@@ -950,6 +950,18 @@ void virtual_vmcs_vmwrite(const struct vcpu *v, u32 vmcs_encoding, u64 val)
virtual_vmcs_exit(v);
}
+enum vmx_insn_errno virtual_vmcs_vmwrite_safe(const struct vcpu *v,
+ u32 vmcs_encoding, u64 val)
+{
+ enum vmx_insn_errno ret;
+
+ virtual_vmcs_enter(v);
+ ret = vmwrite_safe(vmcs_encoding, val);
+ virtual_vmcs_exit(v);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
/*
* This function is only called in a vCPU's initialization phase,
* so we can update the posted-interrupt descriptor in non-atomic way.
@@ -305,6 +305,25 @@ void set_vvmcs_real(const struct vcpu *v, u32 encoding, u64 val)
virtual_vmcs_vmwrite(v, encoding, val);
}
+enum vmx_insn_errno set_vvmcs_virtual_safe(void *vvmcs, u32 encoding, u64 val)
+{
+ set_vvmcs_virtual(vvmcs, encoding, val);
+
+ /*
+ * TODO: This should not always succeed. Fields and values need to be
+ * audited against the features offered to the guest in the VT-x MSRs.
+ * This should be fixed when the MSR levelling work is started, at which
+ * point there will be a cpuid_policy-like object.
+ */
+ return VMX_INSN_SUCCEED;
+}
+
+enum vmx_insn_errno set_vvmcs_real_safe(const struct vcpu *v, u32 encoding,
+ u64 val)
+{
+ return virtual_vmcs_vmwrite_safe(v, encoding, val);
+}
+
static unsigned long reg_read(struct cpu_user_regs *regs,
enum vmx_regs_enc index)
{
@@ -1740,13 +1759,19 @@ int nvmx_handle_vmwrite(struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
unsigned long operand;
u64 vmcs_encoding;
bool_t okay = 1;
+ enum vmx_insn_errno err;
if ( decode_vmx_inst(regs, &decode, &operand, 0)
!= X86EMUL_OKAY )
return X86EMUL_EXCEPTION;
vmcs_encoding = reg_read(regs, decode.reg2);
- set_vvmcs(v, vmcs_encoding, operand);
+ err = set_vvmcs_safe(v, vmcs_encoding, operand);
+ if ( err != VMX_INSN_SUCCEED )
+ {
+ vmfail(regs, err);
+ return X86EMUL_OKAY;
+ }
switch ( vmcs_encoding & ~VMCS_HIGH(0) )
{
@@ -539,6 +539,8 @@ void virtual_vmcs_enter(const struct vcpu *);
void virtual_vmcs_exit(const struct vcpu *);
u64 virtual_vmcs_vmread(const struct vcpu *, u32 encoding);
void virtual_vmcs_vmwrite(const struct vcpu *, u32 encoding, u64 val);
+enum vmx_insn_errno virtual_vmcs_vmwrite_safe(const struct vcpu *v,
+ u32 vmcs_encoding, u64 val);
static inline int vmx_add_guest_msr(u32 msr)
{
@@ -183,6 +183,9 @@ u64 get_vvmcs_virtual(void *vvmcs, u32 encoding);
u64 get_vvmcs_real(const struct vcpu *, u32 encoding);
void set_vvmcs_virtual(void *vvmcs, u32 encoding, u64 val);
void set_vvmcs_real(const struct vcpu *, u32 encoding, u64 val);
+enum vmx_insn_errno set_vvmcs_virtual_safe(void *vvmcs, u32 encoding, u64 val);
+enum vmx_insn_errno set_vvmcs_real_safe(const struct vcpu *, u32 encoding,
+ u64 val);
#define get_vvmcs(vcpu, encoding) \
(cpu_has_vmx_vmcs_shadowing ? \
@@ -194,6 +197,11 @@ void set_vvmcs_real(const struct vcpu *, u32 encoding, u64 val);
set_vvmcs_real(vcpu, encoding, val) : \
set_vvmcs_virtual(vcpu_nestedhvm(vcpu).nv_vvmcx, encoding, val))
+#define set_vvmcs_safe(vcpu, encoding, val) \
+ (cpu_has_vmx_vmcs_shadowing ? \
+ set_vvmcs_real_safe(vcpu, encoding, val) : \
+ set_vvmcs_virtual_safe(vcpu_nestedhvm(vcpu).nv_vvmcx, encoding, val))
+
uint64_t get_shadow_eptp(struct vcpu *v);
void nvmx_destroy_vmcs(struct vcpu *v);
There is an issue with the original __vmwrite() in nested vmx mode: emulation of a guest's VMWRITE with invalid arguments leads to BUG(). Fix this by using vmwrite_safe() and reporting any kind of VMfail back to the guest. A new safe versions of set_vvmcs() macro and related functions are introduced because of new function signatures and lots of existing users. Signed-off-by: Sergey Dyasli <sergey.dyasli@citrix.com> --- v3 --> v4: * VMX_INSN_SUCCEED is used instead of 0 * added TODO comment into set_vvmcs_virtual_safe() based on Andrew's email xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c | 12 ++++++++++++ xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vvmx.c | 27 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++- xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.h | 2 ++ xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vmx/vvmx.h | 8 ++++++++ 4 files changed, 48 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)