| Message ID | 1530542283-26145-4-git-send-email-zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com (mailing list archive) |
|---|---|
| State | New, archived |
| Headers | show |
On 7/2/18 7:37 AM, Mimi Zohar wrote: > The original kexec_load syscall can not verify file signatures, nor can > the kexec image be measured. Based on policy, deny the kexec_load > syscall. Curiosity question: I thought kexec_load() syscall was used to load a crashdump? If this is true, how would this work if kexec_load() is being denied? I don't think I'd want to be hindered in cases where I'm trying to diagnose a crash. Thanks, Jay > Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> > Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> > Cc: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@kernel.org> > Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> > Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> > > --- > Changelog v3: > - use switch/case > > include/linux/ima.h | 7 +++++++ > security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 1 + > security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++ > security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 2 ++ > security/security.c | 7 ++++++- > 5 files changed, 43 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) > > diff --git a/include/linux/ima.h b/include/linux/ima.h > index 0e4647e0eb60..84806b54b50a 100644 > --- a/include/linux/ima.h > +++ b/include/linux/ima.h > @@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ > #define _LINUX_IMA_H > > #include <linux/fs.h> > +#include <linux/security.h> > #include <linux/kexec.h> > struct linux_binprm; > > @@ -19,6 +20,7 @@ extern int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm); > extern int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask, int opened); > extern void ima_file_free(struct file *file); > extern int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot); > +extern int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id); > extern int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id); > extern int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size, > enum kernel_read_file_id id); > @@ -49,6 +51,11 @@ static inline int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot) > return 0; > } > > +static inline int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id) > +{ > + return 0; > +} > + > static inline int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id) > { > return 0; > diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h > index 2ab1affffa36..588e4813370c 100644 > --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h > +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h > @@ -232,6 +232,7 @@ int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v); > #define IMA_APPRAISE_MODULES 0x08 > #define IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE 0x10 > #define IMA_APPRAISE_POLICY 0x20 > +#define IMA_APPRAISE_KEXEC 0x40 > > #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE > int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func, > diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c > index dca44cf7838e..71fecfef0939 100644 > --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c > +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c > @@ -496,6 +496,33 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size, > MAY_READ, func, 0); > } > > +/** > + * ima_load_data - appraise decision based on policy > + * @id: kernel load data caller identifier > + * > + * Callers of this LSM hook can not measure, appraise, or audit the > + * data provided by userspace. Enforce policy rules requring a file > + * signature (eg. kexec'ed kernel image). > + * > + * For permission return 0, otherwise return -EACCES. > + */ > +int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id) > +{ > + if ((ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE) != IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE) > + return 0; > + > + switch (id) { > + case LOADING_KEXEC_IMAGE: > + if (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_KEXEC) { > + pr_err("impossible to appraise a kernel image without a file descriptor; try using kexec_file_load syscall.\n"); > + return -EACCES; /* INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN */ > + } > + default: > + break; > + } > + return 0; > +} > + > static int __init init_ima(void) > { > int error; > diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c > index 7f4a4de7e831..ebfb389b79df 100644 > --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c > +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c > @@ -448,6 +448,8 @@ static int ima_appraise_flag(enum ima_hooks func) > return IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE; > else if (func == POLICY_CHECK) > return IMA_APPRAISE_POLICY; > + else if (func == KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK) > + return IMA_APPRAISE_KEXEC; > return 0; > } > > diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c > index 05fe5b1932d7..7b870df0a335 100644 > --- a/security/security.c > +++ b/security/security.c > @@ -1063,7 +1063,12 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_post_read_file); > > int security_kernel_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id) > { > - return call_int_hook(kernel_load_data, 0, id); > + int ret; > + > + ret = call_int_hook(kernel_load_data, 0, id); > + if (ret) > + return ret; > + return ima_load_data(id); > } > > int security_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
On Mon, 2018-07-02 at 11:31 -0700, J Freyensee wrote: > > On 7/2/18 7:37 AM, Mimi Zohar wrote: > > The original kexec_load syscall can not verify file signatures, nor can > > the kexec image be measured. Based on policy, deny the kexec_load > > syscall. > > > Curiosity question: I thought kexec_load() syscall was used to load a > crashdump? kexec is used to collect the memory used to analyze the crash dump. > If this is true, how would this work if kexec_load() is > being denied? I don't think I'd want to be hindered in cases where I'm > trying to diagnose a crash. For trusted & secure boot, we need a full measurement list and signature chain of trust rooted in HW. Permitting kexec_load would break these chains of trust. Permitting/denying kexec_load is based on a runtime IMA policy. Patch 6/8 "ima: add build time policy", in this patch set, introduces the concept of a build time policy. With these patches, you could configure your kernel and/or load an IMA policy permitting kexec_load. Mimi -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
diff --git a/include/linux/ima.h b/include/linux/ima.h index 0e4647e0eb60..84806b54b50a 100644 --- a/include/linux/ima.h +++ b/include/linux/ima.h @@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ #define _LINUX_IMA_H #include <linux/fs.h> +#include <linux/security.h> #include <linux/kexec.h> struct linux_binprm; @@ -19,6 +20,7 @@ extern int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm); extern int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask, int opened); extern void ima_file_free(struct file *file); extern int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot); +extern int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id); extern int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id); extern int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size, enum kernel_read_file_id id); @@ -49,6 +51,11 @@ static inline int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot) return 0; } +static inline int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id) +{ + return 0; +} + static inline int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id) { return 0; diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h index 2ab1affffa36..588e4813370c 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h @@ -232,6 +232,7 @@ int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v); #define IMA_APPRAISE_MODULES 0x08 #define IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE 0x10 #define IMA_APPRAISE_POLICY 0x20 +#define IMA_APPRAISE_KEXEC 0x40 #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func, diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c index dca44cf7838e..71fecfef0939 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c @@ -496,6 +496,33 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size, MAY_READ, func, 0); } +/** + * ima_load_data - appraise decision based on policy + * @id: kernel load data caller identifier + * + * Callers of this LSM hook can not measure, appraise, or audit the + * data provided by userspace. Enforce policy rules requring a file + * signature (eg. kexec'ed kernel image). + * + * For permission return 0, otherwise return -EACCES. + */ +int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id) +{ + if ((ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE) != IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE) + return 0; + + switch (id) { + case LOADING_KEXEC_IMAGE: + if (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_KEXEC) { + pr_err("impossible to appraise a kernel image without a file descriptor; try using kexec_file_load syscall.\n"); + return -EACCES; /* INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN */ + } + default: + break; + } + return 0; +} + static int __init init_ima(void) { int error; diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c index 7f4a4de7e831..ebfb389b79df 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c @@ -448,6 +448,8 @@ static int ima_appraise_flag(enum ima_hooks func) return IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE; else if (func == POLICY_CHECK) return IMA_APPRAISE_POLICY; + else if (func == KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK) + return IMA_APPRAISE_KEXEC; return 0; } diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index 05fe5b1932d7..7b870df0a335 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -1063,7 +1063,12 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_post_read_file); int security_kernel_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id) { - return call_int_hook(kernel_load_data, 0, id); + int ret; + + ret = call_int_hook(kernel_load_data, 0, id); + if (ret) + return ret; + return ima_load_data(id); } int security_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
The original kexec_load syscall can not verify file signatures, nor can the kexec image be measured. Based on policy, deny the kexec_load syscall. Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@kernel.org> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> --- Changelog v3: - use switch/case include/linux/ima.h | 7 +++++++ security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 1 + security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++ security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 2 ++ security/security.c | 7 ++++++- 5 files changed, 43 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)