| Message ID | 20171018005331.2688-19-bauerman@linux.vnet.ibm.com (mailing list archive) |
|---|---|
| State | New, archived |
| Headers | show |
On Tue, 2017-10-17 at 22:53 -0200, Thiago Jung Bauermann wrote: > diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c > index 6a2d960fbd92..0d3390de7432 100644 > --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c > +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c > @@ -246,7 +246,35 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size, > rc = ima_appraise_measurement(func, iint, file, buf, size, > pathname, &xattr_value, > &xattr_len, opened); > - if (action & IMA_MEASURE) > + > + /* > + * MODSIG has one corner case we need to deal with here: > + * > + * Suppose the policy has one measure rule for one hook and an appraise > + * rule for a different hook. Suppose also that the template requires > + * the signature to be stored in the measurement list. > + * > + * If a file containing a MODSIG is measured by the first hook before > + * being appraised by the second one, the corresponding entry in the > + * measurement list will not contain the MODSIG because we only fetch it > + * for IMA_APPRAISAL. We don't fetch it earlier because if the file has > + * both a DIGSIG and a MODSIG it's not possible to know which one will > + * be valid without actually doing the appraisal. > + * > + * Therefore, after appraisal of a MODSIG signature we need to store the > + * measurement again if the current template requires storing the > + * signature. Yes, all true, but this long comment doesn't belong here in the middle of process_measurement(). > + * With the opposite ordering (the appraise rule triggering before the > + * measurement rule) there is the same problem but it's not possible to > + * do anything about it because at the time we are appraising the > + * signature it's impossible to know whether a measurement will ever > + * need to be stored for this file. > + */ With the template format "ima-sig", the verified file signature needs to be included in the measurement list. Based on this file signature, the attestation server can validate the signature. In this case, where the appraisal comes first followed by the measurement, the appraised file signature is included in the measurement list. I don't see the problem here. > + if ((action & IMA_MEASURE) || ((iint->flags & IMA_MEASURE) && > + xattr_value && > + xattr_value->type == IMA_MODSIG && > + ima_current_template_has_sig())) Like the clean up you did elsewhere, this new set of tests should be made into a function. The comment could placed along with the new function. Mimi > ima_store_measurement(iint, file, pathname, > xattr_value, xattr_len, pcr); > if (action & IMA_AUDIT) > -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Hello Mimi, Thanks for your review. Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> writes: > On Tue, 2017-10-17 at 22:53 -0200, Thiago Jung Bauermann wrote: > >> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c >> index 6a2d960fbd92..0d3390de7432 100644 >> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c >> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c >> @@ -246,7 +246,35 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size, >> rc = ima_appraise_measurement(func, iint, file, buf, size, >> pathname, &xattr_value, >> &xattr_len, opened); >> - if (action & IMA_MEASURE) >> + >> + /* >> + * MODSIG has one corner case we need to deal with here: >> + * >> + * Suppose the policy has one measure rule for one hook and an appraise >> + * rule for a different hook. Suppose also that the template requires >> + * the signature to be stored in the measurement list. >> + * >> + * If a file containing a MODSIG is measured by the first hook before >> + * being appraised by the second one, the corresponding entry in the >> + * measurement list will not contain the MODSIG because we only fetch it >> + * for IMA_APPRAISAL. We don't fetch it earlier because if the file has >> + * both a DIGSIG and a MODSIG it's not possible to know which one will >> + * be valid without actually doing the appraisal. >> + * >> + * Therefore, after appraisal of a MODSIG signature we need to store the >> + * measurement again if the current template requires storing the >> + * signature. > > Yes, all true, but this long comment doesn't belong here in the middle > of process_measurement(). > >> + * With the opposite ordering (the appraise rule triggering before the >> + * measurement rule) there is the same problem but it's not possible to >> + * do anything about it because at the time we are appraising the >> + * signature it's impossible to know whether a measurement will ever >> + * need to be stored for this file. >> + */ > > With the template format "ima-sig", the verified file signature needs > to be included in the measurement list. Based on this file signature, > the attestation server can validate the signature. > > In this case, where the appraisal comes first followed by the > measurement, the appraised file signature is included in the > measurement list. I don't see the problem here. I think I forgot that during appraisal the modsig is copied into the iint cache and that it will be used when the measure rule is trigerred. I'll drop that last paragraph. > >> + if ((action & IMA_MEASURE) || ((iint->flags & IMA_MEASURE) && >> + xattr_value && >> + xattr_value->type == IMA_MODSIG && >> + ima_current_template_has_sig())) > > Like the clean up you did elsewhere, this new set of tests should be > made into a function. The comment could placed along with the new > function. Ok. I didn't create a function because these tests are only done here, but I agree that it will make the code clearer, and be a better place for the big comment as well. Will do in the next version.
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h index b082138461b3..68f471666151 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h @@ -148,6 +148,7 @@ int ima_init_crypto(void); void ima_putc(struct seq_file *m, void *data, int datalen); void ima_print_digest(struct seq_file *m, u8 *digest, u32 size); struct ima_template_desc *ima_template_desc_current(void); +bool ima_current_template_has_sig(void); int ima_restore_measurement_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry); int ima_restore_measurement_list(loff_t bufsize, void *buf); int ima_measurements_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v); @@ -264,6 +265,7 @@ int ima_read_modsig(enum ima_hooks func, const void *buf, loff_t buf_len, int *xattr_len); int ima_get_modsig_hash(struct evm_ima_xattr_data *hdr, enum hash_algo *algo, void const **hash, u8 *len); +int ima_modsig_serialize_data(struct evm_ima_xattr_data **data, int *data_len); int ima_modsig_verify(const unsigned int keyring_id, struct evm_ima_xattr_data *hdr); void ima_free_xattr_data(struct evm_ima_xattr_data *hdr); @@ -334,6 +336,12 @@ static inline int ima_get_modsig_hash(struct evm_ima_xattr_data *hdr, return -ENOTSUPP; } +static inline int ima_modsig_serialize_data(struct evm_ima_xattr_data **data, + int *data_len) +{ + return -ENOTSUPP; +} + static inline int ima_modsig_verify(const unsigned int keyring_id, struct evm_ima_xattr_data *hdr) { diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c index c6d346e9f708..59a5b044b48b 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c @@ -284,7 +284,13 @@ void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, xattr_len, NULL}; int violation = 0; - if (iint->measured_pcrs & (0x1 << pcr)) + /* + * We still need to store the measurement in the case of MODSIG because + * we only have its contents to put in the list at the time of + * appraisal. See comment in process_measurement for more details. + */ + if ((iint->measured_pcrs & (0x1 << pcr)) && + (!xattr_value || xattr_value->type != IMA_MODSIG)) return; result = ima_alloc_init_template(&event_data, &entry); diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c index 6a2d960fbd92..0d3390de7432 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c @@ -246,7 +246,35 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size, rc = ima_appraise_measurement(func, iint, file, buf, size, pathname, &xattr_value, &xattr_len, opened); - if (action & IMA_MEASURE) + + /* + * MODSIG has one corner case we need to deal with here: + * + * Suppose the policy has one measure rule for one hook and an appraise + * rule for a different hook. Suppose also that the template requires + * the signature to be stored in the measurement list. + * + * If a file containing a MODSIG is measured by the first hook before + * being appraised by the second one, the corresponding entry in the + * measurement list will not contain the MODSIG because we only fetch it + * for IMA_APPRAISAL. We don't fetch it earlier because if the file has + * both a DIGSIG and a MODSIG it's not possible to know which one will + * be valid without actually doing the appraisal. + * + * Therefore, after appraisal of a MODSIG signature we need to store the + * measurement again if the current template requires storing the + * signature. + * + * With the opposite ordering (the appraise rule triggering before the + * measurement rule) there is the same problem but it's not possible to + * do anything about it because at the time we are appraising the + * signature it's impossible to know whether a measurement will ever + * need to be stored for this file. + */ + if ((action & IMA_MEASURE) || ((iint->flags & IMA_MEASURE) && + xattr_value && + xattr_value->type == IMA_MODSIG && + ima_current_template_has_sig())) ima_store_measurement(iint, file, pathname, xattr_value, xattr_len, pcr); if (action & IMA_AUDIT) diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_modsig.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_modsig.c index 2786aa97060e..82c3e2693982 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_modsig.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_modsig.c @@ -27,6 +27,10 @@ struct modsig_hdr { const void *data; /* Pointer to data covered by pkcs7_msg. */ size_t data_len; struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7_msg; + int raw_pkcs7_len; + + /* This will be in the measurement list if required by the template. */ + struct evm_ima_xattr_data raw_pkcs7; }; /** @@ -86,7 +90,7 @@ int ima_read_modsig(enum ima_hooks func, const void *buf, loff_t buf_len, sig_len = be32_to_cpu(sig->sig_len); buf_len -= sig_len + sizeof(*sig); - hdr = kmalloc(sizeof(*hdr), GFP_KERNEL); + hdr = kmalloc(sizeof(*hdr) + sig_len, GFP_KERNEL); if (!hdr) return -ENOMEM; @@ -97,6 +101,10 @@ int ima_read_modsig(enum ima_hooks func, const void *buf, loff_t buf_len, return rc; } + memcpy(hdr->raw_pkcs7.data, buf + buf_len, sig_len); + hdr->raw_pkcs7_len = sig_len + 1; + hdr->raw_pkcs7.type = IMA_MODSIG; + hdr->type = IMA_MODSIG; hdr->data = buf; hdr->data_len = buf_len; @@ -129,6 +137,16 @@ int ima_get_modsig_hash(struct evm_ima_xattr_data *hdr, enum hash_algo *algo, return 0; } +int ima_modsig_serialize_data(struct evm_ima_xattr_data **data, int *data_len) +{ + struct modsig_hdr *modsig = (struct modsig_hdr *) *data; + + *data = &modsig->raw_pkcs7; + *data_len = modsig->raw_pkcs7_len; + + return 0; +} + int ima_modsig_verify(const unsigned int keyring_id, struct evm_ima_xattr_data *hdr) { diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c index 3cc1d2763fd2..a5bad6996334 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c @@ -228,6 +228,18 @@ struct ima_template_desc *ima_template_desc_current(void) return ima_template; } +bool ima_current_template_has_sig(void) +{ + struct ima_template_desc *template = ima_template_desc_current(); + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < template->num_fields; i++) + if (!strcmp(template->fields[i]->field_id, "sig")) + return true; + + return false; +} + int __init ima_init_template(void) { struct ima_template_desc *template = ima_template_desc_current(); diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c index e8ec783b6a8d..d0e85def0ae9 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c @@ -379,10 +379,23 @@ int ima_eventsig_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data, struct ima_field_data *field_data) { struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value = event_data->xattr_value; + int xattr_len = event_data->xattr_len; - if (!xattr_value || xattr_value->type != EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG) + if (!is_ima_sig(xattr_value)) return 0; - return ima_write_template_field_data(xattr_value, event_data->xattr_len, + /* + * The xattr_value for IMA_MODSIG is a runtime structure containing + * pointers. Get its raw data instead. + */ + if (xattr_value->type == IMA_MODSIG) { + int rc; + + rc = ima_modsig_serialize_data(&xattr_value, &xattr_len); + if (rc) + return rc; + } + + return ima_write_template_field_data(xattr_value, xattr_len, DATA_FMT_HEX, field_data); }
Add modsig support for templates which require the contents of the file signature to be included in the measurement list. Suggested-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.vnet.ibm.com> --- security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 8 ++++++++ security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 8 +++++++- security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 30 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- security/integrity/ima/ima_modsig.c | 20 +++++++++++++++++++- security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c | 12 ++++++++++++ security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c | 17 +++++++++++++++-- 6 files changed, 90 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html