_namespace *ns, > struct pid *pid, struct task_struct *tsk); > +struct audit_buffer; > +void audit_cgroup_list(struct audit_buffer *ab); > > void cgroup_fork(struct task_struct *p); > extern int cgroup_can_fork(struct task_struct *p); > diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h > index d820aa9..c1ae016 100644 > --- a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h > +++ b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h > @@ -111,6 +111,8 @@ > #define AUDIT_PROCTITLE 1327 /* Proctitle emit event */ > #define AUDIT_FEATURE_CHANGE 1328 /* audit log listing feature changes */ > #define AUDIT_REPLACE 1329 /* Replace auditd if this packet unanswerd */ > +#define AUDIT_CAPABILITY 1330 /* Record showing capability use */ > +#define AUDIT_CGROUP 1331 /* Record showing cgroups */ As Tejun Heo already stated, please put the capability changes and the cgroup changes into two separate patches in one patchset. > #define AUDIT_AVC 1400 /* SE Linux avc denial or grant */ > #define AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR 1401 /* Internal SE Linux Errors */ > diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c > index 8d528f9..98dd920 100644 > --- a/kernel/audit.c > +++ b/kernel/audit.c > @@ -54,6 +54,7 @@ > #include <linux/kthread.h> > #include <linux/kernel.h> > #include <linux/syscalls.h> > +#include <linux/cgroup.h> > > #include <linux/audit.h> > > @@ -1682,7 +1683,7 @@ void audit_log_cap(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *prefix, kernel_cap_t *cap) > { > int i; > > - audit_log_format(ab, " %s=", prefix); > + audit_log_format(ab, "%s=", prefix); Why? > CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(i) { > audit_log_format(ab, "%08x", > cap->cap[CAP_LAST_U32 - i]); > @@ -1696,11 +1697,11 @@ static void audit_log_fcaps(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct audit_names *name) > int log = 0; > > if (!cap_isclear(*perm)) { > - audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_fp", perm); > + audit_log_cap(ab, " cap_fp", perm); This is not an improvement, please stick with the leading space in audit_log_cap() so callers do not have to worry about formatting issues like this. > diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c > index 2672d10..32c3813 100644 > --- a/kernel/auditsc.c > +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c > @@ -1439,6 +1439,18 @@ static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, struct task_struct *ts > > audit_log_proctitle(tsk, context); > > + ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CAPABILITY); > + if (ab) { > + audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_used", &context->cap_used); > + audit_log_end(ab); > + } > + ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CGROUP); > + if (ab) { > + audit_log_format(ab, "cgroups="); > + audit_cgroup_list(ab); Why not just move the "cgroups=" into audit_cgroup_list()? Can you ever think of a reason why you would need to record the cgroups without the "cgroup=" field prefix? > + audit_log_end(ab); > + } > + > /* Send end of event record to help user space know we are finished */ > ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_EOE); > if (ab) > @@ -2428,3 +2440,17 @@ struct list_head *audit_killed_trees(void) > return NULL; > return &ctx->killed_trees; > } > + > +void audit_log_cap_use(int cap) > +{ > + struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; > + > + if (context) { > + cap_raise(context->cap_used, cap); > + audit_set_auditable(context); > + } else { > + audit_log(NULL, GFP_NOFS, AUDIT_CAPABILITY, > + "cap_used=%d pid=%d no audit_context", > + cap, task_pid_nr(current)); > + } > +} You can't log "no audit_context" in the audit record, all information logged should follow the "<field>=<value>" format.
On Tue, Jul 12, 2016 at 9:16 AM, Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> wrote: > Not logging capabilities outside of the initial user namespace is > certainly the conservative place to start, and what selinux does. FYI, we added some basic userns capability smarts to SELinux in Linux 4.7. commit 8e4ff6f228e4722cac74db716e308d1da33d744f Author: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Date: Fri Apr 8 13:52:00 2016 -0400 selinux: distinguish non-init user namespace capability checks Distinguish capability checks against a target associated with the init user namespace versus capability checks against a target associated with a non-init user namespace by defining and using separate security classes for the latter. This is needed to support e.g. Chrome usage of user namespaces for the Chrome sandbox without needing to allow Chrome to also exercise capabilities on targets in the init user namespace. Suggested-by: Dan Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
On 07/12/16 14:59, Tejun Heo wrote: > On Mon, Jul 11, 2016 at 07:47:44PM +0000, Topi Miettinen wrote: >> It's really critical to be able to associate a task in the logs to >> cgroups which were valid that time. Or can we infer somehow what cgroups > > When is "that time"? Without logging all operations, this is > meaningless. > >> a task was taking part, long time after task exit? Perhaps task cgroup >> membership changes and changes in available cgroups should be logged too? >> >> Some kind of cgroup IDs could be logged instead of long paths. Then >> these IDs should be reliably resolvable to paths offline somehow. > > I don't think that's doable. That pretty much requires the kernel to > remember paths of all past cgroups. That's a show stopper for audit approach for getting helpful information for configuration. I'll try something different, probably cgroupstats. -Topi > >> How usual migrations between cgroups are? Why would a task ever move >> from (say) systemd/system.slice/smartd.service to anywhere else? > > In most cases, they won't move once set up initially but that's not > the point of audit subsystem. Logging this once one exit isn't gonna > help anything for auditing the system. > > Thanks. > -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
On 07/12/16 13:16, Eric W. Biederman wrote: > Topi Miettinen <toiwoton@gmail.com> writes: > >> On 07/11/16 21:57, Eric W. Biederman wrote: >>> Topi Miettinen <toiwoton@gmail.com> writes: >>> >>>> There are many basic ways to control processes, including capabilities, >>>> cgroups and resource limits. However, there are far fewer ways to find >>>> out useful values for the limits, except blind trial and error. >>>> >>>> Currently, there is no way to know which capabilities are actually used. >>>> Even the source code is only implicit, in-depth knowledge of each >>>> capability must be used when analyzing a program to judge which >>>> capabilities the program will exercise. >>>> >>>> Generate an audit message at system call exit, when capabilities are used. >>>> This can then be used to configure capability sets for services by a >>>> software developer, maintainer or system administrator. >>>> >>>> Test case demonstrating basic capability monitoring with the new >>>> message types 1330 and 1331 and how the cgroups are displayed (boot to >>>> rdshell): >>> >>> You totally miss the interactions with the user namespace so this won't >>> give you the information you are aiming for. >> >> Please correct me if this is not right: >> >> There are two cases: >> a) real capability use as seen outside the namespace >> b) use of capabilities granted by the namespace >> Both cases could be active independently. >> >> For auditing purposes, we're mostly interested in a) and log noise from >> b) could be even seen a distraction. >> >> For configuration purposes, both cases can be interesting, a) for the >> configuration of services and b) in case where the containerized >> configuration is planned to be deployed outside. I'd still only log >> a). >> >> >> The same logic should apply with cgroup namespaces. > > Not logging capabilities outside of the initial user namespace is > certainly the conservative place to start, and what selinux does. > > You should also be logging capability use from cap_capable. Not But cap_capable is not called from apparmor aa_capable or selinux selinux_capable, how about security_capable()? > ns_capable. You are missing several kinds of capability use as > a quick review of kernel/capability.c should have shown you. Right, sorry about that. -Topi > > Eric > -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h index e38e3fc..971cb2e 100644 --- a/include/linux/audit.h +++ b/include/linux/audit.h @@ -438,6 +438,8 @@ static inline void audit_mmap_fd(int fd, int flags) __audit_mmap_fd(fd, flags); } +extern void audit_log_cap_use(int cap); + extern int audit_n_rules; extern int audit_signals; #else /* CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL */ @@ -545,6 +547,8 @@ static inline void audit_mmap_fd(int fd, int flags) { } static inline void audit_ptrace(struct task_struct *t) { } +static inline void audit_log_cap_use(int cap) +{ } #define audit_n_rules 0 #define audit_signals 0 #endif /* CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL */ diff --git a/include/linux/cgroup.h b/include/linux/cgroup.h index a20320c..b5dc8aa 100644 --- a/include/linux/cgroup.h +++ b/include/linux/cgroup.h @@ -100,6 +100,8 @@ char *task_cgroup_path(struct task_struct *task, char *buf, size_t buflen); int cgroupstats_build(struct cgroupstats *stats, struct dentry *dentry); int proc_cgroup_show(struct seq_file *m, struct pid_namespace *ns, struct pid *pid, struct task_struct *tsk); +struct audit_buffer; +void audit_cgroup_list(struct audit_buffer *ab); void cgroup_fork(struct task_struct *p); extern int cgroup_can_fork(struct task_struct *p); diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h index d820aa9..c1ae016 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h @@ -111,6 +111,8 @@ #define AUDIT_PROCTITLE 1327 /* Proctitle emit event */ #define AUDIT_FEATURE_CHANGE 1328 /* audit log listing feature changes */ #define AUDIT_REPLACE 1329 /* Replace auditd if this packet unanswerd */ +#define AUDIT_CAPABILITY 1330 /* Record showing capability use */ +#define AUDIT_CGROUP 1331 /* Record showing cgroups */ #define AUDIT_AVC 1400 /* SE Linux avc denial or grant */ #define AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR 1401 /* Internal SE Linux Errors */ diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c index 8d528f9..98dd920 100644 --- a/kernel/audit.c +++ b/kernel/audit.c @@ -54,6 +54,7 @@ #include <linux/kthread.h> #include <linux/kernel.h> #include <linux/syscalls.h> +#include <linux/cgroup.h> #include <linux/audit.h> @@ -1682,7 +1683,7 @@ void audit_log_cap(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *prefix, kernel_cap_t *cap) { int i; - audit_log_format(ab, " %s=", prefix); + audit_log_format(ab, "%s=", prefix); CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(i) { audit_log_format(ab, "%08x", cap->cap[CAP_LAST_U32 - i]); @@ -1696,11 +1697,11 @@ static void audit_log_fcaps(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct audit_names *name) int log = 0; if (!cap_isclear(*perm)) { - audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_fp", perm); + audit_log_cap(ab, " cap_fp", perm); log = 1; } if (!cap_isclear(*inh)) { - audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_fi", inh); + audit_log_cap(ab, " cap_fi", inh); log = 1; } diff --git a/kernel/audit.h b/kernel/audit.h index a492f4c..680e8b5 100644 --- a/kernel/audit.h +++ b/kernel/audit.h @@ -202,6 +202,7 @@ struct audit_context { }; int fds[2]; struct audit_proctitle proctitle; + kernel_cap_t cap_used; }; extern u32 audit_ever_enabled; diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c index 2672d10..32c3813 100644 --- a/kernel/auditsc.c +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c @@ -197,7 +197,6 @@ static int audit_match_filetype(struct audit_context *ctx, int val) * References in it _are_ dropped - at the same time we free/drop aux stuff. */ -#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE static void audit_set_auditable(struct audit_context *ctx) { if (!ctx->prio) { @@ -206,6 +205,7 @@ static void audit_set_auditable(struct audit_context *ctx) } } +#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE static int put_tree_ref(struct audit_context *ctx, struct audit_chunk *chunk) { struct audit_tree_refs *p = ctx->trees; @@ -1439,6 +1439,18 @@ static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, struct task_struct *ts audit_log_proctitle(tsk, context); + ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CAPABILITY); + if (ab) { + audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_used", &context->cap_used); + audit_log_end(ab); + } + ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CGROUP); + if (ab) { + audit_log_format(ab, "cgroups="); + audit_cgroup_list(ab); + audit_log_end(ab); + } + /* Send end of event record to help user space know we are finished */ ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_EOE); if (ab) @@ -2428,3 +2440,17 @@ struct list_head *audit_killed_trees(void) return NULL; return &ctx->killed_trees; } + +void audit_log_cap_use(int cap) +{ + struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; + + if (context) { + cap_raise(context->cap_used, cap); + audit_set_auditable(context); + } else { + audit_log(NULL, GFP_NOFS, AUDIT_CAPABILITY, + "cap_used=%d pid=%d no audit_context", + cap, task_pid_nr(current)); + } +} diff --git a/kernel/capability.c b/kernel/capability.c index 45432b5..d45d5b1 100644 --- a/kernel/capability.c +++ b/kernel/capability.c @@ -366,8 +366,8 @@ bool has_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t, int cap) * @ns: The usernamespace we want the capability in * @cap: The capability to be tested for * - * Return true if the current task has the given superior capability currently - * available for use, false if not. + * Return true if the current task has the given superior capability + * currently available for use, false if not. Write an audit message. * * This sets PF_SUPERPRIV on the task if the capability is available on the * assumption that it's about to be used. @@ -380,6 +380,7 @@ bool ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap) } if (security_capable(current_cred(), ns, cap) == 0) { + audit_log_cap_use(cap); current->flags |= PF_SUPERPRIV; return true; } diff --git a/kernel/cgroup.c b/kernel/cgroup.c index 75c0ff0..1931679 100644 --- a/kernel/cgroup.c +++ b/kernel/cgroup.c @@ -63,6 +63,7 @@ #include <linux/nsproxy.h> #include <linux/proc_ns.h> #include <net/sock.h> +#include <linux/audit.h> /* * pidlists linger the following amount before being destroyed. The goal @@ -5789,6 +5790,67 @@ out: return retval; } +/* + * audit_cgroup_list() + * - Print task's cgroup paths with audit_log_format() + * - Used for capability audit logging + * - Otherwise very similar to proc_cgroup_show(). + */ +void audit_cgroup_list(struct audit_buffer *ab) +{ + char *buf, *path; + struct cgroup_root *root; + + buf = kmalloc(PATH_MAX, GFP_NOFS); + if (!buf) + return; + + mutex_lock(&cgroup_mutex); + spin_lock_irq(&css_set_lock); + + for_each_root(root) { + struct cgroup_subsys *ss; + struct cgroup *cgrp; + int ssid, count = 0; + + if (root == &cgrp_dfl_root && !cgrp_dfl_visible) + continue; + + if (root != &cgrp_dfl_root) + for_each_subsys(ss, ssid) + if (root->subsys_mask & (1 << ssid)) + audit_log_format(ab, "%s%s", + count++ ? "," : "", + ss->legacy_name); + if (strlen(root->name)) + audit_log_format(ab, "%sname=%s", count ? "," : "", + root->name); + audit_log_format(ab, ":"); + + cgrp = task_cgroup_from_root(current, root); + + if (cgroup_on_dfl(cgrp) || !(current->flags & PF_EXITING)) { + path = cgroup_path_ns_locked(cgrp, buf, PATH_MAX, + current->nsproxy->cgroup_ns); + if (!path) + goto out_unlock; + } else + path = "/"; + + audit_log_format(ab, "%s", path); + + if (cgroup_on_dfl(cgrp) && cgroup_is_dead(cgrp)) + audit_log_format(ab, " (deleted);"); + else + audit_log_format(ab, ";"); + } + +out_unlock: + spin_unlock_irq(&css_set_lock); + mutex_unlock(&cgroup_mutex); + kfree(buf); +} + /* Display information about each subsystem and each hierarchy */ static int proc_cgroupstats_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) {
There are many basic ways to control processes, including capabilities, cgroups and resource limits. However, there are far fewer ways to find out useful values for the limits, except blind trial and error. Currently, there is no way to know which capabilities are actually used. Even the source code is only implicit, in-depth knowledge of each capability must be used when analyzing a program to judge which capabilities the program will exercise. Generate an audit message at system call exit, when capabilities are used. This can then be used to configure capability sets for services by a software developer, maintainer or system administrator. Test case demonstrating basic capability monitoring with the new message types 1330 and 1331 and how the cgroups are displayed (boot to rdshell): BusyBox v1.22.1 (Debian 1:1.22.0-19) built-in shell (ash) Enter 'help' for a list of built-in commands. (initramfs) cd /sys/fs (initramfs) mount -t cgroup2 cgroup cgroup [ 12.343152] audit_printk_skb: 5886 callbacks suppressed [ 12.355214] audit: type=1300 audit(1468234317.100:518): arch=c000003e syscall=165 success=yes exit=0 a0=7fffe1e9ae2d a1=7fffe1e9ae34 a2=7fffe1e9ae25 a3=8000 items=0 ppid=469 pid=470 auid=4294967295 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 tty=ttyS0 ses=4294967295 comm="mount" exe="/bin/mount" key=(null) [ 12.414853] audit: type=1327 audit(1468234317.100:518): proctitle=6D6F756E74002D74006367726F757032006367726F7570006367726F7570 [ 12.438338] audit: type=1330 audit(1468234317.100:518): cap_used=0000000000200000 [ 12.453893] audit: type=1331 audit(1468234317.100:518): cgroups=:/; (initramfs) cd cgroup (initramfs) mkdir test; cd test [ 17.335625] audit: type=1300 audit(1468234322.092:519): arch=c000003e syscall=83 success=yes exit=0 a0=7ffddfd75e29 a1=1ff a2=0 a3=1e2 items=0 ppid=469 pid=471 auid=4294967295 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 tty=ttyS0 ses=4294967295 comm="mkdir" exe="/bin/mkdir" key=(null) [ 17.392686] audit: type=1327 audit(1468234322.092:519): proctitle=6D6B6469720074657374 [ 17.409404] audit: type=1330 audit(1468234322.092:519): cap_used=0000000000000002 [ 17.425404] audit: type=1331 audit(1468234322.092:519): cgroups=:/; (initramfs) echo $$ >cgroup.procs (initramfs) mknod /dev/z_$$ c 1 2 [ 28.385681] audit: type=1300 audit(1468234333.144:520): arch=c000003e syscall=133 success=yes exit=0 a0=7ffe16324e11 a1=21b6 a2=102 a3=5c9 items=0 ppid=469 pid=472 auid=4294967295 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 tty=ttyS0 ses=4294967295 comm="mknod" exe="/bin/mknod" key=(null) [ 28.443674] audit: type=1327 audit(1468234333.144:520): proctitle=6D6B6E6F64002F6465762F7A5F343639006300310032 [ 28.465888] audit: type=1330 audit(1468234333.144:520): cap_used=0000000008000000 [ 28.482080] audit: type=1331 audit(1468234333.144:520): cgroups=:/test; (initramfs) chown 1234 /dev/z_* [ 34.772992] audit: type=1300 audit(1468234339.532:521): arch=c000003e syscall=92 success=yes exit=0 a0=7ffd0b563e17 a1=4d2 a2=0 a3=60a items=0 ppid=469 pid=473 auid=4294967295 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 tty=ttyS0 ses=4294967295 comm="chown" exe="/bin/chown" key=(null) [ 34.828569] audit: type=1327 audit(1468234339.532:521): proctitle=63686F776E0031323334002F6465762F7A5F343639 [ 34.848747] audit: type=1330 audit(1468234339.532:521): cap_used=0000000000000001 [ 34.864404] audit: type=1331 audit(1468234339.532:521): cgroups=:/test; Signed-off-by: Topi Miettinen <toiwoton@gmail.com> --- include/linux/audit.h | 4 +++ include/linux/cgroup.h | 2 ++ include/uapi/linux/audit.h | 2 ++ kernel/audit.c | 7 +++--- kernel/audit.h | 1 + kernel/auditsc.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++- kernel/capability.c | 5 ++-- kernel/cgroup.c | 62 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 8 files changed, 105 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)