| Message ID | 1484729090-16012-3-git-send-email-nayna@linux.vnet.ibm.com (mailing list archive) |
|---|---|
| State | New, archived |
| Headers | show |
On Wed, Jan 18, 2017 at 03:44:50AM -0500, Nayna Jain wrote: > The current TPM 2.0 device driver extends only the SHA1 PCR bank > but the TCG Specification[1] recommends extending all active PCR > banks, to prevent malicious users from setting unused PCR banks with > fake measurements and quoting them. > > The existing in-kernel interface(tpm_pcr_extend()) expects only a > SHA1 digest. To extend all active PCR banks with differing > digest sizes, the SHA1 digest is padded with trailing 0's as needed. > > This patch reuses the defined digest sizes from the crypto subsystem, > adding a dependency on CRYPTO_HASH_INFO module. > > [1] TPM 2.0 Specification referred here is "TCG PC Client Specific > Platform Firmware Profile for TPM 2.0" > > Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.vnet.ibm.com> > --- > drivers/char/tpm/Kconfig | 1 + > drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c | 15 ++++++- > drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h | 3 +- > drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c | 91 +++++++++++++++++++++------------------- > drivers/char/tpm/tpm_eventlog.h | 7 ++++ > 5 files changed, 73 insertions(+), 44 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/Kconfig b/drivers/char/tpm/Kconfig > index 277186d..af985cc 100644 > --- a/drivers/char/tpm/Kconfig > +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/Kconfig > @@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ menuconfig TCG_TPM > tristate "TPM Hardware Support" > depends on HAS_IOMEM > select SECURITYFS > + select CRYPTO_HASH_INFO > ---help--- > If you have a TPM security chip in your system, which > implements the Trusted Computing Group's specification, > diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c > index a3461cb..00612dd 100644 > --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c > +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c > @@ -770,6 +770,7 @@ static const struct tpm_input_header pcrextend_header = { > int tpm_pcr_extend(u32 chip_num, int pcr_idx, const u8 *hash) > { > struct tpm_cmd_t cmd; > + int i; > int rc; > struct tpm_chip *chip; > > @@ -778,7 +779,19 @@ int tpm_pcr_extend(u32 chip_num, int pcr_idx, const u8 *hash) > return -ENODEV; > > if (chip->flags & TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2) { > - rc = tpm2_pcr_extend(chip, pcr_idx, hash); > + struct tpm2_digest digest_list[ARRAY_SIZE(chip->active_banks)]; > + u32 count = 0; Declare variables in the beginning. > + > + memset(digest_list, 0, sizeof(digest_list)); > + > + for (i = 0; (chip->active_banks[i] != 0) && > + (i < ARRAY_SIZE(chip->active_banks)); i++) { > + digest_list[i].alg_id = chip->active_banks[i]; > + memcpy(digest_list[i].digest, hash, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE); > + count++; > + } > + > + rc = tpm2_pcr_extend(chip, pcr_idx, count, digest_list); > tpm_put_ops(chip); > return rc; > } > diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h > index dddd573..f578822 100644 > --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h > +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h > @@ -533,7 +533,8 @@ static inline void tpm_add_ppi(struct tpm_chip *chip) > #endif > > int tpm2_pcr_read(struct tpm_chip *chip, int pcr_idx, u8 *res_buf); > -int tpm2_pcr_extend(struct tpm_chip *chip, int pcr_idx, const u8 *hash); > +int tpm2_pcr_extend(struct tpm_chip *chip, int pcr_idx, u32 count, > + struct tpm2_digest *digests); > int tpm2_get_random(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *out, size_t max); > int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, > struct trusted_key_payload *payload, > diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c > index 75a7546..7ceebbd 100644 > --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c > +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c > @@ -53,22 +53,6 @@ struct tpm2_pcr_read_out { > u8 digest[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE]; > } __packed; > > -struct tpm2_null_auth_area { > - __be32 handle; > - __be16 nonce_size; > - u8 attributes; > - __be16 auth_size; > -} __packed; > - > -struct tpm2_pcr_extend_in { > - __be32 pcr_idx; > - __be32 auth_area_size; > - struct tpm2_null_auth_area auth_area; > - __be32 digest_cnt; > - __be16 hash_alg; > - u8 digest[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE]; > -} __packed; > - > struct tpm2_get_tpm_pt_in { > __be32 cap_id; > __be32 property_id; > @@ -97,7 +81,6 @@ union tpm2_cmd_params { > struct tpm2_self_test_in selftest_in; > struct tpm2_pcr_read_in pcrread_in; > struct tpm2_pcr_read_out pcrread_out; > - struct tpm2_pcr_extend_in pcrextend_in; > struct tpm2_get_tpm_pt_in get_tpm_pt_in; > struct tpm2_get_tpm_pt_out get_tpm_pt_out; > struct tpm2_get_random_in getrandom_in; > @@ -290,46 +273,68 @@ int tpm2_pcr_read(struct tpm_chip *chip, int pcr_idx, u8 *res_buf) > return rc; > } > > -#define TPM2_GET_PCREXTEND_IN_SIZE \ > - (sizeof(struct tpm_input_header) + \ > - sizeof(struct tpm2_pcr_extend_in)) > - > -static const struct tpm_input_header tpm2_pcrextend_header = { > - .tag = cpu_to_be16(TPM2_ST_SESSIONS), > - .length = cpu_to_be32(TPM2_GET_PCREXTEND_IN_SIZE), > - .ordinal = cpu_to_be32(TPM2_CC_PCR_EXTEND) > -}; > +struct tpm2_null_auth_area { > + __be32 handle; > + __be16 nonce_size; > + u8 attributes; > + __be16 auth_size; > +} __packed; > > /** > * tpm2_pcr_extend() - extend a PCR value > * > * @chip: TPM chip to use. > * @pcr_idx: index of the PCR. > - * @hash: hash value to use for the extend operation. > + * @count: number of digests passed. > + * @digests: list of pcr banks and corresponding digest values to extend. > * > * Return: Same as with tpm_transmit_cmd. > * > -int tpm2_pcr_extend(struct tpm_chip *chip, int pcr_idx, const u8 *hash) > +int tpm2_pcr_extend(struct tpm_chip *chip, int pcr_idx, u32 count, > + struct tpm2_digest *digests) Yes, this much much better. Now you can understand what is happening even if you never have read the TPM 2.0 spec. > { > - struct tpm2_cmd cmd; > + struct tpm_buf buf; > + struct tpm2_null_auth_area auth_area; > int rc; > + int i; > + int j; > > - cmd.header.in = tpm2_pcrextend_header; > - cmd.params.pcrextend_in.pcr_idx = cpu_to_be32(pcr_idx); > - cmd.params.pcrextend_in.auth_area_size = > - cpu_to_be32(sizeof(struct tpm2_null_auth_area)); > - cmd.params.pcrextend_in.auth_area.handle = > - cpu_to_be32(TPM2_RS_PW); > - cmd.params.pcrextend_in.auth_area.nonce_size = 0; > - cmd.params.pcrextend_in.auth_area.attributes = 0; > - cmd.params.pcrextend_in.auth_area.auth_size = 0; > - cmd.params.pcrextend_in.digest_cnt = cpu_to_be32(1); > - cmd.params.pcrextend_in.hash_alg = cpu_to_be16(TPM2_ALG_SHA1); > - memcpy(cmd.params.pcrextend_in.digest, hash, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE); > + if (count > ARRAY_SIZE(chip->active_banks)) > + return -EINVAL; > > - rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &cmd, sizeof(cmd), 0, > + rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_PCR_EXTEND); > + if (rc) > + return rc; > + > + tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, pcr_idx); > + > + auth_area.handle = cpu_to_be32(TPM2_RS_PW); > + auth_area.nonce_size = 0; > + auth_area.attributes = 0; > + auth_area.auth_size = 0; > + > + tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, sizeof(struct tpm2_null_auth_area)); > + tpm_buf_append(&buf, (const unsigned char *)&auth_area, > + sizeof(auth_area)); > + tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, count); > + > + for (i = 0; i < count; i++) { > + for (j = 0; j < ARRAY_SIZE(tpm2_hash_map); j++) { > + if (digests[i].alg_id != tpm2_hash_map[j].tpm_id) > + continue; > + > + tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, digests[i].alg_id); > + tpm_buf_append(&buf, (const unsigned char > + *)&digests[i].digest, > + hash_digest_size[tpm2_hash_map[j].crypto_id]); > + } > + } > + > + rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, buf.data, tpm_buf_length(&buf), 0, > "attempting extend a PCR value"); > > + tpm_buf_destroy(&buf); > + > return rc; > } > > @@ -993,6 +998,8 @@ int tpm2_auto_startup(struct tpm_chip *chip) > } > } > > + rc = tpm2_get_pcr_allocation(chip); > + > out: > if (rc > 0) > rc = -ENODEV; > diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_eventlog.h b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_eventlog.h > index 1660d74..b5ae372 100644 > --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_eventlog.h > +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_eventlog.h > @@ -2,6 +2,8 @@ > #ifndef __TPM_EVENTLOG_H__ > #define __TPM_EVENTLOG_H__ > > +#include <crypto/hash_info.h> > + > #define TCG_EVENT_NAME_LEN_MAX 255 > #define MAX_TEXT_EVENT 1000 /* Max event string length */ > #define ACPI_TCPA_SIG "TCPA" /* 0x41504354 /'TCPA' */ > @@ -73,6 +75,11 @@ enum tcpa_pc_event_ids { > HOST_TABLE_OF_DEVICES, > }; > > +struct tpm2_digest { > + u16 alg_id; > + u8 digest[SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE]; > +} __packed; > + > #if defined(CONFIG_ACPI) > int tpm_read_log_acpi(struct tpm_chip *chip); > #else > -- > 2.5.0 Otherwise, Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> /Jarkko -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
On 01/18/2017 07:28 PM, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote: > On Wed, Jan 18, 2017 at 03:44:50AM -0500, Nayna Jain wrote: >> The current TPM 2.0 device driver extends only the SHA1 PCR bank >> but the TCG Specification[1] recommends extending all active PCR >> banks, to prevent malicious users from setting unused PCR banks with >> fake measurements and quoting them. >> >> The existing in-kernel interface(tpm_pcr_extend()) expects only a >> SHA1 digest. To extend all active PCR banks with differing >> digest sizes, the SHA1 digest is padded with trailing 0's as needed. >> >> This patch reuses the defined digest sizes from the crypto subsystem, >> adding a dependency on CRYPTO_HASH_INFO module. >> >> [1] TPM 2.0 Specification referred here is "TCG PC Client Specific >> Platform Firmware Profile for TPM 2.0" >> >> Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.vnet.ibm.com> >> --- >> drivers/char/tpm/Kconfig | 1 + >> drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c | 15 ++++++- >> drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h | 3 +- >> drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c | 91 +++++++++++++++++++++------------------- >> drivers/char/tpm/tpm_eventlog.h | 7 ++++ >> 5 files changed, 73 insertions(+), 44 deletions(-) >> >> diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/Kconfig b/drivers/char/tpm/Kconfig >> index 277186d..af985cc 100644 >> --- a/drivers/char/tpm/Kconfig >> +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/Kconfig >> @@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ menuconfig TCG_TPM >> tristate "TPM Hardware Support" >> depends on HAS_IOMEM >> select SECURITYFS >> + select CRYPTO_HASH_INFO >> ---help--- >> If you have a TPM security chip in your system, which >> implements the Trusted Computing Group's specification, >> diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c >> index a3461cb..00612dd 100644 >> --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c >> +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c >> @@ -770,6 +770,7 @@ static const struct tpm_input_header pcrextend_header = { >> int tpm_pcr_extend(u32 chip_num, int pcr_idx, const u8 *hash) >> { >> struct tpm_cmd_t cmd; >> + int i; >> int rc; >> struct tpm_chip *chip; >> >> @@ -778,7 +779,19 @@ int tpm_pcr_extend(u32 chip_num, int pcr_idx, const u8 *hash) >> return -ENODEV; >> >> if (chip->flags & TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2) { >> - rc = tpm2_pcr_extend(chip, pcr_idx, hash); >> + struct tpm2_digest digest_list[ARRAY_SIZE(chip->active_banks)]; >> + u32 count = 0; > > Declare variables in the beginning. Done, posted new version with this change. > >> + >> + memset(digest_list, 0, sizeof(digest_list)); >> + >> + for (i = 0; (chip->active_banks[i] != 0) && >> + (i < ARRAY_SIZE(chip->active_banks)); i++) { >> + digest_list[i].alg_id = chip->active_banks[i]; >> + memcpy(digest_list[i].digest, hash, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE); >> + count++; >> + } >> + >> + rc = tpm2_pcr_extend(chip, pcr_idx, count, digest_list); >> tpm_put_ops(chip); >> return rc; >> } >> diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h >> index dddd573..f578822 100644 >> --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h >> +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h >> @@ -533,7 +533,8 @@ static inline void tpm_add_ppi(struct tpm_chip *chip) >> #endif >> >> int tpm2_pcr_read(struct tpm_chip *chip, int pcr_idx, u8 *res_buf); >> -int tpm2_pcr_extend(struct tpm_chip *chip, int pcr_idx, const u8 *hash); >> +int tpm2_pcr_extend(struct tpm_chip *chip, int pcr_idx, u32 count, >> + struct tpm2_digest *digests); >> int tpm2_get_random(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *out, size_t max); >> int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, >> struct trusted_key_payload *payload, >> diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c >> index 75a7546..7ceebbd 100644 >> --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c >> +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c >> @@ -53,22 +53,6 @@ struct tpm2_pcr_read_out { >> u8 digest[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE]; >> } __packed; >> >> -struct tpm2_null_auth_area { >> - __be32 handle; >> - __be16 nonce_size; >> - u8 attributes; >> - __be16 auth_size; >> -} __packed; >> - >> -struct tpm2_pcr_extend_in { >> - __be32 pcr_idx; >> - __be32 auth_area_size; >> - struct tpm2_null_auth_area auth_area; >> - __be32 digest_cnt; >> - __be16 hash_alg; >> - u8 digest[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE]; >> -} __packed; >> - >> struct tpm2_get_tpm_pt_in { >> __be32 cap_id; >> __be32 property_id; >> @@ -97,7 +81,6 @@ union tpm2_cmd_params { >> struct tpm2_self_test_in selftest_in; >> struct tpm2_pcr_read_in pcrread_in; >> struct tpm2_pcr_read_out pcrread_out; >> - struct tpm2_pcr_extend_in pcrextend_in; >> struct tpm2_get_tpm_pt_in get_tpm_pt_in; >> struct tpm2_get_tpm_pt_out get_tpm_pt_out; >> struct tpm2_get_random_in getrandom_in; >> @@ -290,46 +273,68 @@ int tpm2_pcr_read(struct tpm_chip *chip, int pcr_idx, u8 *res_buf) >> return rc; >> } >> >> -#define TPM2_GET_PCREXTEND_IN_SIZE \ >> - (sizeof(struct tpm_input_header) + \ >> - sizeof(struct tpm2_pcr_extend_in)) >> - >> -static const struct tpm_input_header tpm2_pcrextend_header = { >> - .tag = cpu_to_be16(TPM2_ST_SESSIONS), >> - .length = cpu_to_be32(TPM2_GET_PCREXTEND_IN_SIZE), >> - .ordinal = cpu_to_be32(TPM2_CC_PCR_EXTEND) >> -}; >> +struct tpm2_null_auth_area { >> + __be32 handle; >> + __be16 nonce_size; >> + u8 attributes; >> + __be16 auth_size; >> +} __packed; >> >> /** >> * tpm2_pcr_extend() - extend a PCR value >> * >> * @chip: TPM chip to use. >> * @pcr_idx: index of the PCR. >> - * @hash: hash value to use for the extend operation. >> + * @count: number of digests passed. >> + * @digests: list of pcr banks and corresponding digest values to extend. >> * >> * Return: Same as with tpm_transmit_cmd. >> * >> -int tpm2_pcr_extend(struct tpm_chip *chip, int pcr_idx, const u8 *hash) >> +int tpm2_pcr_extend(struct tpm_chip *chip, int pcr_idx, u32 count, >> + struct tpm2_digest *digests) > > Yes, this much much better. Now you can understand what is happening > even if you never have read the TPM 2.0 spec. Yeah.. I agree.. Thanks & Regards, - Nayna > >> { >> - struct tpm2_cmd cmd; >> + struct tpm_buf buf; >> + struct tpm2_null_auth_area auth_area; >> int rc; >> + int i; >> + int j; >> >> - cmd.header.in = tpm2_pcrextend_header; >> - cmd.params.pcrextend_in.pcr_idx = cpu_to_be32(pcr_idx); >> - cmd.params.pcrextend_in.auth_area_size = >> - cpu_to_be32(sizeof(struct tpm2_null_auth_area)); >> - cmd.params.pcrextend_in.auth_area.handle = >> - cpu_to_be32(TPM2_RS_PW); >> - cmd.params.pcrextend_in.auth_area.nonce_size = 0; >> - cmd.params.pcrextend_in.auth_area.attributes = 0; >> - cmd.params.pcrextend_in.auth_area.auth_size = 0; >> - cmd.params.pcrextend_in.digest_cnt = cpu_to_be32(1); >> - cmd.params.pcrextend_in.hash_alg = cpu_to_be16(TPM2_ALG_SHA1); >> - memcpy(cmd.params.pcrextend_in.digest, hash, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE); >> + if (count > ARRAY_SIZE(chip->active_banks)) >> + return -EINVAL; >> >> - rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &cmd, sizeof(cmd), 0, >> + rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_PCR_EXTEND); >> + if (rc) >> + return rc; >> + >> + tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, pcr_idx); >> + >> + auth_area.handle = cpu_to_be32(TPM2_RS_PW); >> + auth_area.nonce_size = 0; >> + auth_area.attributes = 0; >> + auth_area.auth_size = 0; >> + >> + tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, sizeof(struct tpm2_null_auth_area)); >> + tpm_buf_append(&buf, (const unsigned char *)&auth_area, >> + sizeof(auth_area)); >> + tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, count); >> + >> + for (i = 0; i < count; i++) { >> + for (j = 0; j < ARRAY_SIZE(tpm2_hash_map); j++) { >> + if (digests[i].alg_id != tpm2_hash_map[j].tpm_id) >> + continue; >> + >> + tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, digests[i].alg_id); >> + tpm_buf_append(&buf, (const unsigned char >> + *)&digests[i].digest, >> + hash_digest_size[tpm2_hash_map[j].crypto_id]); >> + } >> + } >> + >> + rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, buf.data, tpm_buf_length(&buf), 0, >> "attempting extend a PCR value"); >> >> + tpm_buf_destroy(&buf); >> + >> return rc; >> } >> >> @@ -993,6 +998,8 @@ int tpm2_auto_startup(struct tpm_chip *chip) >> } >> } >> >> + rc = tpm2_get_pcr_allocation(chip); >> + >> out: >> if (rc > 0) >> rc = -ENODEV; >> diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_eventlog.h b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_eventlog.h >> index 1660d74..b5ae372 100644 >> --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_eventlog.h >> +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_eventlog.h >> @@ -2,6 +2,8 @@ >> #ifndef __TPM_EVENTLOG_H__ >> #define __TPM_EVENTLOG_H__ >> >> +#include <crypto/hash_info.h> >> + >> #define TCG_EVENT_NAME_LEN_MAX 255 >> #define MAX_TEXT_EVENT 1000 /* Max event string length */ >> #define ACPI_TCPA_SIG "TCPA" /* 0x41504354 /'TCPA' */ >> @@ -73,6 +75,11 @@ enum tcpa_pc_event_ids { >> HOST_TABLE_OF_DEVICES, >> }; >> >> +struct tpm2_digest { >> + u16 alg_id; >> + u8 digest[SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE]; >> +} __packed; >> + >> #if defined(CONFIG_ACPI) >> int tpm_read_log_acpi(struct tpm_chip *chip); >> #else >> -- >> 2.5.0 > > Otherwise, > > Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> > > /Jarkko > -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/Kconfig b/drivers/char/tpm/Kconfig index 277186d..af985cc 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/Kconfig +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/Kconfig @@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ menuconfig TCG_TPM tristate "TPM Hardware Support" depends on HAS_IOMEM select SECURITYFS + select CRYPTO_HASH_INFO ---help--- If you have a TPM security chip in your system, which implements the Trusted Computing Group's specification, diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c index a3461cb..00612dd 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c @@ -770,6 +770,7 @@ static const struct tpm_input_header pcrextend_header = { int tpm_pcr_extend(u32 chip_num, int pcr_idx, const u8 *hash) { struct tpm_cmd_t cmd; + int i; int rc; struct tpm_chip *chip; @@ -778,7 +779,19 @@ int tpm_pcr_extend(u32 chip_num, int pcr_idx, const u8 *hash) return -ENODEV; if (chip->flags & TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2) { - rc = tpm2_pcr_extend(chip, pcr_idx, hash); + struct tpm2_digest digest_list[ARRAY_SIZE(chip->active_banks)]; + u32 count = 0; + + memset(digest_list, 0, sizeof(digest_list)); + + for (i = 0; (chip->active_banks[i] != 0) && + (i < ARRAY_SIZE(chip->active_banks)); i++) { + digest_list[i].alg_id = chip->active_banks[i]; + memcpy(digest_list[i].digest, hash, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE); + count++; + } + + rc = tpm2_pcr_extend(chip, pcr_idx, count, digest_list); tpm_put_ops(chip); return rc; } diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h index dddd573..f578822 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h @@ -533,7 +533,8 @@ static inline void tpm_add_ppi(struct tpm_chip *chip) #endif int tpm2_pcr_read(struct tpm_chip *chip, int pcr_idx, u8 *res_buf); -int tpm2_pcr_extend(struct tpm_chip *chip, int pcr_idx, const u8 *hash); +int tpm2_pcr_extend(struct tpm_chip *chip, int pcr_idx, u32 count, + struct tpm2_digest *digests); int tpm2_get_random(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *out, size_t max); int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct trusted_key_payload *payload, diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c index 75a7546..7ceebbd 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c @@ -53,22 +53,6 @@ struct tpm2_pcr_read_out { u8 digest[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE]; } __packed; -struct tpm2_null_auth_area { - __be32 handle; - __be16 nonce_size; - u8 attributes; - __be16 auth_size; -} __packed; - -struct tpm2_pcr_extend_in { - __be32 pcr_idx; - __be32 auth_area_size; - struct tpm2_null_auth_area auth_area; - __be32 digest_cnt; - __be16 hash_alg; - u8 digest[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE]; -} __packed; - struct tpm2_get_tpm_pt_in { __be32 cap_id; __be32 property_id; @@ -97,7 +81,6 @@ union tpm2_cmd_params { struct tpm2_self_test_in selftest_in; struct tpm2_pcr_read_in pcrread_in; struct tpm2_pcr_read_out pcrread_out; - struct tpm2_pcr_extend_in pcrextend_in; struct tpm2_get_tpm_pt_in get_tpm_pt_in; struct tpm2_get_tpm_pt_out get_tpm_pt_out; struct tpm2_get_random_in getrandom_in; @@ -290,46 +273,68 @@ int tpm2_pcr_read(struct tpm_chip *chip, int pcr_idx, u8 *res_buf) return rc; } -#define TPM2_GET_PCREXTEND_IN_SIZE \ - (sizeof(struct tpm_input_header) + \ - sizeof(struct tpm2_pcr_extend_in)) - -static const struct tpm_input_header tpm2_pcrextend_header = { - .tag = cpu_to_be16(TPM2_ST_SESSIONS), - .length = cpu_to_be32(TPM2_GET_PCREXTEND_IN_SIZE), - .ordinal = cpu_to_be32(TPM2_CC_PCR_EXTEND) -}; +struct tpm2_null_auth_area { + __be32 handle; + __be16 nonce_size; + u8 attributes; + __be16 auth_size; +} __packed; /** * tpm2_pcr_extend() - extend a PCR value * * @chip: TPM chip to use. * @pcr_idx: index of the PCR. - * @hash: hash value to use for the extend operation. + * @count: number of digests passed. + * @digests: list of pcr banks and corresponding digest values to extend. * * Return: Same as with tpm_transmit_cmd. */ -int tpm2_pcr_extend(struct tpm_chip *chip, int pcr_idx, const u8 *hash) +int tpm2_pcr_extend(struct tpm_chip *chip, int pcr_idx, u32 count, + struct tpm2_digest *digests) { - struct tpm2_cmd cmd; + struct tpm_buf buf; + struct tpm2_null_auth_area auth_area; int rc; + int i; + int j; - cmd.header.in = tpm2_pcrextend_header; - cmd.params.pcrextend_in.pcr_idx = cpu_to_be32(pcr_idx); - cmd.params.pcrextend_in.auth_area_size = - cpu_to_be32(sizeof(struct tpm2_null_auth_area)); - cmd.params.pcrextend_in.auth_area.handle = - cpu_to_be32(TPM2_RS_PW); - cmd.params.pcrextend_in.auth_area.nonce_size = 0; - cmd.params.pcrextend_in.auth_area.attributes = 0; - cmd.params.pcrextend_in.auth_area.auth_size = 0; - cmd.params.pcrextend_in.digest_cnt = cpu_to_be32(1); - cmd.params.pcrextend_in.hash_alg = cpu_to_be16(TPM2_ALG_SHA1); - memcpy(cmd.params.pcrextend_in.digest, hash, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE); + if (count > ARRAY_SIZE(chip->active_banks)) + return -EINVAL; - rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &cmd, sizeof(cmd), 0, + rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_PCR_EXTEND); + if (rc) + return rc; + + tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, pcr_idx); + + auth_area.handle = cpu_to_be32(TPM2_RS_PW); + auth_area.nonce_size = 0; + auth_area.attributes = 0; + auth_area.auth_size = 0; + + tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, sizeof(struct tpm2_null_auth_area)); + tpm_buf_append(&buf, (const unsigned char *)&auth_area, + sizeof(auth_area)); + tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, count); + + for (i = 0; i < count; i++) { + for (j = 0; j < ARRAY_SIZE(tpm2_hash_map); j++) { + if (digests[i].alg_id != tpm2_hash_map[j].tpm_id) + continue; + + tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, digests[i].alg_id); + tpm_buf_append(&buf, (const unsigned char + *)&digests[i].digest, + hash_digest_size[tpm2_hash_map[j].crypto_id]); + } + } + + rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, buf.data, tpm_buf_length(&buf), 0, "attempting extend a PCR value"); + tpm_buf_destroy(&buf); + return rc; } @@ -993,6 +998,8 @@ int tpm2_auto_startup(struct tpm_chip *chip) } } + rc = tpm2_get_pcr_allocation(chip); + out: if (rc > 0) rc = -ENODEV; diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_eventlog.h b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_eventlog.h index 1660d74..b5ae372 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_eventlog.h +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_eventlog.h @@ -2,6 +2,8 @@ #ifndef __TPM_EVENTLOG_H__ #define __TPM_EVENTLOG_H__ +#include <crypto/hash_info.h> + #define TCG_EVENT_NAME_LEN_MAX 255 #define MAX_TEXT_EVENT 1000 /* Max event string length */ #define ACPI_TCPA_SIG "TCPA" /* 0x41504354 /'TCPA' */ @@ -73,6 +75,11 @@ enum tcpa_pc_event_ids { HOST_TABLE_OF_DEVICES, }; +struct tpm2_digest { + u16 alg_id; + u8 digest[SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE]; +} __packed; + #if defined(CONFIG_ACPI) int tpm_read_log_acpi(struct tpm_chip *chip); #else
The current TPM 2.0 device driver extends only the SHA1 PCR bank but the TCG Specification[1] recommends extending all active PCR banks, to prevent malicious users from setting unused PCR banks with fake measurements and quoting them. The existing in-kernel interface(tpm_pcr_extend()) expects only a SHA1 digest. To extend all active PCR banks with differing digest sizes, the SHA1 digest is padded with trailing 0's as needed. This patch reuses the defined digest sizes from the crypto subsystem, adding a dependency on CRYPTO_HASH_INFO module. [1] TPM 2.0 Specification referred here is "TCG PC Client Specific Platform Firmware Profile for TPM 2.0" Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.vnet.ibm.com> --- drivers/char/tpm/Kconfig | 1 + drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c | 15 ++++++- drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h | 3 +- drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c | 91 +++++++++++++++++++++------------------- drivers/char/tpm/tpm_eventlog.h | 7 ++++ 5 files changed, 73 insertions(+), 44 deletions(-)