diff mbox

[v3,02/17] khwasan: move common kasan and khwasan code to common.c

Message ID 687f2c3ce27015abb6bc412646894ae40051d8af.1529515183.git.andreyknvl@google.com (mailing list archive)
State New, archived
Headers show

Commit Message

Andrey Konovalov June 20, 2018, 5:39 p.m. UTC
KHWASAN will reuse a significant part of KASAN code, so move the common
parts to common.c without any functional changes.

Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
---
 mm/kasan/Makefile |   5 +-
 mm/kasan/common.c | 603 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 mm/kasan/kasan.c  | 567 +------------------------------------------
 mm/kasan/kasan.h  |  85 ++++++-
 4 files changed, 693 insertions(+), 567 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 mm/kasan/common.c

Comments

kernel test robot June 20, 2018, 8:36 p.m. UTC | #1
Hi Andrey,

Thank you for the patch! Yet something to improve:

[auto build test ERROR on mmotm/master]
[also build test ERROR on v4.18-rc1 next-20180620]
[if your patch is applied to the wrong git tree, please drop us a note to help improve the system]

url:    https://github.com/0day-ci/linux/commits/Andrey-Konovalov/khwasan-kernel-hardware-assisted-address-sanitizer/20180621-035912
base:   git://git.cmpxchg.org/linux-mmotm.git master
config: x86_64-randconfig-x011-201824 (attached as .config)
compiler: gcc-7 (Debian 7.3.0-16) 7.3.0
reproduce:
        # save the attached .config to linux build tree
        make ARCH=x86_64 

Note: the linux-review/Andrey-Konovalov/khwasan-kernel-hardware-assisted-address-sanitizer/20180621-035912 HEAD 0e30ed7118e854b38bb6ab96365e7c74a2518290 builds fine.
      It only hurts bisectibility.

All errors (new ones prefixed by >>):

>> mm//kasan/report.c:42:20: error: conflicting types for 'find_first_bad_addr'
    static const void *find_first_bad_addr(const void *addr, size_t size)
                       ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
   In file included from mm//kasan/report.c:33:0:
   mm//kasan/kasan.h:130:7: note: previous declaration of 'find_first_bad_addr' was here
    void *find_first_bad_addr(void *addr, size_t size);
          ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
>> mm//kasan/report.c:54:13: error: conflicting types for 'addr_has_shadow'
    static bool addr_has_shadow(struct kasan_access_info *info)
                ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
   In file included from mm//kasan/report.c:33:0:
   mm//kasan/kasan.h:120:20: note: previous definition of 'addr_has_shadow' was here
    static inline bool addr_has_shadow(const void *addr)
                       ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
   mm//kasan/report.c: In function 'get_shadow_bug_type':
   mm//kasan/report.c:86:2: error: duplicate case value
     case KASAN_KMALLOC_REDZONE:
     ^~~~
   mm//kasan/report.c:85:2: note: previously used here
     case KASAN_PAGE_REDZONE:
     ^~~~
   mm//kasan/report.c:98:2: error: duplicate case value
     case KASAN_FREE_PAGE:
     ^~~~
   mm//kasan/report.c:85:2: note: previously used here
     case KASAN_PAGE_REDZONE:
     ^~~~
   mm//kasan/report.c:99:2: error: duplicate case value
     case KASAN_KMALLOC_FREE:
     ^~~~
   mm//kasan/report.c:85:2: note: previously used here
     case KASAN_PAGE_REDZONE:
     ^~~~
   mm//kasan/report.c: At top level:
>> mm//kasan/report.c:128:20: error: static declaration of 'get_bug_type' follows non-static declaration
    static const char *get_bug_type(struct kasan_access_info *info)
                       ^~~~~~~~~~~~
   In file included from mm//kasan/report.c:33:0:
   mm//kasan/kasan.h:131:13: note: previous declaration of 'get_bug_type' was here
    const char *get_bug_type(struct kasan_access_info *info);
                ^~~~~~~~~~~~

vim +/find_first_bad_addr +42 mm//kasan/report.c

0b24becc Andrey Ryabinin  2015-02-13   41  
0b24becc Andrey Ryabinin  2015-02-13  @42  static const void *find_first_bad_addr(const void *addr, size_t size)
0b24becc Andrey Ryabinin  2015-02-13   43  {
0b24becc Andrey Ryabinin  2015-02-13   44  	u8 shadow_val = *(u8 *)kasan_mem_to_shadow(addr);
0b24becc Andrey Ryabinin  2015-02-13   45  	const void *first_bad_addr = addr;
0b24becc Andrey Ryabinin  2015-02-13   46  
0b24becc Andrey Ryabinin  2015-02-13   47  	while (!shadow_val && first_bad_addr < addr + size) {
0b24becc Andrey Ryabinin  2015-02-13   48  		first_bad_addr += KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE;
0b24becc Andrey Ryabinin  2015-02-13   49  		shadow_val = *(u8 *)kasan_mem_to_shadow(first_bad_addr);
0b24becc Andrey Ryabinin  2015-02-13   50  	}
0b24becc Andrey Ryabinin  2015-02-13   51  	return first_bad_addr;
0b24becc Andrey Ryabinin  2015-02-13   52  }
0b24becc Andrey Ryabinin  2015-02-13   53  
5e82cd12 Andrey Konovalov 2017-05-03  @54  static bool addr_has_shadow(struct kasan_access_info *info)
5e82cd12 Andrey Konovalov 2017-05-03   55  {
5e82cd12 Andrey Konovalov 2017-05-03   56  	return (info->access_addr >=
5e82cd12 Andrey Konovalov 2017-05-03   57  		kasan_shadow_to_mem((void *)KASAN_SHADOW_START));
5e82cd12 Andrey Konovalov 2017-05-03   58  }
5e82cd12 Andrey Konovalov 2017-05-03   59  
5e82cd12 Andrey Konovalov 2017-05-03   60  static const char *get_shadow_bug_type(struct kasan_access_info *info)
0b24becc Andrey Ryabinin  2015-02-13   61  {
0952d87f Andrey Konovalov 2015-11-05   62  	const char *bug_type = "unknown-crash";
cdf6a273 Andrey Konovalov 2015-11-05   63  	u8 *shadow_addr;
0b24becc Andrey Ryabinin  2015-02-13   64  
0b24becc Andrey Ryabinin  2015-02-13   65  	info->first_bad_addr = find_first_bad_addr(info->access_addr,
0b24becc Andrey Ryabinin  2015-02-13   66  						info->access_size);
0b24becc Andrey Ryabinin  2015-02-13   67  
cdf6a273 Andrey Konovalov 2015-11-05   68  	shadow_addr = (u8 *)kasan_mem_to_shadow(info->first_bad_addr);
0b24becc Andrey Ryabinin  2015-02-13   69  
cdf6a273 Andrey Konovalov 2015-11-05   70  	/*
cdf6a273 Andrey Konovalov 2015-11-05   71  	 * If shadow byte value is in [0, KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE) we can look
cdf6a273 Andrey Konovalov 2015-11-05   72  	 * at the next shadow byte to determine the type of the bad access.
cdf6a273 Andrey Konovalov 2015-11-05   73  	 */
cdf6a273 Andrey Konovalov 2015-11-05   74  	if (*shadow_addr > 0 && *shadow_addr <= KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE - 1)
cdf6a273 Andrey Konovalov 2015-11-05   75  		shadow_addr++;
cdf6a273 Andrey Konovalov 2015-11-05   76  
cdf6a273 Andrey Konovalov 2015-11-05   77  	switch (*shadow_addr) {
0952d87f Andrey Konovalov 2015-11-05   78  	case 0 ... KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE - 1:
cdf6a273 Andrey Konovalov 2015-11-05   79  		/*
cdf6a273 Andrey Konovalov 2015-11-05   80  		 * In theory it's still possible to see these shadow values
cdf6a273 Andrey Konovalov 2015-11-05   81  		 * due to a data race in the kernel code.
cdf6a273 Andrey Konovalov 2015-11-05   82  		 */
0952d87f Andrey Konovalov 2015-11-05   83  		bug_type = "out-of-bounds";
b8c73fc2 Andrey Ryabinin  2015-02-13   84  		break;
0316bec2 Andrey Ryabinin  2015-02-13   85  	case KASAN_PAGE_REDZONE:
0316bec2 Andrey Ryabinin  2015-02-13   86  	case KASAN_KMALLOC_REDZONE:
0952d87f Andrey Konovalov 2015-11-05   87  		bug_type = "slab-out-of-bounds";
0952d87f Andrey Konovalov 2015-11-05   88  		break;
bebf56a1 Andrey Ryabinin  2015-02-13   89  	case KASAN_GLOBAL_REDZONE:
0952d87f Andrey Konovalov 2015-11-05   90  		bug_type = "global-out-of-bounds";
0b24becc Andrey Ryabinin  2015-02-13   91  		break;
c420f167 Andrey Ryabinin  2015-02-13   92  	case KASAN_STACK_LEFT:
c420f167 Andrey Ryabinin  2015-02-13   93  	case KASAN_STACK_MID:
c420f167 Andrey Ryabinin  2015-02-13   94  	case KASAN_STACK_RIGHT:
c420f167 Andrey Ryabinin  2015-02-13   95  	case KASAN_STACK_PARTIAL:
0952d87f Andrey Konovalov 2015-11-05   96  		bug_type = "stack-out-of-bounds";
0952d87f Andrey Konovalov 2015-11-05   97  		break;
0952d87f Andrey Konovalov 2015-11-05   98  	case KASAN_FREE_PAGE:
0952d87f Andrey Konovalov 2015-11-05  @99  	case KASAN_KMALLOC_FREE:
0952d87f Andrey Konovalov 2015-11-05  100  		bug_type = "use-after-free";
c420f167 Andrey Ryabinin  2015-02-13  101  		break;
828347f8 Dmitry Vyukov    2016-11-30  102  	case KASAN_USE_AFTER_SCOPE:
828347f8 Dmitry Vyukov    2016-11-30  103  		bug_type = "use-after-scope";
828347f8 Dmitry Vyukov    2016-11-30  104  		break;
342061ee Paul Lawrence    2018-02-06  105  	case KASAN_ALLOCA_LEFT:
342061ee Paul Lawrence    2018-02-06  106  	case KASAN_ALLOCA_RIGHT:
342061ee Paul Lawrence    2018-02-06  107  		bug_type = "alloca-out-of-bounds";
342061ee Paul Lawrence    2018-02-06  108  		break;
0b24becc Andrey Ryabinin  2015-02-13  109  	}
0b24becc Andrey Ryabinin  2015-02-13  110  
5e82cd12 Andrey Konovalov 2017-05-03  111  	return bug_type;
5e82cd12 Andrey Konovalov 2017-05-03  112  }
5e82cd12 Andrey Konovalov 2017-05-03  113  
822d5ec2 Colin Ian King   2017-07-10  114  static const char *get_wild_bug_type(struct kasan_access_info *info)
5e82cd12 Andrey Konovalov 2017-05-03  115  {
5e82cd12 Andrey Konovalov 2017-05-03  116  	const char *bug_type = "unknown-crash";
5e82cd12 Andrey Konovalov 2017-05-03  117  
5e82cd12 Andrey Konovalov 2017-05-03  118  	if ((unsigned long)info->access_addr < PAGE_SIZE)
5e82cd12 Andrey Konovalov 2017-05-03  119  		bug_type = "null-ptr-deref";
5e82cd12 Andrey Konovalov 2017-05-03  120  	else if ((unsigned long)info->access_addr < TASK_SIZE)
5e82cd12 Andrey Konovalov 2017-05-03  121  		bug_type = "user-memory-access";
5e82cd12 Andrey Konovalov 2017-05-03  122  	else
5e82cd12 Andrey Konovalov 2017-05-03  123  		bug_type = "wild-memory-access";
5e82cd12 Andrey Konovalov 2017-05-03  124  
5e82cd12 Andrey Konovalov 2017-05-03  125  	return bug_type;
5e82cd12 Andrey Konovalov 2017-05-03  126  }
5e82cd12 Andrey Konovalov 2017-05-03  127  
7d418f7b Andrey Konovalov 2017-05-03 @128  static const char *get_bug_type(struct kasan_access_info *info)
7d418f7b Andrey Konovalov 2017-05-03  129  {
7d418f7b Andrey Konovalov 2017-05-03  130  	if (addr_has_shadow(info))
7d418f7b Andrey Konovalov 2017-05-03  131  		return get_shadow_bug_type(info);
7d418f7b Andrey Konovalov 2017-05-03  132  	return get_wild_bug_type(info);
7d418f7b Andrey Konovalov 2017-05-03  133  }
7d418f7b Andrey Konovalov 2017-05-03  134  

:::::: The code at line 42 was first introduced by commit
:::::: 0b24becc810dc3be6e3f94103a866f214c282394 kasan: add kernel address sanitizer infrastructure

:::::: TO: Andrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@samsung.com>
:::::: CC: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

---
0-DAY kernel test infrastructure                Open Source Technology Center
https://lists.01.org/pipermail/kbuild-all                   Intel Corporation
Andrey Konovalov June 21, 2018, 12:40 p.m. UTC | #2
On Wed, Jun 20, 2018 at 10:36 PM, kbuild test robot <lkp@intel.com> wrote:
> Hi Andrey,
>
> Thank you for the patch! Yet something to improve:
>
> [auto build test ERROR on mmotm/master]
> [also build test ERROR on v4.18-rc1 next-20180620]
> [if your patch is applied to the wrong git tree, please drop us a note to help improve the system]
>
> url:    https://github.com/0day-ci/linux/commits/Andrey-Konovalov/khwasan-kernel-hardware-assisted-address-sanitizer/20180621-035912
> base:   git://git.cmpxchg.org/linux-mmotm.git master
> config: x86_64-randconfig-x011-201824 (attached as .config)
> compiler: gcc-7 (Debian 7.3.0-16) 7.3.0
> reproduce:
>         # save the attached .config to linux build tree
>         make ARCH=x86_64
>
> Note: the linux-review/Andrey-Konovalov/khwasan-kernel-hardware-assisted-address-sanitizer/20180621-035912 HEAD 0e30ed7118e854b38bb6ab96365e7c74a2518290 builds fine.
>       It only hurts bisectibility.

Will fix in v4, thanks!

>
> All errors (new ones prefixed by >>):
>
>>> mm//kasan/report.c:42:20: error: conflicting types for 'find_first_bad_addr'
>     static const void *find_first_bad_addr(const void *addr, size_t size)
>                        ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
>    In file included from mm//kasan/report.c:33:0:
>    mm//kasan/kasan.h:130:7: note: previous declaration of 'find_first_bad_addr' was here
>     void *find_first_bad_addr(void *addr, size_t size);
>           ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
>>> mm//kasan/report.c:54:13: error: conflicting types for 'addr_has_shadow'
>     static bool addr_has_shadow(struct kasan_access_info *info)
>                 ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
>    In file included from mm//kasan/report.c:33:0:
>    mm//kasan/kasan.h:120:20: note: previous definition of 'addr_has_shadow' was here
>     static inline bool addr_has_shadow(const void *addr)
>                        ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
>    mm//kasan/report.c: In function 'get_shadow_bug_type':
>    mm//kasan/report.c:86:2: error: duplicate case value
>      case KASAN_KMALLOC_REDZONE:
>      ^~~~
>    mm//kasan/report.c:85:2: note: previously used here
>      case KASAN_PAGE_REDZONE:
>      ^~~~
>    mm//kasan/report.c:98:2: error: duplicate case value
>      case KASAN_FREE_PAGE:
>      ^~~~
>    mm//kasan/report.c:85:2: note: previously used here
>      case KASAN_PAGE_REDZONE:
>      ^~~~
>    mm//kasan/report.c:99:2: error: duplicate case value
>      case KASAN_KMALLOC_FREE:
>      ^~~~
>    mm//kasan/report.c:85:2: note: previously used here
>      case KASAN_PAGE_REDZONE:
>      ^~~~
>    mm//kasan/report.c: At top level:
>>> mm//kasan/report.c:128:20: error: static declaration of 'get_bug_type' follows non-static declaration
>     static const char *get_bug_type(struct kasan_access_info *info)
>                        ^~~~~~~~~~~~
>    In file included from mm//kasan/report.c:33:0:
>    mm//kasan/kasan.h:131:13: note: previous declaration of 'get_bug_type' was here
>     const char *get_bug_type(struct kasan_access_info *info);
>                 ^~~~~~~~~~~~
>
> vim +/find_first_bad_addr +42 mm//kasan/report.c
>
> 0b24becc Andrey Ryabinin  2015-02-13   41
> 0b24becc Andrey Ryabinin  2015-02-13  @42  static const void *find_first_bad_addr(const void *addr, size_t size)
> 0b24becc Andrey Ryabinin  2015-02-13   43  {
> 0b24becc Andrey Ryabinin  2015-02-13   44       u8 shadow_val = *(u8 *)kasan_mem_to_shadow(addr);
> 0b24becc Andrey Ryabinin  2015-02-13   45       const void *first_bad_addr = addr;
> 0b24becc Andrey Ryabinin  2015-02-13   46
> 0b24becc Andrey Ryabinin  2015-02-13   47       while (!shadow_val && first_bad_addr < addr + size) {
> 0b24becc Andrey Ryabinin  2015-02-13   48               first_bad_addr += KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE;
> 0b24becc Andrey Ryabinin  2015-02-13   49               shadow_val = *(u8 *)kasan_mem_to_shadow(first_bad_addr);
> 0b24becc Andrey Ryabinin  2015-02-13   50       }
> 0b24becc Andrey Ryabinin  2015-02-13   51       return first_bad_addr;
> 0b24becc Andrey Ryabinin  2015-02-13   52  }
> 0b24becc Andrey Ryabinin  2015-02-13   53
> 5e82cd12 Andrey Konovalov 2017-05-03  @54  static bool addr_has_shadow(struct kasan_access_info *info)
> 5e82cd12 Andrey Konovalov 2017-05-03   55  {
> 5e82cd12 Andrey Konovalov 2017-05-03   56       return (info->access_addr >=
> 5e82cd12 Andrey Konovalov 2017-05-03   57               kasan_shadow_to_mem((void *)KASAN_SHADOW_START));
> 5e82cd12 Andrey Konovalov 2017-05-03   58  }
> 5e82cd12 Andrey Konovalov 2017-05-03   59
> 5e82cd12 Andrey Konovalov 2017-05-03   60  static const char *get_shadow_bug_type(struct kasan_access_info *info)
> 0b24becc Andrey Ryabinin  2015-02-13   61  {
> 0952d87f Andrey Konovalov 2015-11-05   62       const char *bug_type = "unknown-crash";
> cdf6a273 Andrey Konovalov 2015-11-05   63       u8 *shadow_addr;
> 0b24becc Andrey Ryabinin  2015-02-13   64
> 0b24becc Andrey Ryabinin  2015-02-13   65       info->first_bad_addr = find_first_bad_addr(info->access_addr,
> 0b24becc Andrey Ryabinin  2015-02-13   66                                               info->access_size);
> 0b24becc Andrey Ryabinin  2015-02-13   67
> cdf6a273 Andrey Konovalov 2015-11-05   68       shadow_addr = (u8 *)kasan_mem_to_shadow(info->first_bad_addr);
> 0b24becc Andrey Ryabinin  2015-02-13   69
> cdf6a273 Andrey Konovalov 2015-11-05   70       /*
> cdf6a273 Andrey Konovalov 2015-11-05   71        * If shadow byte value is in [0, KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE) we can look
> cdf6a273 Andrey Konovalov 2015-11-05   72        * at the next shadow byte to determine the type of the bad access.
> cdf6a273 Andrey Konovalov 2015-11-05   73        */
> cdf6a273 Andrey Konovalov 2015-11-05   74       if (*shadow_addr > 0 && *shadow_addr <= KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE - 1)
> cdf6a273 Andrey Konovalov 2015-11-05   75               shadow_addr++;
> cdf6a273 Andrey Konovalov 2015-11-05   76
> cdf6a273 Andrey Konovalov 2015-11-05   77       switch (*shadow_addr) {
> 0952d87f Andrey Konovalov 2015-11-05   78       case 0 ... KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE - 1:
> cdf6a273 Andrey Konovalov 2015-11-05   79               /*
> cdf6a273 Andrey Konovalov 2015-11-05   80                * In theory it's still possible to see these shadow values
> cdf6a273 Andrey Konovalov 2015-11-05   81                * due to a data race in the kernel code.
> cdf6a273 Andrey Konovalov 2015-11-05   82                */
> 0952d87f Andrey Konovalov 2015-11-05   83               bug_type = "out-of-bounds";
> b8c73fc2 Andrey Ryabinin  2015-02-13   84               break;
> 0316bec2 Andrey Ryabinin  2015-02-13   85       case KASAN_PAGE_REDZONE:
> 0316bec2 Andrey Ryabinin  2015-02-13   86       case KASAN_KMALLOC_REDZONE:
> 0952d87f Andrey Konovalov 2015-11-05   87               bug_type = "slab-out-of-bounds";
> 0952d87f Andrey Konovalov 2015-11-05   88               break;
> bebf56a1 Andrey Ryabinin  2015-02-13   89       case KASAN_GLOBAL_REDZONE:
> 0952d87f Andrey Konovalov 2015-11-05   90               bug_type = "global-out-of-bounds";
> 0b24becc Andrey Ryabinin  2015-02-13   91               break;
> c420f167 Andrey Ryabinin  2015-02-13   92       case KASAN_STACK_LEFT:
> c420f167 Andrey Ryabinin  2015-02-13   93       case KASAN_STACK_MID:
> c420f167 Andrey Ryabinin  2015-02-13   94       case KASAN_STACK_RIGHT:
> c420f167 Andrey Ryabinin  2015-02-13   95       case KASAN_STACK_PARTIAL:
> 0952d87f Andrey Konovalov 2015-11-05   96               bug_type = "stack-out-of-bounds";
> 0952d87f Andrey Konovalov 2015-11-05   97               break;
> 0952d87f Andrey Konovalov 2015-11-05   98       case KASAN_FREE_PAGE:
> 0952d87f Andrey Konovalov 2015-11-05  @99       case KASAN_KMALLOC_FREE:
> 0952d87f Andrey Konovalov 2015-11-05  100               bug_type = "use-after-free";
> c420f167 Andrey Ryabinin  2015-02-13  101               break;
> 828347f8 Dmitry Vyukov    2016-11-30  102       case KASAN_USE_AFTER_SCOPE:
> 828347f8 Dmitry Vyukov    2016-11-30  103               bug_type = "use-after-scope";
> 828347f8 Dmitry Vyukov    2016-11-30  104               break;
> 342061ee Paul Lawrence    2018-02-06  105       case KASAN_ALLOCA_LEFT:
> 342061ee Paul Lawrence    2018-02-06  106       case KASAN_ALLOCA_RIGHT:
> 342061ee Paul Lawrence    2018-02-06  107               bug_type = "alloca-out-of-bounds";
> 342061ee Paul Lawrence    2018-02-06  108               break;
> 0b24becc Andrey Ryabinin  2015-02-13  109       }
> 0b24becc Andrey Ryabinin  2015-02-13  110
> 5e82cd12 Andrey Konovalov 2017-05-03  111       return bug_type;
> 5e82cd12 Andrey Konovalov 2017-05-03  112  }
> 5e82cd12 Andrey Konovalov 2017-05-03  113
> 822d5ec2 Colin Ian King   2017-07-10  114  static const char *get_wild_bug_type(struct kasan_access_info *info)
> 5e82cd12 Andrey Konovalov 2017-05-03  115  {
> 5e82cd12 Andrey Konovalov 2017-05-03  116       const char *bug_type = "unknown-crash";
> 5e82cd12 Andrey Konovalov 2017-05-03  117
> 5e82cd12 Andrey Konovalov 2017-05-03  118       if ((unsigned long)info->access_addr < PAGE_SIZE)
> 5e82cd12 Andrey Konovalov 2017-05-03  119               bug_type = "null-ptr-deref";
> 5e82cd12 Andrey Konovalov 2017-05-03  120       else if ((unsigned long)info->access_addr < TASK_SIZE)
> 5e82cd12 Andrey Konovalov 2017-05-03  121               bug_type = "user-memory-access";
> 5e82cd12 Andrey Konovalov 2017-05-03  122       else
> 5e82cd12 Andrey Konovalov 2017-05-03  123               bug_type = "wild-memory-access";
> 5e82cd12 Andrey Konovalov 2017-05-03  124
> 5e82cd12 Andrey Konovalov 2017-05-03  125       return bug_type;
> 5e82cd12 Andrey Konovalov 2017-05-03  126  }
> 5e82cd12 Andrey Konovalov 2017-05-03  127
> 7d418f7b Andrey Konovalov 2017-05-03 @128  static const char *get_bug_type(struct kasan_access_info *info)
> 7d418f7b Andrey Konovalov 2017-05-03  129  {
> 7d418f7b Andrey Konovalov 2017-05-03  130       if (addr_has_shadow(info))
> 7d418f7b Andrey Konovalov 2017-05-03  131               return get_shadow_bug_type(info);
> 7d418f7b Andrey Konovalov 2017-05-03  132       return get_wild_bug_type(info);
> 7d418f7b Andrey Konovalov 2017-05-03  133  }
> 7d418f7b Andrey Konovalov 2017-05-03  134
>
> :::::: The code at line 42 was first introduced by commit
> :::::: 0b24becc810dc3be6e3f94103a866f214c282394 kasan: add kernel address sanitizer infrastructure
>
> :::::: TO: Andrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@samsung.com>
> :::::: CC: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
>
> ---
> 0-DAY kernel test infrastructure                Open Source Technology Center
> https://lists.01.org/pipermail/kbuild-all                   Intel Corporation
>
> --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "kasan-dev" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to kasan-dev+unsubscribe@googlegroups.com.
> To post to this group, send email to kasan-dev@googlegroups.com.
> To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/kasan-dev/201806210451.tOaA22Qm%25fengguang.wu%40intel.com.
> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kbuild" in
the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org
More majordomo info at  http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
diff mbox

Patch

diff --git a/mm/kasan/Makefile b/mm/kasan/Makefile
index 3289db38bc87..a6df14bffb6b 100644
--- a/mm/kasan/Makefile
+++ b/mm/kasan/Makefile
@@ -1,11 +1,14 @@ 
 # SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
 KASAN_SANITIZE := n
+UBSAN_SANITIZE_common.o := n
 UBSAN_SANITIZE_kasan.o := n
 KCOV_INSTRUMENT := n
 
 CFLAGS_REMOVE_kasan.o = -pg
 # Function splitter causes unnecessary splits in __asan_load1/__asan_store1
 # see: https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=63533
+
+CFLAGS_common.o := $(call cc-option, -fno-conserve-stack -fno-stack-protector)
 CFLAGS_kasan.o := $(call cc-option, -fno-conserve-stack -fno-stack-protector)
 
-obj-y := kasan.o report.o kasan_init.o quarantine.o
+obj-y := common.o kasan.o report.o kasan_init.o quarantine.o
diff --git a/mm/kasan/common.c b/mm/kasan/common.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..e78ebeff1f4c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/mm/kasan/common.c
@@ -0,0 +1,603 @@ 
+/*
+ * This file contains common KASAN and KHWASAN code.
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2014 Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.
+ * Author: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
+ *
+ * Some code borrowed from https://github.com/xairy/kasan-prototype by
+ *        Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com>
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation.
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <linux/export.h>
+#include <linux/interrupt.h>
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/kasan.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/kmemleak.h>
+#include <linux/linkage.h>
+#include <linux/memblock.h>
+#include <linux/memory.h>
+#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/printk.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/sched/task_stack.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/stacktrace.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
+#include <linux/bug.h>
+
+#include "kasan.h"
+#include "../slab.h"
+
+static inline int in_irqentry_text(unsigned long ptr)
+{
+	return (ptr >= (unsigned long)&__irqentry_text_start &&
+		ptr < (unsigned long)&__irqentry_text_end) ||
+		(ptr >= (unsigned long)&__softirqentry_text_start &&
+		 ptr < (unsigned long)&__softirqentry_text_end);
+}
+
+static inline void filter_irq_stacks(struct stack_trace *trace)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	if (!trace->nr_entries)
+		return;
+	for (i = 0; i < trace->nr_entries; i++)
+		if (in_irqentry_text(trace->entries[i])) {
+			/* Include the irqentry function into the stack. */
+			trace->nr_entries = i + 1;
+			break;
+		}
+}
+
+static inline depot_stack_handle_t save_stack(gfp_t flags)
+{
+	unsigned long entries[KASAN_STACK_DEPTH];
+	struct stack_trace trace = {
+		.nr_entries = 0,
+		.entries = entries,
+		.max_entries = KASAN_STACK_DEPTH,
+		.skip = 0
+	};
+
+	save_stack_trace(&trace);
+	filter_irq_stacks(&trace);
+	if (trace.nr_entries != 0 &&
+	    trace.entries[trace.nr_entries-1] == ULONG_MAX)
+		trace.nr_entries--;
+
+	return depot_save_stack(&trace, flags);
+}
+
+static inline void set_track(struct kasan_track *track, gfp_t flags)
+{
+	track->pid = current->pid;
+	track->stack = save_stack(flags);
+}
+
+void kasan_enable_current(void)
+{
+	current->kasan_depth++;
+}
+
+void kasan_disable_current(void)
+{
+	current->kasan_depth--;
+}
+
+void kasan_check_read(const volatile void *p, unsigned int size)
+{
+	check_memory_region((unsigned long)p, size, false, _RET_IP_);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(kasan_check_read);
+
+void kasan_check_write(const volatile void *p, unsigned int size)
+{
+	check_memory_region((unsigned long)p, size, true, _RET_IP_);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(kasan_check_write);
+
+#undef memset
+void *memset(void *addr, int c, size_t len)
+{
+	check_memory_region((unsigned long)addr, len, true, _RET_IP_);
+
+	return __memset(addr, c, len);
+}
+
+#undef memmove
+void *memmove(void *dest, const void *src, size_t len)
+{
+	check_memory_region((unsigned long)src, len, false, _RET_IP_);
+	check_memory_region((unsigned long)dest, len, true, _RET_IP_);
+
+	return __memmove(dest, src, len);
+}
+
+#undef memcpy
+void *memcpy(void *dest, const void *src, size_t len)
+{
+	check_memory_region((unsigned long)src, len, false, _RET_IP_);
+	check_memory_region((unsigned long)dest, len, true, _RET_IP_);
+
+	return __memcpy(dest, src, len);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Poisons the shadow memory for 'size' bytes starting from 'addr'.
+ * Memory addresses should be aligned to KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE.
+ */
+void kasan_poison_shadow(const void *address, size_t size, u8 value)
+{
+	void *shadow_start, *shadow_end;
+
+	shadow_start = kasan_mem_to_shadow(address);
+	shadow_end = kasan_mem_to_shadow(address + size);
+
+	__memset(shadow_start, value, shadow_end - shadow_start);
+}
+
+void kasan_unpoison_shadow(const void *address, size_t size)
+{
+	kasan_poison_shadow(address, size, 0);
+
+	if (size & KASAN_SHADOW_MASK) {
+		u8 *shadow = (u8 *)kasan_mem_to_shadow(address + size);
+		*shadow = size & KASAN_SHADOW_MASK;
+	}
+}
+
+static void __kasan_unpoison_stack(struct task_struct *task, const void *sp)
+{
+	void *base = task_stack_page(task);
+	size_t size = sp - base;
+
+	kasan_unpoison_shadow(base, size);
+}
+
+/* Unpoison the entire stack for a task. */
+void kasan_unpoison_task_stack(struct task_struct *task)
+{
+	__kasan_unpoison_stack(task, task_stack_page(task) + THREAD_SIZE);
+}
+
+/* Unpoison the stack for the current task beyond a watermark sp value. */
+asmlinkage void kasan_unpoison_task_stack_below(const void *watermark)
+{
+	/*
+	 * Calculate the task stack base address.  Avoid using 'current'
+	 * because this function is called by early resume code which hasn't
+	 * yet set up the percpu register (%gs).
+	 */
+	void *base = (void *)((unsigned long)watermark & ~(THREAD_SIZE - 1));
+
+	kasan_unpoison_shadow(base, watermark - base);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Clear all poison for the region between the current SP and a provided
+ * watermark value, as is sometimes required prior to hand-crafted asm function
+ * returns in the middle of functions.
+ */
+void kasan_unpoison_stack_above_sp_to(const void *watermark)
+{
+	const void *sp = __builtin_frame_address(0);
+	size_t size = watermark - sp;
+
+	if (WARN_ON(sp > watermark))
+		return;
+	kasan_unpoison_shadow(sp, size);
+}
+
+void kasan_alloc_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order)
+{
+	if (likely(!PageHighMem(page)))
+		kasan_unpoison_shadow(page_address(page), PAGE_SIZE << order);
+}
+
+void kasan_free_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order)
+{
+	if (likely(!PageHighMem(page)))
+		kasan_poison_shadow(page_address(page),
+				PAGE_SIZE << order,
+				KASAN_FREE_PAGE);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Adaptive redzone policy taken from the userspace AddressSanitizer runtime.
+ * For larger allocations larger redzones are used.
+ */
+static inline unsigned int optimal_redzone(unsigned int object_size)
+{
+	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_HW))
+		return 0;
+
+	return
+		object_size <= 64        - 16   ? 16 :
+		object_size <= 128       - 32   ? 32 :
+		object_size <= 512       - 64   ? 64 :
+		object_size <= 4096      - 128  ? 128 :
+		object_size <= (1 << 14) - 256  ? 256 :
+		object_size <= (1 << 15) - 512  ? 512 :
+		object_size <= (1 << 16) - 1024 ? 1024 : 2048;
+}
+
+void kasan_cache_create(struct kmem_cache *cache, unsigned int *size,
+			slab_flags_t *flags)
+{
+	unsigned int orig_size = *size;
+	int redzone_adjust;
+
+	/* Add alloc meta. */
+	cache->kasan_info.alloc_meta_offset = *size;
+	*size += sizeof(struct kasan_alloc_meta);
+
+	/* Add free meta. */
+	if (cache->flags & SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU || cache->ctor ||
+	    cache->object_size < sizeof(struct kasan_free_meta)) {
+		cache->kasan_info.free_meta_offset = *size;
+		*size += sizeof(struct kasan_free_meta);
+	}
+	redzone_adjust = optimal_redzone(cache->object_size) -
+		(*size - cache->object_size);
+
+	if (redzone_adjust > 0)
+		*size += redzone_adjust;
+
+	*size = min_t(unsigned int, KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE,
+			max(*size, cache->object_size +
+					optimal_redzone(cache->object_size)));
+
+	/*
+	 * If the metadata doesn't fit, don't enable KASAN at all.
+	 */
+	if (*size <= cache->kasan_info.alloc_meta_offset ||
+			*size <= cache->kasan_info.free_meta_offset) {
+		cache->kasan_info.alloc_meta_offset = 0;
+		cache->kasan_info.free_meta_offset = 0;
+		*size = orig_size;
+		return;
+	}
+
+	*flags |= SLAB_KASAN;
+}
+
+size_t kasan_metadata_size(struct kmem_cache *cache)
+{
+	return (cache->kasan_info.alloc_meta_offset ?
+		sizeof(struct kasan_alloc_meta) : 0) +
+		(cache->kasan_info.free_meta_offset ?
+		sizeof(struct kasan_free_meta) : 0);
+}
+
+struct kasan_alloc_meta *get_alloc_info(struct kmem_cache *cache,
+					const void *object)
+{
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct kasan_alloc_meta) > 32);
+	return (void *)object + cache->kasan_info.alloc_meta_offset;
+}
+
+struct kasan_free_meta *get_free_info(struct kmem_cache *cache,
+				      const void *object)
+{
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct kasan_free_meta) > 32);
+	return (void *)object + cache->kasan_info.free_meta_offset;
+}
+
+void kasan_poison_slab(struct page *page)
+{
+	kasan_poison_shadow(page_address(page),
+			PAGE_SIZE << compound_order(page),
+			KASAN_KMALLOC_REDZONE);
+}
+
+void kasan_unpoison_object_data(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object)
+{
+	kasan_unpoison_shadow(object, cache->object_size);
+}
+
+void kasan_poison_object_data(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object)
+{
+	kasan_poison_shadow(object,
+			round_up(cache->object_size, KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE),
+			KASAN_KMALLOC_REDZONE);
+}
+
+void kasan_init_slab_obj(struct kmem_cache *cache, const void *object)
+{
+	struct kasan_alloc_meta *alloc_info;
+
+	if (!(cache->flags & SLAB_KASAN))
+		return;
+
+	alloc_info = get_alloc_info(cache, object);
+	__memset(alloc_info, 0, sizeof(*alloc_info));
+}
+
+void *kasan_slab_alloc(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object, gfp_t flags)
+{
+	return kasan_kmalloc(cache, object, cache->object_size, flags);
+}
+
+static bool __kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object,
+			      unsigned long ip, bool quarantine)
+{
+	s8 shadow_byte;
+	unsigned long rounded_up_size;
+
+	if (unlikely(nearest_obj(cache, virt_to_head_page(object), object) !=
+	    object)) {
+		kasan_report_invalid_free(object, ip);
+		return true;
+	}
+
+	/* RCU slabs could be legally used after free within the RCU period */
+	if (unlikely(cache->flags & SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU))
+		return false;
+
+	shadow_byte = READ_ONCE(*(s8 *)kasan_mem_to_shadow(object));
+	if (shadow_byte < 0 || shadow_byte >= KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE) {
+		kasan_report_invalid_free(object, ip);
+		return true;
+	}
+
+	rounded_up_size = round_up(cache->object_size, KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE);
+	kasan_poison_shadow(object, rounded_up_size, KASAN_KMALLOC_FREE);
+
+	if (!quarantine || unlikely(!(cache->flags & SLAB_KASAN)))
+		return false;
+
+	set_track(&get_alloc_info(cache, object)->free_track, GFP_NOWAIT);
+	quarantine_put(get_free_info(cache, object), cache);
+	return true;
+}
+
+bool kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object, unsigned long ip)
+{
+	return __kasan_slab_free(cache, object, ip, true);
+}
+
+void *kasan_kmalloc(struct kmem_cache *cache, const void *object, size_t size,
+		   gfp_t flags)
+{
+	unsigned long redzone_start;
+	unsigned long redzone_end;
+
+	if (gfpflags_allow_blocking(flags))
+		quarantine_reduce();
+
+	if (unlikely(object == NULL))
+		return NULL;
+
+	redzone_start = round_up((unsigned long)(object + size),
+				KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE);
+	redzone_end = round_up((unsigned long)object + cache->object_size,
+				KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE);
+
+	kasan_unpoison_shadow(object, size);
+	kasan_poison_shadow((void *)redzone_start, redzone_end - redzone_start,
+		KASAN_KMALLOC_REDZONE);
+
+	if (cache->flags & SLAB_KASAN)
+		set_track(&get_alloc_info(cache, object)->alloc_track, flags);
+
+	return (void *)object;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(kasan_kmalloc);
+
+void *kasan_kmalloc_large(const void *ptr, size_t size, gfp_t flags)
+{
+	struct page *page;
+	unsigned long redzone_start;
+	unsigned long redzone_end;
+
+	if (gfpflags_allow_blocking(flags))
+		quarantine_reduce();
+
+	if (unlikely(ptr == NULL))
+		return NULL;
+
+	page = virt_to_page(ptr);
+	redzone_start = round_up((unsigned long)(ptr + size),
+				KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE);
+	redzone_end = (unsigned long)ptr + (PAGE_SIZE << compound_order(page));
+
+	kasan_unpoison_shadow(ptr, size);
+	kasan_poison_shadow((void *)redzone_start, redzone_end - redzone_start,
+		KASAN_PAGE_REDZONE);
+
+	return (void *)ptr;
+}
+
+void *kasan_krealloc(const void *object, size_t size, gfp_t flags)
+{
+	struct page *page;
+
+	if (unlikely(object == ZERO_SIZE_PTR))
+		return (void *)object;
+
+	page = virt_to_head_page(object);
+
+	if (unlikely(!PageSlab(page)))
+		return kasan_kmalloc_large(object, size, flags);
+	else
+		return kasan_kmalloc(page->slab_cache, object, size, flags);
+}
+
+void kasan_poison_kfree(void *ptr, unsigned long ip)
+{
+	struct page *page;
+
+	page = virt_to_head_page(ptr);
+
+	if (unlikely(!PageSlab(page))) {
+		if (ptr != page_address(page)) {
+			kasan_report_invalid_free(ptr, ip);
+			return;
+		}
+		kasan_poison_shadow(ptr, PAGE_SIZE << compound_order(page),
+				KASAN_FREE_PAGE);
+	} else {
+		__kasan_slab_free(page->slab_cache, ptr, ip, false);
+	}
+}
+
+void kasan_kfree_large(void *ptr, unsigned long ip)
+{
+	if (ptr != page_address(virt_to_head_page(ptr)))
+		kasan_report_invalid_free(ptr, ip);
+	/* The object will be poisoned by page_alloc. */
+}
+
+int kasan_module_alloc(void *addr, size_t size)
+{
+	void *ret;
+	size_t shadow_size;
+	unsigned long shadow_start;
+
+	shadow_start = (unsigned long)kasan_mem_to_shadow(addr);
+	shadow_size = round_up(size >> KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT,
+			PAGE_SIZE);
+
+	if (WARN_ON(!PAGE_ALIGNED(shadow_start)))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	ret = __vmalloc_node_range(shadow_size, 1, shadow_start,
+			shadow_start + shadow_size,
+			GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO,
+			PAGE_KERNEL, VM_NO_GUARD, NUMA_NO_NODE,
+			__builtin_return_address(0));
+
+	if (ret) {
+		find_vm_area(addr)->flags |= VM_KASAN;
+		kmemleak_ignore(ret);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	return -ENOMEM;
+}
+
+void kasan_free_shadow(const struct vm_struct *vm)
+{
+	if (vm->flags & VM_KASAN)
+		vfree(kasan_mem_to_shadow(vm->addr));
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_MEMORY_HOTPLUG
+static bool shadow_mapped(unsigned long addr)
+{
+	pgd_t *pgd = pgd_offset_k(addr);
+	p4d_t *p4d;
+	pud_t *pud;
+	pmd_t *pmd;
+	pte_t *pte;
+
+	if (pgd_none(*pgd))
+		return false;
+	p4d = p4d_offset(pgd, addr);
+	if (p4d_none(*p4d))
+		return false;
+	pud = pud_offset(p4d, addr);
+	if (pud_none(*pud))
+		return false;
+
+	/*
+	 * We can't use pud_large() or pud_huge(), the first one is
+	 * arch-specific, the last one depends on HUGETLB_PAGE.  So let's abuse
+	 * pud_bad(), if pud is bad then it's bad because it's huge.
+	 */
+	if (pud_bad(*pud))
+		return true;
+	pmd = pmd_offset(pud, addr);
+	if (pmd_none(*pmd))
+		return false;
+
+	if (pmd_bad(*pmd))
+		return true;
+	pte = pte_offset_kernel(pmd, addr);
+	return !pte_none(*pte);
+}
+
+static int __meminit kasan_mem_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb,
+			unsigned long action, void *data)
+{
+	struct memory_notify *mem_data = data;
+	unsigned long nr_shadow_pages, start_kaddr, shadow_start;
+	unsigned long shadow_end, shadow_size;
+
+	nr_shadow_pages = mem_data->nr_pages >> KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT;
+	start_kaddr = (unsigned long)pfn_to_kaddr(mem_data->start_pfn);
+	shadow_start = (unsigned long)kasan_mem_to_shadow((void *)start_kaddr);
+	shadow_size = nr_shadow_pages << PAGE_SHIFT;
+	shadow_end = shadow_start + shadow_size;
+
+	if (WARN_ON(mem_data->nr_pages % KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE) ||
+		WARN_ON(start_kaddr % (KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE << PAGE_SHIFT)))
+		return NOTIFY_BAD;
+
+	switch (action) {
+	case MEM_GOING_ONLINE: {
+		void *ret;
+
+		/*
+		 * If shadow is mapped already than it must have been mapped
+		 * during the boot. This could happen if we onlining previously
+		 * offlined memory.
+		 */
+		if (shadow_mapped(shadow_start))
+			return NOTIFY_OK;
+
+		ret = __vmalloc_node_range(shadow_size, PAGE_SIZE, shadow_start,
+					shadow_end, GFP_KERNEL,
+					PAGE_KERNEL, VM_NO_GUARD,
+					pfn_to_nid(mem_data->start_pfn),
+					__builtin_return_address(0));
+		if (!ret)
+			return NOTIFY_BAD;
+
+		kmemleak_ignore(ret);
+		return NOTIFY_OK;
+	}
+	case MEM_CANCEL_ONLINE:
+	case MEM_OFFLINE: {
+		struct vm_struct *vm;
+
+		/*
+		 * shadow_start was either mapped during boot by kasan_init()
+		 * or during memory online by __vmalloc_node_range().
+		 * In the latter case we can use vfree() to free shadow.
+		 * Non-NULL result of the find_vm_area() will tell us if
+		 * that was the second case.
+		 *
+		 * Currently it's not possible to free shadow mapped
+		 * during boot by kasan_init(). It's because the code
+		 * to do that hasn't been written yet. So we'll just
+		 * leak the memory.
+		 */
+		vm = find_vm_area((void *)shadow_start);
+		if (vm)
+			vfree((void *)shadow_start);
+	}
+	}
+
+	return NOTIFY_OK;
+}
+
+static int __init kasan_memhotplug_init(void)
+{
+	hotplug_memory_notifier(kasan_mem_notifier, 0);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+core_initcall(kasan_memhotplug_init);
+#endif
diff --git a/mm/kasan/kasan.c b/mm/kasan/kasan.c
index f04aa1e0ba48..44ec228de0a2 100644
--- a/mm/kasan/kasan.c
+++ b/mm/kasan/kasan.c
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ 
 /*
- * This file contains shadow memory manipulation code.
+ * This file contains core KASAN code.
  *
  * Copyright (c) 2014 Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.
  * Author: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
@@ -40,82 +40,6 @@ 
 #include "kasan.h"
 #include "../slab.h"
 
-void kasan_enable_current(void)
-{
-	current->kasan_depth++;
-}
-
-void kasan_disable_current(void)
-{
-	current->kasan_depth--;
-}
-
-/*
- * Poisons the shadow memory for 'size' bytes starting from 'addr'.
- * Memory addresses should be aligned to KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE.
- */
-static void kasan_poison_shadow(const void *address, size_t size, u8 value)
-{
-	void *shadow_start, *shadow_end;
-
-	shadow_start = kasan_mem_to_shadow(address);
-	shadow_end = kasan_mem_to_shadow(address + size);
-
-	memset(shadow_start, value, shadow_end - shadow_start);
-}
-
-void kasan_unpoison_shadow(const void *address, size_t size)
-{
-	kasan_poison_shadow(address, size, 0);
-
-	if (size & KASAN_SHADOW_MASK) {
-		u8 *shadow = (u8 *)kasan_mem_to_shadow(address + size);
-		*shadow = size & KASAN_SHADOW_MASK;
-	}
-}
-
-static void __kasan_unpoison_stack(struct task_struct *task, const void *sp)
-{
-	void *base = task_stack_page(task);
-	size_t size = sp - base;
-
-	kasan_unpoison_shadow(base, size);
-}
-
-/* Unpoison the entire stack for a task. */
-void kasan_unpoison_task_stack(struct task_struct *task)
-{
-	__kasan_unpoison_stack(task, task_stack_page(task) + THREAD_SIZE);
-}
-
-/* Unpoison the stack for the current task beyond a watermark sp value. */
-asmlinkage void kasan_unpoison_task_stack_below(const void *watermark)
-{
-	/*
-	 * Calculate the task stack base address.  Avoid using 'current'
-	 * because this function is called by early resume code which hasn't
-	 * yet set up the percpu register (%gs).
-	 */
-	void *base = (void *)((unsigned long)watermark & ~(THREAD_SIZE - 1));
-
-	kasan_unpoison_shadow(base, watermark - base);
-}
-
-/*
- * Clear all poison for the region between the current SP and a provided
- * watermark value, as is sometimes required prior to hand-crafted asm function
- * returns in the middle of functions.
- */
-void kasan_unpoison_stack_above_sp_to(const void *watermark)
-{
-	const void *sp = __builtin_frame_address(0);
-	size_t size = watermark - sp;
-
-	if (WARN_ON(sp > watermark))
-		return;
-	kasan_unpoison_shadow(sp, size);
-}
-
 /*
  * All functions below always inlined so compiler could
  * perform better optimizations in each of __asan_loadX/__assn_storeX
@@ -260,121 +184,12 @@  static __always_inline void check_memory_region_inline(unsigned long addr,
 	kasan_report(addr, size, write, ret_ip);
 }
 
-static void check_memory_region(unsigned long addr,
-				size_t size, bool write,
+void check_memory_region(unsigned long addr, size_t size, bool write,
 				unsigned long ret_ip)
 {
 	check_memory_region_inline(addr, size, write, ret_ip);
 }
 
-void kasan_check_read(const volatile void *p, unsigned int size)
-{
-	check_memory_region((unsigned long)p, size, false, _RET_IP_);
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(kasan_check_read);
-
-void kasan_check_write(const volatile void *p, unsigned int size)
-{
-	check_memory_region((unsigned long)p, size, true, _RET_IP_);
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(kasan_check_write);
-
-#undef memset
-void *memset(void *addr, int c, size_t len)
-{
-	check_memory_region((unsigned long)addr, len, true, _RET_IP_);
-
-	return __memset(addr, c, len);
-}
-
-#undef memmove
-void *memmove(void *dest, const void *src, size_t len)
-{
-	check_memory_region((unsigned long)src, len, false, _RET_IP_);
-	check_memory_region((unsigned long)dest, len, true, _RET_IP_);
-
-	return __memmove(dest, src, len);
-}
-
-#undef memcpy
-void *memcpy(void *dest, const void *src, size_t len)
-{
-	check_memory_region((unsigned long)src, len, false, _RET_IP_);
-	check_memory_region((unsigned long)dest, len, true, _RET_IP_);
-
-	return __memcpy(dest, src, len);
-}
-
-void kasan_alloc_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order)
-{
-	if (likely(!PageHighMem(page)))
-		kasan_unpoison_shadow(page_address(page), PAGE_SIZE << order);
-}
-
-void kasan_free_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order)
-{
-	if (likely(!PageHighMem(page)))
-		kasan_poison_shadow(page_address(page),
-				PAGE_SIZE << order,
-				KASAN_FREE_PAGE);
-}
-
-/*
- * Adaptive redzone policy taken from the userspace AddressSanitizer runtime.
- * For larger allocations larger redzones are used.
- */
-static unsigned int optimal_redzone(unsigned int object_size)
-{
-	return
-		object_size <= 64        - 16   ? 16 :
-		object_size <= 128       - 32   ? 32 :
-		object_size <= 512       - 64   ? 64 :
-		object_size <= 4096      - 128  ? 128 :
-		object_size <= (1 << 14) - 256  ? 256 :
-		object_size <= (1 << 15) - 512  ? 512 :
-		object_size <= (1 << 16) - 1024 ? 1024 : 2048;
-}
-
-void kasan_cache_create(struct kmem_cache *cache, unsigned int *size,
-			slab_flags_t *flags)
-{
-	unsigned int orig_size = *size;
-	int redzone_adjust;
-
-	/* Add alloc meta. */
-	cache->kasan_info.alloc_meta_offset = *size;
-	*size += sizeof(struct kasan_alloc_meta);
-
-	/* Add free meta. */
-	if (cache->flags & SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU || cache->ctor ||
-	    cache->object_size < sizeof(struct kasan_free_meta)) {
-		cache->kasan_info.free_meta_offset = *size;
-		*size += sizeof(struct kasan_free_meta);
-	}
-	redzone_adjust = optimal_redzone(cache->object_size) -
-		(*size - cache->object_size);
-
-	if (redzone_adjust > 0)
-		*size += redzone_adjust;
-
-	*size = min_t(unsigned int, KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE,
-			max(*size, cache->object_size +
-					optimal_redzone(cache->object_size)));
-
-	/*
-	 * If the metadata doesn't fit, don't enable KASAN at all.
-	 */
-	if (*size <= cache->kasan_info.alloc_meta_offset ||
-			*size <= cache->kasan_info.free_meta_offset) {
-		cache->kasan_info.alloc_meta_offset = 0;
-		cache->kasan_info.free_meta_offset = 0;
-		*size = orig_size;
-		return;
-	}
-
-	*flags |= SLAB_KASAN;
-}
-
 void kasan_cache_shrink(struct kmem_cache *cache)
 {
 	quarantine_remove_cache(cache);
@@ -386,274 +201,6 @@  void kasan_cache_shutdown(struct kmem_cache *cache)
 		quarantine_remove_cache(cache);
 }
 
-size_t kasan_metadata_size(struct kmem_cache *cache)
-{
-	return (cache->kasan_info.alloc_meta_offset ?
-		sizeof(struct kasan_alloc_meta) : 0) +
-		(cache->kasan_info.free_meta_offset ?
-		sizeof(struct kasan_free_meta) : 0);
-}
-
-void kasan_poison_slab(struct page *page)
-{
-	kasan_poison_shadow(page_address(page),
-			PAGE_SIZE << compound_order(page),
-			KASAN_KMALLOC_REDZONE);
-}
-
-void kasan_unpoison_object_data(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object)
-{
-	kasan_unpoison_shadow(object, cache->object_size);
-}
-
-void kasan_poison_object_data(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object)
-{
-	kasan_poison_shadow(object,
-			round_up(cache->object_size, KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE),
-			KASAN_KMALLOC_REDZONE);
-}
-
-static inline int in_irqentry_text(unsigned long ptr)
-{
-	return (ptr >= (unsigned long)&__irqentry_text_start &&
-		ptr < (unsigned long)&__irqentry_text_end) ||
-		(ptr >= (unsigned long)&__softirqentry_text_start &&
-		 ptr < (unsigned long)&__softirqentry_text_end);
-}
-
-static inline void filter_irq_stacks(struct stack_trace *trace)
-{
-	int i;
-
-	if (!trace->nr_entries)
-		return;
-	for (i = 0; i < trace->nr_entries; i++)
-		if (in_irqentry_text(trace->entries[i])) {
-			/* Include the irqentry function into the stack. */
-			trace->nr_entries = i + 1;
-			break;
-		}
-}
-
-static inline depot_stack_handle_t save_stack(gfp_t flags)
-{
-	unsigned long entries[KASAN_STACK_DEPTH];
-	struct stack_trace trace = {
-		.nr_entries = 0,
-		.entries = entries,
-		.max_entries = KASAN_STACK_DEPTH,
-		.skip = 0
-	};
-
-	save_stack_trace(&trace);
-	filter_irq_stacks(&trace);
-	if (trace.nr_entries != 0 &&
-	    trace.entries[trace.nr_entries-1] == ULONG_MAX)
-		trace.nr_entries--;
-
-	return depot_save_stack(&trace, flags);
-}
-
-static inline void set_track(struct kasan_track *track, gfp_t flags)
-{
-	track->pid = current->pid;
-	track->stack = save_stack(flags);
-}
-
-struct kasan_alloc_meta *get_alloc_info(struct kmem_cache *cache,
-					const void *object)
-{
-	BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct kasan_alloc_meta) > 32);
-	return (void *)object + cache->kasan_info.alloc_meta_offset;
-}
-
-struct kasan_free_meta *get_free_info(struct kmem_cache *cache,
-				      const void *object)
-{
-	BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct kasan_free_meta) > 32);
-	return (void *)object + cache->kasan_info.free_meta_offset;
-}
-
-void kasan_init_slab_obj(struct kmem_cache *cache, const void *object)
-{
-	struct kasan_alloc_meta *alloc_info;
-
-	if (!(cache->flags & SLAB_KASAN))
-		return;
-
-	alloc_info = get_alloc_info(cache, object);
-	__memset(alloc_info, 0, sizeof(*alloc_info));
-}
-
-void *kasan_slab_alloc(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object, gfp_t flags)
-{
-	return kasan_kmalloc(cache, object, cache->object_size, flags);
-}
-
-static bool __kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object,
-			      unsigned long ip, bool quarantine)
-{
-	s8 shadow_byte;
-	unsigned long rounded_up_size;
-
-	if (unlikely(nearest_obj(cache, virt_to_head_page(object), object) !=
-	    object)) {
-		kasan_report_invalid_free(object, ip);
-		return true;
-	}
-
-	/* RCU slabs could be legally used after free within the RCU period */
-	if (unlikely(cache->flags & SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU))
-		return false;
-
-	shadow_byte = READ_ONCE(*(s8 *)kasan_mem_to_shadow(object));
-	if (shadow_byte < 0 || shadow_byte >= KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE) {
-		kasan_report_invalid_free(object, ip);
-		return true;
-	}
-
-	rounded_up_size = round_up(cache->object_size, KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE);
-	kasan_poison_shadow(object, rounded_up_size, KASAN_KMALLOC_FREE);
-
-	if (!quarantine || unlikely(!(cache->flags & SLAB_KASAN)))
-		return false;
-
-	set_track(&get_alloc_info(cache, object)->free_track, GFP_NOWAIT);
-	quarantine_put(get_free_info(cache, object), cache);
-	return true;
-}
-
-bool kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object, unsigned long ip)
-{
-	return __kasan_slab_free(cache, object, ip, true);
-}
-
-void *kasan_kmalloc(struct kmem_cache *cache, const void *object, size_t size,
-		   gfp_t flags)
-{
-	unsigned long redzone_start;
-	unsigned long redzone_end;
-
-	if (gfpflags_allow_blocking(flags))
-		quarantine_reduce();
-
-	if (unlikely(object == NULL))
-		return NULL;
-
-	redzone_start = round_up((unsigned long)(object + size),
-				KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE);
-	redzone_end = round_up((unsigned long)object + cache->object_size,
-				KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE);
-
-	kasan_unpoison_shadow(object, size);
-	kasan_poison_shadow((void *)redzone_start, redzone_end - redzone_start,
-		KASAN_KMALLOC_REDZONE);
-
-	if (cache->flags & SLAB_KASAN)
-		set_track(&get_alloc_info(cache, object)->alloc_track, flags);
-
-	return (void *)object;
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(kasan_kmalloc);
-
-void *kasan_kmalloc_large(const void *ptr, size_t size, gfp_t flags)
-{
-	struct page *page;
-	unsigned long redzone_start;
-	unsigned long redzone_end;
-
-	if (gfpflags_allow_blocking(flags))
-		quarantine_reduce();
-
-	if (unlikely(ptr == NULL))
-		return NULL;
-
-	page = virt_to_page(ptr);
-	redzone_start = round_up((unsigned long)(ptr + size),
-				KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE);
-	redzone_end = (unsigned long)ptr + (PAGE_SIZE << compound_order(page));
-
-	kasan_unpoison_shadow(ptr, size);
-	kasan_poison_shadow((void *)redzone_start, redzone_end - redzone_start,
-		KASAN_PAGE_REDZONE);
-
-	return (void *)ptr;
-}
-
-void *kasan_krealloc(const void *object, size_t size, gfp_t flags)
-{
-	struct page *page;
-
-	if (unlikely(object == ZERO_SIZE_PTR))
-		return ZERO_SIZE_PTR;
-
-	page = virt_to_head_page(object);
-
-	if (unlikely(!PageSlab(page)))
-		return kasan_kmalloc_large(object, size, flags);
-	else
-		return kasan_kmalloc(page->slab_cache, object, size, flags);
-}
-
-void kasan_poison_kfree(void *ptr, unsigned long ip)
-{
-	struct page *page;
-
-	page = virt_to_head_page(ptr);
-
-	if (unlikely(!PageSlab(page))) {
-		if (ptr != page_address(page)) {
-			kasan_report_invalid_free(ptr, ip);
-			return;
-		}
-		kasan_poison_shadow(ptr, PAGE_SIZE << compound_order(page),
-				KASAN_FREE_PAGE);
-	} else {
-		__kasan_slab_free(page->slab_cache, ptr, ip, false);
-	}
-}
-
-void kasan_kfree_large(void *ptr, unsigned long ip)
-{
-	if (ptr != page_address(virt_to_head_page(ptr)))
-		kasan_report_invalid_free(ptr, ip);
-	/* The object will be poisoned by page_alloc. */
-}
-
-int kasan_module_alloc(void *addr, size_t size)
-{
-	void *ret;
-	size_t shadow_size;
-	unsigned long shadow_start;
-
-	shadow_start = (unsigned long)kasan_mem_to_shadow(addr);
-	shadow_size = round_up(size >> KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT,
-			PAGE_SIZE);
-
-	if (WARN_ON(!PAGE_ALIGNED(shadow_start)))
-		return -EINVAL;
-
-	ret = __vmalloc_node_range(shadow_size, 1, shadow_start,
-			shadow_start + shadow_size,
-			GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO,
-			PAGE_KERNEL, VM_NO_GUARD, NUMA_NO_NODE,
-			__builtin_return_address(0));
-
-	if (ret) {
-		find_vm_area(addr)->flags |= VM_KASAN;
-		kmemleak_ignore(ret);
-		return 0;
-	}
-
-	return -ENOMEM;
-}
-
-void kasan_free_shadow(const struct vm_struct *vm)
-{
-	if (vm->flags & VM_KASAN)
-		vfree(kasan_mem_to_shadow(vm->addr));
-}
-
 static void register_global(struct kasan_global *global)
 {
 	size_t aligned_size = round_up(global->size, KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE);
@@ -794,113 +341,3 @@  DEFINE_ASAN_SET_SHADOW(f2);
 DEFINE_ASAN_SET_SHADOW(f3);
 DEFINE_ASAN_SET_SHADOW(f5);
 DEFINE_ASAN_SET_SHADOW(f8);
-
-#ifdef CONFIG_MEMORY_HOTPLUG
-static bool shadow_mapped(unsigned long addr)
-{
-	pgd_t *pgd = pgd_offset_k(addr);
-	p4d_t *p4d;
-	pud_t *pud;
-	pmd_t *pmd;
-	pte_t *pte;
-
-	if (pgd_none(*pgd))
-		return false;
-	p4d = p4d_offset(pgd, addr);
-	if (p4d_none(*p4d))
-		return false;
-	pud = pud_offset(p4d, addr);
-	if (pud_none(*pud))
-		return false;
-
-	/*
-	 * We can't use pud_large() or pud_huge(), the first one is
-	 * arch-specific, the last one depends on HUGETLB_PAGE.  So let's abuse
-	 * pud_bad(), if pud is bad then it's bad because it's huge.
-	 */
-	if (pud_bad(*pud))
-		return true;
-	pmd = pmd_offset(pud, addr);
-	if (pmd_none(*pmd))
-		return false;
-
-	if (pmd_bad(*pmd))
-		return true;
-	pte = pte_offset_kernel(pmd, addr);
-	return !pte_none(*pte);
-}
-
-static int __meminit kasan_mem_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb,
-			unsigned long action, void *data)
-{
-	struct memory_notify *mem_data = data;
-	unsigned long nr_shadow_pages, start_kaddr, shadow_start;
-	unsigned long shadow_end, shadow_size;
-
-	nr_shadow_pages = mem_data->nr_pages >> KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT;
-	start_kaddr = (unsigned long)pfn_to_kaddr(mem_data->start_pfn);
-	shadow_start = (unsigned long)kasan_mem_to_shadow((void *)start_kaddr);
-	shadow_size = nr_shadow_pages << PAGE_SHIFT;
-	shadow_end = shadow_start + shadow_size;
-
-	if (WARN_ON(mem_data->nr_pages % KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE) ||
-		WARN_ON(start_kaddr % (KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE << PAGE_SHIFT)))
-		return NOTIFY_BAD;
-
-	switch (action) {
-	case MEM_GOING_ONLINE: {
-		void *ret;
-
-		/*
-		 * If shadow is mapped already than it must have been mapped
-		 * during the boot. This could happen if we onlining previously
-		 * offlined memory.
-		 */
-		if (shadow_mapped(shadow_start))
-			return NOTIFY_OK;
-
-		ret = __vmalloc_node_range(shadow_size, PAGE_SIZE, shadow_start,
-					shadow_end, GFP_KERNEL,
-					PAGE_KERNEL, VM_NO_GUARD,
-					pfn_to_nid(mem_data->start_pfn),
-					__builtin_return_address(0));
-		if (!ret)
-			return NOTIFY_BAD;
-
-		kmemleak_ignore(ret);
-		return NOTIFY_OK;
-	}
-	case MEM_CANCEL_ONLINE:
-	case MEM_OFFLINE: {
-		struct vm_struct *vm;
-
-		/*
-		 * shadow_start was either mapped during boot by kasan_init()
-		 * or during memory online by __vmalloc_node_range().
-		 * In the latter case we can use vfree() to free shadow.
-		 * Non-NULL result of the find_vm_area() will tell us if
-		 * that was the second case.
-		 *
-		 * Currently it's not possible to free shadow mapped
-		 * during boot by kasan_init(). It's because the code
-		 * to do that hasn't been written yet. So we'll just
-		 * leak the memory.
-		 */
-		vm = find_vm_area((void *)shadow_start);
-		if (vm)
-			vfree((void *)shadow_start);
-	}
-	}
-
-	return NOTIFY_OK;
-}
-
-static int __init kasan_memhotplug_init(void)
-{
-	hotplug_memory_notifier(kasan_mem_notifier, 0);
-
-	return 0;
-}
-
-core_initcall(kasan_memhotplug_init);
-#endif
diff --git a/mm/kasan/kasan.h b/mm/kasan/kasan.h
index c12dcfde2ebd..6f4f2ebf5f57 100644
--- a/mm/kasan/kasan.h
+++ b/mm/kasan/kasan.h
@@ -8,10 +8,22 @@ 
 #define KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE (1UL << KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT)
 #define KASAN_SHADOW_MASK       (KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE - 1)
 
+#define KHWASAN_TAG_KERNEL	0xFF /* native kernel pointers tag */
+#define KHWASAN_TAG_INVALID	0xFE /* inaccessible memory tag */
+#define KHWASAN_TAG_MAX		0xFD /* maximum value for random tags */
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC
 #define KASAN_FREE_PAGE         0xFF  /* page was freed */
 #define KASAN_PAGE_REDZONE      0xFE  /* redzone for kmalloc_large allocations */
 #define KASAN_KMALLOC_REDZONE   0xFC  /* redzone inside slub object */
 #define KASAN_KMALLOC_FREE      0xFB  /* object was freed (kmem_cache_free/kfree) */
+#else
+#define KASAN_FREE_PAGE         KHWASAN_TAG_INVALID
+#define KASAN_PAGE_REDZONE      KHWASAN_TAG_INVALID
+#define KASAN_KMALLOC_REDZONE   KHWASAN_TAG_INVALID
+#define KASAN_KMALLOC_FREE      KHWASAN_TAG_INVALID
+#endif
+
 #define KASAN_GLOBAL_REDZONE    0xFA  /* redzone for global variable */
 
 /*
@@ -105,11 +117,31 @@  static inline const void *kasan_shadow_to_mem(const void *shadow_addr)
 		<< KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT);
 }
 
+static inline bool addr_has_shadow(const void *addr)
+{
+	return (addr >= kasan_shadow_to_mem((void *)KASAN_SHADOW_START));
+}
+
+void kasan_poison_shadow(const void *address, size_t size, u8 value);
+
+void check_memory_region(unsigned long addr, size_t size, bool write,
+				unsigned long ret_ip);
+
+void *find_first_bad_addr(void *addr, size_t size);
+const char *get_bug_type(struct kasan_access_info *info);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_HW
+void print_tags(u8 addr_tag, const void *addr);
+#else
+static inline void print_tags(u8 addr_tag, const void *addr) { }
+#endif
+
 void kasan_report(unsigned long addr, size_t size,
 		bool is_write, unsigned long ip);
 void kasan_report_invalid_free(void *object, unsigned long ip);
 
-#if defined(CONFIG_SLAB) || defined(CONFIG_SLUB)
+#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC) && \
+	(defined(CONFIG_SLAB) || defined(CONFIG_SLUB))
 void quarantine_put(struct kasan_free_meta *info, struct kmem_cache *cache);
 void quarantine_reduce(void);
 void quarantine_remove_cache(struct kmem_cache *cache);
@@ -120,6 +152,57 @@  static inline void quarantine_reduce(void) { }
 static inline void quarantine_remove_cache(struct kmem_cache *cache) { }
 #endif
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_HW
+
+#define KHWASAN_TAG_SHIFT 56
+#define KHWASAN_TAG_MASK (0xFFUL << KHWASAN_TAG_SHIFT)
+
+u8 random_tag(void);
+
+static inline void *set_tag(const void *addr, u8 tag)
+{
+	u64 a = (u64)addr;
+
+	a &= ~KHWASAN_TAG_MASK;
+	a |= ((u64)tag << KHWASAN_TAG_SHIFT);
+
+	return (void *)a;
+}
+
+static inline u8 get_tag(const void *addr)
+{
+	return (u8)((u64)addr >> KHWASAN_TAG_SHIFT);
+}
+
+static inline void *reset_tag(const void *addr)
+{
+	return set_tag(addr, KHWASAN_TAG_KERNEL);
+}
+
+#else /* CONFIG_KASAN_HW */
+
+static inline u8 random_tag(void)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static inline void *set_tag(const void *addr, u8 tag)
+{
+	return (void *)addr;
+}
+
+static inline u8 get_tag(const void *addr)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static inline void *reset_tag(const void *addr)
+{
+	return (void *)addr;
+}
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_KASAN_HW */
+
 /*
  * Exported functions for interfaces called from assembly or from generated
  * code. Declarations here to avoid warning about missing declarations.