| Message ID | 20170328234650.19695-8-mic@digikod.net (mailing list archive) |
|---|---|
| State | New, archived |
| Headers | show |
On Wed, Mar 29, 2017 at 1:46 AM, Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> wrote: > A landlocked process has less privileges than a non-landlocked process > and must then be subject to additional restrictions when manipulating > processes. To be allowed to use ptrace(2) and related syscalls on a > target process, a landlocked process must have a subset of the target > process' rules. > > New in v6 > > Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> > Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> > Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> > Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> > Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> > Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> > Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> > Cc: Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> > --- > security/landlock/Makefile | 2 +- > security/landlock/hooks_ptrace.c | 126 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ > security/landlock/hooks_ptrace.h | 11 ++++ > security/landlock/init.c | 2 + > 4 files changed, 140 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) > create mode 100644 security/landlock/hooks_ptrace.c > create mode 100644 security/landlock/hooks_ptrace.h > [...] > +/** > + * landlock_ptrace_access_check - determine whether the current process may > + * access another > + * > + * @child: the process to be accessed > + * @mode: the mode of attachment > + * > + * If the current task has Landlock rules, then the child must have at least > + * the same rules. Else denied. > + * > + * Determine whether a process may access another, returning 0 if permission > + * granted, -errno if denied. > + */ > +static int landlock_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, > + unsigned int mode) > +{ > + if (!landlocked(current)) > + return 0; > + > + if (!landlocked(child)) > + return -EPERM; > + > + if (landlock_task_has_subset_events(current, child)) > + return 0; > + > + return -EPERM; > +} > + Maybe you want to check the mode argument here if it is a PTRACE_ATTACH which may translate to read/writes ? PTRACE_READ are normally for reads only. Or also which creds were used if this was a direct syscall or a filesystem call through procfs. I'm bringing this, since you may want to make some room for landlock ptrace events and what others may want to do with it. Also I'm planning to send another v2 RFC for procfs separate instances [1], the aim is to give LSMs a security_ptrace_access_check hook path when dealing with /proc/<pids>/ [2] . Right now LSMs don't really have a security path there, and the implementation does not guarantee that. With this Yama ptrace scope or other LSMs may take advantage of it and check the 'PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCRED' mode for filesystem accesses. That's why I think it would be better if the default landlock ptrace semantics are not that wide. Thanks! [1] https://lkml.org/lkml/2017/3/30/670 [2] http://lxr.free-electrons.com/source/fs/proc/base.c#L719 -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
On 10/04/2017 08:48, Djalal Harouni wrote: > On Wed, Mar 29, 2017 at 1:46 AM, Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> wrote: >> A landlocked process has less privileges than a non-landlocked process >> and must then be subject to additional restrictions when manipulating >> processes. To be allowed to use ptrace(2) and related syscalls on a >> target process, a landlocked process must have a subset of the target >> process' rules. >> >> New in v6 >> >> Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> >> Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> >> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> >> Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> >> Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> >> Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> >> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> >> Cc: Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> >> --- >> security/landlock/Makefile | 2 +- >> security/landlock/hooks_ptrace.c | 126 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ >> security/landlock/hooks_ptrace.h | 11 ++++ >> security/landlock/init.c | 2 + >> 4 files changed, 140 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) >> create mode 100644 security/landlock/hooks_ptrace.c >> create mode 100644 security/landlock/hooks_ptrace.h >> > [...] > >> +/** >> + * landlock_ptrace_access_check - determine whether the current process may >> + * access another >> + * >> + * @child: the process to be accessed >> + * @mode: the mode of attachment >> + * >> + * If the current task has Landlock rules, then the child must have at least >> + * the same rules. Else denied. >> + * >> + * Determine whether a process may access another, returning 0 if permission >> + * granted, -errno if denied. >> + */ >> +static int landlock_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, >> + unsigned int mode) >> +{ >> + if (!landlocked(current)) >> + return 0; >> + >> + if (!landlocked(child)) >> + return -EPERM; >> + >> + if (landlock_task_has_subset_events(current, child)) >> + return 0; >> + >> + return -EPERM; >> +} >> + > > Maybe you want to check the mode argument here if it is a > PTRACE_ATTACH which may translate to read/writes ? PTRACE_READ are > normally for reads only. Or also which creds were used if this was a > direct syscall or a filesystem call through procfs. The idea is to mimic the behavior of UID/GID checks, namespaces and so on. A hierarchy of Landlock rules has a similar semantic as namespaces, at least for now with the FS event. > > I'm bringing this, since you may want to make some room for landlock > ptrace events and what others may want to do with it. Also I'm I don't see any no problem to add a ptrace event in the future as long as the composition with this default rule is a logical AND to allow a ptrace action. It would be possible to relax this default policy for rules with a dedicated option flag, but the current behavior is a sane one from a security point of view. > planning to send another v2 RFC for procfs separate instances [1], the > aim is to give LSMs a security_ptrace_access_check hook path when > dealing with /proc/<pids>/ [2] . Right now LSMs don't really have a > security path there, and the implementation does not guarantee that. > With this Yama ptrace scope or other LSMs may take advantage of it and > check the 'PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCRED' mode for filesystem accesses. Interesting, feel free to CC me. > That's why I think it would be better if the default landlock ptrace > semantics are not that wide. > > Thanks! > > [1] https://lkml.org/lkml/2017/3/30/670 > [2] http://lxr.free-electrons.com/source/fs/proc/base.c#L719 > If a task is allowed to ptrace/read the memory of another task with different privileges, the tracer could also access sensitive data not allowed otherwise. Do you have an use case where this constraint would be an issue? Mickaël
diff --git a/security/landlock/Makefile b/security/landlock/Makefile index da8ba8b5183e..099a56ca4842 100644 --- a/security/landlock/Makefile +++ b/security/landlock/Makefile @@ -2,4 +2,4 @@ ccflags-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK) += -Werror=unused-function obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK) := landlock.o -landlock-y := init.o providers.o hooks.o hooks_fs.o +landlock-y := init.o providers.o hooks.o hooks_fs.o hooks_ptrace.o diff --git a/security/landlock/hooks_ptrace.c b/security/landlock/hooks_ptrace.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..8ab53baba9ad --- /dev/null +++ b/security/landlock/hooks_ptrace.c @@ -0,0 +1,126 @@ +/* + * Landlock LSM - ptrace hooks + * + * Copyright © 2017 Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2, as + * published by the Free Software Foundation. + */ + +#include <asm/current.h> +#include <linux/kernel.h> /* ARRAY_SIZE */ +#include <linux/landlock.h> /* struct landlock_events */ +#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h> +#include <linux/sched.h> /* struct task_struct */ +#include <linux/seccomp.h> + +#include "hooks.h" /* landlocked() */ + +#include "hooks_ptrace.h" + + +static bool landlock_events_are_subset(const struct landlock_events *parent, + const struct landlock_events *child) +{ + size_t i; + + if (!parent || !child) + return false; + if (parent == child) + return true; + + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(child->rules); i++) { + struct landlock_rule *walker; + bool found_parent = false; + + if (!parent->rules[i]) + continue; + for (walker = child->rules[i]; walker; walker = walker->prev) { + if (walker == parent->rules[i]) { + found_parent = true; + break; + } + } + if (!found_parent) + return false; + } + return true; +} + +static bool landlock_task_has_subset_events(const struct task_struct *parent, + const struct task_struct *child) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER + if (landlock_events_are_subset(parent->seccomp.landlock_events, + child->seccomp.landlock_events)) + /* must be ANDed with other providers (i.e. cgroup) */ + return true; +#endif /* CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER */ + return false; +} + +/** + * landlock_ptrace_access_check - determine whether the current process may + * access another + * + * @child: the process to be accessed + * @mode: the mode of attachment + * + * If the current task has Landlock rules, then the child must have at least + * the same rules. Else denied. + * + * Determine whether a process may access another, returning 0 if permission + * granted, -errno if denied. + */ +static int landlock_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, + unsigned int mode) +{ + if (!landlocked(current)) + return 0; + + if (!landlocked(child)) + return -EPERM; + + if (landlock_task_has_subset_events(current, child)) + return 0; + + return -EPERM; +} + +/** + * landlock_ptrace_traceme - determine whether another process may trace the + * current one + * + * @parent: the task proposed to be the tracer + * + * If the parent has Landlock rules, then the current task must have the same + * or more rules. + * Else denied. + * + * Determine whether the nominated task is permitted to trace the current + * process, returning 0 if permission is granted, -errno if denied. + */ +static int landlock_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent) +{ + if (!landlocked(parent)) + return 0; + + if (!landlocked(current)) + return -EPERM; + + if (landlock_task_has_subset_events(parent, current)) + return 0; + + return -EPERM; +} + +static struct security_hook_list landlock_hooks[] = { + LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, landlock_ptrace_access_check), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, landlock_ptrace_traceme), +}; + +__init void landlock_add_hooks_ptrace(void) +{ + landlock_register_hooks(landlock_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(landlock_hooks)); +} diff --git a/security/landlock/hooks_ptrace.h b/security/landlock/hooks_ptrace.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..15b1f3479e0e --- /dev/null +++ b/security/landlock/hooks_ptrace.h @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +/* + * Landlock LSM - ptrace hooks + * + * Copyright © 2017 Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2, as + * published by the Free Software Foundation. + */ + +__init void landlock_add_hooks_ptrace(void); diff --git a/security/landlock/init.c b/security/landlock/init.c index ef8a3da69860..c8bce3142a32 100644 --- a/security/landlock/init.c +++ b/security/landlock/init.c @@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ #include <linux/lsm_hooks.h> #include "hooks_fs.h" +#include "hooks_ptrace.h" static inline bool bpf_landlock_is_valid_access(int off, int size, @@ -137,6 +138,7 @@ void __init landlock_add_hooks(void) { pr_info("landlock: Version %u, ready to sandbox with %s\n", LANDLOCK_VERSION, "seccomp"); + landlock_add_hooks_ptrace(); landlock_add_hooks_fs(); security_add_hooks(NULL, 0, "landlock"); bpf_register_prog_type(&bpf_landlock_type);
A landlocked process has less privileges than a non-landlocked process and must then be subject to additional restrictions when manipulating processes. To be allowed to use ptrace(2) and related syscalls on a target process, a landlocked process must have a subset of the target process' rules. New in v6 Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> --- security/landlock/Makefile | 2 +- security/landlock/hooks_ptrace.c | 126 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ security/landlock/hooks_ptrace.h | 11 ++++ security/landlock/init.c | 2 + 4 files changed, 140 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 security/landlock/hooks_ptrace.c create mode 100644 security/landlock/hooks_ptrace.h