Message ID | 20180124175631.22925-5-igor.stoppa@huawei.com (mailing list archive) |
---|---|
State | New, archived |
Headers | show |
On Wed, Jan 24, 2018 at 6:56 PM, Igor Stoppa <igor.stoppa@huawei.com> wrote: > The MMU available in many systems running Linux can often provide R/O > protection to the memory pages it handles. > > However, the MMU-based protection works efficiently only when said pages > contain exclusively data that will not need further modifications. > > Statically allocated variables can be segregated into a dedicated > section, but this does not sit very well with dynamically allocated > ones. > > Dynamic allocation does not provide, currently, any means for grouping > variables in memory pages that would contain exclusively data suitable > for conversion to read only access mode. > > The allocator here provided (pmalloc - protectable memory allocator) > introduces the concept of pools of protectable memory. > > A module can request a pool and then refer any allocation request to the > pool handler it has received. > > Once all the chunks of memory associated to a specific pool are > initialized, the pool can be protected. I'm not entirely convinced by the approach of marking small parts of kernel memory as readonly for hardening. Comments on some details are inline. > diff --git a/include/linux/vmalloc.h b/include/linux/vmalloc.h > index 1e5d8c3..116d280 100644 > --- a/include/linux/vmalloc.h > +++ b/include/linux/vmalloc.h > @@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ struct notifier_block; /* in notifier.h */ > #define VM_UNINITIALIZED 0x00000020 /* vm_struct is not fully initialized */ > #define VM_NO_GUARD 0x00000040 /* don't add guard page */ > #define VM_KASAN 0x00000080 /* has allocated kasan shadow memory */ > +#define VM_PMALLOC 0x00000100 /* pmalloc area - see docs */ Is "see docs" specific enough to actually guide the reader to the right documentation? > +#define pmalloc_attr_init(data, attr_name) \ > +do { \ > + sysfs_attr_init(&data->attr_##attr_name.attr); \ > + data->attr_##attr_name.attr.name = #attr_name; \ > + data->attr_##attr_name.attr.mode = VERIFY_OCTAL_PERMISSIONS(0444); \ > + data->attr_##attr_name.show = pmalloc_pool_show_##attr_name; \ > +} while (0) Is there a good reason for making all these files mode 0444 (as opposed to setting them to 0400 and then allowing userspace to make them accessible if desired)? /proc/slabinfo contains vaguely similar data and is mode 0400 (or mode 0600, depending on the kernel config) AFAICS. > +void *pmalloc(struct gen_pool *pool, size_t size, gfp_t gfp) > +{ [...] > + /* Expand pool */ > + chunk_size = roundup(size, PAGE_SIZE); > + chunk = vmalloc(chunk_size); You're allocating with vmalloc(), which, as far as I know, establishes a second mapping in the vmalloc area for pages that are already mapped as RW through the physmap. AFAICS, later, when you're trying to make pages readonly, you're only changing the protections on the second mapping in the vmalloc area, therefore leaving the memory writable through the physmap. Is that correct? If so, please either document the reasoning why this is okay or change it. -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Hi, thanks for the review. My reply below. On 24/01/18 21:10, Jann Horn wrote: > I'm not entirely convinced by the approach of marking small parts of > kernel memory as readonly for hardening. Because of the physmap you mention later? Regarding small parts vs big parts (what is big enough?) I did propose the use of a custom zone at the very beginning, however I met 2 objections: 1. It's not a special case and there was no will to reserve another zone This might be mitigated by aliasing with a zone that is already defined, but not in use. For example DMA or DMA32. But it looks like a good way to replicate the confusion that is page struct. Anyway, I found the next objection more convincing. 2. What would be the size of this zone? It would become something that is really application specific. At the very least it should become a command line parameter. A distro would have to allocate a lot of memory for it, because it cannot really know upfront what its users will do. But, most likely, the vast majority of users would never need that much. If you have some idea of how to address these objections without using vmalloc, or at least without using the same page provider that vmalloc is using now, I'd be interested to hear it. Besides the double mapping problem, the major benefit I can see from having a contiguous area is that it simplifies the hardened user copy verification, because there is a fixed range to test for overlap. > Comments on some details are inline. thank you >> diff --git a/include/linux/vmalloc.h b/include/linux/vmalloc.h >> index 1e5d8c3..116d280 100644 >> --- a/include/linux/vmalloc.h >> +++ b/include/linux/vmalloc.h >> @@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ struct notifier_block; /* in notifier.h */ >> #define VM_UNINITIALIZED 0x00000020 /* vm_struct is not fully initialized */ >> #define VM_NO_GUARD 0x00000040 /* don't add guard page */ >> #define VM_KASAN 0x00000080 /* has allocated kasan shadow memory */ >> +#define VM_PMALLOC 0x00000100 /* pmalloc area - see docs */ > > Is "see docs" specific enough to actually guide the reader to the > right documentation? The doc file is named pmalloc.txt, but I can be more explicit. >> +#define pmalloc_attr_init(data, attr_name) \ >> +do { \ >> + sysfs_attr_init(&data->attr_##attr_name.attr); \ >> + data->attr_##attr_name.attr.name = #attr_name; \ >> + data->attr_##attr_name.attr.mode = VERIFY_OCTAL_PERMISSIONS(0444); \ >> + data->attr_##attr_name.show = pmalloc_pool_show_##attr_name; \ >> +} while (0) > > Is there a good reason for making all these files mode 0444 (as > opposed to setting them to 0400 and then allowing userspace to make > them accessible if desired)? /proc/slabinfo contains vaguely similar > data and is mode 0400 (or mode 0600, depending on the kernel config) > AFAICS. ok, you do have a point, so far I have been mostly focusing on the "drop-in replacement for kmalloc" aspect. >> +void *pmalloc(struct gen_pool *pool, size_t size, gfp_t gfp) >> +{ > [...] >> + /* Expand pool */ >> + chunk_size = roundup(size, PAGE_SIZE); >> + chunk = vmalloc(chunk_size); > > You're allocating with vmalloc(), which, as far as I know, establishes > a second mapping in the vmalloc area for pages that are already mapped > as RW through the physmap. AFAICS, later, when you're trying to make > pages readonly, you're only changing the protections on the second > mapping in the vmalloc area, therefore leaving the memory writable > through the physmap. Is that correct? If so, please either document > the reasoning why this is okay or change it. About why vmalloc as backend for pmalloc, please refer to this: http://www.openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2018/01/24/11 I tried to give a short summary of what took me toward vmalloc. vmalloc is also a convenient way of obtaining arbitrarily (within reason) large amounts of virtually contiguous memory. Your objection is toward the unprotected access, through the alternate mapping, rather than to the idea of having pools that can be protected individually, right? In the mail I linked, I explained that I could not use kmalloc because of the problem of splitting huge pages on ARM. kmalloc does require the physmap, for performance reason. However, vmalloc is already doing mapping of individual pages, because it must ensure that they are virtually contiguous, so would it be possible to have vmalloc _always_ outside of the physmap? If I have understood correctly, the actual extension of physmap is highly architecture and platform dependant, so it might be (but I have not checked) that in some cases (like some 32bit systems) vmalloc is typically outside of physmap, but probably that is not the case on 64bit? Also, I need to understand how physmap works against vmalloc vs how it works against kernel text and const/__ro_after_init sections. Can they also be accessed (and written?) through the physmap? But, to take a different angle: if an attacker knows where kernel symbols are and has gained capability to write at arbitrary location(s) in kernel data, what prevents a modification of mappings and permissions? What is considered robust enough? I have the impression that, without support from HW, to have some one-way mechanism that protects some page permanently, it's always possible to undo the various protections we are talking about, only harder. From the perspective of protecting against accidental overwrites, instead, the current implementation should be ok, since it's less likely that some stray pointer happens to assume a value that goes through the physmap. But I'm interested to hear, if you have some suggestion about how to prevent the side access through the physmap. -- thanks, igor -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
On Thu, Jan 25, 2018 at 6:59 AM, Igor Stoppa <igor.stoppa@huawei.com> wrote: > > Hi, > > thanks for the review. My reply below. > > On 24/01/18 21:10, Jann Horn wrote: > > > I'm not entirely convinced by the approach of marking small parts of > > kernel memory as readonly for hardening. > > Because of the physmap you mention later? > > Regarding small parts vs big parts (what is big enough?) I did propose > the use of a custom zone at the very beginning, however I met 2 objections: > > 1. It's not a special case and there was no will to reserve another zone > This might be mitigated by aliasing with a zone that is already > defined, but not in use. For example DMA or DMA32. > But it looks like a good way to replicate the confusion that is page > struct. Anyway, I found the next objection more convincing. > > 2. What would be the size of this zone? It would become something that > is really application specific. At the very least it should become a > command line parameter. A distro would have to allocate a lot of > memory for it, because it cannot really know upfront what its users > will do. But, most likely, the vast majority of users would never > need that much. > > If you have some idea of how to address these objections without using > vmalloc, or at least without using the same page provider that vmalloc > is using now, I'd be interested to hear it. > > Besides the double mapping problem, the major benefit I can see from > having a contiguous area is that it simplifies the hardened user copy > verification, because there is a fixed range to test for overlap. > > > Comments on some details are inline. > > thank you > > >> diff --git a/include/linux/vmalloc.h b/include/linux/vmalloc.h > >> index 1e5d8c3..116d280 100644 > >> --- a/include/linux/vmalloc.h > >> +++ b/include/linux/vmalloc.h > >> @@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ struct notifier_block; /* in notifier.h */ > >> #define VM_UNINITIALIZED 0x00000020 /* vm_struct is not fully initialized */ > >> #define VM_NO_GUARD 0x00000040 /* don't add guard page */ > >> #define VM_KASAN 0x00000080 /* has allocated kasan shadow memory */ > >> +#define VM_PMALLOC 0x00000100 /* pmalloc area - see docs */ > > > > Is "see docs" specific enough to actually guide the reader to the > > right documentation? > > The doc file is named pmalloc.txt, but I can be more explicit. > > >> +#define pmalloc_attr_init(data, attr_name) \ > >> +do { \ > >> + sysfs_attr_init(&data->attr_##attr_name.attr); \ > >> + data->attr_##attr_name.attr.name = #attr_name; \ > >> + data->attr_##attr_name.attr.mode = VERIFY_OCTAL_PERMISSIONS(0444); \ > >> + data->attr_##attr_name.show = pmalloc_pool_show_##attr_name; \ > >> +} while (0) > > > > Is there a good reason for making all these files mode 0444 (as > > opposed to setting them to 0400 and then allowing userspace to make > > them accessible if desired)? /proc/slabinfo contains vaguely similar > > data and is mode 0400 (or mode 0600, depending on the kernel config) > > AFAICS. > > ok, you do have a point, so far I have been mostly focusing on the > > "drop-in replacement for kmalloc" aspect. > > >> +void *pmalloc(struct gen_pool *pool, size_t size, gfp_t gfp) > >> +{ > > [...] > >> + /* Expand pool */ > >> + chunk_size = roundup(size, PAGE_SIZE); > >> + chunk = vmalloc(chunk_size); > > > > You're allocating with vmalloc(), which, as far as I know, establishes > > a second mapping in the vmalloc area for pages that are already mapped > > as RW through the physmap. AFAICS, later, when you're trying to make > > pages readonly, you're only changing the protections on the second > > mapping in the vmalloc area, therefore leaving the memory writable > > through the physmap. Is that correct? If so, please either document > > the reasoning why this is okay or change it. > > About why vmalloc as backend for pmalloc, please refer to this: > > http://www.openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2018/01/24/11 > > I tried to give a short summary of what took me toward vmalloc. > vmalloc is also a convenient way of obtaining arbitrarily (within > reason) large amounts of virtually contiguous memory. > > Your objection is toward the unprotected access, through the alternate > mapping, rather than to the idea of having pools that can be protected > individually, right? > > In the mail I linked, I explained that I could not use kmalloc because > of the problem of splitting huge pages on ARM. > > kmalloc does require the physmap, for performance reason. > > However, vmalloc is already doing mapping of individual pages, because > it must ensure that they are virtually contiguous, so would it be > possible to have vmalloc _always_ outside of the physmap? > > If I have understood correctly, the actual extension of physmap is > highly architecture and platform dependant, so it might be (but I have > not checked) that in some cases (like some 32bit systems) vmalloc is > typically outside of physmap, but probably that is not the case on 64bit? > > Also, I need to understand how physmap works against vmalloc vs how it > works against kernel text and const/__ro_after_init sections. > > Can they also be accessed (and written?) through the physmap? > > But, to take a different angle: if an attacker knows where kernel > symbols are and has gained capability to write at arbitrary location(s) > in kernel data, what prevents a modification of mappings and permissions? > > What is considered robust enough? > > I have the impression that, without support from HW, to have some > one-way mechanism that protects some page permanently, it's always > possible to undo the various protections we are talking about, only harder. > > From the perspective of protecting against accidental overwrites, > instead, the current implementation should be ok, since it's less likely > that some stray pointer happens to assume a value that goes through the > physmap. > > But I'm interested to hear, if you have some suggestion about how to > prevent the side access through the physmap. > > -- > thanks, igor DMA/physmap access coupled with a knowledge of which virtual mappings are in the physical space should be enough for an attacker to bypass the gating mechanism this work imposes. Not trivial, but not impossible. Since there's no way to prevent that sort of access in current hardware (especially something like a NIC or GPU working independently of the CPU altogether), we have the option of checking contents of a sealed page against a checksum/hash of the page prior to returning its contents to the caller (since it needs to be read to be verified), or some other mechanism within the read path to ensure that no event since the last read affected the page/allocation. If the structure containing the list of verifiers is separate from the page, the attacker needs to resolve and change the contents of those signatures for the pages they're affecting via DMA before the kernel checks one against the other in the read path. I cant speak to overhead, but it should complicate the logic of a successful attack chain. Off the cuff, if the allocator sums the contents when sealing a page, stores it in a lookup table, and forces verification on every read/lookup, it should prevent _use_ of memory which was modified unless our attacker is clever enough to fix that up prior to the next access. Since its write-once memory, race conditions on subsequent access shouldn't be a problem.
On Thu, Jan 25, 2018 at 10:14:28AM -0500, Boris Lukashev wrote: > On Thu, Jan 25, 2018 at 6:59 AM, Igor Stoppa <igor.stoppa@huawei.com> wrote: [...] > DMA/physmap access coupled with a knowledge of which virtual mappings > are in the physical space should be enough for an attacker to bypass > the gating mechanism this work imposes. Not trivial, but not > impossible. Since there's no way to prevent that sort of access in > current hardware (especially something like a NIC or GPU working > independently of the CPU altogether) I am not saying this is impossible but this is unlikely they are several mecanisms. First you have IOMMU it has been defaulted to on by OEM for last few years (it use to be enabled only on server for virtualization). Which means that a given device only can access memory that is mapped to it through the IOMMU page table (usualy each device get their own distinct IOMMU page table). Then on device like GPU you have an MMU (no GPU without an MMU for the last 10 years or more). The MMU is under the control of the kernel driver of the GPU and for the open source driver we try hard to make sure it can not be abuse and circumvent by userspace ie we restrict userspace process to only access memory they own. I am not saying that this can not happen but that we are trying our best to avoid it. Cheers, Jérôme -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
On Wed, Jan 24, 2018 at 08:10:53PM +0100, Jann Horn wrote: > I'm not entirely convinced by the approach of marking small parts of > kernel memory as readonly for hardening. It depends how significant the data stored in there are. For example, storing function pointers in read-only memory provides significant hardening. > You're allocating with vmalloc(), which, as far as I know, establishes > a second mapping in the vmalloc area for pages that are already mapped > as RW through the physmap. AFAICS, later, when you're trying to make > pages readonly, you're only changing the protections on the second > mapping in the vmalloc area, therefore leaving the memory writable > through the physmap. Is that correct? If so, please either document > the reasoning why this is okay or change it. Yes, this is still vulnerable to attacks through the physmap. That's also true for marking structs as const. We should probably fix that at some point, but at least they're not vulnerable to heap overruns by small amounts ... you have to be able to overrun some other array by terabytes. It's worth having a discussion about whether we want the pmalloc API or whether we want a slab-based API. We can have a separate discussion about an API to remove pages from the physmap. -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
On 26/01/18 07:35, Matthew Wilcox wrote: > On Wed, Jan 24, 2018 at 08:10:53PM +0100, Jann Horn wrote: >> I'm not entirely convinced by the approach of marking small parts of >> kernel memory as readonly for hardening. > > It depends how significant the data stored in there are. For example, > storing function pointers in read-only memory provides significant > hardening. > >> You're allocating with vmalloc(), which, as far as I know, establishes >> a second mapping in the vmalloc area for pages that are already mapped >> as RW through the physmap. AFAICS, later, when you're trying to make >> pages readonly, you're only changing the protections on the second >> mapping in the vmalloc area, therefore leaving the memory writable >> through the physmap. Is that correct? If so, please either document >> the reasoning why this is okay or change it. > > Yes, this is still vulnerable to attacks through the physmap. That's also > true for marking structs as const. We should probably fix that at some > point, but at least they're not vulnerable to heap overruns by small > amounts ... you have to be able to overrun some other array by terabytes. Actually, I think there is something to say in favor of using a vmalloc based approach, precisely because of the physmap :-P If I understood correctly, the physmap is primarily meant to speed up access to physical memory through the TLB. In particular, for kmalloc based allocations. Which means that, to perform a physmap-based attack to a kmalloced allocation, one needs to know: - the address of the target variable in the kmalloc range - the randomized offset of the kernel - the location of the physmap But, for a vmalloc based allocation, there is one extra hoop: since the mapping is really per page, now the attacker has actually to walk the page table, to figure out where to poke in the physmap. One more thought about physmap: does it map also code? Because, if it does, and one wants to use it for an attack, isn't it easier to look for some security test and replace a bne with be or equivalent? > It's worth having a discussion about whether we want the pmalloc API > or whether we want a slab-based API. pmalloc is meant to be useful where the attack surface is made up of lots of small allocations - my first use case was the SE Linux policy DB, where there is a variety of elements being allocated, in large amount. To the point where having ready made caches would be wasteful. Then there is the issue I already mentioned about arm/arm64 which would require to break down large mappings, which seems to be against current policy, as described in my previous mail: http://www.openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2018/01/24/11 I do not know exactly what you have in mind wrt slab, but my impression is that it will most likely gravitate toward the pmalloc implementation. It will need: - "pools" or anyway some means to lock only a certain group of pages, related to a specific kernel user - (mostly) lockless allocation - a way to manage granularity (or order of allocation) Most of this is already provided by genalloc, which is what I ended up almost re-implementing, before being pointed to it :-) I only had to add the tracking of end of allocations, which is what the patch 1/6 does - as side note, is anybody maintaining it? I could not find an entry in MAINTAINERS As I mentioned above, using vmalloc adds even an extra layer of protection. The major downside is the increased TLB use, however this is not so relevant for the volumes of data that I had to deal with so far: only few 4K pages. But you might have in mind something else. I'd be interested to know what and what would be an obstacle in using pmalloc. Maybe it can be solved. -- igor -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
On 25/01/18 17:38, Jerome Glisse wrote: > On Thu, Jan 25, 2018 at 10:14:28AM -0500, Boris Lukashev wrote: >> On Thu, Jan 25, 2018 at 6:59 AM, Igor Stoppa <igor.stoppa@huawei.com> wrote: > > [...] > >> DMA/physmap access coupled with a knowledge of which virtual mappings >> are in the physical space should be enough for an attacker to bypass >> the gating mechanism this work imposes. Not trivial, but not >> impossible. Since there's no way to prevent that sort of access in >> current hardware (especially something like a NIC or GPU working >> independently of the CPU altogether) [...] > I am not saying that this can not happen but that we are trying our best > to avoid it. How about an opt-in verification, similar to what proposed by Boris Lukashev? When reading back the data, one could access the pointer directly and bypass the verification, or could use a function that explicitly checks the integrity of the data. Starting from an unprotected kmalloc allocation, even just turning the data into R/O is an improvement, but if one can afford the overhead of performing the verification, why not? It would still be better if the service was provided by the library, instead than implemented by individual users, I think. -- igor -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
On Fri, Jan 26, 2018 at 7:28 AM, Igor Stoppa <igor.stoppa@huawei.com> wrote: > On 25/01/18 17:38, Jerome Glisse wrote: >> On Thu, Jan 25, 2018 at 10:14:28AM -0500, Boris Lukashev wrote: >>> On Thu, Jan 25, 2018 at 6:59 AM, Igor Stoppa <igor.stoppa@huawei.com> wrote: >> >> [...] >> >>> DMA/physmap access coupled with a knowledge of which virtual mappings >>> are in the physical space should be enough for an attacker to bypass >>> the gating mechanism this work imposes. Not trivial, but not >>> impossible. Since there's no way to prevent that sort of access in >>> current hardware (especially something like a NIC or GPU working >>> independently of the CPU altogether) > > [...] > >> I am not saying that this can not happen but that we are trying our best >> to avoid it. > > How about an opt-in verification, similar to what proposed by Boris > Lukashev? > > When reading back the data, one could access the pointer directly and > bypass the verification, or could use a function that explicitly checks > the integrity of the data. > > Starting from an unprotected kmalloc allocation, even just turning the > data into R/O is an improvement, but if one can afford the overhead of > performing the verification, why not? > I like the idea of making the verification call optional for consumers allowing for fast/slow+hard paths depending on their needs. Cant see any additional vectors for abuse (other than the original ones effecting out-of-band modification) introduced by having verify/normal callers, but i've not had enough coffee yet. Any access races or things like that come to mind for anyone? Shouldn't happen with a write-once allocation, but again, lacking coffee. > It would still be better if the service was provided by the library, > instead than implemented by individual users, I think. > > -- > igor -Boris -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
On 24/01/18 19:56, Igor Stoppa wrote: [...] > +bool pmalloc_prealloc(struct gen_pool *pool, size_t size) > +{ [...] > +abort: > + vfree(chunk); this should be vfree_atomic() [...] > +void *pmalloc(struct gen_pool *pool, size_t size, gfp_t gfp) > +{ [...] > +free: > + vfree(chunk); and this one too I will fix them in the next iteration. I am waiting to see if any more comments arrive. Otherwise, I'll send it out probably next Tuesday. -- igor -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
On 26/01/18 18:36, Boris Lukashev wrote: > I like the idea of making the verification call optional for consumers > allowing for fast/slow+hard paths depending on their needs. > Cant see any additional vectors for abuse (other than the original > ones effecting out-of-band modification) introduced by having > verify/normal callers, but i've not had enough coffee yet. Any access > races or things like that come to mind for anyone? Well, the devil is in the details. In this case, the question is how to perform the verification in a way that is sufficiently robust against races. After thinking about it for a while, I doubt it can be done reliably. It might work for some small data types, but the typical use case I have found myself dealing with, is protecting data structures. That also brings up a separate problem: what would be the size of data to hash? At one extreme there is a page, but it's probably too much, so what is the correct size? it cannot be smaller than a specific allocation, however that would imply looking for the hash related to the data being accessed, with extra overhead. And the data being accessed might be a field in a struct, for which we would not have any hash. There would be a hash only for the containing struct that was allocated ... Overall, it seems a good idea in theory, but when I think about its implementation, it seems like the overhead is so big that it would discourage its use for almost any practical purpose. If one really wants to be paranoid could, otoh have redundancy in a different pool. -- igor -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
On Thu, 25 Jan 2018, Matthew Wilcox wrote: > It's worth having a discussion about whether we want the pmalloc API > or whether we want a slab-based API. We can have a separate discussion > about an API to remove pages from the physmap. We could even do this in a more thorough way. Can we use a ring 1 / 2 distinction to create a hardened OS core that policies the rest of the ever expanding kernel with all its modules and this and that feature? I think that will long term be a better approach and allow more than the current hardening approaches can get you. It seems that we are willing to tolerate significant performance regressions now. So lets use the protection mechanisms that the hardware offers. -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
+Boris Lukashev On 02/02/18 20:39, Christopher Lameter wrote: > On Thu, 25 Jan 2018, Matthew Wilcox wrote: > >> It's worth having a discussion about whether we want the pmalloc API >> or whether we want a slab-based API. We can have a separate discussion >> about an API to remove pages from the physmap. > > We could even do this in a more thorough way. Can we use a ring 1 / 2 > distinction to create a hardened OS core that policies the rest of > the ever expanding kernel with all its modules and this and that feature? What would be the differentiating criteria? Furthermore, what are the chances of invalidating the entire concept, because there is already an hypervisor using the higher level features? That is what you are proposing, if I understand correctly. But more on this below ... > I think that will long term be a better approach and allow more than the > current hardening approaches can get you. It seems that we are willing to > tolerate significant performance regressions now. So lets use the > protection mechanisms that the hardware offers. I would rather *not* propose significant performance regression :-P There might be some one-off case or anyway rare event which is penalized, but my preference goes to not introducing any significant performance penalty, during regular use. After all, the lower the penalty, the wider the (potential) adoption. More in detail: there are 2 major cases for wanting some form of read-only protection. 1) extra ward against accidental corruption The kernel provides many debugging tools and they can detect lots of errors during development, but they require time and knowledge to use them, which are not always available. Furthermore, it is objectively true that not all the code has the same level of maturity, especially when non-upstream code is used in some custom product. It's not my main goal, but it would be nice if that case too could be addressed by the protection. Corruption *can* happen. Having live guards against it, will definitely help spotting bugs or, at the very least, crash/reboot a device before it can cause permanent data corruption. Protection against accidental corruption should be used as widely as possible, therefore it cannot have an high price tag, in terms of lost performance. Otherwise, there's the risk that it will be just a debug feature, more like lockdep or ubsan. 2) protection against malicious attacks This is harder, of course, but what is realistically to be expected? If an attacker can gain full control of the kernel, the only way to do damage control is to have HW and/or higher privilege SW that can somehow limit the reach of the attacker. To make it work for real, it should be mandated that either these extra HW/SW means can tell apart legitimate kernel activity from rogue actions, or they operate so independently from the kernel that a compromise kernel cannot use any API to influence them. The consensus seems to be to put aside (for now) this concern and instead focus on what is a typical scenario: - some bug is found that allows to read/write kernel memory - some other bug is found, which leaks the address of a well known variable, effectively revealing the randomized offset of each symbol placed in linear memory, once their relative location is known. What is described above is a toolkit that effectively can allow - with patience - to attack anything that is writable by the kernel. Including page tables and permissions. However the typical attack is more like: "let's flip some bit(s)". Which is where __ro_after_init has its purpose to exist. My proposal is to extend the same sort of protection also to variables allocated dynamically. * make the pages read only, once the data is initialized * use vmalloc to prevent that exfiltrating the address of an unrelated variable can easily give away the location of the real target, because of the individual page mapping vs linear mapping. Boris Lukashev proposed additional hardening, when accessing a certain variable, in the form of hash/checksum, but I could not come up with an implementation that did not have too much overhead. Re-considering this, one option would be to have a function "pool_validate()" - probably expensive - that could be invoked by a piece of code before using the data from the pool. Not perfect, because it would not be atomic, but it could be used once, at the beginning of a function, without adding overhead to each access to the pool that the function would perform. An attacker would have to time the attack so that the corruption of the data wold happen after the pool is validated and before the data is read from it. Possible, but way tricker than the current unprotected situation. What I am trying to say, is that even after having multi-ring implementation (which would be more dependent on HW features), there would be still the problem of validating the legitimacy of the use of the API that such implementation would expose. I'd rather try to preserve performance and still provide a defense against the more trivial attacks, since other types of attacks are much harder to perform in the wild. Of course, I'm interested in alternatives (I'll comment separately on the compound pages) The way pmalloc is designed is to take advantage of any page provider. So far, vmalloc seems to me the best option, but something else might emerge that works better. Yet the pmalloc API is, I think, what would be still needed, to let the rest of the kernel take advantage of this feature. -- igor -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
>> On Thu, 25 Jan 2018, Matthew Wilcox wrote: >>> It's worth having a discussion about whether we want the pmalloc API >>> or whether we want a slab-based API. I'd love to have some feedback specifically about the API. I have also some idea about userspace and how to extend the pmalloc concept to it: http://www.openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2018/01/30/20 I'll be AFK intermittently for about 2 weeks, so i might not be able to reply immediately, but from my perspective this would be just the beginning of a broader hardening of both kernel and userspace that I'd like to pursue. -- igor -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
On Sat, Feb 3, 2018 at 2:57 PM, Igor Stoppa <igor.stoppa@huawei.com> wrote: >>> On Thu, 25 Jan 2018, Matthew Wilcox wrote: > >>>> It's worth having a discussion about whether we want the pmalloc API >>>> or whether we want a slab-based API. > I'd love to have some feedback specifically about the API. > > I have also some idea about userspace and how to extend the pmalloc > concept to it: > > http://www.openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2018/01/30/20 > > I'll be AFK intermittently for about 2 weeks, so i might not be able to > reply immediately, but from my perspective this would be just the > beginning of a broader hardening of both kernel and userspace that I'd > like to pursue. > > -- > igor Regarding the notion of validated protected memory, is there a method by which the resulting checksum could be used in a lookup table/function to resolve the location of the protected data? Effectively a hash table of protected allocations, with a benefit of dedup since any data matching the same key would be the same data (multiple identical cred structs being pushed around). Should leave the resolver address/csum in recent memory to check against, right?
On 03/02/18 22:12, Boris Lukashev wrote: > Regarding the notion of validated protected memory, is there a method > by which the resulting checksum could be used in a lookup > table/function to resolve the location of the protected data? What I have in mind is a checksum at page/vmap_area level, so there would be no 1:1 mapping between a specific allocation and the checksum. An extreme case would be the one where an allocation crosses one or more page boundaries, while the checksum refers to a (partially) overlapping memory area. Code accessing a pool could perform one (relatively expensive) validation. But still something that would require a more sophisticated attack, to subvert. > Effectively a hash table of protected allocations, with a benefit of > dedup since any data matching the same key would be the same data > (multiple identical cred structs being pushed around). Should leave > the resolver address/csum in recent memory to check against, right? I see where you are trying to land, but I do not see how it would work without a further intermediate step. pmalloc dishes out virtual memory addresses, when called. It doesn't know what the user of the allocation will put in it. The user, otoh, has the direct address of the memory it got. What you are suggesting, if I have understood it correctly, is that, when the pool is protected, the addresses already given out, will become traps that get resolved through a lookup table that is built based on the content of each allocation. That seems to generate a lot of overhead, not to mention the fact that it might not play very well with the MMU. If I misunderstood, then I'd need a step by step description of what happens, because it's not clear to me how else the data would be accessed if not through the address that was obtained when pmalloc was invoked. -- igor -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
On Sat, Feb 3, 2018 at 3:32 PM, Igor Stoppa <igor.stoppa@huawei.com> wrote: > > > On 03/02/18 22:12, Boris Lukashev wrote: > >> Regarding the notion of validated protected memory, is there a method >> by which the resulting checksum could be used in a lookup >> table/function to resolve the location of the protected data? > > What I have in mind is a checksum at page/vmap_area level, so there > would be no 1:1 mapping between a specific allocation and the checksum. > > An extreme case would be the one where an allocation crosses one or more > page boundaries, while the checksum refers to a (partially) overlapping > memory area. > > Code accessing a pool could perform one (relatively expensive) > validation. But still something that would require a more sophisticated > attack, to subvert. > >> Effectively a hash table of protected allocations, with a benefit of >> dedup since any data matching the same key would be the same data >> (multiple identical cred structs being pushed around). Should leave >> the resolver address/csum in recent memory to check against, right? > > I see where you are trying to land, but I do not see how it would work > without a further intermediate step. > > pmalloc dishes out virtual memory addresses, when called. > > It doesn't know what the user of the allocation will put in it. > The user, otoh, has the direct address of the memory it got. > > What you are suggesting, if I have understood it correctly, is that, > when the pool is protected, the addresses already given out, will become > traps that get resolved through a lookup table that is built based on > the content of each allocation. > > That seems to generate a lot of overhead, not to mention the fact that > it might not play very well with the MMU. That is effectively what i'm suggesting - as a form of protection for consumers against direct reads of data which may have been corrupted by some irrelevant means. In the context of pmalloc, it would probably be a separate type of ro+verified pool which consumers would explicitly opt into. Say there's a maintenance cycle on a <name some scary thing controlled by Linux> and it wants to make sure that the instructions it read in are what they should have been before running them, those consumers might well take the penalty if it keeps <said scary big thing> from doing <the thing we're scared of it doing>. If such a resolver could be implemented in a manner which doesnt break all the things (including acceptable performance for at least a significant number of workloads), it might be useful as a general tool for handing out memory to userspace, even in rw, as it provides execution context in which other requirements can be forcibly resolved, preventing unauthorized access to pages the consumer shouldn't get in a very generic way. Spectre comes to mind as a potential class of issues to be addressed this way, since speculative load could be prevented if the resolution were to fail. > > If I misunderstood, then I'd need a step by step description of what > happens, because it's not clear to me how else the data would be > accessed if not through the address that was obtained when pmalloc was > invoked. > > -- > igor
On 04/02/18 00:29, Boris Lukashev wrote: > On Sat, Feb 3, 2018 at 3:32 PM, Igor Stoppa <igor.stoppa@huawei.com> wrote: [...] >> What you are suggesting, if I have understood it correctly, is that, >> when the pool is protected, the addresses already given out, will become >> traps that get resolved through a lookup table that is built based on >> the content of each allocation. >> >> That seems to generate a lot of overhead, not to mention the fact that >> it might not play very well with the MMU. > > That is effectively what i'm suggesting - as a form of protection for > consumers against direct reads of data which may have been corrupted > by some irrelevant means. In the context of pmalloc, it would probably > be a separate type of ro+verified pool ok, that seems more like an extension though. ATM I am having problems gaining traction to get even the basic merged :-) I would consider this as a possibility for future work, unless it is said that it's necessary for pmalloc to be accepted ... -- igor -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
On Sat, 3 Feb 2018, Igor Stoppa wrote: > > We could even do this in a more thorough way. Can we use a ring 1 / 2 > > distinction to create a hardened OS core that policies the rest of > > the ever expanding kernel with all its modules and this and that feature? > > What would be the differentiating criteria? Furthermore, what are the > chances > of invalidating the entire concept, because there is already an > hypervisor using > the higher level features? > That is what you are proposing, if I understand correctly. Were there not 4 rings as well as methods by the processor vendors to virtualize them as well? > > I think that will long term be a better approach and allow more than the > > current hardening approaches can get you. It seems that we are willing to > > tolerate significant performance regressions now. So lets use the > > protection mechanisms that the hardware offers. > > I would rather *not* propose significant performance regression :-P But we already have implemented significant kernel hardening which causes performance regressions. Using hardware capabilities allows the processor vendor to further optimize these mechanisms whereas the software preventative measures are eating up more and more performance as the pile them on. Plus these are methods that can be worked around. Restrictions implemented in a higher ring can be enforced and are much better than just "hardening" (which is making life difficult for the hackers and throwing away performannce for the average user). -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
On 05/02/18 17:40, Christopher Lameter wrote: > On Sat, 3 Feb 2018, Igor Stoppa wrote: > >>> We could even do this in a more thorough way. Can we use a ring 1 / 2 >>> distinction to create a hardened OS core that policies the rest of >>> the ever expanding kernel with all its modules and this and that feature? >> >> What would be the differentiating criteria? Furthermore, what are the >> chances >> of invalidating the entire concept, because there is already an >> hypervisor using >> the higher level features? >> That is what you are proposing, if I understand correctly. > > Were there not 4 rings as well as methods by the processor vendors to > virtualize them as well? I think you are talking x86, mostly. On ARM there are ELx and they are often (typically?) already used. For x86 I cannot comment. >>> I think that will long term be a better approach and allow more than the >>> current hardening approaches can get you. It seems that we are willing to >>> tolerate significant performance regressions now. So lets use the >>> protection mechanisms that the hardware offers. >> >> I would rather *not* propose significant performance regression :-P > > But we already have implemented significant kernel hardening which causes > performance regressions. Using hardware capabilities allows the processor > vendor to further optimize these mechanisms whereas the software > preventative measures are eating up more and more performance as the pile > them on. Plus these are methods that can be worked around. Restrictions > implemented in a higher ring can be enforced and are much better than > just "hardening" (which is making life difficult for the hackers and > throwing away performannce for the average user). What you are proposing requires major restructuring of the memory management - at the very least - provided that it doesn't cause the conflicts I mentioned above. Even after you do that, the system will still be working with memory pages, there will be still a need to segregate data within certain pages, or pay the penalty of handling exceptions, when data with different permissions coexist within the same page. The way the pmalloc API is designed is meant to facilitate the segregation and to actually improve performance, by grouping types of data with same scope and permission. WRT the implementation, there is a minimal exposure to the memory provider, both for allocation and release. Same goes for the protection mechanism. It's a single call to the function which makes pages read only. It would be trivial to swap it out with a call to whatever framework you want to come up with, for implementing ring/EL based protection. From this perspective, you can easily provide patches that implement what you are proposing, against pmalloc, if you really think that it's the way to go. I'll be happy to use them, if they provide improved performance and same or better protection. The way I designed pmalloc was really to be able to switch to some alternate memory provider and/or protection mechanism, should a better one arise. But it can be done in a separate step, I think, since you are not proposing to just change pmalloc, you are proposing to re-design how the overall kernel memory hardening works (including executable pages, const data, __ro_after_init, etc.) -- igor -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
On Sun, Feb 4, 2018 at 7:05 AM, Igor Stoppa <igor.stoppa@huawei.com> wrote: > On 04/02/18 00:29, Boris Lukashev wrote: >> On Sat, Feb 3, 2018 at 3:32 PM, Igor Stoppa <igor.stoppa@huawei.com> wrote: > > [...] > >>> What you are suggesting, if I have understood it correctly, is that, >>> when the pool is protected, the addresses already given out, will become >>> traps that get resolved through a lookup table that is built based on >>> the content of each allocation. >>> >>> That seems to generate a lot of overhead, not to mention the fact that >>> it might not play very well with the MMU. >> >> That is effectively what i'm suggesting - as a form of protection for >> consumers against direct reads of data which may have been corrupted >> by some irrelevant means. In the context of pmalloc, it would probably >> be a separate type of ro+verified pool > ok, that seems more like an extension though. > > ATM I am having problems gaining traction to get even the basic merged :-) > > I would consider this as a possibility for future work, unless it is > said that it's necessary for pmalloc to be accepted ... I would agree: let's get basic functionality in first. Both verification and the physmap part can be done separately, IMO. -Kees
On 02/12/2018 03:27 PM, Kees Cook wrote: > On Sun, Feb 4, 2018 at 7:05 AM, Igor Stoppa <igor.stoppa@huawei.com> wrote: >> On 04/02/18 00:29, Boris Lukashev wrote: >>> On Sat, Feb 3, 2018 at 3:32 PM, Igor Stoppa <igor.stoppa@huawei.com> wrote: >> >> [...] >> >>>> What you are suggesting, if I have understood it correctly, is that, >>>> when the pool is protected, the addresses already given out, will become >>>> traps that get resolved through a lookup table that is built based on >>>> the content of each allocation. >>>> >>>> That seems to generate a lot of overhead, not to mention the fact that >>>> it might not play very well with the MMU. >>> >>> That is effectively what i'm suggesting - as a form of protection for >>> consumers against direct reads of data which may have been corrupted >>> by some irrelevant means. In the context of pmalloc, it would probably >>> be a separate type of ro+verified pool >> ok, that seems more like an extension though. >> >> ATM I am having problems gaining traction to get even the basic merged :-) >> >> I would consider this as a possibility for future work, unless it is >> said that it's necessary for pmalloc to be accepted ... > > I would agree: let's get basic functionality in first. Both > verification and the physmap part can be done separately, IMO. Skipping over physmap leaves a pretty big area of exposure that could be difficult to solve later. I appreciate this might block basic functionality but I don't think we should just gloss over it without at least some idea of what we would do. Thanks, Laura -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
On Mon, Feb 12, 2018 at 4:40 PM, Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com> wrote: > On 02/12/2018 03:27 PM, Kees Cook wrote: >> >> On Sun, Feb 4, 2018 at 7:05 AM, Igor Stoppa <igor.stoppa@huawei.com> >> wrote: >>> >>> On 04/02/18 00:29, Boris Lukashev wrote: >>>> >>>> On Sat, Feb 3, 2018 at 3:32 PM, Igor Stoppa <igor.stoppa@huawei.com> >>>> wrote: >>> >>> >>> [...] >>> >>>>> What you are suggesting, if I have understood it correctly, is that, >>>>> when the pool is protected, the addresses already given out, will >>>>> become >>>>> traps that get resolved through a lookup table that is built based on >>>>> the content of each allocation. >>>>> >>>>> That seems to generate a lot of overhead, not to mention the fact that >>>>> it might not play very well with the MMU. >>>> >>>> >>>> That is effectively what i'm suggesting - as a form of protection for >>>> consumers against direct reads of data which may have been corrupted >>>> by some irrelevant means. In the context of pmalloc, it would probably >>>> be a separate type of ro+verified pool >>> >>> ok, that seems more like an extension though. >>> >>> ATM I am having problems gaining traction to get even the basic merged >>> :-) >>> >>> I would consider this as a possibility for future work, unless it is >>> said that it's necessary for pmalloc to be accepted ... >> >> >> I would agree: let's get basic functionality in first. Both >> verification and the physmap part can be done separately, IMO. > > > Skipping over physmap leaves a pretty big area of exposure that could > be difficult to solve later. I appreciate this might block basic > functionality but I don't think we should just gloss over it without > at least some idea of what we would do. What's our exposure on physmap for other regions? e.g. things that are executable, or made read-only later (like __ro_after_init)? -Kees
On Tue, Feb 13, 2018 at 2:25 AM, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote: > On Mon, Feb 12, 2018 at 4:40 PM, Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com> wrote: >> On 02/12/2018 03:27 PM, Kees Cook wrote: >>> >>> On Sun, Feb 4, 2018 at 7:05 AM, Igor Stoppa <igor.stoppa@huawei.com> >>> wrote: >>>> >>>> On 04/02/18 00:29, Boris Lukashev wrote: >>>>> >>>>> On Sat, Feb 3, 2018 at 3:32 PM, Igor Stoppa <igor.stoppa@huawei.com> >>>>> wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> [...] >>>> >>>>>> What you are suggesting, if I have understood it correctly, is that, >>>>>> when the pool is protected, the addresses already given out, will >>>>>> become >>>>>> traps that get resolved through a lookup table that is built based on >>>>>> the content of each allocation. >>>>>> >>>>>> That seems to generate a lot of overhead, not to mention the fact that >>>>>> it might not play very well with the MMU. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> That is effectively what i'm suggesting - as a form of protection for >>>>> consumers against direct reads of data which may have been corrupted >>>>> by some irrelevant means. In the context of pmalloc, it would probably >>>>> be a separate type of ro+verified pool >>>> >>>> ok, that seems more like an extension though. >>>> >>>> ATM I am having problems gaining traction to get even the basic merged >>>> :-) >>>> >>>> I would consider this as a possibility for future work, unless it is >>>> said that it's necessary for pmalloc to be accepted ... >>> >>> >>> I would agree: let's get basic functionality in first. Both >>> verification and the physmap part can be done separately, IMO. >> >> >> Skipping over physmap leaves a pretty big area of exposure that could >> be difficult to solve later. I appreciate this might block basic >> functionality but I don't think we should just gloss over it without >> at least some idea of what we would do. > > What's our exposure on physmap for other regions? e.g. things that are > executable, or made read-only later (like __ro_after_init)? I just checked on a system with a 4.9 kernel, and there seems to be no physical memory that is mapped as writable in the init PGD and executable elsewhere. Ah, I think I missed something. At least on X86, set_memory_ro, set_memory_rw, set_memory_nx and set_memory_x all use change_page_attr_clear/change_page_attr_set, which use change_page_attr_set_clr, which calls __change_page_attr_set_clr() with a second parameter "checkalias" that is set to 1 unless the bit being changed is the NX bit, and that parameter causes the invocation of cpa_process_alias(), which will, for mapped ranges, also change the attributes of physmap ranges. set_memory_ro() and so on are also used by the module loading code. But in the ARM64 code, I don't see anything similar. Does anyone with a better understanding of ARM64 want to check whether I missed something? Or maybe, with a recent kernel, check whether executable module pages show up with a second writable mapping in the "kernel_page_tables" file in debugfs? -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
On 02/12/2018 07:39 PM, Jann Horn wrote: > On Tue, Feb 13, 2018 at 2:25 AM, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote: >> On Mon, Feb 12, 2018 at 4:40 PM, Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com> wrote: >>> On 02/12/2018 03:27 PM, Kees Cook wrote: >>>> >>>> On Sun, Feb 4, 2018 at 7:05 AM, Igor Stoppa <igor.stoppa@huawei.com> >>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> On 04/02/18 00:29, Boris Lukashev wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> On Sat, Feb 3, 2018 at 3:32 PM, Igor Stoppa <igor.stoppa@huawei.com> >>>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> [...] >>>>> >>>>>>> What you are suggesting, if I have understood it correctly, is that, >>>>>>> when the pool is protected, the addresses already given out, will >>>>>>> become >>>>>>> traps that get resolved through a lookup table that is built based on >>>>>>> the content of each allocation. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> That seems to generate a lot of overhead, not to mention the fact that >>>>>>> it might not play very well with the MMU. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> That is effectively what i'm suggesting - as a form of protection for >>>>>> consumers against direct reads of data which may have been corrupted >>>>>> by some irrelevant means. In the context of pmalloc, it would probably >>>>>> be a separate type of ro+verified pool >>>>> >>>>> ok, that seems more like an extension though. >>>>> >>>>> ATM I am having problems gaining traction to get even the basic merged >>>>> :-) >>>>> >>>>> I would consider this as a possibility for future work, unless it is >>>>> said that it's necessary for pmalloc to be accepted ... >>>> >>>> >>>> I would agree: let's get basic functionality in first. Both >>>> verification and the physmap part can be done separately, IMO. >>> >>> >>> Skipping over physmap leaves a pretty big area of exposure that could >>> be difficult to solve later. I appreciate this might block basic >>> functionality but I don't think we should just gloss over it without >>> at least some idea of what we would do. >> >> What's our exposure on physmap for other regions? e.g. things that are >> executable, or made read-only later (like __ro_after_init)? > > I just checked on a system with a 4.9 kernel, and there seems to be no > physical memory that is mapped as writable in the init PGD and > executable elsewhere. > > Ah, I think I missed something. At least on X86, set_memory_ro, > set_memory_rw, set_memory_nx and set_memory_x all use > change_page_attr_clear/change_page_attr_set, which use > change_page_attr_set_clr, which calls __change_page_attr_set_clr() > with a second parameter "checkalias" that is set to 1 unless the bit > being changed is the NX bit, and that parameter causes the invocation > of cpa_process_alias(), which will, for mapped ranges, also change the > attributes of physmap ranges. set_memory_ro() and so on are also used > by the module loading code. > > But in the ARM64 code, I don't see anything similar. Does anyone with > a better understanding of ARM64 want to check whether I missed > something? Or maybe, with a recent kernel, check whether executable > module pages show up with a second writable mapping in the > "kernel_page_tables" file in debugfs? > No, arm64 doesn't fixup the aliases, mostly because arm64 uses larger page sizes which can't be broken down at runtime. CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING does use 4K pages which could be adjusted at runtime. So yes, you are right we would have physmap exposure on arm64 as well. To the original question, it does sound like we are actually okay with the physmap. Thanks, Laura -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
On 02/13/2018 07:20 AM, Igor Stoppa wrote: > Why alterations of page properties are not considered a risk and the physmap is? > And how would it be easier (i suppose) to attack the latter? Alterations are certainly a risk but with the physmap the mapping is already there. Find the address and you have access vs. needing to actually modify the properties then do the access. I could also be complete off base on my threat model here so please correct me if I'm wrong. I think your other summaries are good points though and should go in the cover letter. Thanks, Laura -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
On Tue, Feb 13, 2018 at 8:09 AM, Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com> wrote: > No, arm64 doesn't fixup the aliases, mostly because arm64 uses larger > page sizes which can't be broken down at runtime. CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING > does use 4K pages which could be adjusted at runtime. So yes, you are > right we would have physmap exposure on arm64 as well. Errr, so that means even modules and kernel code are writable via the arm64 physmap? That seems extraordinarily bad. :( -Kees
On 02/13/2018 01:43 PM, Kees Cook wrote: > On Tue, Feb 13, 2018 at 8:09 AM, Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com> wrote: >> No, arm64 doesn't fixup the aliases, mostly because arm64 uses larger >> page sizes which can't be broken down at runtime. CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING >> does use 4K pages which could be adjusted at runtime. So yes, you are >> right we would have physmap exposure on arm64 as well. > > Errr, so that means even modules and kernel code are writable via the > arm64 physmap? That seems extraordinarily bad. :( > > -Kees > (adding linux-arm-kernel and changing the subject) Kernel code should be fine, if it isn't that is a bug that should be fixed. Modules yes are not fully protected. The conclusion from past experience has been that we cannot safely break down larger page sizes at runtime like x86 does. We could theoretically add support for fixing up the alias if PAGE_POISONING is enabled but I don't know who would actually use that in production. Performance is very poor at that point. Thanks, Laura -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
On 14 February 2018 at 19:06, Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com> wrote: > On 02/13/2018 01:43 PM, Kees Cook wrote: >> >> On Tue, Feb 13, 2018 at 8:09 AM, Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com> wrote: >>> >>> No, arm64 doesn't fixup the aliases, mostly because arm64 uses larger >>> page sizes which can't be broken down at runtime. CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING >>> does use 4K pages which could be adjusted at runtime. So yes, you are >>> right we would have physmap exposure on arm64 as well. >> >> >> Errr, so that means even modules and kernel code are writable via the >> arm64 physmap? That seems extraordinarily bad. :( >> >> -Kees >> > > (adding linux-arm-kernel and changing the subject) > > Kernel code should be fine, if it isn't that is a bug that should be > fixed. We take care to ensure that the linear alias of the core kernel's .text and .rodata segments are mapped read-only. When we first moved the kernel out of the linear region, we did not map it there at all anymore, but that broke hibernation so we had to put something back. > Modules yes are not fully protected. The conclusion from past > experience has been that we cannot safely break down larger page sizes > at runtime like x86 does. We could theoretically > add support for fixing up the alias if PAGE_POISONING is enabled but > I don't know who would actually use that in production. Performance > is very poor at that point. > As long as the linear alias of the module is mapped down to pages, we should be able to tweak the permissions. I take it that PAGE_POISONING does more than just that? -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
On Wed, Feb 14, 2018 at 11:06 AM, Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com> wrote: > On 02/13/2018 01:43 PM, Kees Cook wrote: >> >> On Tue, Feb 13, 2018 at 8:09 AM, Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com> wrote: >>> >>> No, arm64 doesn't fixup the aliases, mostly because arm64 uses larger >>> page sizes which can't be broken down at runtime. CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING >>> does use 4K pages which could be adjusted at runtime. So yes, you are >>> right we would have physmap exposure on arm64 as well. >> >> >> Errr, so that means even modules and kernel code are writable via the >> arm64 physmap? That seems extraordinarily bad. :( >> >> -Kees >> > > (adding linux-arm-kernel and changing the subject) > > Kernel code should be fine, if it isn't that is a bug that should be > fixed. Modules yes are not fully protected. The conclusion from past I think that's a pretty serious problem: we can't have aliases with mismatched permissions; this degrades a deterministic protection (read-only) to a probabilistic protection (knowing where the alias of a target is mapped). Having an attack be "needs some info leaks" instead of "need execution control to change perms" is a much lower bar, IMO. > experience has been that we cannot safely break down larger page sizes > at runtime like x86 does. We could theoretically > add support for fixing up the alias if PAGE_POISONING is enabled but > I don't know who would actually use that in production. Performance > is very poor at that point. Why does using finer granularity on the physmap degrade performance? I assume TLB pressure, but what is heavily using that area? (I must not be understanding what physmap actually gets used for -- I thought it was just a convenience to have a 1:1 virt/phys map for some lookups?) -Kees
On Wed, Feb 14, 2018 at 11:29 AM, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote: > Why does using finer granularity on the physmap degrade performance? I > assume TLB pressure, but what is heavily using that area? (I must not > be understanding what physmap actually gets used for -- I thought it > was just a convenience to have a 1:1 virt/phys map for some lookups?) Jann has sorted me out: it's that physmap isn't an _alias_ for the buddy allocator memory areas; it's used directly. -Kees
On Wed, Feb 14, 2018 at 11:06 AM, Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com> wrote: > fixed. Modules yes are not fully protected. The conclusion from past > experience has been that we cannot safely break down larger page sizes > at runtime like x86 does. We could theoretically > add support for fixing up the alias if PAGE_POISONING is enabled but > I don't know who would actually use that in production. Performance > is very poor at that point. XPFO forces 4K pages on the physmap[1] for similar reasons. I have no doubt about performance changes, but I'd be curious to see real numbers. Did anyone do benchmarks on just the huge/4K change? (Without also the XPFO overhead?) If this, XPFO, and PAGE_POISONING all need it, I think we have to start a closer investigation. :) -Kees [1] http://www.openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2017/09/07/13
On 02/14/2018 11:28 AM, Ard Biesheuvel wrote: > On 14 February 2018 at 19:06, Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com> wrote: >> On 02/13/2018 01:43 PM, Kees Cook wrote: >>> >>> On Tue, Feb 13, 2018 at 8:09 AM, Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com> wrote: >>>> >>>> No, arm64 doesn't fixup the aliases, mostly because arm64 uses larger >>>> page sizes which can't be broken down at runtime. CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING >>>> does use 4K pages which could be adjusted at runtime. So yes, you are >>>> right we would have physmap exposure on arm64 as well. >>> >>> >>> Errr, so that means even modules and kernel code are writable via the >>> arm64 physmap? That seems extraordinarily bad. :( >>> >>> -Kees >>> >> >> (adding linux-arm-kernel and changing the subject) >> >> Kernel code should be fine, if it isn't that is a bug that should be >> fixed. > > We take care to ensure that the linear alias of the core kernel's > .text and .rodata segments are mapped read-only. When we first moved > the kernel out of the linear region, we did not map it there at all > anymore, but that broke hibernation so we had to put something back. > >> Modules yes are not fully protected. The conclusion from past >> experience has been that we cannot safely break down larger page sizes >> at runtime like x86 does. We could theoretically >> add support for fixing up the alias if PAGE_POISONING is enabled but >> I don't know who would actually use that in production. Performance >> is very poor at that point. >> > > As long as the linear alias of the module is mapped down to pages, we > should be able to tweak the permissions. I take it that PAGE_POISONING > does more than just that? > Page poisoning does exactly that. The argument I was trying to make was that if nobody really uses page poisoning except for debugging it might not be worth it to fix up the alias. Thinking a bit more, this is a terrible argument for many reasons so yes I agree that we can just fix up the alias if PAGE_POISONING (or other features) are enabled. Thanks, Laura -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
On Wed, Feb 14, 2018 at 11:48:38AM -0800, Kees Cook wrote: > On Wed, Feb 14, 2018 at 11:06 AM, Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com> wrote: > > fixed. Modules yes are not fully protected. The conclusion from past > > experience has been that we cannot safely break down larger page sizes > > at runtime like x86 does. We could theoretically > > add support for fixing up the alias if PAGE_POISONING is enabled but > > I don't know who would actually use that in production. Performance > > is very poor at that point. > > XPFO forces 4K pages on the physmap[1] for similar reasons. I have no > doubt about performance changes, but I'd be curious to see real > numbers. Did anyone do benchmarks on just the huge/4K change? (Without > also the XPFO overhead?) > > If this, XPFO, and PAGE_POISONING all need it, I think we have to > start a closer investigation. :) I haven't but it shouldn't be too hard. What benchmarks are you thinking? Tycho -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
On Wed, Feb 14, 2018 at 2:13 PM, Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws> wrote: > On Wed, Feb 14, 2018 at 11:48:38AM -0800, Kees Cook wrote: >> On Wed, Feb 14, 2018 at 11:06 AM, Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com> wrote: >> > fixed. Modules yes are not fully protected. The conclusion from past >> > experience has been that we cannot safely break down larger page sizes >> > at runtime like x86 does. We could theoretically >> > add support for fixing up the alias if PAGE_POISONING is enabled but >> > I don't know who would actually use that in production. Performance >> > is very poor at that point. >> >> XPFO forces 4K pages on the physmap[1] for similar reasons. I have no >> doubt about performance changes, but I'd be curious to see real >> numbers. Did anyone do benchmarks on just the huge/4K change? (Without >> also the XPFO overhead?) >> >> If this, XPFO, and PAGE_POISONING all need it, I think we have to >> start a closer investigation. :) > > I haven't but it shouldn't be too hard. What benchmarks are you > thinking? Unless I'm looking at some specific micro benchmark, I tend to default to looking at kernel build benchmarks but that gets pretty noisy. Laura regularly uses hackbench, IIRC. I'm not finding the pastebin I had for that, though. I wonder if we need a benchmark subdirectory in tools/testing/, so we could collect some of these common tools? All benchmarks are terrible, but at least we'd have the same terrible benchmarks. :) -Kees
On 14/02/18 21:29, Kees Cook wrote: > On Wed, Feb 14, 2018 at 11:06 AM, Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com> wrote: [...] >> Kernel code should be fine, if it isn't that is a bug that should be >> fixed. Modules yes are not fully protected. The conclusion from past > > I think that's a pretty serious problem: we can't have aliases with > mismatched permissions; this degrades a deterministic protection > (read-only) to a probabilistic protection (knowing where the alias of > a target is mapped). Having an attack be "needs some info leaks" > instead of "need execution control to change perms" is a much lower > bar, IMO. Why "need execution control to change permission"? Or, iow, what does it mean exactly? ROP/JOP? Data-oriented control flow hijack? Unless I misunderstand the meaning of "need execution control", I think that "need write capability to arbitrary data address" should be sufficient, albeit uncomfortable to use. OTOH, "need read/write capability from/to arbitrary data address" would be enough, I think, assuming that one knows the offset where to write to - but that information could be inferred, for example, by scanning the memory for known patterns. IMHO the attack surface is so vast that it's not unreasonable to expect that it will be possible to fish out means to perform arbitrary R/W into kernel address space. Ex: some more recent/less tested driver. One can argue that this sort of R/W activity probably does require some form of execution control, but AFAIK, the only way to to prevent it, is to have CFI - btw, is there any standardization in that sense? So, from my (pessimistic?) perspective, the best that can be hoped for, is to make it much harder to figure out where the data is located. Virtual mapping has this side effect, compared to linear mapping. But, once easier attack targets are removed, I suspect the page mapping will become the next target. -- igor -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
On 13/02/18 20:10, Laura Abbott wrote: > On 02/13/2018 07:20 AM, Igor Stoppa wrote: >> Why alterations of page properties are not considered a risk and the physmap is? >> And how would it be easier (i suppose) to attack the latter? > > Alterations are certainly a risk but with the physmap the > mapping is already there. Find the address and you have > access vs. needing to actually modify the properties > then do the access. I could also be complete off base > on my threat model here so please correct me if I'm > wrong. It's difficult for me to comment on this without knowing *how* the attack would be performed, in your model. Ex: my expectation is that the attacked has R/W access to kernel data and has knowledge of the location of static variables. This is not just a guess, but a real-life scenario, found in attacks that, among other things, are capable of disabling SELinux, to proceed toward gaining full root capability. At that point, I think that variables which are allocated dynamically, in vmalloc address space, are harder to locate, because of the virtual mapping and the randomness of the address chosen (this I have not confirmed yet, but I suppose there is some randomness in picking the address to assign to a certain allocation request to vmalloc, otherwise, it could be added). > I think your other summaries are good points though > and should go in the cover letter. Ok, I'm just afraid it risks becoming a lengthy dissertation :-) -- igor -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
On Tue, Feb 20, 2018 at 8:28 AM, Igor Stoppa <igor.stoppa@huawei.com> wrote: > > > On 14/02/18 21:29, Kees Cook wrote: >> On Wed, Feb 14, 2018 at 11:06 AM, Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com> wrote: > > [...] > >>> Kernel code should be fine, if it isn't that is a bug that should be >>> fixed. Modules yes are not fully protected. The conclusion from past >> >> I think that's a pretty serious problem: we can't have aliases with >> mismatched permissions; this degrades a deterministic protection >> (read-only) to a probabilistic protection (knowing where the alias of >> a target is mapped). Having an attack be "needs some info leaks" >> instead of "need execution control to change perms" is a much lower >> bar, IMO. > > Why "need execution control to change permission"? > Or, iow, what does it mean exactly? > ROP/JOP? Data-oriented control flow hijack? Right, I mean, if an attacker has already gained execute control, they can just call the needed functions to change memory permissions. But that isn't needed if there is a mismatch between physmap and virtmap: i.e. they can write to the physmap without needing to change perms first. > One can argue that this sort of R/W activity probably does require some > form of execution control, but AFAIK, the only way to to prevent it, is > to have CFI - btw, is there any standardization in that sense? I meant that I don't want a difference in protection between physmap and virtmap. I'd like to be able to reason the smae about the exposures in either. > So, from my (pessimistic?) perspective, the best that can be hoped for, > is to make it much harder to figure out where the data is located. > > Virtual mapping has this side effect, compared to linear mapping. Right, this is good, for sure. No complaints there at all. It's why I think pmalloc and arm64 physmap perms are separate issues. -Kees
On Tue, Feb 20, 2018 at 9:16 AM, Igor Stoppa <igor.stoppa@huawei.com> wrote: > > > On 13/02/18 20:10, Laura Abbott wrote: >> On 02/13/2018 07:20 AM, Igor Stoppa wrote: >>> Why alterations of page properties are not considered a risk and the physmap is? >>> And how would it be easier (i suppose) to attack the latter? >> >> Alterations are certainly a risk but with the physmap the >> mapping is already there. Find the address and you have >> access vs. needing to actually modify the properties >> then do the access. I could also be complete off base >> on my threat model here so please correct me if I'm >> wrong. > > It's difficult for me to comment on this without knowing *how* the > attack would be performed, in your model. > > Ex: my expectation is that the attacked has R/W access to kernel data > and has knowledge of the location of static variables. > > This is not just a guess, but a real-life scenario, found in attacks > that, among other things, are capable of disabling SELinux, to proceed > toward gaining full root capability. > > At that point, I think that variables which are allocated dynamically, > in vmalloc address space, are harder to locate, because of the virtual > mapping and the randomness of the address chosen (this I have not > confirmed yet, but I suppose there is some randomness in picking the > address to assign to a certain allocation request to vmalloc, otherwise, > it could be added). Machine-to-machine runtime variation certainly affects the mapping location, but for early boot allocations, these become surprisingly deterministic, especially across similar hardware/memory layouts (both the virtmap and physmap locations). However, using CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MEMORY makes it MUCH more difficult. (Note that RANDOMIZE_BASE on arm64 effectively includes RANDOMIZE_MEMORY, as it uses the entropy for multiple base offsets, including the physmap, IIRC.) >> I think your other summaries are good points though >> and should go in the cover letter. > > Ok, I'm just afraid it risks becoming a lengthy dissertation :-) It's rare to have anyone say "your commit log is too long". :) -Kees
diff --git a/include/linux/genalloc.h b/include/linux/genalloc.h index a8fdabf..9f2974f 100644 --- a/include/linux/genalloc.h +++ b/include/linux/genalloc.h @@ -121,6 +121,9 @@ extern unsigned long gen_pool_alloc_algo(struct gen_pool *, size_t, extern void *gen_pool_dma_alloc(struct gen_pool *pool, size_t size, dma_addr_t *dma); extern void gen_pool_free(struct gen_pool *, unsigned long, size_t); + +extern void gen_pool_flush_chunk(struct gen_pool *pool, + struct gen_pool_chunk *chunk); extern void gen_pool_for_each_chunk(struct gen_pool *, void (*)(struct gen_pool *, struct gen_pool_chunk *, void *), void *); extern size_t gen_pool_avail(struct gen_pool *); diff --git a/include/linux/pmalloc.h b/include/linux/pmalloc.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..cb18739 --- /dev/null +++ b/include/linux/pmalloc.h @@ -0,0 +1,215 @@ +/* + * pmalloc.h: Header for Protectable Memory Allocator + * + * (C) Copyright 2017 Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd. + * Author: Igor Stoppa <igor.stoppa@huawei.com> + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or + * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License + * as published by the Free Software Foundation; version 2 + * of the License. + */ + +#ifndef _PMALLOC_H +#define _PMALLOC_H + + +#include <linux/genalloc.h> +#include <linux/string.h> + +#define PMALLOC_DEFAULT_ALLOC_ORDER (-1) + +/* + * Library for dynamic allocation of pools of memory that can be, + * after initialization, marked as read-only. + * + * This is intended to complement __read_only_after_init, for those cases + * where either it is not possible to know the initialization value before + * init is completed, or the amount of data is variable and can be + * determined only at run-time. + * + * ***WARNING*** + * The user of the API is expected to synchronize: + * 1) allocation, + * 2) writes to the allocated memory, + * 3) write protection of the pool, + * 4) freeing of the allocated memory, and + * 5) destruction of the pool. + * + * For a non-threaded scenario, this type of locking is not even required. + * + * Even if the library were to provide support for locking, point 2) + * would still depend on the user taking the lock. + */ + + +/** + * pmalloc_create_pool - create a new protectable memory pool - + * @name: the name of the pool, must be unique + * @min_alloc_order: log2 of the minimum allocation size obtainable + * from the pool + * + * Creates a new (empty) memory pool for allocation of protectable + * memory. Memory will be allocated upon request (through pmalloc). + * + * Returns a pointer to the new pool upon success, otherwise a NULL. + */ +struct gen_pool *pmalloc_create_pool(const char *name, + int min_alloc_order); + + +int is_pmalloc_object(const void *ptr, const unsigned long n); + +/** + * pmalloc_prealloc - tries to allocate a memory chunk of the requested size + * @pool: handler to the pool to be used for memory allocation + * @size: amount of memory (in bytes) requested + * + * Prepares a chunk of the requested size. + * This is intended to both minimize latency in later memory requests and + * avoid sleping during allocation. + * Memory allocated with prealloc is stored in one single chunk, as + * opposite to what is allocated on-demand when pmalloc runs out of free + * space already existing in the pool and has to invoke vmalloc. + * + * Returns true if the vmalloc call was successful, false otherwise. + */ +bool pmalloc_prealloc(struct gen_pool *pool, size_t size); + +/** + * pmalloc - allocate protectable memory from a pool + * @pool: handler to the pool to be used for memory allocation + * @size: amount of memory (in bytes) requested + * @gfp: flags for page allocation + * + * Allocates memory from an unprotected pool. If the pool doesn't have + * enough memory, and the request did not include GFP_ATOMIC, an attempt + * is made to add a new chunk of memory to the pool + * (a multiple of PAGE_SIZE), in order to fit the new request. + * Otherwise, NULL is returned. + * + * Returns the pointer to the memory requested upon success, + * NULL otherwise (either no memory available or pool already read-only). + */ +void *pmalloc(struct gen_pool *pool, size_t size, gfp_t gfp); + + +/** + * pzalloc - zero-initialized version of pmalloc + * @pool: handler to the pool to be used for memory allocation + * @size: amount of memory (in bytes) requested + * @gfp: flags for page allocation + * + * Executes pmalloc, initializing the memory requested to 0, + * before returning the pointer to it. + * + * Returns the pointer to the zeroed memory requested, upon success, + * NULL otherwise (either no memory available or pool already read-only). + */ +static inline void *pzalloc(struct gen_pool *pool, size_t size, gfp_t gfp) +{ + return pmalloc(pool, size, gfp | __GFP_ZERO); +} + +/** + * pmalloc_array - allocates an array according to the parameters + * @pool: handler to the pool to be used for memory allocation + * @size: amount of memory (in bytes) requested + * @gfp: flags for page allocation + * + * Executes pmalloc, if it has a chance to succeed. + * + * Returns either NULL or the pmalloc result. + */ +static inline void *pmalloc_array(struct gen_pool *pool, size_t n, + size_t size, gfp_t flags) +{ + if (unlikely(!(pool && n && size))) + return NULL; + return pmalloc(pool, n * size, flags); +} + +/** + * pcalloc - allocates a 0-initialized array according to the parameters + * @pool: handler to the pool to be used for memory allocation + * @size: amount of memory (in bytes) requested + * @gfp: flags for page allocation + * + * Executes pmalloc, if it has a chance to succeed. + * + * Returns either NULL or the pmalloc result. + */ +static inline void *pcalloc(struct gen_pool *pool, size_t n, + size_t size, gfp_t flags) +{ + return pmalloc_array(pool, n, size, flags | __GFP_ZERO); +} + +/** + * pstrdup - duplicate a string, using pmalloc as allocator + * @pool: handler to the pool to be used for memory allocation + * @s: string to duplicate + * @gfp: flags for page allocation + * + * Generates a copy of the given string, allocating sufficient memory + * from the given pmalloc pool. + * + * Returns a pointer to the replica, NULL in case of recoverable error. + */ +static inline char *pstrdup(struct gen_pool *pool, const char *s, gfp_t gfp) +{ + size_t len; + char *buf; + + if (unlikely(pool == NULL || s == NULL)) + return NULL; + + len = strlen(s) + 1; + buf = pmalloc(pool, len, gfp); + if (likely(buf)) + strncpy(buf, s, len); + return buf; +} + +/** + * pmalloc_protect_pool - turn a read/write pool read-only + * @pool: the pool to protect + * + * Write-protects all the memory chunks assigned to the pool. + * This prevents any further allocation. + * + * Returns 0 upon success, -EINVAL in abnormal cases. + */ +int pmalloc_protect_pool(struct gen_pool *pool); + +/** + * pfree - mark as unused memory that was previously in use + * @pool: handler to the pool to be used for memory allocation + * @addr: the beginning of the memory area to be freed + * + * The behavior of pfree is different, depending on the state of the + * protection. + * If the pool is not yet protected, the memory is marked as unused and + * will be availabel for further allocations. + * If the pool is already protected, the memory is marked as unused, but + * it will still be impossible to perform further allocation, because of + * the existing protection. + * The freed memory, in this case, will be truly released only when the + * pool is destroyed. + */ +static inline void pfree(struct gen_pool *pool, const void *addr) +{ + gen_pool_free(pool, (unsigned long)addr, 0); +} + +/** + * pmalloc_destroy_pool - destroys a pool and all the associated memory + * @pool: the pool to destroy + * + * All the memory that was allocated through pmalloc in the pool will be freed. + * + * Returns 0 upon success, -EINVAL in abnormal cases. + */ +int pmalloc_destroy_pool(struct gen_pool *pool); + +#endif diff --git a/include/linux/vmalloc.h b/include/linux/vmalloc.h index 1e5d8c3..116d280 100644 --- a/include/linux/vmalloc.h +++ b/include/linux/vmalloc.h @@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ struct notifier_block; /* in notifier.h */ #define VM_UNINITIALIZED 0x00000020 /* vm_struct is not fully initialized */ #define VM_NO_GUARD 0x00000040 /* don't add guard page */ #define VM_KASAN 0x00000080 /* has allocated kasan shadow memory */ +#define VM_PMALLOC 0x00000100 /* pmalloc area - see docs */ /* bits [20..32] reserved for arch specific ioremap internals */ /* diff --git a/lib/genalloc.c b/lib/genalloc.c index 13bc8cf..8ce616fb 100644 --- a/lib/genalloc.c +++ b/lib/genalloc.c @@ -519,6 +519,33 @@ void gen_pool_free(struct gen_pool *pool, unsigned long addr, size_t size) } EXPORT_SYMBOL(gen_pool_free); + +/** + * gen_pool_flush_chunk - drops all the allocations from a specific chunk + * @pool: the generic memory pool + * @chunk: The chunk to wipe clear. + * + * This is meant to be called only while destroying a pool. It's up to the + * caller to avoid races, but really, at this point the pool should have + * already been retired and have become unavailable for any other sort of + * operation. + */ +void gen_pool_flush_chunk(struct gen_pool *pool, + struct gen_pool_chunk *chunk) +{ + size_t size; + + if (unlikely(!(pool && chunk))) + return; + + size = chunk->end_addr + 1 - chunk->start_addr; + memset(chunk->entries, 0, + DIV_ROUND_UP(size >> pool->min_alloc_order * BITS_PER_ENTRY, + BITS_PER_BYTE)); + atomic_set(&chunk->avail, size); +} + + /** * gen_pool_for_each_chunk - call func for every chunk of generic memory pool * @pool: the generic memory pool diff --git a/mm/Makefile b/mm/Makefile index e669f02..a6a47e1 100644 --- a/mm/Makefile +++ b/mm/Makefile @@ -65,6 +65,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SPARSEMEM) += sparse.o obj-$(CONFIG_SPARSEMEM_VMEMMAP) += sparse-vmemmap.o obj-$(CONFIG_SLOB) += slob.o obj-$(CONFIG_MMU_NOTIFIER) += mmu_notifier.o +obj-$(CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_SET_MEMORY) += pmalloc.o obj-$(CONFIG_KSM) += ksm.o obj-$(CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING) += page_poison.o obj-$(CONFIG_SLAB) += slab.o diff --git a/mm/pmalloc.c b/mm/pmalloc.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a64ac49 --- /dev/null +++ b/mm/pmalloc.c @@ -0,0 +1,513 @@ +/* + * pmalloc.c: Protectable Memory Allocator + * + * (C) Copyright 2017 Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd. + * Author: Igor Stoppa <igor.stoppa@huawei.com> + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or + * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License + * as published by the Free Software Foundation; version 2 + * of the License. + */ + +#include <linux/printk.h> +#include <linux/init.h> +#include <linux/mm.h> +#include <linux/vmalloc.h> +#include <linux/genalloc.h> +#include <linux/kernel.h> +#include <linux/log2.h> +#include <linux/slab.h> +#include <linux/device.h> +#include <linux/atomic.h> +#include <linux/rculist.h> +#include <linux/set_memory.h> +#include <asm/cacheflush.h> +#include <asm/page.h> + +/** + * pmalloc_data contains the data specific to a pmalloc pool, + * in a format compatible with the design of gen_alloc. + * Some of the fields are used for exposing the corresponding parameter + * to userspace, through sysfs. + */ +struct pmalloc_data { + struct gen_pool *pool; /* Link back to the associated pool. */ + bool protected; /* Status of the pool: RO or RW. */ + struct kobj_attribute attr_protected; /* Sysfs attribute. */ + struct kobj_attribute attr_avail; /* Sysfs attribute. */ + struct kobj_attribute attr_size; /* Sysfs attribute. */ + struct kobj_attribute attr_chunks; /* Sysfs attribute. */ + struct kobject *pool_kobject; + struct list_head node; /* list of pools */ +}; + +static LIST_HEAD(pmalloc_final_list); +static LIST_HEAD(pmalloc_tmp_list); +static struct list_head *pmalloc_list = &pmalloc_tmp_list; +static DEFINE_MUTEX(pmalloc_mutex); +static struct kobject *pmalloc_kobject; + +static ssize_t pmalloc_pool_show_protected(struct kobject *dev, + struct kobj_attribute *attr, + char *buf) +{ + struct pmalloc_data *data; + + data = container_of(attr, struct pmalloc_data, attr_protected); + if (data->protected) + return sprintf(buf, "protected\n"); + else + return sprintf(buf, "unprotected\n"); +} + +static ssize_t pmalloc_pool_show_avail(struct kobject *dev, + struct kobj_attribute *attr, + char *buf) +{ + struct pmalloc_data *data; + + data = container_of(attr, struct pmalloc_data, attr_avail); + return sprintf(buf, "%lu\n", gen_pool_avail(data->pool)); +} + +static ssize_t pmalloc_pool_show_size(struct kobject *dev, + struct kobj_attribute *attr, + char *buf) +{ + struct pmalloc_data *data; + + data = container_of(attr, struct pmalloc_data, attr_size); + return sprintf(buf, "%lu\n", gen_pool_size(data->pool)); +} + +static void pool_chunk_number(struct gen_pool *pool, + struct gen_pool_chunk *chunk, void *data) +{ + unsigned long *counter = data; + + (*counter)++; +} + +static ssize_t pmalloc_pool_show_chunks(struct kobject *dev, + struct kobj_attribute *attr, + char *buf) +{ + struct pmalloc_data *data; + unsigned long chunks_num = 0; + + data = container_of(attr, struct pmalloc_data, attr_chunks); + gen_pool_for_each_chunk(data->pool, pool_chunk_number, &chunks_num); + return sprintf(buf, "%lu\n", chunks_num); +} + +/** + * Exposes the pool and its attributes through sysfs. + */ +static struct kobject *pmalloc_connect(struct pmalloc_data *data) +{ + const struct attribute *attrs[] = { + &data->attr_protected.attr, + &data->attr_avail.attr, + &data->attr_size.attr, + &data->attr_chunks.attr, + NULL + }; + struct kobject *kobj; + + kobj = kobject_create_and_add(data->pool->name, pmalloc_kobject); + if (unlikely(!kobj)) + return NULL; + + if (unlikely(sysfs_create_files(kobj, attrs) < 0)) { + kobject_put(kobj); + kobj = NULL; + } + return kobj; +} + +/** + * Removes the pool and its attributes from sysfs. + */ +static void pmalloc_disconnect(struct pmalloc_data *data, + struct kobject *kobj) +{ + const struct attribute *attrs[] = { + &data->attr_protected.attr, + &data->attr_avail.attr, + &data->attr_size.attr, + &data->attr_chunks.attr, + NULL + }; + + sysfs_remove_files(kobj, attrs); + kobject_put(kobj); +} + +/** + * Declares an attribute of the pool. + */ + +#define pmalloc_attr_init(data, attr_name) \ +do { \ + sysfs_attr_init(&data->attr_##attr_name.attr); \ + data->attr_##attr_name.attr.name = #attr_name; \ + data->attr_##attr_name.attr.mode = VERIFY_OCTAL_PERMISSIONS(0444); \ + data->attr_##attr_name.show = pmalloc_pool_show_##attr_name; \ +} while (0) + +struct gen_pool *pmalloc_create_pool(const char *name, int min_alloc_order) +{ + struct gen_pool *pool; + const char *pool_name; + struct pmalloc_data *data; + + if (!name) { + WARN_ON(1); + return NULL; + } + + if (min_alloc_order < 0) + min_alloc_order = ilog2(sizeof(unsigned long)); + + pool = gen_pool_create(min_alloc_order, NUMA_NO_NODE); + if (unlikely(!pool)) + return NULL; + + mutex_lock(&pmalloc_mutex); + list_for_each_entry(data, pmalloc_list, node) + if (!strcmp(name, data->pool->name)) + goto same_name_err; + + pool_name = kstrdup(name, GFP_KERNEL); + if (unlikely(!pool_name)) + goto name_alloc_err; + + data = kzalloc(sizeof(struct pmalloc_data), GFP_KERNEL); + if (unlikely(!data)) + goto data_alloc_err; + + data->protected = false; + data->pool = pool; + pmalloc_attr_init(data, protected); + pmalloc_attr_init(data, avail); + pmalloc_attr_init(data, size); + pmalloc_attr_init(data, chunks); + pool->data = data; + pool->name = pool_name; + + list_add(&data->node, pmalloc_list); + if (pmalloc_list == &pmalloc_final_list) + data->pool_kobject = pmalloc_connect(data); + mutex_unlock(&pmalloc_mutex); + return pool; + +data_alloc_err: + kfree(pool_name); +name_alloc_err: +same_name_err: + mutex_unlock(&pmalloc_mutex); + gen_pool_destroy(pool); + return NULL; +} + +static inline int check_alloc_params(struct gen_pool *pool, size_t req_size) +{ + struct pmalloc_data *data; + unsigned int order; + + if (unlikely(!req_size || !pool)) + return -1; + + order = (unsigned int)pool->min_alloc_order; + data = pool->data; + + if (data == NULL) + return -1; + + if (unlikely(data->protected)) { + WARN_ON(1); + return -1; + } + return 0; +} + + +static inline bool chunk_tagging(void *chunk, bool tag) +{ + struct vm_struct *area; + struct page *page; + + if (!is_vmalloc_addr(chunk)) + return false; + + page = vmalloc_to_page(chunk); + if (unlikely(!page)) + return false; + + area = page->area; + if (tag) + area->flags |= VM_PMALLOC; + else + area->flags &= ~VM_PMALLOC; + return true; +} + + +static inline bool tag_chunk(void *chunk) +{ + return chunk_tagging(chunk, true); +} + + +static inline bool untag_chunk(void *chunk) +{ + return chunk_tagging(chunk, false); +} + +enum { + INVALID_PMALLOC_OBJECT = -1, + NOT_PMALLOC_OBJECT = 0, + VALID_PMALLOC_OBJECT = 1, +}; + +int is_pmalloc_object(const void *ptr, const unsigned long n) +{ + struct vm_struct *area; + struct page *page; + unsigned long area_start; + unsigned long area_end; + unsigned long object_start; + unsigned long object_end; + + + /* is_pmalloc_object gets called pretty late, so chances are high + * that the object is indeed of vmalloc type + */ + if (unlikely(!is_vmalloc_addr(ptr))) + return NOT_PMALLOC_OBJECT; + + page = vmalloc_to_page(ptr); + if (unlikely(!page)) + return NOT_PMALLOC_OBJECT; + + area = page->area; + + if (likely(!(area->flags & VM_PMALLOC))) + return NOT_PMALLOC_OBJECT; + + area_start = (unsigned long)area->addr; + area_end = area_start + area->nr_pages * PAGE_SIZE - 1; + object_start = (unsigned long)ptr; + object_end = object_start + n - 1; + + if (likely((area_start <= object_start) && + (object_end <= area_end))) + return VALID_PMALLOC_OBJECT; + else + return INVALID_PMALLOC_OBJECT; +} + + +bool pmalloc_prealloc(struct gen_pool *pool, size_t size) +{ + void *chunk; + size_t chunk_size; + bool add_error; + unsigned int order; + + if (check_alloc_params(pool, size)) + return false; + + order = (unsigned int)pool->min_alloc_order; + + /* Expand pool */ + chunk_size = roundup(size, PAGE_SIZE); + chunk = vmalloc(chunk_size); + if (unlikely(chunk == NULL)) + return false; + + /* Locking is already done inside gen_pool_add */ + add_error = gen_pool_add(pool, (unsigned long)chunk, chunk_size, + NUMA_NO_NODE); + if (unlikely(add_error != 0)) + goto abort; + + return true; +abort: + vfree(chunk); + return false; + +} + +void *pmalloc(struct gen_pool *pool, size_t size, gfp_t gfp) +{ + void *chunk; + size_t chunk_size; + bool add_error; + unsigned long retval; + unsigned int order; + + if (check_alloc_params(pool, size)) + return NULL; + + order = (unsigned int)pool->min_alloc_order; + +retry_alloc_from_pool: + retval = gen_pool_alloc(pool, size); + if (retval) + goto return_allocation; + + if (unlikely((gfp & __GFP_ATOMIC))) { + if (unlikely((gfp & __GFP_NOFAIL))) + goto retry_alloc_from_pool; + else + return NULL; + } + + /* Expand pool */ + chunk_size = roundup(size, PAGE_SIZE); + chunk = vmalloc(chunk_size); + if (unlikely(!chunk)) { + if (unlikely((gfp & __GFP_NOFAIL))) + goto retry_alloc_from_pool; + else + return NULL; + } + if (unlikely(!tag_chunk(chunk))) + goto free; + + /* Locking is already done inside gen_pool_add */ + add_error = gen_pool_add(pool, (unsigned long)chunk, chunk_size, + NUMA_NO_NODE); + if (unlikely(add_error)) + goto abort; + + retval = gen_pool_alloc(pool, size); + if (retval) { +return_allocation: + *(size_t *)retval = size; + if (gfp & __GFP_ZERO) + memset((void *)retval, 0, size); + return (void *)retval; + } + /* Here there is no test for __GFP_NO_FAIL because, in case of + * concurrent allocation, one thread might add a chunk to the + * pool and this memory could be allocated by another thread, + * before the first thread gets a chance to use it. + * As long as vmalloc succeeds, it's ok to retry. + */ + goto retry_alloc_from_pool; +abort: + untag_chunk(chunk); +free: + vfree(chunk); + return NULL; +} + +static void pmalloc_chunk_set_protection(struct gen_pool *pool, + + struct gen_pool_chunk *chunk, + void *data) +{ + const bool *flag = data; + size_t chunk_size = chunk->end_addr + 1 - chunk->start_addr; + unsigned long pages = chunk_size / PAGE_SIZE; + + BUG_ON(chunk_size & (PAGE_SIZE - 1)); + + if (*flag) + set_memory_ro(chunk->start_addr, pages); + else + set_memory_rw(chunk->start_addr, pages); +} + +static int pmalloc_pool_set_protection(struct gen_pool *pool, bool protection) +{ + struct pmalloc_data *data; + struct gen_pool_chunk *chunk; + + if (unlikely(!pool)) + return -EINVAL; + + data = pool->data; + + if (unlikely(!data)) + return -EINVAL; + + if (unlikely(data->protected == protection)) { + WARN_ON(1); + return 0; + } + + data->protected = protection; + list_for_each_entry(chunk, &(pool)->chunks, next_chunk) + pmalloc_chunk_set_protection(pool, chunk, &protection); + return 0; +} + +int pmalloc_protect_pool(struct gen_pool *pool) +{ + return pmalloc_pool_set_protection(pool, true); +} + + +static void pmalloc_chunk_free(struct gen_pool *pool, + struct gen_pool_chunk *chunk, void *data) +{ + untag_chunk(chunk); + gen_pool_flush_chunk(pool, chunk); + vfree_atomic((void *)chunk->start_addr); +} + + +int pmalloc_destroy_pool(struct gen_pool *pool) +{ + struct pmalloc_data *data; + + if (unlikely(pool == NULL)) + return -EINVAL; + + data = pool->data; + + if (unlikely(data == NULL)) + return -EINVAL; + + mutex_lock(&pmalloc_mutex); + list_del(&data->node); + mutex_unlock(&pmalloc_mutex); + + if (likely(data->pool_kobject)) + pmalloc_disconnect(data, data->pool_kobject); + + pmalloc_pool_set_protection(pool, false); + gen_pool_for_each_chunk(pool, pmalloc_chunk_free, NULL); + gen_pool_destroy(pool); + kfree(data); + return 0; +} + +/** + * When the sysfs is ready to receive registrations, connect all the + * pools previously created. Also enable further pools to be connected + * right away. + */ +static int __init pmalloc_late_init(void) +{ + struct pmalloc_data *data, *n; + + pmalloc_kobject = kobject_create_and_add("pmalloc", kernel_kobj); + + mutex_lock(&pmalloc_mutex); + pmalloc_list = &pmalloc_final_list; + + if (likely(pmalloc_kobject != NULL)) { + list_for_each_entry_safe(data, n, &pmalloc_tmp_list, node) { + list_move(&data->node, &pmalloc_final_list); + pmalloc_connect(data); + } + } + mutex_unlock(&pmalloc_mutex); + return 0; +} +late_initcall(pmalloc_late_init); diff --git a/mm/usercopy.c b/mm/usercopy.c index a9852b2..c3b1029 100644 --- a/mm/usercopy.c +++ b/mm/usercopy.c @@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ #define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt #include <linux/mm.h> +#include <linux/pmalloc.h> #include <linux/slab.h> #include <linux/sched.h> #include <linux/sched/task.h> @@ -222,6 +223,7 @@ static inline const char *check_heap_object(const void *ptr, unsigned long n, void __check_object_size(const void *ptr, unsigned long n, bool to_user) { const char *err; + int retv; /* Skip all tests if size is zero. */ if (!n) @@ -229,12 +231,12 @@ void __check_object_size(const void *ptr, unsigned long n, bool to_user) /* Check for invalid addresses. */ err = check_bogus_address(ptr, n); - if (err) + if (unlikely(err)) goto report; /* Check for bad heap object. */ err = check_heap_object(ptr, n, to_user); - if (err) + if (unlikely(err)) goto report; /* Check for bad stack object. */ @@ -257,8 +259,23 @@ void __check_object_size(const void *ptr, unsigned long n, bool to_user) /* Check for object in kernel to avoid text exposure. */ err = check_kernel_text_object(ptr, n); - if (!err) - return; + if (unlikely(err)) + goto report; + + /* Check if object is from a pmalloc chunk. + */ + retv = is_pmalloc_object(ptr, n); + if (unlikely(retv)) { + if (unlikely(!to_user)) { + err = "<trying to write to pmalloc object>"; + goto report; + } + if (retv < 0) { + err = "<invalid pmalloc object>"; + goto report; + } + } + return; report: report_usercopy(ptr, n, to_user, err);
The MMU available in many systems running Linux can often provide R/O protection to the memory pages it handles. However, the MMU-based protection works efficiently only when said pages contain exclusively data that will not need further modifications. Statically allocated variables can be segregated into a dedicated section, but this does not sit very well with dynamically allocated ones. Dynamic allocation does not provide, currently, any means for grouping variables in memory pages that would contain exclusively data suitable for conversion to read only access mode. The allocator here provided (pmalloc - protectable memory allocator) introduces the concept of pools of protectable memory. A module can request a pool and then refer any allocation request to the pool handler it has received. Once all the chunks of memory associated to a specific pool are initialized, the pool can be protected. After this point, the pool can only be destroyed (it is up to the module to avoid any further references to the memory from the pool, after the destruction is invoked). The latter case is mainly meant for releasing memory, when a module is unloaded. A module can have as many pools as needed, for example to support the protection of data that is initialized in sufficiently distinct phases. Signed-off-by: Igor Stoppa <igor.stoppa@huawei.com> --- include/linux/genalloc.h | 3 + include/linux/pmalloc.h | 215 ++++++++++++++++++++ include/linux/vmalloc.h | 1 + lib/genalloc.c | 27 +++ mm/Makefile | 1 + mm/pmalloc.c | 513 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ mm/usercopy.c | 25 ++- 7 files changed, 781 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) create mode 100644 include/linux/pmalloc.h create mode 100644 mm/pmalloc.c