diff mbox

[1/4] crypto: dh - fix double free of ctx->p

Message ID 20171101222517.41602-2-ebiggers3@gmail.com (mailing list archive)
State Superseded
Delegated to: Herbert Xu
Headers show

Commit Message

Eric Biggers Nov. 1, 2017, 10:25 p.m. UTC
From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>

When setting the secret with the software Diffie-Hellman implementation,
if allocating 'g' failed (e.g. if it was longer than
MAX_EXTERN_MPI_BITS), then 'p' was freed twice: once immediately, and
once later when the crypto_kpp tfm was destroyed.  Fix it by using
dh_free_ctx() in the error paths, as that sets the pointers to NULL.

KASAN report:

    MPI: mpi too large (32760 bits)
    ==================================================================
    BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in mpi_free+0x131/0x170
    Read of size 4 at addr ffff88006c7cdf90 by task reproduce_doubl/367

    CPU: 1 PID: 367 Comm: reproduce_doubl Not tainted 4.14.0-rc7-00040-g05298abde6fe #7
    Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
    Call Trace:
     dump_stack+0xb3/0x10b
     ? mpi_free+0x131/0x170
     print_address_description+0x79/0x2a0
     ? mpi_free+0x131/0x170
     kasan_report+0x236/0x340
     ? akcipher_register_instance+0x90/0x90
     __asan_report_load4_noabort+0x14/0x20
     mpi_free+0x131/0x170
     ? akcipher_register_instance+0x90/0x90
     dh_exit_tfm+0x3d/0x140
     crypto_kpp_exit_tfm+0x52/0x70
     crypto_destroy_tfm+0xb3/0x250
     __keyctl_dh_compute+0x640/0xe90
     ? kasan_slab_free+0x12f/0x180
     ? dh_data_from_key+0x240/0x240
     ? key_create_or_update+0x1ee/0xb20
     ? key_instantiate_and_link+0x440/0x440
     ? lock_contended+0xee0/0xee0
     ? kfree+0xcf/0x210
     ? SyS_add_key+0x268/0x340
     keyctl_dh_compute+0xb3/0xf1
     ? __keyctl_dh_compute+0xe90/0xe90
     ? SyS_add_key+0x26d/0x340
     ? entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x5/0xbe
     ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0x3f4/0x560
     SyS_keyctl+0x72/0x2c0
     entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xbe
    RIP: 0033:0x43ccf9
    RSP: 002b:00007ffeeec96158 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000fa
    RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000248b9b9 RCX: 000000000043ccf9
    RDX: 00007ffeeec96170 RSI: 00007ffeeec96160 RDI: 0000000000000017
    RBP: 0000000000000046 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0248b9b9143dc936
    R10: 0000000000001000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
    R13: 0000000000409670 R14: 0000000000409700 R15: 0000000000000000

    Allocated by task 367:
     save_stack_trace+0x16/0x20
     kasan_kmalloc+0xeb/0x180
     kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x114/0x300
     mpi_alloc+0x4b/0x230
     mpi_read_raw_data+0xbe/0x360
     dh_set_secret+0x1dc/0x460
     __keyctl_dh_compute+0x623/0xe90
     keyctl_dh_compute+0xb3/0xf1
     SyS_keyctl+0x72/0x2c0
     entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xbe

    Freed by task 367:
     save_stack_trace+0x16/0x20
     kasan_slab_free+0xab/0x180
     kfree+0xb5/0x210
     mpi_free+0xcb/0x170
     dh_set_secret+0x2d7/0x460
     __keyctl_dh_compute+0x623/0xe90
     keyctl_dh_compute+0xb3/0xf1
     SyS_keyctl+0x72/0x2c0
     entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xbe

Fixes: 802c7f1c84e4 ("crypto: dh - Add DH software implementation")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.8+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
---
 crypto/dh.c | 18 +++++++++---------
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)

Comments

Tudor Ambarus Nov. 2, 2017, 10:55 a.m. UTC | #1
Hi, Eric,

On 11/02/2017 12:25 AM, Eric Biggers wrote:
> When setting the secret with the software Diffie-Hellman implementation,
> if allocating 'g' failed (e.g. if it was longer than
> MAX_EXTERN_MPI_BITS), then 'p' was freed twice: once immediately, and
> once later when the crypto_kpp tfm was destroyed.  Fix it by using
> dh_free_ctx() in the error paths, as that sets the pointers to NULL.

Other solution would be to have just an one-line patch that sets p to
NULL after freeing it. The benefit of just setting p to NULL and not
using dh_free_ctx() is that you'll spare some cpu cycles. If g fails,
g and a will already be NULL, so freeing them and set them to NULL is
redundant.

However, if you decide to always use dh_free_ctx(), you'll have to get
rid of dh_clear_params(), because it will be used just in dh_free_ctx().
You can copy dh_clear_params() body to dh_free_ctx().

Cheers,
ta
Eric Biggers Nov. 2, 2017, 5:30 p.m. UTC | #2
Hi Tudor,

On Thu, Nov 02, 2017 at 12:55:56PM +0200, Tudor Ambarus wrote:
> Hi, Eric,
> 
> On 11/02/2017 12:25 AM, Eric Biggers wrote:
> >When setting the secret with the software Diffie-Hellman implementation,
> >if allocating 'g' failed (e.g. if it was longer than
> >MAX_EXTERN_MPI_BITS), then 'p' was freed twice: once immediately, and
> >once later when the crypto_kpp tfm was destroyed.  Fix it by using
> >dh_free_ctx() in the error paths, as that sets the pointers to NULL.
> 
> Other solution would be to have just an one-line patch that sets p to
> NULL after freeing it. The benefit of just setting p to NULL and not
> using dh_free_ctx() is that you'll spare some cpu cycles. If g fails,
> g and a will already be NULL, so freeing them and set them to NULL is
> redundant.
> 
> However, if you decide to always use dh_free_ctx(), you'll have to get
> rid of dh_clear_params(), because it will be used just in dh_free_ctx().
> You can copy dh_clear_params() body to dh_free_ctx().
> 

This is on an error path, so a few cycles don't matter.  I would much rather
have the simpler code, with less chance to introduce exploitable bugs.

Yes, I should inline dh_clear_params() into dh_free_ctx().

Eric
diff mbox

Patch

diff --git a/crypto/dh.c b/crypto/dh.c
index b1032a5c1bfa..b488f1782ced 100644
--- a/crypto/dh.c
+++ b/crypto/dh.c
@@ -71,10 +71,8 @@  static int dh_set_params(struct dh_ctx *ctx, struct dh *params)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	ctx->g = mpi_read_raw_data(params->g, params->g_size);
-	if (!ctx->g) {
-		mpi_free(ctx->p);
+	if (!ctx->g)
 		return -EINVAL;
-	}
 
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -89,18 +87,20 @@  static int dh_set_secret(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, const void *buf,
 	dh_free_ctx(ctx);
 
 	if (crypto_dh_decode_key(buf, len, &params) < 0)
-		return -EINVAL;
+		goto err_free_ctx;
 
 	if (dh_set_params(ctx, &params) < 0)
-		return -EINVAL;
+		goto err_free_ctx;
 
 	ctx->xa = mpi_read_raw_data(params.key, params.key_size);
-	if (!ctx->xa) {
-		dh_clear_params(ctx);
-		return -EINVAL;
-	}
+	if (!ctx->xa)
+		goto err_free_ctx;
 
 	return 0;
+
+err_free_ctx:
+	dh_free_ctx(ctx);
+	return -EINVAL;
 }
 
 static int dh_compute_value(struct kpp_request *req)