Message ID | 20170209120301.28152-1-colin.king@canonical.com (mailing list archive) |
---|---|
State | New, archived |
Headers | show |
Am 09.02.2017 13:03, schrieb Colin King: > From: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com> > > The initialisation of pointer ssp is from a dereference on sock->sk > before sock-sk is null checked, hence there is a potential for a > null pointer deference. Fix this by moving the assignment of ssp > to just before it is used in the call to smk_ipv6_check. > > Detected with CoverityScan, CID#1324196 ("Dereference before null check") > > Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com> > --- > security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 6 ++++-- > 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c > index fc8fb31..bb17387 100644 > --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c > +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c > @@ -2899,7 +2899,7 @@ static int smack_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *sap, > #endif > #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING > struct smack_known *rsp; > - struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk->sk_security; > + struct socket_smack *ssp; > #endif > > if (sock->sk == NULL) > @@ -2916,9 +2916,11 @@ static int smack_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *sap, > return -EINVAL; > #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING > rsp = smack_ipv6host_label(sip); > - if (rsp != NULL) > + if (rsp != NULL) { > + ssp = sock->sk->sk_security; > rc = smk_ipv6_check(ssp->smk_out, rsp, sip, > SMK_CONNECTING); > + } > #endif > #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING > rc = smk_ipv6_port_check(sock->sk, sip, SMK_CONNECTING); In the hope of reducing the ifdef forrest: you could move the struct smack_known *rsp; and struct socket_smack *ssp; into the block like: { struct smack_known *rsp=smack_ipv6host_label(sip); if (rsp != NULL) { struct socket_smack *ssp= sock->sk->sk_security; rc = smk_ipv6_check(ssp->smk_out, rsp, sip, SMK_CONNECTING); } } just my 2 cents ... re, wh -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
On 2/9/2017 5:09 AM, walter harms wrote: > > Am 09.02.2017 13:03, schrieb Colin King: >> From: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com> >> >> The initialisation of pointer ssp is from a dereference on sock->sk >> before sock-sk is null checked, hence there is a potential for a >> null pointer deference. Fix this by moving the assignment of ssp >> to just before it is used in the call to smk_ipv6_check. >> >> Detected with CoverityScan, CID#1324196 ("Dereference before null check") >> >> Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com> >> --- >> security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 6 ++++-- >> 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) >> >> diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c >> index fc8fb31..bb17387 100644 >> --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c >> +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c >> @@ -2899,7 +2899,7 @@ static int smack_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *sap, >> #endif >> #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING >> struct smack_known *rsp; >> - struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk->sk_security; >> + struct socket_smack *ssp; >> #endif >> >> if (sock->sk == NULL) >> @@ -2916,9 +2916,11 @@ static int smack_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *sap, >> return -EINVAL; >> #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING >> rsp = smack_ipv6host_label(sip); >> - if (rsp != NULL) >> + if (rsp != NULL) { >> + ssp = sock->sk->sk_security; >> rc = smk_ipv6_check(ssp->smk_out, rsp, sip, >> SMK_CONNECTING); >> + } >> #endif >> #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING >> rc = smk_ipv6_port_check(sock->sk, sip, SMK_CONNECTING); > > In the hope of reducing the ifdef forrest: > you could move the struct smack_known *rsp; and struct socket_smack *ssp; into the block like: > > { > struct smack_known *rsp=smack_ipv6host_label(sip); > > if (rsp != NULL) { > struct socket_smack *ssp= sock->sk->sk_security; > rc = smk_ipv6_check(ssp->smk_out, rsp, sip, > SMK_CONNECTING); > } > } > > > just my 2 cents ... I can't say that I'm proud of that chunk of code. A real clean-up is on my todo list, and I would happily entertain patches. > > re, > wh > -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c index fc8fb31..bb17387 100644 --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c @@ -2899,7 +2899,7 @@ static int smack_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *sap, #endif #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING struct smack_known *rsp; - struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk->sk_security; + struct socket_smack *ssp; #endif if (sock->sk == NULL) @@ -2916,9 +2916,11 @@ static int smack_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *sap, return -EINVAL; #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING rsp = smack_ipv6host_label(sip); - if (rsp != NULL) + if (rsp != NULL) { + ssp = sock->sk->sk_security; rc = smk_ipv6_check(ssp->smk_out, rsp, sip, SMK_CONNECTING); + } #endif #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING rc = smk_ipv6_port_check(sock->sk, sip, SMK_CONNECTING);