| Message ID | 20180702152449.3219288-1-stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com (mailing list archive) |
|---|---|
| State | New, archived |
| Headers | show |
On Mon, 2018-07-02 at 11:24 -0400, Stefan Berger wrote: > Rather than accessing the TPM functions by passing a NULL pointer for > the tpm_chip, which causes a lookup for a suitable chip every time, get a > hold of a tpm_chip and access the TPM functions using it. Also get rid of > the ima_used_chip variable and use the new ima_tpm_chip variable instead > for determining whether to call TPM functions. > > Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com> > Acked-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Jarkko, would you mind staging this patch with the rest of the patch set? Mimi > --- > security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 2 +- > security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c | 4 ++-- > security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c | 16 +++++----------- > security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c | 4 ++-- > 4 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h > index 354bb5716ce3..2ab1affffa36 100644 > --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h > +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h > @@ -53,9 +53,9 @@ enum tpm_pcrs { TPM_PCR0 = 0, TPM_PCR8 = 8 }; > extern int ima_policy_flag; > > /* set during initialization */ > -extern int ima_used_chip; > extern int ima_hash_algo; > extern int ima_appraise; > +extern struct tpm_chip *ima_tpm_chip; > > /* IMA event related data */ > struct ima_event_data { > diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c > index 4e085a17124f..7e7e7e7c250a 100644 > --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c > +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c > @@ -631,10 +631,10 @@ int ima_calc_buffer_hash(const void *buf, loff_t len, > > static void __init ima_pcrread(int idx, u8 *pcr) > { > - if (!ima_used_chip) > + if (!ima_tpm_chip) > return; > > - if (tpm_pcr_read(NULL, idx, pcr) != 0) > + if (tpm_pcr_read(ima_tpm_chip, idx, pcr) != 0) > pr_err("Error Communicating to TPM chip\n"); > } > > diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c > index 29b72cd2502e..faac9ecaa0ae 100644 > --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c > +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c > @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ > > /* name for boot aggregate entry */ > static const char *boot_aggregate_name = "boot_aggregate"; > -int ima_used_chip; > +struct tpm_chip *ima_tpm_chip; > > /* Add the boot aggregate to the IMA measurement list and extend > * the PCR register. > @@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ static int __init ima_add_boot_aggregate(void) > iint->ima_hash->algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA1; > iint->ima_hash->length = SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE; > > - if (ima_used_chip) { > + if (ima_tpm_chip) { > result = ima_calc_boot_aggregate(&hash.hdr); > if (result < 0) { > audit_cause = "hashing_error"; > @@ -106,17 +106,11 @@ void __init ima_load_x509(void) > > int __init ima_init(void) > { > - u8 pcr_i[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE]; > int rc; > > - ima_used_chip = 0; > - rc = tpm_pcr_read(NULL, 0, pcr_i); > - if (rc == 0) > - ima_used_chip = 1; > - > - if (!ima_used_chip) > - pr_info("No TPM chip found, activating TPM-bypass! (rc=%d)\n", > - rc); > + ima_tpm_chip = tpm_default_chip(); > + if (!ima_tpm_chip) > + pr_info("No TPM chip found, activating TPM-bypass!\n"); > > rc = integrity_init_keyring(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_IMA); > if (rc) > diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c > index 418f35e38015..b186819bd5aa 100644 > --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c > +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c > @@ -142,10 +142,10 @@ static int ima_pcr_extend(const u8 *hash, int pcr) > { > int result = 0; > > - if (!ima_used_chip) > + if (!ima_tpm_chip) > return result; > > - result = tpm_pcr_extend(NULL, pcr, hash); > + result = tpm_pcr_extend(ima_tpm_chip, pcr, hash); > if (result != 0) > pr_err("Error Communicating to TPM chip, result: %d\n", result); > return result;
On Mon, 2018-07-02 at 13:00 -0400, Mimi Zohar wrote: > On Mon, 2018-07-02 at 11:24 -0400, Stefan Berger wrote: > > Rather than accessing the TPM functions by passing a NULL pointer for > > the tpm_chip, which causes a lookup for a suitable chip every time, get a > > hold of a tpm_chip and access the TPM functions using it. Also get rid of > > the ima_used_chip variable and use the new ima_tpm_chip variable instead > > for determining whether to call TPM functions. > > > > Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com> > > Acked-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> > > Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> > > Jarkko, would you mind staging this patch with the rest of the patch > set? Yes, sure, I can do that. Any additional tag? /Jarkko
On Tue, 2018-07-03 at 19:32 +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote: > On Mon, 2018-07-02 at 13:00 -0400, Mimi Zohar wrote: > > On Mon, 2018-07-02 at 11:24 -0400, Stefan Berger wrote: > > > Rather than accessing the TPM functions by passing a NULL pointer for > > > the tpm_chip, which causes a lookup for a suitable chip every time, get a > > > hold of a tpm_chip and access the TPM functions using it. Also get rid of > > > the ima_used_chip variable and use the new ima_tpm_chip variable instead > > > for determining whether to call TPM functions. > > > > > > Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com> > > > Acked-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> > > > > Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> > > > > Jarkko, would you mind staging this patch with the rest of the patch > > set? > > Yes, sure, I can do that. Any additional tag? Thanks, just these. Mimi
On Wed, Jul 04, 2018 at 08:10:03AM -0400, Mimi Zohar wrote: > > > Jarkko, would you mind staging this patch with the rest of the patch > > > set? > > > > Yes, sure, I can do that. Any additional tag? > > Thanks, just these. I pushed the changes to my tree (also next). > Mimi /Jarkko
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h index 354bb5716ce3..2ab1affffa36 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h @@ -53,9 +53,9 @@ enum tpm_pcrs { TPM_PCR0 = 0, TPM_PCR8 = 8 }; extern int ima_policy_flag; /* set during initialization */ -extern int ima_used_chip; extern int ima_hash_algo; extern int ima_appraise; +extern struct tpm_chip *ima_tpm_chip; /* IMA event related data */ struct ima_event_data { diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c index 4e085a17124f..7e7e7e7c250a 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c @@ -631,10 +631,10 @@ int ima_calc_buffer_hash(const void *buf, loff_t len, static void __init ima_pcrread(int idx, u8 *pcr) { - if (!ima_used_chip) + if (!ima_tpm_chip) return; - if (tpm_pcr_read(NULL, idx, pcr) != 0) + if (tpm_pcr_read(ima_tpm_chip, idx, pcr) != 0) pr_err("Error Communicating to TPM chip\n"); } diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c index 29b72cd2502e..faac9ecaa0ae 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ /* name for boot aggregate entry */ static const char *boot_aggregate_name = "boot_aggregate"; -int ima_used_chip; +struct tpm_chip *ima_tpm_chip; /* Add the boot aggregate to the IMA measurement list and extend * the PCR register. @@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ static int __init ima_add_boot_aggregate(void) iint->ima_hash->algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA1; iint->ima_hash->length = SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE; - if (ima_used_chip) { + if (ima_tpm_chip) { result = ima_calc_boot_aggregate(&hash.hdr); if (result < 0) { audit_cause = "hashing_error"; @@ -106,17 +106,11 @@ void __init ima_load_x509(void) int __init ima_init(void) { - u8 pcr_i[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE]; int rc; - ima_used_chip = 0; - rc = tpm_pcr_read(NULL, 0, pcr_i); - if (rc == 0) - ima_used_chip = 1; - - if (!ima_used_chip) - pr_info("No TPM chip found, activating TPM-bypass! (rc=%d)\n", - rc); + ima_tpm_chip = tpm_default_chip(); + if (!ima_tpm_chip) + pr_info("No TPM chip found, activating TPM-bypass!\n"); rc = integrity_init_keyring(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_IMA); if (rc) diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c index 418f35e38015..b186819bd5aa 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c @@ -142,10 +142,10 @@ static int ima_pcr_extend(const u8 *hash, int pcr) { int result = 0; - if (!ima_used_chip) + if (!ima_tpm_chip) return result; - result = tpm_pcr_extend(NULL, pcr, hash); + result = tpm_pcr_extend(ima_tpm_chip, pcr, hash); if (result != 0) pr_err("Error Communicating to TPM chip, result: %d\n", result); return result;