| Message ID | 20180824161642.1144-2-ebiggers@kernel.org (mailing list archive) |
|---|---|
| State | Superseded |
| Headers | show |
| Series | fs-verity: filesystem-level integrity protection | expand |
On 08/24/2018 09:16 AM, Eric Biggers wrote: > +/* ========== Ioctls ========== */ > + > +struct fsverity_digest { > + __u16 digest_algorithm; > + __u16 digest_size; /* input/output */ > + __u8 digest[]; > +}; > + > +#define FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY _IO('f', 133) > +#define FS_IOC_MEASURE_VERITY _IOWR('f', 134, struct fsverity_digest) Hi, Please update Documentation/ioctl/ioctl-number.txt also. thanks,
On Fri, Aug 24, 2018, at 12:16 PM, Eric Biggers wrote: > From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> > > fs-verity is a filesystem feature that provides efficient, transparent > integrity verification and authentication of read-only files. It uses a > dm-verity like mechanism at the file level: a Merkle tree hidden past > the end of the file is used to verify any block in the file in > log(filesize) time. It is implemented mainly by helper functions in > fs/verity/ that will be shared by multiple filesystems. > > Essentially, fs-verity reports a file's hash in constant time, but reads > that would violate that hash fail at runtime. This is useful when only > a portion of the file is actually accessed, as only the accessed portion > has to be hashed, and the latency to the first read is much reduced over > a full file hash. On top of this hashing mechanism, auditing or > authentication policies can be implemented to log or verify file hashes. > > Note that in general, fs-verity is *not* a replacement for IMA. > fs-verity is a lower-level feature, primarily a way to hash a file; > whereas IMA deals more with higher-level policy logic, like defining > which files are "measured" and what to do with those measurements. We > plan for IMA to support fs-verity measurements as an alternative to the > traditional full file hash. Still, some users find fs-verity useful by > itself, so it's also usable without IMA in simple cases, e.g. in cases > where just retrieving the file measurement via an ioctl is enough. > > A structure containing the properties of the Merkle tree -- such as the > hash algorithm used, the block size, and the root hash -- is also stored > on-disk, following the Merkle tree. The actual file measurement hash > that fs-verity reports is the hash of this structure. > > All fs-verity metadata is written by userspace; the kernel only reads > it. Extended attributes aren't used because the Merkle tree may be much > larger than XATTR_SIZE_MAX, we want the hash pages to be cached in the > page cache as usual, and in the case of fs-verity combined with fscrypt > we want the metadata to be encrypted to avoid leaking plaintext hashes. > The fs-verity metadata is hidden from userspace by overriding the i_size > of the in-memory VFS inode; ext4 additionally will override the on-disk > i_size in order to make verity a RO_COMPAT filesystem feature. > > This initial patch only adds the fs-verity Kconfig option, UAPI, and > setup code, e.g. the ->open() hook that parses the fs-verity descriptor. This first patch also adds a bit of core logic in the simple fsverity_prepare_setattr() which ends up being called by ext4 later. While I'm not too familiar with the vfs, as far as I can tell from inspection of Linus' git master is that pretty much any change (timestamp, hardlinks) ends up calling notify_change() which calls the fs-specific one, and in the verity case basically denies everything, right? Previously I brought up many uses for "content immutable" files: https://marc.info/?l=linux-fsdevel&m=151698481512084&w=2 The discussion sort of died out but...did you have any opinion on e.g. my proposal to use the Unix mode bits as a way to describe levels of mutablility? Let's say that your new _VERITY inode flag becomes "_WRITEPROT" or something a bit more generic. Do you have any thoughts on my proposal to reuse the Unix mode bits to control levels of inode mutability? For example, it seems to me we could define u+w as "hardlinks are OK". There shouldn't be any reason ext4/f2fs couldn't hardlink a verity-protected inode right? Or if for some reason that is hard, we could disallow that to start, but at least have the core VFS support _WRITEPROT inodes?
On Fri, Aug 24, 2018 at 01:42:29PM -0400, Colin Walters wrote: > > While I'm not too familiar with the vfs, as far as I can > tell from inspection of Linus' git master is that pretty much any change (timestamp, hardlinks) ends up > calling notify_change() which calls the fs-specific one, and in > the verity case basically denies everything, right? That's not correct. The verity case only denies truncate, because changing the data of the file would break the Merkle tree checksums. The metadata of the file is is not made immutable. So a verity-protected file can be deleted, renamed, can have hard links, and the timestamps can be set via utimes(), etc. Cheers, - Ted
Hi Colin, On Fri, Aug 24, 2018 at 01:42:29PM -0400, Colin Walters wrote: > > On Fri, Aug 24, 2018, at 12:16 PM, Eric Biggers wrote: > > From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> > > > > fs-verity is a filesystem feature that provides efficient, transparent > > integrity verification and authentication of read-only files. It uses a > > dm-verity like mechanism at the file level: a Merkle tree hidden past > > the end of the file is used to verify any block in the file in > > log(filesize) time. It is implemented mainly by helper functions in > > fs/verity/ that will be shared by multiple filesystems. > > > > Essentially, fs-verity reports a file's hash in constant time, but reads > > that would violate that hash fail at runtime. This is useful when only > > a portion of the file is actually accessed, as only the accessed portion > > has to be hashed, and the latency to the first read is much reduced over > > a full file hash. On top of this hashing mechanism, auditing or > > authentication policies can be implemented to log or verify file hashes. > > > > Note that in general, fs-verity is *not* a replacement for IMA. > > fs-verity is a lower-level feature, primarily a way to hash a file; > > whereas IMA deals more with higher-level policy logic, like defining > > which files are "measured" and what to do with those measurements. We > > plan for IMA to support fs-verity measurements as an alternative to the > > traditional full file hash. Still, some users find fs-verity useful by > > itself, so it's also usable without IMA in simple cases, e.g. in cases > > where just retrieving the file measurement via an ioctl is enough. > > > > A structure containing the properties of the Merkle tree -- such as the > > hash algorithm used, the block size, and the root hash -- is also stored > > on-disk, following the Merkle tree. The actual file measurement hash > > that fs-verity reports is the hash of this structure. > > > > All fs-verity metadata is written by userspace; the kernel only reads > > it. Extended attributes aren't used because the Merkle tree may be much > > larger than XATTR_SIZE_MAX, we want the hash pages to be cached in the > > page cache as usual, and in the case of fs-verity combined with fscrypt > > we want the metadata to be encrypted to avoid leaking plaintext hashes. > > The fs-verity metadata is hidden from userspace by overriding the i_size > > of the in-memory VFS inode; ext4 additionally will override the on-disk > > i_size in order to make verity a RO_COMPAT filesystem feature. > > > > This initial patch only adds the fs-verity Kconfig option, UAPI, and > > setup code, e.g. the ->open() hook that parses the fs-verity descriptor. > > This first patch also adds a bit of core logic in the > simple fsverity_prepare_setattr() which ends up being called > by ext4 later. > > While I'm not too familiar with the vfs, as far as I can > tell from inspection of Linus' git master is that pretty much any change (timestamp, hardlinks) ends up > calling notify_change() which calls the fs-specific one, and in > the verity case basically denies everything, right? > > Previously I brought up many uses for "content immutable" files: > https://marc.info/?l=linux-fsdevel&m=151698481512084&w=2 > > The discussion sort of died out but...did you have any opinion > on e.g. my proposal to use the Unix mode bits as a way to describe > levels of mutablility? > > Let's say that your new _VERITY inode flag becomes "_WRITEPROT" > or something a bit more generic. > > Do you have any thoughts on my proposal to reuse the Unix mode > bits to control levels of inode mutability? > > For example, it seems to me we could define u+w as "hardlinks are OK". > There shouldn't be any reason ext4/f2fs couldn't hardlink a verity-protected > inode right? Or if for some reason that is hard, we could disallow that to > start, but at least have the core VFS support _WRITEPROT inodes? > As Ted pointed out, only truncates are denied on fs-verity files, not other metadata changes like chmod(). Think of it this way: the purpose of fs-verity is *not* to make files immutable. It's to hash them. We can't allow people to change the thing being hashed, since that would invalidate the hash. So while fs-verity does make the file contents immutable, it's actually a requirement for it being hashed (measured), rather than the end goal. There's no reason from fs-verity's perspective to make anything else immutable. That being said, in the future, we could allow declaring file metadata like the Unix mode bits in the authenticated portion of the fs-verity descriptor, so they would be included in the file hash. fs-verity would then need to enforce that the declared mode matches the actual one and that the actual one cannot be changed. Extended attributes could be included in the hash in the same way. But that's out of scope for now, as so far users only need the file contents to be hashed. - Eric
Hi Eric- Context: I'm working on IMA support for NFSv4, and would like to use fs-verity (or some Merkle tree-like mechanism) eventually to help address the performance impacts of using IMA with large NFS files. > On Aug 24, 2018, at 12:16 PM, Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org> wrote: > > From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> > > fs-verity is a filesystem feature that provides efficient, transparent > integrity verification and authentication of read-only files. It uses a > dm-verity like mechanism at the file level: a Merkle tree hidden past > the end of the file is used to verify any block in the file in > log(filesize) time. It is implemented mainly by helper functions in > fs/verity/ that will be shared by multiple filesystems. This description suggests that the only way fs-verity can work is by placing the Merkle tree data after EOF. Further, this organi- zation is exposed to user space, making it a fixed part of the fs-verity kernel/user space API. Remote filesystems -- esp. NFS -- would prefer to manage the Merkle tree data in other ways. The NFSv4 protocol, for example, supports named streams (as some other filesystems do), and could store the Merkle trees in those. Or, a new pNFS layout type could be con- structed where Merkle trees are stored separately from a file's content -- perhaps even on a separate file server. File servers can store this data as the servers' local filesystems require. Sharing how the Merkle tree is created and used is sensible, but IMHO the filesystem implementations should be allowed to store this tree however they find convenient. The Merkle trees should be exposed via a clean API, not as part of the file's content. > Essentially, fs-verity reports a file's hash in constant time, but reads > that would violate that hash fail at runtime. This is useful when only > a portion of the file is actually accessed, as only the accessed portion > has to be hashed, and the latency to the first read is much reduced over > a full file hash. On top of this hashing mechanism, auditing or > authentication policies can be implemented to log or verify file hashes. > > Note that in general, fs-verity is *not* a replacement for IMA. > fs-verity is a lower-level feature, primarily a way to hash a file; > whereas IMA deals more with higher-level policy logic, like defining > which files are "measured" and what to do with those measurements. We > plan for IMA to support fs-verity measurements as an alternative to the > traditional full file hash. Still, some users find fs-verity useful by > itself, so it's also usable without IMA in simple cases, e.g. in cases > where just retrieving the file measurement via an ioctl is enough. > > A structure containing the properties of the Merkle tree -- such as the > hash algorithm used, the block size, and the root hash -- is also stored > on-disk, following the Merkle tree. The actual file measurement hash > that fs-verity reports is the hash of this structure. > > All fs-verity metadata is written by userspace; the kernel only reads > it. Extended attributes aren't used because the Merkle tree may be much > larger than XATTR_SIZE_MAX, we want the hash pages to be cached in the > page cache as usual, and in the case of fs-verity combined with fscrypt > we want the metadata to be encrypted to avoid leaking plaintext hashes. > The fs-verity metadata is hidden from userspace by overriding the i_size > of the in-memory VFS inode; ext4 additionally will override the on-disk > i_size in order to make verity a RO_COMPAT filesystem feature. > > This initial patch only adds the fs-verity Kconfig option, UAPI, and > setup code, e.g. the ->open() hook that parses the fs-verity descriptor. > The actual ->readpages() data verification, the ioctls, ext4 and f2fs > support, and other functionality comes in later patches. > > Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> > --- > fs/Kconfig | 2 + > fs/Makefile | 1 + > fs/verity/Kconfig | 36 ++ > fs/verity/Makefile | 3 + > fs/verity/fsverity_private.h | 99 ++++ > fs/verity/hash_algs.c | 106 +++++ > fs/verity/setup.c | 846 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ > include/linux/fs.h | 9 + > include/linux/fsverity.h | 62 +++ > include/uapi/linux/fsverity.h | 86 ++++ > 10 files changed, 1250 insertions(+) > create mode 100644 fs/verity/Kconfig > create mode 100644 fs/verity/Makefile > create mode 100644 fs/verity/fsverity_private.h > create mode 100644 fs/verity/hash_algs.c > create mode 100644 fs/verity/setup.c > create mode 100644 include/linux/fsverity.h > create mode 100644 include/uapi/linux/fsverity.h > > diff --git a/fs/Kconfig b/fs/Kconfig > index ac474a61be379..ddadc4e999429 100644 > --- a/fs/Kconfig > +++ b/fs/Kconfig > @@ -105,6 +105,8 @@ config MANDATORY_FILE_LOCKING > > source "fs/crypto/Kconfig" > > +source "fs/verity/Kconfig" > + > source "fs/notify/Kconfig" > > source "fs/quota/Kconfig" > diff --git a/fs/Makefile b/fs/Makefile > index 293733f61594b..10b37f651ffde 100644 > --- a/fs/Makefile > +++ b/fs/Makefile > @@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_USERFAULTFD) += userfaultfd.o > obj-$(CONFIG_AIO) += aio.o > obj-$(CONFIG_FS_DAX) += dax.o > obj-$(CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION) += crypto/ > +obj-$(CONFIG_FS_VERITY) += verity/ > obj-$(CONFIG_FILE_LOCKING) += locks.o > obj-$(CONFIG_COMPAT) += compat.o compat_ioctl.o > obj-$(CONFIG_BINFMT_AOUT) += binfmt_aout.o > diff --git a/fs/verity/Kconfig b/fs/verity/Kconfig > new file mode 100644 > index 0000000000000..308d733a9401b > --- /dev/null > +++ b/fs/verity/Kconfig > @@ -0,0 +1,36 @@ > +config FS_VERITY > + tristate "FS Verity (file-based integrity/authentication)" > + depends on BLOCK > + select CRYPTO > + # SHA-256 is selected as it's intended to be the default hash algorithm. > + # To avoid bloat, other wanted algorithms must be selected explicitly. > + select CRYPTO_SHA256 > + help > + This option enables fs-verity. fs-verity is the dm-verity > + mechanism implemented at the file level. On supported > + filesystems, userspace can append a Merkle tree (hash tree) to > + a file, then enable fs-verity on the file. The filesystem > + will then transparently verify any data read from the file > + against the Merkle tree. The file is also made read-only. > + > + This serves as an integrity check, but the availability of the > + Merkle tree root hash also allows efficiently supporting > + various use cases where normally the whole file would need to > + be hashed at once, such as: (a) auditing (logging the file's > + hash), or (b) authenticity verification (comparing the hash > + against a known good value, e.g. from a digital signature). > + > + fs-verity is especially useful on large files where not all > + the contents may actually be needed. Also, fs-verity verifies > + data each time it is paged back in, which provides better > + protection against malicious disks vs. an ahead-of-time hash. > + > + If unsure, say N. > + > +config FS_VERITY_DEBUG > + bool "FS Verity debugging" > + depends on FS_VERITY > + help > + Enable debugging messages related to fs-verity by default. > + > + Say N unless you are an fs-verity developer. > diff --git a/fs/verity/Makefile b/fs/verity/Makefile > new file mode 100644 > index 0000000000000..39e123805c827 > --- /dev/null > +++ b/fs/verity/Makefile > @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ > +obj-$(CONFIG_FS_VERITY) += fsverity.o > + > +fsverity-y := hash_algs.o setup.o > diff --git a/fs/verity/fsverity_private.h b/fs/verity/fsverity_private.h > new file mode 100644 > index 0000000000000..a18ff645695f4 > --- /dev/null > +++ b/fs/verity/fsverity_private.h > @@ -0,0 +1,99 @@ > +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ > +/* > + * fs-verity: read-only file-based integrity/authentication > + * > + * Copyright (C) 2018 Google LLC > + */ > + > +#ifndef _FSVERITY_PRIVATE_H > +#define _FSVERITY_PRIVATE_H > + > +#ifdef CONFIG_FS_VERITY_DEBUG > +#define DEBUG > +#endif > + > +#define pr_fmt(fmt) "fs-verity: " fmt > + > +#include <crypto/sha.h> > +#define __FS_HAS_VERITY 1 > +#include <linux/fsverity.h> > + > +/* > + * Maximum depth of the Merkle tree. Up to 64 levels are theoretically possible > + * with a very small block size, but we'd like to limit stack usage during > + * verification, and in practice this is plenty. E.g., with SHA-256 and 4K > + * blocks, a file with size UINT64_MAX bytes needs just 8 levels. > + */ > +#define FS_VERITY_MAX_LEVELS 16 > + > +/* > + * Largest digest size among all hash algorithms supported by fs-verity. This > + * can be increased if needed. > + */ > +#define FS_VERITY_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE > + > +/* A hash algorithm supported by fs-verity */ > +struct fsverity_hash_alg { > + struct crypto_ahash *tfm; /* allocated on demand */ > + const char *name; > + unsigned int digest_size; > + bool cryptographic; > +}; > + > +/** > + * fsverity_info - cached verity metadata for an inode > + * > + * When a verity file is first opened, an instance of this struct is allocated > + * and stored in ->i_verity_info. It caches various values from the verity > + * metadata, such as the tree topology and the root hash, which are needed to > + * efficiently verify data read from the file. Once created, it remains until > + * the inode is evicted. > + * > + * (The tree pages themselves are not cached here, though they may be cached in > + * the inode's page cache.) > + */ > +struct fsverity_info { > + const struct fsverity_hash_alg *hash_alg; /* hash algorithm */ > + u8 block_bits; /* log2(block size) */ > + u8 log_arity; /* log2(hashes per hash block) */ > + u8 depth; /* depth of the Merkle tree */ > + u8 *hashstate; /* salted initial hash state */ > + u64 data_i_size; /* original file size */ > + u64 full_i_size; /* full file size including metadata */ > + u8 root_hash[FS_VERITY_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE]; /* Merkle tree root hash */ > + u8 measurement[FS_VERITY_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE]; /* file measurement */ > + bool have_root_hash; /* have root hash from disk? */ > + > + /* Starting blocks for each tree level. 'depth-1' is the root level. */ > + u64 hash_lvl_region_idx[FS_VERITY_MAX_LEVELS]; > +}; > + > +/* hash_algs.c */ > +extern struct fsverity_hash_alg fsverity_hash_algs[]; > +const struct fsverity_hash_alg *fsverity_get_hash_alg(unsigned int num); > +void __init fsverity_check_hash_algs(void); > +void __exit fsverity_exit_hash_algs(void); > + > +/* setup.c */ > +struct fsverity_info *create_fsverity_info(struct inode *inode, bool enabling); > +void free_fsverity_info(struct fsverity_info *vi); > + > +static inline struct fsverity_info *get_fsverity_info(const struct inode *inode) > +{ > + /* pairs with cmpxchg_release() in set_fsverity_info() */ > + return smp_load_acquire(&inode->i_verity_info); > +} > + > +static inline bool set_fsverity_info(struct inode *inode, > + struct fsverity_info *vi) > +{ > + /* pairs with smp_load_acquire() in get_fsverity_info() */ > + if (cmpxchg_release(&inode->i_verity_info, NULL, vi) != NULL) > + return false; > + > + /* Set the in-memory i_size to the data size */ > + i_size_write(inode, vi->data_i_size); > + return true; > +} > + > +#endif /* _FSVERITY_PRIVATE_H */ > diff --git a/fs/verity/hash_algs.c b/fs/verity/hash_algs.c > new file mode 100644 > index 0000000000000..424a26ee2f3c2 > --- /dev/null > +++ b/fs/verity/hash_algs.c > @@ -0,0 +1,106 @@ > +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 > +/* > + * fs/verity/hash_algs.c: fs-verity hash algorithm management > + * > + * Copyright (C) 2018 Google LLC > + * > + * Written by Eric Biggers. > + */ > + > +#include "fsverity_private.h" > + > +#include <crypto/hash.h> > + > +/* The list of hash algorithms supported by fs-verity */ > +struct fsverity_hash_alg fsverity_hash_algs[] = { > + [FS_VERITY_ALG_SHA256] = { > + .name = "sha256", > + .digest_size = 32, > + .cryptographic = true, > + }, > +}; > + > +/* > + * Translate the given fs-verity hash algorithm number into a struct describing > + * the algorithm, and ensure it has a hash transform ready to go. The hash > + * transforms are allocated on-demand firstly to not waste resources when they > + * aren't needed, and secondly because the fs-verity module may be loaded > + * earlier than the needed crypto modules. > + */ > +const struct fsverity_hash_alg *fsverity_get_hash_alg(unsigned int num) > +{ > + struct fsverity_hash_alg *alg; > + struct crypto_ahash *tfm; > + int err; > + > + if (num >= ARRAY_SIZE(fsverity_hash_algs) || > + !fsverity_hash_algs[num].digest_size) { > + pr_warn("Unknown hash algorithm: %u\n", num); > + return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); > + } > + alg = &fsverity_hash_algs[num]; > +retry: > + /* pairs with cmpxchg_release() below */ > + tfm = smp_load_acquire(&alg->tfm); > + if (tfm) > + return alg; > + /* > + * Using the shash API would make things a bit simpler, but the ahash > + * API is preferable as it allows the use of crypto accelerators. > + */ > + tfm = crypto_alloc_ahash(alg->name, 0, 0); > + if (IS_ERR(tfm)) { > + if (PTR_ERR(tfm) == -ENOENT) > + pr_warn("Algorithm %u (%s) is unavailable\n", > + num, alg->name); > + else > + pr_warn("Error allocating algorithm %u (%s): %ld\n", > + num, alg->name, PTR_ERR(tfm)); > + return ERR_CAST(tfm); > + } > + > + err = -EINVAL; > + if (WARN_ON(alg->digest_size != crypto_ahash_digestsize(tfm))) > + goto err_free_tfm; > + > + pr_info("%s using implementation \"%s\"\n", alg->name, > + crypto_hash_alg_common(tfm)->base.cra_driver_name); > + > + /* pairs with smp_load_acquire() above */ > + if (cmpxchg_release(&alg->tfm, NULL, tfm) != NULL) { > + crypto_free_ahash(tfm); > + goto retry; > + } > + > + return alg; > + > +err_free_tfm: > + crypto_free_ahash(tfm); > + return ERR_PTR(err); > +} > + > +void __init fsverity_check_hash_algs(void) > +{ > + int i; > + > + /* > + * Sanity check the digest sizes (could be a build-time check, but > + * they're in an array) > + */ > + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(fsverity_hash_algs); i++) { > + struct fsverity_hash_alg *alg = &fsverity_hash_algs[i]; > + > + if (!alg->digest_size) > + continue; > + BUG_ON(alg->digest_size > FS_VERITY_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE); > + BUG_ON(!is_power_of_2(alg->digest_size)); > + } > +} > + > +void __exit fsverity_exit_hash_algs(void) > +{ > + int i; > + > + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(fsverity_hash_algs); i++) > + crypto_free_ahash(fsverity_hash_algs[i].tfm); > +} > diff --git a/fs/verity/setup.c b/fs/verity/setup.c > new file mode 100644 > index 0000000000000..e675c52898d5b > --- /dev/null > +++ b/fs/verity/setup.c > @@ -0,0 +1,846 @@ > +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 > +/* > + * fs/verity/setup.c: fs-verity module initialization and descriptor parsing > + * > + * Copyright (C) 2018 Google LLC > + * > + * Originally written by Jaegeuk Kim and Michael Halcrow; > + * heavily rewritten by Eric Biggers. > + */ > + > +#include "fsverity_private.h" > + > +#include <crypto/hash.h> > +#include <linux/highmem.h> > +#include <linux/list_sort.h> > +#include <linux/module.h> > +#include <linux/pagemap.h> > +#include <linux/scatterlist.h> > +#include <linux/vmalloc.h> > + > +static struct kmem_cache *fsverity_info_cachep; > + > +static void dump_fsverity_descriptor(const struct fsverity_descriptor *desc) > +{ > + pr_debug("magic = %.*s\n", (int)sizeof(desc->magic), desc->magic); > + pr_debug("major_version = %u\n", desc->major_version); > + pr_debug("minor_version = %u\n", desc->minor_version); > + pr_debug("log_data_blocksize = %u\n", desc->log_data_blocksize); > + pr_debug("log_tree_blocksize = %u\n", desc->log_tree_blocksize); > + pr_debug("data_algorithm = %u\n", le16_to_cpu(desc->data_algorithm)); > + pr_debug("tree_algorithm = %u\n", le16_to_cpu(desc->tree_algorithm)); > + pr_debug("flags = %#x\n", le32_to_cpu(desc->flags)); > + pr_debug("orig_file_size = %llu\n", le64_to_cpu(desc->orig_file_size)); > + pr_debug("auth_ext_count = %u\n", le16_to_cpu(desc->auth_ext_count)); > +} > + > +/* Precompute the salted initial hash state */ > +static int set_salt(struct fsverity_info *vi, const u8 *salt, size_t saltlen) > +{ > + struct crypto_ahash *tfm = vi->hash_alg->tfm; > + struct ahash_request *req; > + unsigned int reqsize = sizeof(*req) + crypto_ahash_reqsize(tfm); > + struct scatterlist sg; > + DECLARE_CRYPTO_WAIT(wait); > + u8 *saltbuf; > + int err; > + > + vi->hashstate = kmalloc(crypto_ahash_statesize(tfm), GFP_KERNEL); > + if (!vi->hashstate) > + return -ENOMEM; > + /* On error, vi->hashstate is freed by free_fsverity_info() */ > + > + /* > + * Allocate a hash request buffer. Also reserve space for a copy of > + * the salt, since the given 'salt' may point into vmap'ed memory, so > + * sg_init_one() may not work on it. > + */ > + req = kmalloc(reqsize + saltlen, GFP_KERNEL); > + if (!req) > + return -ENOMEM; > + saltbuf = (u8 *)req + reqsize; > + memcpy(saltbuf, salt, saltlen); > + sg_init_one(&sg, saltbuf, saltlen); > + > + ahash_request_set_tfm(req, tfm); > + ahash_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP | > + CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG, > + crypto_req_done, &wait); > + ahash_request_set_crypt(req, &sg, NULL, saltlen); > + > + err = crypto_wait_req(crypto_ahash_init(req), &wait); > + if (err) > + goto out; > + err = crypto_wait_req(crypto_ahash_update(req), &wait); > + if (err) > + goto out; > + err = crypto_ahash_export(req, vi->hashstate); > +out: > + kfree(req); > + return err; > +} > + > +/* > + * Copy in the root hash stored on disk. > + * > + * Note that the root hash could be computed by hashing the root block of the > + * Merkle tree. But it works out a bit simpler to store the hash separately; > + * then it gets included in the file measurement without special-casing it, and > + * the root block gets verified on the ->readpages() path like the other blocks. > + */ > +static int parse_root_hash_extension(struct fsverity_info *vi, > + const void *hash, size_t size) > +{ > + const struct fsverity_hash_alg *alg = vi->hash_alg; > + > + if (vi->have_root_hash) { > + pr_warn("Multiple root hashes were found!\n"); > + return -EINVAL; > + } > + if (size != alg->digest_size) { > + pr_warn("Wrong root hash size; got %zu bytes, but expected %u for hash algorithm %s\n", > + size, alg->digest_size, alg->name); > + return -EINVAL; > + } > + memcpy(vi->root_hash, hash, size); > + vi->have_root_hash = true; > + pr_debug("Root hash: %s:%*phN\n", alg->name, > + alg->digest_size, vi->root_hash); > + return 0; > +} > + > +static int parse_salt_extension(struct fsverity_info *vi, > + const void *salt, size_t saltlen) > +{ > + if (vi->hashstate) { > + pr_warn("Multiple salts were found!\n"); > + return -EINVAL; > + } > + return set_salt(vi, salt, saltlen); > +} > + > +/* The available types of extensions (variable-length metadata items) */ > +static const struct extension_type { > + int (*parse)(struct fsverity_info *vi, const void *_ext, > + size_t extra_len); > + size_t base_len; /* length of fixed-size part of payload, if any */ > + bool unauthenticated; /* true if not included in file measurement */ > +} extension_types[] = { > + [FS_VERITY_EXT_ROOT_HASH] = { > + .parse = parse_root_hash_extension, > + }, > + [FS_VERITY_EXT_SALT] = { > + .parse = parse_salt_extension, > + }, > +}; > + > +static int do_parse_extensions(struct fsverity_info *vi, > + const struct fsverity_extension **ext_hdr_p, > + const void *end, int count, bool authenticated) > +{ > + const struct fsverity_extension *ext_hdr = *ext_hdr_p; > + int i; > + int err; > + > + for (i = 0; i < count; i++) { > + const struct extension_type *type; > + u32 len, rounded_len; > + u16 type_code; > + > + if (end - (const void *)ext_hdr < sizeof(*ext_hdr)) { > + pr_warn("Extension list overflows buffer\n"); > + return -EINVAL; > + } > + type_code = le16_to_cpu(ext_hdr->type); > + if (type_code >= ARRAY_SIZE(extension_types) || > + !extension_types[type_code].parse) { > + pr_warn("Unknown extension type: %u\n", type_code); > + return -EINVAL; > + } > + type = &extension_types[type_code]; > + if (authenticated != !type->unauthenticated) { > + pr_warn("Extension type %u must be %sauthenticated\n", > + type_code, type->unauthenticated ? "un" : ""); > + return -EINVAL; > + } > + if (ext_hdr->reserved) { > + pr_warn("Reserved bits set in extension header\n"); > + return -EINVAL; > + } > + len = le32_to_cpu(ext_hdr->length); > + if (len < sizeof(*ext_hdr)) { > + pr_warn("Invalid length in extension header\n"); > + return -EINVAL; > + } > + rounded_len = round_up(len, 8); > + if (rounded_len == 0 || > + rounded_len > end - (const void *)ext_hdr) { > + pr_warn("Extension item overflows buffer\n"); > + return -EINVAL; > + } > + if (len < sizeof(*ext_hdr) + type->base_len) { > + pr_warn("Extension length too small for type\n"); > + return -EINVAL; > + } > + err = type->parse(vi, ext_hdr + 1, > + len - sizeof(*ext_hdr) - type->base_len); > + if (err) > + return err; > + ext_hdr = (const void *)ext_hdr + rounded_len; > + } > + *ext_hdr_p = ext_hdr; > + return 0; > +} > + > +/* > + * Parse the extension items following the fixed-size portion of the fs-verity > + * descriptor. The fsverity_info is updated accordingly. > + * > + * Return: On success, the size of the authenticated portion of the descriptor > + * (the fixed-size portion plus the authenticated extensions). > + * Otherwise, a -errno value. > + */ > +static int parse_extensions(struct fsverity_info *vi, > + const struct fsverity_descriptor *desc, > + int desc_len) > +{ > + const struct fsverity_extension *ext_hdr = (const void *)(desc + 1); > + const void *end = (const void *)desc + desc_len; > + u16 auth_ext_count = le16_to_cpu(desc->auth_ext_count); > + int auth_desc_len; > + int err; > + > + err = do_parse_extensions(vi, &ext_hdr, end, auth_ext_count, true); > + if (err) > + return err; > + auth_desc_len = (void *)ext_hdr - (void *)desc; > + > + /* > + * Unauthenticated extensions (optional). Careful: an attacker able to > + * corrupt the file can change these arbitrarily without being detected. > + * Thus, only specific types of extensions are whitelisted here -- > + * namely, the ones containing a signature of the file measurement, > + * which by definition can't be included in the file measurement itself. > + */ > + if (end - (void *)ext_hdr >= 8) { > + u16 unauth_ext_count = le16_to_cpup((__le16 *)ext_hdr); > + > + ext_hdr = (void *)ext_hdr + 8; > + err = do_parse_extensions(vi, &ext_hdr, end, > + unauth_ext_count, false); > + if (err) > + return err; > + } > + > + return auth_desc_len; > +} > + > +/* > + * Parse an fs-verity descriptor, loading information into the fsverity_info. > + * > + * Return: On success, the size of the authenticated portion of the descriptor > + * (the fixed-size portion plus the authenticated extensions). > + * Otherwise, a -errno value. > + */ > +static int parse_fsverity_descriptor(struct fsverity_info *vi, > + const struct fsverity_descriptor *desc, > + int desc_len, loff_t desc_start) > +{ > + unsigned int alg_num; > + unsigned int hashes_per_block; > + u64 orig_file_size; > + int desc_auth_len; > + int err; > + > + BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(*desc) != 64); > + > + /* magic */ > + if (memcmp(desc->magic, FS_VERITY_MAGIC, sizeof(desc->magic))) { > + pr_warn("Wrong magic bytes\n"); > + return -EINVAL; > + } > + > + /* major_version */ > + if (desc->major_version != 1) { > + pr_warn("Unsupported major version (%u)\n", > + desc->major_version); > + return -EINVAL; > + } > + > + /* minor_version */ > + if (desc->minor_version != 0) { > + pr_warn("Unsupported minor version (%u)\n", > + desc->minor_version); > + return -EINVAL; > + } > + > + /* data_algorithm and tree_algorithm */ > + alg_num = le16_to_cpu(desc->data_algorithm); > + if (alg_num != le16_to_cpu(desc->tree_algorithm)) { > + pr_warn("Unimplemented case: data (%u) and tree (%u) hash algorithms differ\n", > + alg_num, le16_to_cpu(desc->tree_algorithm)); > + return -EINVAL; > + } > + vi->hash_alg = fsverity_get_hash_alg(alg_num); > + if (IS_ERR(vi->hash_alg)) > + return PTR_ERR(vi->hash_alg); > + > + /* log_data_blocksize and log_tree_blocksize */ > + if (desc->log_data_blocksize != PAGE_SHIFT) { > + pr_warn("Unsupported log_blocksize (%u). Need block_size == PAGE_SIZE.\n", > + desc->log_data_blocksize); > + return -EINVAL; > + } > + if (desc->log_tree_blocksize != desc->log_data_blocksize) { > + pr_warn("Unimplemented case: data (%u) and tree (%u) block sizes differ\n", > + desc->log_data_blocksize, desc->log_data_blocksize); > + return -EINVAL; > + } > + vi->block_bits = desc->log_data_blocksize; > + hashes_per_block = (1 << vi->block_bits) / vi->hash_alg->digest_size; > + if (!is_power_of_2(hashes_per_block)) { > + pr_warn("Unimplemented case: hashes per block (%u) isn't a power of 2\n", > + hashes_per_block); > + return -EINVAL; > + } > + vi->log_arity = ilog2(hashes_per_block); > + > + /* flags */ > + if (desc->flags) { > + pr_warn("Unsupported flags (%#x)\n", le32_to_cpu(desc->flags)); > + return -EINVAL; > + } > + > + /* reserved fields */ > + if (desc->reserved1 || > + memchr_inv(desc->reserved2, 0, sizeof(desc->reserved2))) { > + pr_warn("Reserved bits set in fsverity_descriptor\n"); > + return -EINVAL; > + } > + > + /* > + * orig_file_size. For filesystems that set the on-disk i_size to > + * data_i_size rather than to full_i_size, this field is redundant -- > + * though it still must be included in the file measurement! Make sure > + * it's really the same. > + */ > + orig_file_size = le64_to_cpu(desc->orig_file_size); > + if (vi->data_i_size) { > + if (orig_file_size != vi->data_i_size) { > + pr_warn("fsverity_descriptor.orig_file_size (%llu) doesn't match i_size (%llu)!\n", > + orig_file_size, vi->data_i_size); > + return -EINVAL; > + } > + } else { > + vi->data_i_size = orig_file_size; > + } > + if (vi->data_i_size == 0) { > + pr_warn("Original file size is 0; this is not supported\n"); > + return -EINVAL; > + } > + if (vi->data_i_size > desc_start) { > + pr_warn("Original file size is too large (%llu)\n", > + vi->data_i_size); > + return -EINVAL; > + } > + > + /* extensions */ > + desc_auth_len = parse_extensions(vi, desc, desc_len); > + if (desc_auth_len < 0) > + return desc_auth_len; > + > + if (!vi->have_root_hash) { > + pr_warn("Root hash wasn't found!\n"); > + return -EINVAL; > + } > + > + /* Use an empty salt if no salt was found in the extensions list */ > + if (!vi->hashstate) { > + err = set_salt(vi, "", 0); > + if (err) > + return err; > + } > + > + return desc_auth_len; > +} > + > +/* > + * Calculate the depth of the Merkle tree, then create a map from level to the > + * block offset at which that level's hash blocks start. Level 'depth - 1' is > + * the root and is stored first in the file, in the first block following the > + * original data. Level 0 is the level directly "above" the data blocks and is > + * stored last in the file, just before the fsverity_descriptor. > + */ > +static int compute_tree_depth_and_offsets(struct fsverity_info *vi) > +{ > + unsigned int hashes_per_block = 1 << vi->log_arity; > + u64 blocks = (vi->data_i_size + (1 << vi->block_bits) - 1) >> > + vi->block_bits; > + u64 offset = blocks; > + int depth = 0; > + int i; > + > + while (blocks > 1) { > + if (depth >= FS_VERITY_MAX_LEVELS) { > + pr_warn("Too many tree levels (max is %d)\n", > + FS_VERITY_MAX_LEVELS); > + return -EINVAL; > + } > + blocks = (blocks + hashes_per_block - 1) >> vi->log_arity; > + vi->hash_lvl_region_idx[depth++] = blocks; > + } > + vi->depth = depth; > + > + for (i = depth - 1; i >= 0; i--) { > + u64 next_count = vi->hash_lvl_region_idx[i]; > + > + vi->hash_lvl_region_idx[i] = offset; > + pr_debug("Level %d is [%llu..%llu] (%llu blocks)\n", > + i, offset, offset + next_count - 1, next_count); > + offset += next_count; > + } > + return 0; > +} > + > +/* Arbitrary limit, can be increased if needed */ > +#define MAX_DESCRIPTOR_PAGES 16 > + > +/* > + * Compute the file's measurement by hashing the first 'desc_auth_len' bytes of > + * the fs-verity descriptor (which includes the Merkle tree root hash as an > + * authenticated extension item). > + * > + * Note: 'desc' may point into vmap'ed memory, so it can't be passed directly to > + * sg_set_buf() for the ahash API. Instead, we pass the pages directly. > + */ > +static int compute_measurement(const struct fsverity_info *vi, > + const struct fsverity_descriptor *desc, > + int desc_auth_len, > + struct page *desc_pages[MAX_DESCRIPTOR_PAGES], > + int nr_desc_pages, u8 *measurement) > +{ > + struct ahash_request *req; > + DECLARE_CRYPTO_WAIT(wait); > + struct scatterlist sg[MAX_DESCRIPTOR_PAGES]; > + int offset, len, remaining; > + int i; > + int err; > + > + req = ahash_request_alloc(vi->hash_alg->tfm, GFP_KERNEL); > + if (!req) > + return -ENOMEM; > + > + sg_init_table(sg, nr_desc_pages); > + offset = offset_in_page(desc); > + remaining = desc_auth_len; > + for (i = 0; i < nr_desc_pages && remaining; i++) { > + len = min_t(int, PAGE_SIZE - offset, remaining); > + sg_set_page(&sg[i], desc_pages[i], len, offset); > + remaining -= len; > + offset = 0; > + } > + > + ahash_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP | > + CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG, > + crypto_req_done, &wait); > + ahash_request_set_crypt(req, sg, measurement, desc_auth_len); > + err = crypto_wait_req(crypto_ahash_digest(req), &wait); > + ahash_request_free(req); > + return err; > +} > + > +static struct fsverity_info *alloc_fsverity_info(void) > +{ > + return kmem_cache_zalloc(fsverity_info_cachep, GFP_NOFS); > +} > + > +void free_fsverity_info(struct fsverity_info *vi) > +{ > + if (!vi) > + return; > + kfree(vi->hashstate); > + kmem_cache_free(fsverity_info_cachep, vi); > +} > + > +/** > + * find_fsverity_footer - find the fsverity_footer in the last page of the file > + * > + * To find the fsverity_footer we have to scan backwards from the end, skipping > + * zero bytes. This is needed because some filesystems (e.g. ext4) set the > + * on-disk i_size to data_i_size rather than to full_i_size, and full_i_size is > + * instead gotten indirectly via the end of the last extent. This causes > + * full_i_size to be rounded up to the end of the filesystem block. > + * > + * Return: pointer to the footer if found, else NULL > + */ > +static const struct fsverity_footer * > +find_fsverity_footer(const u8 *last_virt, size_t last_validsize) > +{ > + const u8 *p = last_virt + last_validsize; > + const struct fsverity_footer *ftr; > + > + /* Find the last nonzero byte, which should be ftr->magic[7] */ > + do { > + if (p <= last_virt) > + return NULL; > + } while (*--p == 0); > + > + BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(ftr->magic) != 8); > + BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(struct fsverity_footer, magic[8]) != > + sizeof(*ftr)); > + if (p - last_virt < offsetof(struct fsverity_footer, magic[7])) > + return NULL; > + ftr = container_of(p, struct fsverity_footer, magic[7]); > + if (memcmp(ftr->magic, FS_VERITY_MAGIC, sizeof(ftr->magic))) > + return NULL; > + return ftr; > +} > + > +/** > + * map_fsverity_descriptor - map an inode's fs-verity descriptor into memory > + * > + * If the descriptor fits in one page, we use kmap; otherwise we use vmap. > + * unmap_fsverity_descriptor() must be called later to unmap it. > + * > + * It's assumed that the file contents cannot be modified concurrently. > + * (This is guaranteed by either deny_write_access() or by the verity bit.) > + * > + * Return: the virtual address of the start of the descriptor, in virtually > + * contiguous memory. Also fills in desc_pages and returns in *desc_len the > + * length of the descriptor including all extensions, and in *desc_start the > + * offset of the descriptor from the start of the file, in bytes. > + */ > +static const struct fsverity_descriptor * > +map_fsverity_descriptor(struct inode *inode, loff_t full_i_size, > + struct page *desc_pages[MAX_DESCRIPTOR_PAGES], > + int *nr_desc_pages, int *desc_len, loff_t *desc_start) > +{ > + const int last_validsize = ((full_i_size - 1) & ~PAGE_MASK) + 1; > + const pgoff_t last_pgoff = (full_i_size - 1) >> PAGE_SHIFT; > + struct page *last_page; > + const void *last_virt; > + const struct fsverity_footer *ftr; > + pgoff_t first_pgoff; > + u32 desc_reverse_offset; > + pgoff_t pgoff; > + const void *desc_virt; > + int i; > + int err; > + > + *nr_desc_pages = 0; > + *desc_len = 0; > + *desc_start = 0; > + > + if (full_i_size <= 0) { > + pr_warn("File is empty!\n"); > + return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); > + } > + > + last_page = read_mapping_page(inode->i_mapping, last_pgoff, NULL); > + if (IS_ERR(last_page)) { > + pr_warn("Error reading last page: %ld\n", PTR_ERR(last_page)); > + return ERR_CAST(last_page); > + } > + last_virt = kmap(last_page); > + > + ftr = find_fsverity_footer(last_virt, last_validsize); > + if (!ftr) { > + pr_warn("No verity metadata found\n"); > + err = -EINVAL; > + goto err_out; > + } > + full_i_size -= (last_virt + last_validsize - sizeof(*ftr)) - > + (void *)ftr; > + > + desc_reverse_offset = le32_to_cpu(ftr->desc_reverse_offset); > + if (desc_reverse_offset < > + sizeof(struct fsverity_descriptor) + sizeof(*ftr) || > + desc_reverse_offset > full_i_size) { > + pr_warn("Unexpected desc_reverse_offset: %u\n", > + desc_reverse_offset); > + err = -EINVAL; > + goto err_out; > + } > + *desc_start = full_i_size - desc_reverse_offset; > + if (*desc_start & 7) { > + pr_warn("fs-verity descriptor is misaligned (desc_start=%lld)\n", > + *desc_start); > + err = -EINVAL; > + goto err_out; > + } > + > + first_pgoff = *desc_start >> PAGE_SHIFT; > + if (last_pgoff - first_pgoff >= MAX_DESCRIPTOR_PAGES) { > + pr_warn("fs-verity descriptor is too long (%lu pages)\n", > + last_pgoff - first_pgoff + 1); > + err = -EINVAL; > + goto err_out; > + } > + > + *desc_len = desc_reverse_offset - sizeof(__le32); > + > + if (first_pgoff == last_pgoff) { > + /* Single-page descriptor; use the already-kmapped last page */ > + desc_pages[0] = last_page; > + *nr_desc_pages = 1; > + return last_virt + (*desc_start & ~PAGE_MASK); > + } > + > + /* Multi-page descriptor; map the additional pages into memory */ > + > + for (pgoff = first_pgoff; pgoff < last_pgoff; pgoff++) { > + struct page *page; > + > + page = read_mapping_page(inode->i_mapping, pgoff, NULL); > + if (IS_ERR(page)) { > + err = PTR_ERR(page); > + pr_warn("Error reading descriptor page: %d\n", err); > + goto err_out; > + } > + desc_pages[(*nr_desc_pages)++] = page; > + } > + > + desc_pages[(*nr_desc_pages)++] = last_page; > + kunmap(last_page); > + last_page = NULL; > + > + desc_virt = vmap(desc_pages, *nr_desc_pages, VM_MAP, PAGE_KERNEL_RO); > + if (!desc_virt) { > + err = -ENOMEM; > + goto err_out; > + } > + > + return desc_virt + (*desc_start & ~PAGE_MASK); > + > +err_out: > + for (i = 0; i < *nr_desc_pages; i++) > + put_page(desc_pages[i]); > + if (last_page) { > + kunmap(last_page); > + put_page(last_page); > + } > + return ERR_PTR(err); > +} > + > +static void > +unmap_fsverity_descriptor(const struct fsverity_descriptor *desc, > + struct page *desc_pages[MAX_DESCRIPTOR_PAGES], > + int nr_desc_pages) > +{ > + int i; > + > + if (is_vmalloc_addr(desc)) { > + vunmap((void *)((unsigned long)desc & PAGE_MASK)); > + } else { > + WARN_ON(nr_desc_pages != 1); > + kunmap(desc_pages[0]); > + } > + for (i = 0; i < nr_desc_pages; i++) > + put_page(desc_pages[i]); > +} > + > +/* > + * Read the file's fs-verity descriptor and create an fsverity_info for it. > + */ > +struct fsverity_info *create_fsverity_info(struct inode *inode, bool enabling) > +{ > + loff_t full_i_size; > + struct fsverity_info *vi; > + const struct fsverity_descriptor *desc = NULL; > + struct page *desc_pages[MAX_DESCRIPTOR_PAGES]; > + int nr_desc_pages; > + int desc_len; > + loff_t desc_start; > + int desc_auth_len; > + int err; > + > + vi = alloc_fsverity_info(); > + if (!vi) > + return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); > + > + full_i_size = i_size_read(inode); > + > + if (inode->i_sb->s_vop->get_full_i_size && !enabling) { > + /* > + * For filesystems that set the on-disk i_size to data_i_size > + * rather than to full_i_size, we have to get full_i_size from > + * somewhere else, e.g. the end of the last extent. > + */ > + vi->data_i_size = full_i_size; > + err = inode->i_sb->s_vop->get_full_i_size(inode, &full_i_size); > + if (err) > + goto out; > + } > + vi->full_i_size = full_i_size; > + pr_debug("full_i_size=%lld\n", full_i_size); > + > + desc = map_fsverity_descriptor(inode, full_i_size, desc_pages, > + &nr_desc_pages, &desc_len, &desc_start); > + if (IS_ERR(desc)) { > + err = PTR_ERR(desc); > + desc = NULL; > + goto out; > + } > + > + dump_fsverity_descriptor(desc); > + desc_auth_len = parse_fsverity_descriptor(vi, desc, desc_len, > + desc_start); > + if (desc_auth_len < 0) { > + err = desc_auth_len; > + goto out; > + } > + > + err = compute_tree_depth_and_offsets(vi); > + if (err) > + goto out; > + err = compute_measurement(vi, desc, desc_auth_len, desc_pages, > + nr_desc_pages, vi->measurement); > +out: > + if (desc) > + unmap_fsverity_descriptor(desc, desc_pages, nr_desc_pages); > + if (err) { > + free_fsverity_info(vi); > + vi = ERR_PTR(err); > + } > + return vi; > +} > + > +/* Ensure the inode has an ->i_verity_info */ > +static int setup_fsverity_info(struct inode *inode) > +{ > + struct fsverity_info *vi = get_fsverity_info(inode); > + > + if (vi) > + return 0; > + > + vi = create_fsverity_info(inode, false); > + if (IS_ERR(vi)) > + return PTR_ERR(vi); > + > + if (!set_fsverity_info(inode, vi)) > + free_fsverity_info(vi); > + return 0; > +} > + > +/** > + * fsverity_file_open - prepare to open a verity file > + * @inode: the inode being opened > + * @filp: the struct file being set up > + * > + * When opening a verity file, deny the open if it is for writing. Otherwise, > + * set up the inode's ->i_verity_info (if not already done) by parsing the > + * verity metadata at the end of the file. > + * > + * When combined with fscrypt, this must be called after fscrypt_file_open(). > + * Otherwise, we won't have the key set up to decrypt the verity metadata. > + * > + * Return: 0 on success, -errno on failure > + */ > +int fsverity_file_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp) > +{ > + if (filp->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) { > + pr_debug("Denying opening verity file (ino %lu) for write\n", > + inode->i_ino); > + return -EPERM; > + } > + > + return setup_fsverity_info(inode); > +} > +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fsverity_file_open); > + > +/** > + * fsverity_prepare_setattr - prepare to change a verity inode's attributes > + * @dentry: dentry through which the inode is being changed > + * @attr: attributes to change > + * > + * Verity files are immutable, so deny truncates. This isn't covered by the > + * open-time check because sys_truncate() takes a path, not a file descriptor. > + * > + * Return: 0 on success, -errno on failure > + */ > +int fsverity_prepare_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr) > +{ > + if (attr->ia_valid & ATTR_SIZE) { > + pr_debug("Denying truncate of verity file (ino %lu)\n", > + d_inode(dentry)->i_ino); > + return -EPERM; > + } > + return 0; > +} > +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fsverity_prepare_setattr); > + > +/** > + * fsverity_prepare_getattr - prepare to get a verity inode's attributes > + * @inode: the inode for which the attributes are being retrieved > + * > + * For filesystems that set the on-disk i_size to full_i_size rather than to > + * data_i_size, to make st_size exclude the verity metadata even before the file > + * has been opened for the first time we need to grab the original data size > + * from the fs-verity descriptor. Currently, to implement this we just set up > + * the ->i_verity_info, like in the ->open() hook. > + * > + * However, when combined with fscrypt, on an encrypted file this must only be > + * called if the encryption key has been set up! > + * > + * Return: 0 on success, -errno on failure > + */ > +int fsverity_prepare_getattr(struct inode *inode) > +{ > + return setup_fsverity_info(inode); > +} > +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fsverity_prepare_getattr); > + > +/** > + * fsverity_cleanup_inode - free the inode's verity info, if present > + * > + * Filesystems must call this on inode eviction to free ->i_verity_info. > + */ > +void fsverity_cleanup_inode(struct inode *inode) > +{ > + free_fsverity_info(inode->i_verity_info); > + inode->i_verity_info = NULL; > +} > +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fsverity_cleanup_inode); > + > +/** > + * fsverity_full_i_size - get the full (on-disk) file size > + * > + * If the inode has had its in-memory ->i_size overridden for fs-verity (to > + * exclude the metadata at the end of the file), then return the full i_size > + * which is stored on-disk. Otherwise, just return the in-memory ->i_size. > + * > + * Return: the full (on-disk) file size > + */ > +loff_t fsverity_full_i_size(const struct inode *inode) > +{ > + struct fsverity_info *vi = get_fsverity_info(inode); > + > + if (vi) > + return vi->full_i_size; > + > + return i_size_read(inode); > +} > +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fsverity_full_i_size); > + > +static int __init fsverity_module_init(void) > +{ > + fsverity_info_cachep = KMEM_CACHE(fsverity_info, SLAB_RECLAIM_ACCOUNT); > + if (!fsverity_info_cachep) > + return -ENOMEM; > + > + fsverity_check_hash_algs(); > + > + pr_debug("Initialized fs-verity\n"); > + return 0; > +} > + > +static void __exit fsverity_module_exit(void) > +{ > + kmem_cache_destroy(fsverity_info_cachep); > + fsverity_exit_hash_algs(); > +} > + > +module_init(fsverity_module_init) > +module_exit(fsverity_module_exit); > +MODULE_LICENSE("GPL v2"); > +MODULE_DESCRIPTION("fs-verity: read-only file-based integrity/authentication"); > diff --git a/include/linux/fs.h b/include/linux/fs.h > index 805bf22898cf2..26764ebcb7724 100644 > --- a/include/linux/fs.h > +++ b/include/linux/fs.h > @@ -61,6 +61,8 @@ struct workqueue_struct; > struct iov_iter; > struct fscrypt_info; > struct fscrypt_operations; > +struct fsverity_info; > +struct fsverity_operations; > > extern void __init inode_init(void); > extern void __init inode_init_early(void); > @@ -671,6 +673,10 @@ struct inode { > struct fscrypt_info *i_crypt_info; > #endif > > +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_FS_VERITY) > + struct fsverity_info *i_verity_info; > +#endif > + > void *i_private; /* fs or device private pointer */ > } __randomize_layout; > > @@ -1369,6 +1375,9 @@ struct super_block { > const struct xattr_handler **s_xattr; > #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION) > const struct fscrypt_operations *s_cop; > +#endif > +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_FS_VERITY) > + const struct fsverity_operations *s_vop; > #endif > struct hlist_bl_head s_roots; /* alternate root dentries for NFS */ > struct list_head s_mounts; /* list of mounts; _not_ for fs use */ > diff --git a/include/linux/fsverity.h b/include/linux/fsverity.h > new file mode 100644 > index 0000000000000..3af55241046aa > --- /dev/null > +++ b/include/linux/fsverity.h > @@ -0,0 +1,62 @@ > +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ > +/* > + * fs-verity: read-only file-based integrity/authentication > + * > + * Copyright (C) 2018 Google, Inc. > + */ > + > +#ifndef _LINUX_FSVERITY_H > +#define _LINUX_FSVERITY_H > + > +#include <linux/fs.h> > +#include <uapi/linux/fsverity.h> > + > +/* > + * fs-verity operations for filesystems > + */ > +struct fsverity_operations { > + int (*set_verity)(struct inode *inode, loff_t data_i_size); > + int (*get_full_i_size)(struct inode *inode, loff_t *full_i_size_ret); > +}; > + > +#if __FS_HAS_VERITY > + > +/* setup.c */ > +extern int fsverity_file_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp); > +extern int fsverity_prepare_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr); > +extern int fsverity_prepare_getattr(struct inode *inode); > +extern void fsverity_cleanup_inode(struct inode *inode); > +extern loff_t fsverity_full_i_size(const struct inode *inode); > + > +#else /* !__FS_HAS_VERITY */ > + > +/* setup.c */ > + > +static inline int fsverity_file_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp) > +{ > + return -EOPNOTSUPP; > +} > + > +static inline int fsverity_prepare_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, > + struct iattr *attr) > +{ > + return -EOPNOTSUPP; > +} > + > +static inline int fsverity_prepare_getattr(struct inode *inode) > +{ > + return -EOPNOTSUPP; > +} > + > +static inline void fsverity_cleanup_inode(struct inode *inode) > +{ > +} > + > +static inline loff_t fsverity_full_i_size(const struct inode *inode) > +{ > + return i_size_read(inode); > +} > + > +#endif /* !__FS_HAS_VERITY */ > + > +#endif /* _LINUX_FSVERITY_H */ > diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/fsverity.h b/include/uapi/linux/fsverity.h > new file mode 100644 > index 0000000000000..24ebb8b6ea0d4 > --- /dev/null > +++ b/include/uapi/linux/fsverity.h > @@ -0,0 +1,86 @@ > +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note */ > +/* > + * fs-verity (file-based verity) support > + * > + * Copyright (C) 2018 Google LLC > + */ > +#ifndef _UAPI_LINUX_FSVERITY_H > +#define _UAPI_LINUX_FSVERITY_H > + > +#include <linux/limits.h> > +#include <linux/ioctl.h> > +#include <linux/types.h> > + > +/* ========== Ioctls ========== */ > + > +struct fsverity_digest { > + __u16 digest_algorithm; > + __u16 digest_size; /* input/output */ > + __u8 digest[]; > +}; > + > +#define FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY _IO('f', 133) > +#define FS_IOC_MEASURE_VERITY _IOWR('f', 134, struct fsverity_digest) > + > +/* ========== On-disk format ========== */ > + > +#define FS_VERITY_MAGIC "FSVerity" > + > +/* Supported hash algorithms */ > +#define FS_VERITY_ALG_SHA256 1 > + > +/* Metadata stored near the end of verity files, after the Merkle tree */ > +/* This structure is 64 bytes long */ > +struct fsverity_descriptor { > + __u8 magic[8]; /* must be FS_VERITY_MAGIC */ > + __u8 major_version; /* must be 1 */ > + __u8 minor_version; /* must be 0 */ > + __u8 log_data_blocksize;/* log2(data-bytes-per-hash), e.g. 12 for 4KB */ > + __u8 log_tree_blocksize;/* log2(tree-bytes-per-hash), e.g. 12 for 4KB */ > + __le16 data_algorithm; /* hash algorithm for data blocks */ > + __le16 tree_algorithm; /* hash algorithm for tree blocks */ > + __le32 flags; /* flags */ > + __le32 reserved1; /* must be 0 */ > + __le64 orig_file_size; /* size of the original, unpadded data */ > + __le16 auth_ext_count; /* number of authenticated extensions */ > + __u8 reserved2[30]; /* must be 0 */ > +}; > +/* followed by list of 'auth_ext_count' authenticated extensions */ > +/* > + * then followed by '__le16 unauth_ext_count' padded to next 8-byte boundary, > + * then a list of 'unauth_ext_count' (may be 0) unauthenticated extensions > + */ > + > +/* Extension types */ > +#define FS_VERITY_EXT_ROOT_HASH 1 > +#define FS_VERITY_EXT_SALT 2 > + > +/* Header of each extension (variable-length metadata item) */ > +struct fsverity_extension { > + /* > + * Length in bytes, including this header but excluding padding to next > + * 8-byte boundary that is applied when advancing to the next extension. > + */ > + __le32 length; > + __le16 type; /* Type of this extension (see codes above) */ > + __le16 reserved; /* Reserved, must be 0 */ > +}; > +/* followed by the payload of 'length - 8' bytes */ > + > +/* Extension payload formats */ > + > +/* > + * FS_VERITY_EXT_ROOT_HASH payload is just a byte array, with size equal to the > + * digest size of the hash algorithm given in the fsverity_descriptor > + */ > + > +/* FS_VERITY_EXT_SALT payload is just a byte array, any size */ > + > + > +/* Fields stored at the very end of the file */ > +struct fsverity_footer { > + __le32 desc_reverse_offset; /* distance to fsverity_descriptor */ > + __u8 magic[8]; /* FS_VERITY_MAGIC */ > +} __packed; > + > +#endif /* _UAPI_LINUX_FSVERITY_H */ > -- > 2.18.0 > -- Chuck Lever chucklever@gmail.com
Hi Chuck, On Sun, Aug 26, 2018 at 12:22:08PM -0400, Chuck Lever wrote: > Hi Eric- > > Context: I'm working on IMA support for NFSv4, and would like to > use fs-verity (or some Merkle tree-like mechanism) eventually to > help address the performance impacts of using IMA with large NFS > files. > > > > On Aug 24, 2018, at 12:16 PM, Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org> wrote: > > > > From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> > > > > fs-verity is a filesystem feature that provides efficient, transparent > > integrity verification and authentication of read-only files. It uses a > > dm-verity like mechanism at the file level: a Merkle tree hidden past > > the end of the file is used to verify any block in the file in > > log(filesize) time. It is implemented mainly by helper functions in > > fs/verity/ that will be shared by multiple filesystems. > > This description suggests that the only way fs-verity can work is > by placing the Merkle tree data after EOF. Further, this organi- > zation is exposed to user space, making it a fixed part of the > fs-verity kernel/user space API. > > Remote filesystems -- esp. NFS -- would prefer to manage the Merkle > tree data in other ways. The NFSv4 protocol, for example, supports > named streams (as some other filesystems do), and could store the > Merkle trees in those. Or, a new pNFS layout type could be con- > structed where Merkle trees are stored separately from a file's > content -- perhaps even on a separate file server. > > File servers can store this data as the servers' local filesystems > require. > > Sharing how the Merkle tree is created and used is sensible, but > IMHO the filesystem implementations should be allowed to store this > tree however they find convenient. The Merkle trees should be > exposed via a clean API, not as part of the file's content. > There has also been discussion with this on the thread for patch 02/10. "A Merkle tree hidden past the end of the file" describes how ext4 and f2fs are proposed to implement it, and it describes the file format expected by FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY. But, at FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY time, a filesystem could copy the verity metadata to somewhere else if it wanted, e.g. into a file stream, and then truncate the file to its original size. Afterwards, fs-verity doesn't really care where the metadata is stored. Currently it does actually assume it's beyond EOF since it calls read_mapping_page() directly, but that could be replaced at any time with indirection via a method fsverity_operations.read_metadata_page(). We actually had such a method originally, but it turned out to be unnecessary for ext4 and f2fs, so I had dropped it for now. I will make this clearer in the next revision of the patchset, and maybe even consider reintroducing ->read_metadata_page() to make it clear that filesystems don't necessarily have to store the metadata beyond EOF. Thanks, - Eric
On Sat, Aug 25, 2018, at 12:48 AM, Eric Biggers wrote: > > As Ted pointed out, only truncates are denied on fs-verity files, not other > metadata changes like chmod(). > > Think of it this way: the purpose of fs-verity is *not* to make files immutable. > It's to hash them. Sorry for my unfamiliarity with Android internals but - in earlier discussion I believe it was mentioned that APK (zip files?) that are being targeted here, right? Now AIUI, Zip files have an internal header that contains e.g. the size and indexes into the internal files. So if someone added random data to the end of a zip file, nothing is going to end up actually reading it. However, there are file formats that use the size of the file reported by stat(); at least OSTree does this with serializing GVariant. I'm sure there are others - I'd imagine at least some things parsing ELF do this? In such a case, we really want to deny appending to the file as well. Unless there's some mechanism to deny applications reading not-verified data? And "hidden" data after fs-verity protected files would be a nice place for persistent malware to hide. Does anyone know of a use case for appending to a fs-verity file? The slides here: https://events.linuxfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/fs-verify_Mike-Halcrow_Eric-Biggers.pdf even say "File becomes read-only!" If not, then here's a strawman: Require that at FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY time the file does not have any +w bits set (and I guess no ACLs that do so... that may get ugly). I think that would make it easier to later factor out a "_CONTENTS_IMMUTABLE" flag.
Hi Colin, On Fri, Sep 14, 2018 at 09:15:30AM -0400, Colin Walters wrote: > On Sat, Aug 25, 2018, at 12:48 AM, Eric Biggers wrote: > > > > As Ted pointed out, only truncates are denied on fs-verity files, not other > > metadata changes like chmod(). > > > > Think of it this way: the purpose of fs-verity is *not* to make files immutable. > > It's to hash them. > > Sorry for my unfamiliarity with Android internals but - in earlier discussion > I believe it was mentioned that APK (zip files?) that are being targeted here, right? > > Now AIUI, Zip files have an internal header that contains e.g. the size and > indexes into the internal files. So if someone added random data to the end > of a zip file, nothing is going to end up actually reading it. > > However, there are file formats that use the size of the file reported by stat(); > at least OSTree does this with serializing GVariant. I'm sure there are others - > I'd imagine at least some things parsing ELF do this? > In such a case, we really want to deny appending to the file as well. > > Unless there's some mechanism to deny applications reading not-verified > data? > > And "hidden" data after fs-verity protected files would be a nice place > for persistent malware to hide. > > Does anyone know of a use case for appending to a fs-verity file? > > The slides here: > https://events.linuxfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/fs-verify_Mike-Halcrow_Eric-Biggers.pdf > even say "File becomes read-only!" > > If not, then here's a strawman: Require that at FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY time > the file does not have any +w bits set (and I guess no ACLs that do so... > that may get ugly). > > I think that would make it easier to later factor out a "_CONTENTS_IMMUTABLE" > flag. > After the verity bit is enabled, the verity metadata is not visible to userspace. Yes, that means i_size is adjusted too. Also all contents modifications are denied, including appends. - Eric
On Fri, Sep 14, 2018 at 09:21:43AM -0700, Eric Biggers wrote: > > > > Now AIUI, Zip files have an internal header that contains e.g. the size and > > indexes into the internal files. So if someone added random data to the end > > of a zip file, nothing is going to end up actually reading it. > > After the verity bit is enabled, the verity metadata is not visible to > userspace. Yes, that means i_size is adjusted too. Also all contents > modifications are denied, including appends. One of this reasons why this is important is that ZIP files *also* have an central directory at the end. And in the case of the APK files, there is an in-band signature block which is located at at the end of the last file and the central directory, which can be located by starting at the end of the file, finding the length of the central directory, and then backing up to find the signature block. - Ted
diff --git a/fs/Kconfig b/fs/Kconfig index ac474a61be379..ddadc4e999429 100644 --- a/fs/Kconfig +++ b/fs/Kconfig @@ -105,6 +105,8 @@ config MANDATORY_FILE_LOCKING source "fs/crypto/Kconfig" +source "fs/verity/Kconfig" + source "fs/notify/Kconfig" source "fs/quota/Kconfig" diff --git a/fs/Makefile b/fs/Makefile index 293733f61594b..10b37f651ffde 100644 --- a/fs/Makefile +++ b/fs/Makefile @@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_USERFAULTFD) += userfaultfd.o obj-$(CONFIG_AIO) += aio.o obj-$(CONFIG_FS_DAX) += dax.o obj-$(CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION) += crypto/ +obj-$(CONFIG_FS_VERITY) += verity/ obj-$(CONFIG_FILE_LOCKING) += locks.o obj-$(CONFIG_COMPAT) += compat.o compat_ioctl.o obj-$(CONFIG_BINFMT_AOUT) += binfmt_aout.o diff --git a/fs/verity/Kconfig b/fs/verity/Kconfig new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000..308d733a9401b --- /dev/null +++ b/fs/verity/Kconfig @@ -0,0 +1,36 @@ +config FS_VERITY + tristate "FS Verity (file-based integrity/authentication)" + depends on BLOCK + select CRYPTO + # SHA-256 is selected as it's intended to be the default hash algorithm. + # To avoid bloat, other wanted algorithms must be selected explicitly. + select CRYPTO_SHA256 + help + This option enables fs-verity. fs-verity is the dm-verity + mechanism implemented at the file level. On supported + filesystems, userspace can append a Merkle tree (hash tree) to + a file, then enable fs-verity on the file. The filesystem + will then transparently verify any data read from the file + against the Merkle tree. The file is also made read-only. + + This serves as an integrity check, but the availability of the + Merkle tree root hash also allows efficiently supporting + various use cases where normally the whole file would need to + be hashed at once, such as: (a) auditing (logging the file's + hash), or (b) authenticity verification (comparing the hash + against a known good value, e.g. from a digital signature). + + fs-verity is especially useful on large files where not all + the contents may actually be needed. Also, fs-verity verifies + data each time it is paged back in, which provides better + protection against malicious disks vs. an ahead-of-time hash. + + If unsure, say N. + +config FS_VERITY_DEBUG + bool "FS Verity debugging" + depends on FS_VERITY + help + Enable debugging messages related to fs-verity by default. + + Say N unless you are an fs-verity developer. diff --git a/fs/verity/Makefile b/fs/verity/Makefile new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000..39e123805c827 --- /dev/null +++ b/fs/verity/Makefile @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +obj-$(CONFIG_FS_VERITY) += fsverity.o + +fsverity-y := hash_algs.o setup.o diff --git a/fs/verity/fsverity_private.h b/fs/verity/fsverity_private.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000..a18ff645695f4 --- /dev/null +++ b/fs/verity/fsverity_private.h @@ -0,0 +1,99 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +/* + * fs-verity: read-only file-based integrity/authentication + * + * Copyright (C) 2018 Google LLC + */ + +#ifndef _FSVERITY_PRIVATE_H +#define _FSVERITY_PRIVATE_H + +#ifdef CONFIG_FS_VERITY_DEBUG +#define DEBUG +#endif + +#define pr_fmt(fmt) "fs-verity: " fmt + +#include <crypto/sha.h> +#define __FS_HAS_VERITY 1 +#include <linux/fsverity.h> + +/* + * Maximum depth of the Merkle tree. Up to 64 levels are theoretically possible + * with a very small block size, but we'd like to limit stack usage during + * verification, and in practice this is plenty. E.g., with SHA-256 and 4K + * blocks, a file with size UINT64_MAX bytes needs just 8 levels. + */ +#define FS_VERITY_MAX_LEVELS 16 + +/* + * Largest digest size among all hash algorithms supported by fs-verity. This + * can be increased if needed. + */ +#define FS_VERITY_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE + +/* A hash algorithm supported by fs-verity */ +struct fsverity_hash_alg { + struct crypto_ahash *tfm; /* allocated on demand */ + const char *name; + unsigned int digest_size; + bool cryptographic; +}; + +/** + * fsverity_info - cached verity metadata for an inode + * + * When a verity file is first opened, an instance of this struct is allocated + * and stored in ->i_verity_info. It caches various values from the verity + * metadata, such as the tree topology and the root hash, which are needed to + * efficiently verify data read from the file. Once created, it remains until + * the inode is evicted. + * + * (The tree pages themselves are not cached here, though they may be cached in + * the inode's page cache.) + */ +struct fsverity_info { + const struct fsverity_hash_alg *hash_alg; /* hash algorithm */ + u8 block_bits; /* log2(block size) */ + u8 log_arity; /* log2(hashes per hash block) */ + u8 depth; /* depth of the Merkle tree */ + u8 *hashstate; /* salted initial hash state */ + u64 data_i_size; /* original file size */ + u64 full_i_size; /* full file size including metadata */ + u8 root_hash[FS_VERITY_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE]; /* Merkle tree root hash */ + u8 measurement[FS_VERITY_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE]; /* file measurement */ + bool have_root_hash; /* have root hash from disk? */ + + /* Starting blocks for each tree level. 'depth-1' is the root level. */ + u64 hash_lvl_region_idx[FS_VERITY_MAX_LEVELS]; +}; + +/* hash_algs.c */ +extern struct fsverity_hash_alg fsverity_hash_algs[]; +const struct fsverity_hash_alg *fsverity_get_hash_alg(unsigned int num); +void __init fsverity_check_hash_algs(void); +void __exit fsverity_exit_hash_algs(void); + +/* setup.c */ +struct fsverity_info *create_fsverity_info(struct inode *inode, bool enabling); +void free_fsverity_info(struct fsverity_info *vi); + +static inline struct fsverity_info *get_fsverity_info(const struct inode *inode) +{ + /* pairs with cmpxchg_release() in set_fsverity_info() */ + return smp_load_acquire(&inode->i_verity_info); +} + +static inline bool set_fsverity_info(struct inode *inode, + struct fsverity_info *vi) +{ + /* pairs with smp_load_acquire() in get_fsverity_info() */ + if (cmpxchg_release(&inode->i_verity_info, NULL, vi) != NULL) + return false; + + /* Set the in-memory i_size to the data size */ + i_size_write(inode, vi->data_i_size); + return true; +} + +#endif /* _FSVERITY_PRIVATE_H */ diff --git a/fs/verity/hash_algs.c b/fs/verity/hash_algs.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000..424a26ee2f3c2 --- /dev/null +++ b/fs/verity/hash_algs.c @@ -0,0 +1,106 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * fs/verity/hash_algs.c: fs-verity hash algorithm management + * + * Copyright (C) 2018 Google LLC + * + * Written by Eric Biggers. + */ + +#include "fsverity_private.h" + +#include <crypto/hash.h> + +/* The list of hash algorithms supported by fs-verity */ +struct fsverity_hash_alg fsverity_hash_algs[] = { + [FS_VERITY_ALG_SHA256] = { + .name = "sha256", + .digest_size = 32, + .cryptographic = true, + }, +}; + +/* + * Translate the given fs-verity hash algorithm number into a struct describing + * the algorithm, and ensure it has a hash transform ready to go. The hash + * transforms are allocated on-demand firstly to not waste resources when they + * aren't needed, and secondly because the fs-verity module may be loaded + * earlier than the needed crypto modules. + */ +const struct fsverity_hash_alg *fsverity_get_hash_alg(unsigned int num) +{ + struct fsverity_hash_alg *alg; + struct crypto_ahash *tfm; + int err; + + if (num >= ARRAY_SIZE(fsverity_hash_algs) || + !fsverity_hash_algs[num].digest_size) { + pr_warn("Unknown hash algorithm: %u\n", num); + return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); + } + alg = &fsverity_hash_algs[num]; +retry: + /* pairs with cmpxchg_release() below */ + tfm = smp_load_acquire(&alg->tfm); + if (tfm) + return alg; + /* + * Using the shash API would make things a bit simpler, but the ahash + * API is preferable as it allows the use of crypto accelerators. + */ + tfm = crypto_alloc_ahash(alg->name, 0, 0); + if (IS_ERR(tfm)) { + if (PTR_ERR(tfm) == -ENOENT) + pr_warn("Algorithm %u (%s) is unavailable\n", + num, alg->name); + else + pr_warn("Error allocating algorithm %u (%s): %ld\n", + num, alg->name, PTR_ERR(tfm)); + return ERR_CAST(tfm); + } + + err = -EINVAL; + if (WARN_ON(alg->digest_size != crypto_ahash_digestsize(tfm))) + goto err_free_tfm; + + pr_info("%s using implementation \"%s\"\n", alg->name, + crypto_hash_alg_common(tfm)->base.cra_driver_name); + + /* pairs with smp_load_acquire() above */ + if (cmpxchg_release(&alg->tfm, NULL, tfm) != NULL) { + crypto_free_ahash(tfm); + goto retry; + } + + return alg; + +err_free_tfm: + crypto_free_ahash(tfm); + return ERR_PTR(err); +} + +void __init fsverity_check_hash_algs(void) +{ + int i; + + /* + * Sanity check the digest sizes (could be a build-time check, but + * they're in an array) + */ + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(fsverity_hash_algs); i++) { + struct fsverity_hash_alg *alg = &fsverity_hash_algs[i]; + + if (!alg->digest_size) + continue; + BUG_ON(alg->digest_size > FS_VERITY_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE); + BUG_ON(!is_power_of_2(alg->digest_size)); + } +} + +void __exit fsverity_exit_hash_algs(void) +{ + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(fsverity_hash_algs); i++) + crypto_free_ahash(fsverity_hash_algs[i].tfm); +} diff --git a/fs/verity/setup.c b/fs/verity/setup.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000..e675c52898d5b --- /dev/null +++ b/fs/verity/setup.c @@ -0,0 +1,846 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * fs/verity/setup.c: fs-verity module initialization and descriptor parsing + * + * Copyright (C) 2018 Google LLC + * + * Originally written by Jaegeuk Kim and Michael Halcrow; + * heavily rewritten by Eric Biggers. + */ + +#include "fsverity_private.h" + +#include <crypto/hash.h> +#include <linux/highmem.h> +#include <linux/list_sort.h> +#include <linux/module.h> +#include <linux/pagemap.h> +#include <linux/scatterlist.h> +#include <linux/vmalloc.h> + +static struct kmem_cache *fsverity_info_cachep; + +static void dump_fsverity_descriptor(const struct fsverity_descriptor *desc) +{ + pr_debug("magic = %.*s\n", (int)sizeof(desc->magic), desc->magic); + pr_debug("major_version = %u\n", desc->major_version); + pr_debug("minor_version = %u\n", desc->minor_version); + pr_debug("log_data_blocksize = %u\n", desc->log_data_blocksize); + pr_debug("log_tree_blocksize = %u\n", desc->log_tree_blocksize); + pr_debug("data_algorithm = %u\n", le16_to_cpu(desc->data_algorithm)); + pr_debug("tree_algorithm = %u\n", le16_to_cpu(desc->tree_algorithm)); + pr_debug("flags = %#x\n", le32_to_cpu(desc->flags)); + pr_debug("orig_file_size = %llu\n", le64_to_cpu(desc->orig_file_size)); + pr_debug("auth_ext_count = %u\n", le16_to_cpu(desc->auth_ext_count)); +} + +/* Precompute the salted initial hash state */ +static int set_salt(struct fsverity_info *vi, const u8 *salt, size_t saltlen) +{ + struct crypto_ahash *tfm = vi->hash_alg->tfm; + struct ahash_request *req; + unsigned int reqsize = sizeof(*req) + crypto_ahash_reqsize(tfm); + struct scatterlist sg; + DECLARE_CRYPTO_WAIT(wait); + u8 *saltbuf; + int err; + + vi->hashstate = kmalloc(crypto_ahash_statesize(tfm), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!vi->hashstate) + return -ENOMEM; + /* On error, vi->hashstate is freed by free_fsverity_info() */ + + /* + * Allocate a hash request buffer. Also reserve space for a copy of + * the salt, since the given 'salt' may point into vmap'ed memory, so + * sg_init_one() may not work on it. + */ + req = kmalloc(reqsize + saltlen, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!req) + return -ENOMEM; + saltbuf = (u8 *)req + reqsize; + memcpy(saltbuf, salt, saltlen); + sg_init_one(&sg, saltbuf, saltlen); + + ahash_request_set_tfm(req, tfm); + ahash_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP | + CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG, + crypto_req_done, &wait); + ahash_request_set_crypt(req, &sg, NULL, saltlen); + + err = crypto_wait_req(crypto_ahash_init(req), &wait); + if (err) + goto out; + err = crypto_wait_req(crypto_ahash_update(req), &wait); + if (err) + goto out; + err = crypto_ahash_export(req, vi->hashstate); +out: + kfree(req); + return err; +} + +/* + * Copy in the root hash stored on disk. + * + * Note that the root hash could be computed by hashing the root block of the + * Merkle tree. But it works out a bit simpler to store the hash separately; + * then it gets included in the file measurement without special-casing it, and + * the root block gets verified on the ->readpages() path like the other blocks. + */ +static int parse_root_hash_extension(struct fsverity_info *vi, + const void *hash, size_t size) +{ + const struct fsverity_hash_alg *alg = vi->hash_alg; + + if (vi->have_root_hash) { + pr_warn("Multiple root hashes were found!\n"); + return -EINVAL; + } + if (size != alg->digest_size) { + pr_warn("Wrong root hash size; got %zu bytes, but expected %u for hash algorithm %s\n", + size, alg->digest_size, alg->name); + return -EINVAL; + } + memcpy(vi->root_hash, hash, size); + vi->have_root_hash = true; + pr_debug("Root hash: %s:%*phN\n", alg->name, + alg->digest_size, vi->root_hash); + return 0; +} + +static int parse_salt_extension(struct fsverity_info *vi, + const void *salt, size_t saltlen) +{ + if (vi->hashstate) { + pr_warn("Multiple salts were found!\n"); + return -EINVAL; + } + return set_salt(vi, salt, saltlen); +} + +/* The available types of extensions (variable-length metadata items) */ +static const struct extension_type { + int (*parse)(struct fsverity_info *vi, const void *_ext, + size_t extra_len); + size_t base_len; /* length of fixed-size part of payload, if any */ + bool unauthenticated; /* true if not included in file measurement */ +} extension_types[] = { + [FS_VERITY_EXT_ROOT_HASH] = { + .parse = parse_root_hash_extension, + }, + [FS_VERITY_EXT_SALT] = { + .parse = parse_salt_extension, + }, +}; + +static int do_parse_extensions(struct fsverity_info *vi, + const struct fsverity_extension **ext_hdr_p, + const void *end, int count, bool authenticated) +{ + const struct fsverity_extension *ext_hdr = *ext_hdr_p; + int i; + int err; + + for (i = 0; i < count; i++) { + const struct extension_type *type; + u32 len, rounded_len; + u16 type_code; + + if (end - (const void *)ext_hdr < sizeof(*ext_hdr)) { + pr_warn("Extension list overflows buffer\n"); + return -EINVAL; + } + type_code = le16_to_cpu(ext_hdr->type); + if (type_code >= ARRAY_SIZE(extension_types) || + !extension_types[type_code].parse) { + pr_warn("Unknown extension type: %u\n", type_code); + return -EINVAL; + } + type = &extension_types[type_code]; + if (authenticated != !type->unauthenticated) { + pr_warn("Extension type %u must be %sauthenticated\n", + type_code, type->unauthenticated ? "un" : ""); + return -EINVAL; + } + if (ext_hdr->reserved) { + pr_warn("Reserved bits set in extension header\n"); + return -EINVAL; + } + len = le32_to_cpu(ext_hdr->length); + if (len < sizeof(*ext_hdr)) { + pr_warn("Invalid length in extension header\n"); + return -EINVAL; + } + rounded_len = round_up(len, 8); + if (rounded_len == 0 || + rounded_len > end - (const void *)ext_hdr) { + pr_warn("Extension item overflows buffer\n"); + return -EINVAL; + } + if (len < sizeof(*ext_hdr) + type->base_len) { + pr_warn("Extension length too small for type\n"); + return -EINVAL; + } + err = type->parse(vi, ext_hdr + 1, + len - sizeof(*ext_hdr) - type->base_len); + if (err) + return err; + ext_hdr = (const void *)ext_hdr + rounded_len; + } + *ext_hdr_p = ext_hdr; + return 0; +} + +/* + * Parse the extension items following the fixed-size portion of the fs-verity + * descriptor. The fsverity_info is updated accordingly. + * + * Return: On success, the size of the authenticated portion of the descriptor + * (the fixed-size portion plus the authenticated extensions). + * Otherwise, a -errno value. + */ +static int parse_extensions(struct fsverity_info *vi, + const struct fsverity_descriptor *desc, + int desc_len) +{ + const struct fsverity_extension *ext_hdr = (const void *)(desc + 1); + const void *end = (const void *)desc + desc_len; + u16 auth_ext_count = le16_to_cpu(desc->auth_ext_count); + int auth_desc_len; + int err; + + err = do_parse_extensions(vi, &ext_hdr, end, auth_ext_count, true); + if (err) + return err; + auth_desc_len = (void *)ext_hdr - (void *)desc; + + /* + * Unauthenticated extensions (optional). Careful: an attacker able to + * corrupt the file can change these arbitrarily without being detected. + * Thus, only specific types of extensions are whitelisted here -- + * namely, the ones containing a signature of the file measurement, + * which by definition can't be included in the file measurement itself. + */ + if (end - (void *)ext_hdr >= 8) { + u16 unauth_ext_count = le16_to_cpup((__le16 *)ext_hdr); + + ext_hdr = (void *)ext_hdr + 8; + err = do_parse_extensions(vi, &ext_hdr, end, + unauth_ext_count, false); + if (err) + return err; + } + + return auth_desc_len; +} + +/* + * Parse an fs-verity descriptor, loading information into the fsverity_info. + * + * Return: On success, the size of the authenticated portion of the descriptor + * (the fixed-size portion plus the authenticated extensions). + * Otherwise, a -errno value. + */ +static int parse_fsverity_descriptor(struct fsverity_info *vi, + const struct fsverity_descriptor *desc, + int desc_len, loff_t desc_start) +{ + unsigned int alg_num; + unsigned int hashes_per_block; + u64 orig_file_size; + int desc_auth_len; + int err; + + BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(*desc) != 64); + + /* magic */ + if (memcmp(desc->magic, FS_VERITY_MAGIC, sizeof(desc->magic))) { + pr_warn("Wrong magic bytes\n"); + return -EINVAL; + } + + /* major_version */ + if (desc->major_version != 1) { + pr_warn("Unsupported major version (%u)\n", + desc->major_version); + return -EINVAL; + } + + /* minor_version */ + if (desc->minor_version != 0) { + pr_warn("Unsupported minor version (%u)\n", + desc->minor_version); + return -EINVAL; + } + + /* data_algorithm and tree_algorithm */ + alg_num = le16_to_cpu(desc->data_algorithm); + if (alg_num != le16_to_cpu(desc->tree_algorithm)) { + pr_warn("Unimplemented case: data (%u) and tree (%u) hash algorithms differ\n", + alg_num, le16_to_cpu(desc->tree_algorithm)); + return -EINVAL; + } + vi->hash_alg = fsverity_get_hash_alg(alg_num); + if (IS_ERR(vi->hash_alg)) + return PTR_ERR(vi->hash_alg); + + /* log_data_blocksize and log_tree_blocksize */ + if (desc->log_data_blocksize != PAGE_SHIFT) { + pr_warn("Unsupported log_blocksize (%u). Need block_size == PAGE_SIZE.\n", + desc->log_data_blocksize); + return -EINVAL; + } + if (desc->log_tree_blocksize != desc->log_data_blocksize) { + pr_warn("Unimplemented case: data (%u) and tree (%u) block sizes differ\n", + desc->log_data_blocksize, desc->log_data_blocksize); + return -EINVAL; + } + vi->block_bits = desc->log_data_blocksize; + hashes_per_block = (1 << vi->block_bits) / vi->hash_alg->digest_size; + if (!is_power_of_2(hashes_per_block)) { + pr_warn("Unimplemented case: hashes per block (%u) isn't a power of 2\n", + hashes_per_block); + return -EINVAL; + } + vi->log_arity = ilog2(hashes_per_block); + + /* flags */ + if (desc->flags) { + pr_warn("Unsupported flags (%#x)\n", le32_to_cpu(desc->flags)); + return -EINVAL; + } + + /* reserved fields */ + if (desc->reserved1 || + memchr_inv(desc->reserved2, 0, sizeof(desc->reserved2))) { + pr_warn("Reserved bits set in fsverity_descriptor\n"); + return -EINVAL; + } + + /* + * orig_file_size. For filesystems that set the on-disk i_size to + * data_i_size rather than to full_i_size, this field is redundant -- + * though it still must be included in the file measurement! Make sure + * it's really the same. + */ + orig_file_size = le64_to_cpu(desc->orig_file_size); + if (vi->data_i_size) { + if (orig_file_size != vi->data_i_size) { + pr_warn("fsverity_descriptor.orig_file_size (%llu) doesn't match i_size (%llu)!\n", + orig_file_size, vi->data_i_size); + return -EINVAL; + } + } else { + vi->data_i_size = orig_file_size; + } + if (vi->data_i_size == 0) { + pr_warn("Original file size is 0; this is not supported\n"); + return -EINVAL; + } + if (vi->data_i_size > desc_start) { + pr_warn("Original file size is too large (%llu)\n", + vi->data_i_size); + return -EINVAL; + } + + /* extensions */ + desc_auth_len = parse_extensions(vi, desc, desc_len); + if (desc_auth_len < 0) + return desc_auth_len; + + if (!vi->have_root_hash) { + pr_warn("Root hash wasn't found!\n"); + return -EINVAL; + } + + /* Use an empty salt if no salt was found in the extensions list */ + if (!vi->hashstate) { + err = set_salt(vi, "", 0); + if (err) + return err; + } + + return desc_auth_len; +} + +/* + * Calculate the depth of the Merkle tree, then create a map from level to the + * block offset at which that level's hash blocks start. Level 'depth - 1' is + * the root and is stored first in the file, in the first block following the + * original data. Level 0 is the level directly "above" the data blocks and is + * stored last in the file, just before the fsverity_descriptor. + */ +static int compute_tree_depth_and_offsets(struct fsverity_info *vi) +{ + unsigned int hashes_per_block = 1 << vi->log_arity; + u64 blocks = (vi->data_i_size + (1 << vi->block_bits) - 1) >> + vi->block_bits; + u64 offset = blocks; + int depth = 0; + int i; + + while (blocks > 1) { + if (depth >= FS_VERITY_MAX_LEVELS) { + pr_warn("Too many tree levels (max is %d)\n", + FS_VERITY_MAX_LEVELS); + return -EINVAL; + } + blocks = (blocks + hashes_per_block - 1) >> vi->log_arity; + vi->hash_lvl_region_idx[depth++] = blocks; + } + vi->depth = depth; + + for (i = depth - 1; i >= 0; i--) { + u64 next_count = vi->hash_lvl_region_idx[i]; + + vi->hash_lvl_region_idx[i] = offset; + pr_debug("Level %d is [%llu..%llu] (%llu blocks)\n", + i, offset, offset + next_count - 1, next_count); + offset += next_count; + } + return 0; +} + +/* Arbitrary limit, can be increased if needed */ +#define MAX_DESCRIPTOR_PAGES 16 + +/* + * Compute the file's measurement by hashing the first 'desc_auth_len' bytes of + * the fs-verity descriptor (which includes the Merkle tree root hash as an + * authenticated extension item). + * + * Note: 'desc' may point into vmap'ed memory, so it can't be passed directly to + * sg_set_buf() for the ahash API. Instead, we pass the pages directly. + */ +static int compute_measurement(const struct fsverity_info *vi, + const struct fsverity_descriptor *desc, + int desc_auth_len, + struct page *desc_pages[MAX_DESCRIPTOR_PAGES], + int nr_desc_pages, u8 *measurement) +{ + struct ahash_request *req; + DECLARE_CRYPTO_WAIT(wait); + struct scatterlist sg[MAX_DESCRIPTOR_PAGES]; + int offset, len, remaining; + int i; + int err; + + req = ahash_request_alloc(vi->hash_alg->tfm, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!req) + return -ENOMEM; + + sg_init_table(sg, nr_desc_pages); + offset = offset_in_page(desc); + remaining = desc_auth_len; + for (i = 0; i < nr_desc_pages && remaining; i++) { + len = min_t(int, PAGE_SIZE - offset, remaining); + sg_set_page(&sg[i], desc_pages[i], len, offset); + remaining -= len; + offset = 0; + } + + ahash_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP | + CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG, + crypto_req_done, &wait); + ahash_request_set_crypt(req, sg, measurement, desc_auth_len); + err = crypto_wait_req(crypto_ahash_digest(req), &wait); + ahash_request_free(req); + return err; +} + +static struct fsverity_info *alloc_fsverity_info(void) +{ + return kmem_cache_zalloc(fsverity_info_cachep, GFP_NOFS); +} + +void free_fsverity_info(struct fsverity_info *vi) +{ + if (!vi) + return; + kfree(vi->hashstate); + kmem_cache_free(fsverity_info_cachep, vi); +} + +/** + * find_fsverity_footer - find the fsverity_footer in the last page of the file + * + * To find the fsverity_footer we have to scan backwards from the end, skipping + * zero bytes. This is needed because some filesystems (e.g. ext4) set the + * on-disk i_size to data_i_size rather than to full_i_size, and full_i_size is + * instead gotten indirectly via the end of the last extent. This causes + * full_i_size to be rounded up to the end of the filesystem block. + * + * Return: pointer to the footer if found, else NULL + */ +static const struct fsverity_footer * +find_fsverity_footer(const u8 *last_virt, size_t last_validsize) +{ + const u8 *p = last_virt + last_validsize; + const struct fsverity_footer *ftr; + + /* Find the last nonzero byte, which should be ftr->magic[7] */ + do { + if (p <= last_virt) + return NULL; + } while (*--p == 0); + + BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(ftr->magic) != 8); + BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(struct fsverity_footer, magic[8]) != + sizeof(*ftr)); + if (p - last_virt < offsetof(struct fsverity_footer, magic[7])) + return NULL; + ftr = container_of(p, struct fsverity_footer, magic[7]); + if (memcmp(ftr->magic, FS_VERITY_MAGIC, sizeof(ftr->magic))) + return NULL; + return ftr; +} + +/** + * map_fsverity_descriptor - map an inode's fs-verity descriptor into memory + * + * If the descriptor fits in one page, we use kmap; otherwise we use vmap. + * unmap_fsverity_descriptor() must be called later to unmap it. + * + * It's assumed that the file contents cannot be modified concurrently. + * (This is guaranteed by either deny_write_access() or by the verity bit.) + * + * Return: the virtual address of the start of the descriptor, in virtually + * contiguous memory. Also fills in desc_pages and returns in *desc_len the + * length of the descriptor including all extensions, and in *desc_start the + * offset of the descriptor from the start of the file, in bytes. + */ +static const struct fsverity_descriptor * +map_fsverity_descriptor(struct inode *inode, loff_t full_i_size, + struct page *desc_pages[MAX_DESCRIPTOR_PAGES], + int *nr_desc_pages, int *desc_len, loff_t *desc_start) +{ + const int last_validsize = ((full_i_size - 1) & ~PAGE_MASK) + 1; + const pgoff_t last_pgoff = (full_i_size - 1) >> PAGE_SHIFT; + struct page *last_page; + const void *last_virt; + const struct fsverity_footer *ftr; + pgoff_t first_pgoff; + u32 desc_reverse_offset; + pgoff_t pgoff; + const void *desc_virt; + int i; + int err; + + *nr_desc_pages = 0; + *desc_len = 0; + *desc_start = 0; + + if (full_i_size <= 0) { + pr_warn("File is empty!\n"); + return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); + } + + last_page = read_mapping_page(inode->i_mapping, last_pgoff, NULL); + if (IS_ERR(last_page)) { + pr_warn("Error reading last page: %ld\n", PTR_ERR(last_page)); + return ERR_CAST(last_page); + } + last_virt = kmap(last_page); + + ftr = find_fsverity_footer(last_virt, last_validsize); + if (!ftr) { + pr_warn("No verity metadata found\n"); + err = -EINVAL; + goto err_out; + } + full_i_size -= (last_virt + last_validsize - sizeof(*ftr)) - + (void *)ftr; + + desc_reverse_offset = le32_to_cpu(ftr->desc_reverse_offset); + if (desc_reverse_offset < + sizeof(struct fsverity_descriptor) + sizeof(*ftr) || + desc_reverse_offset > full_i_size) { + pr_warn("Unexpected desc_reverse_offset: %u\n", + desc_reverse_offset); + err = -EINVAL; + goto err_out; + } + *desc_start = full_i_size - desc_reverse_offset; + if (*desc_start & 7) { + pr_warn("fs-verity descriptor is misaligned (desc_start=%lld)\n", + *desc_start); + err = -EINVAL; + goto err_out; + } + + first_pgoff = *desc_start >> PAGE_SHIFT; + if (last_pgoff - first_pgoff >= MAX_DESCRIPTOR_PAGES) { + pr_warn("fs-verity descriptor is too long (%lu pages)\n", + last_pgoff - first_pgoff + 1); + err = -EINVAL; + goto err_out; + } + + *desc_len = desc_reverse_offset - sizeof(__le32); + + if (first_pgoff == last_pgoff) { + /* Single-page descriptor; use the already-kmapped last page */ + desc_pages[0] = last_page; + *nr_desc_pages = 1; + return last_virt + (*desc_start & ~PAGE_MASK); + } + + /* Multi-page descriptor; map the additional pages into memory */ + + for (pgoff = first_pgoff; pgoff < last_pgoff; pgoff++) { + struct page *page; + + page = read_mapping_page(inode->i_mapping, pgoff, NULL); + if (IS_ERR(page)) { + err = PTR_ERR(page); + pr_warn("Error reading descriptor page: %d\n", err); + goto err_out; + } + desc_pages[(*nr_desc_pages)++] = page; + } + + desc_pages[(*nr_desc_pages)++] = last_page; + kunmap(last_page); + last_page = NULL; + + desc_virt = vmap(desc_pages, *nr_desc_pages, VM_MAP, PAGE_KERNEL_RO); + if (!desc_virt) { + err = -ENOMEM; + goto err_out; + } + + return desc_virt + (*desc_start & ~PAGE_MASK); + +err_out: + for (i = 0; i < *nr_desc_pages; i++) + put_page(desc_pages[i]); + if (last_page) { + kunmap(last_page); + put_page(last_page); + } + return ERR_PTR(err); +} + +static void +unmap_fsverity_descriptor(const struct fsverity_descriptor *desc, + struct page *desc_pages[MAX_DESCRIPTOR_PAGES], + int nr_desc_pages) +{ + int i; + + if (is_vmalloc_addr(desc)) { + vunmap((void *)((unsigned long)desc & PAGE_MASK)); + } else { + WARN_ON(nr_desc_pages != 1); + kunmap(desc_pages[0]); + } + for (i = 0; i < nr_desc_pages; i++) + put_page(desc_pages[i]); +} + +/* + * Read the file's fs-verity descriptor and create an fsverity_info for it. + */ +struct fsverity_info *create_fsverity_info(struct inode *inode, bool enabling) +{ + loff_t full_i_size; + struct fsverity_info *vi; + const struct fsverity_descriptor *desc = NULL; + struct page *desc_pages[MAX_DESCRIPTOR_PAGES]; + int nr_desc_pages; + int desc_len; + loff_t desc_start; + int desc_auth_len; + int err; + + vi = alloc_fsverity_info(); + if (!vi) + return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); + + full_i_size = i_size_read(inode); + + if (inode->i_sb->s_vop->get_full_i_size && !enabling) { + /* + * For filesystems that set the on-disk i_size to data_i_size + * rather than to full_i_size, we have to get full_i_size from + * somewhere else, e.g. the end of the last extent. + */ + vi->data_i_size = full_i_size; + err = inode->i_sb->s_vop->get_full_i_size(inode, &full_i_size); + if (err) + goto out; + } + vi->full_i_size = full_i_size; + pr_debug("full_i_size=%lld\n", full_i_size); + + desc = map_fsverity_descriptor(inode, full_i_size, desc_pages, + &nr_desc_pages, &desc_len, &desc_start); + if (IS_ERR(desc)) { + err = PTR_ERR(desc); + desc = NULL; + goto out; + } + + dump_fsverity_descriptor(desc); + desc_auth_len = parse_fsverity_descriptor(vi, desc, desc_len, + desc_start); + if (desc_auth_len < 0) { + err = desc_auth_len; + goto out; + } + + err = compute_tree_depth_and_offsets(vi); + if (err) + goto out; + err = compute_measurement(vi, desc, desc_auth_len, desc_pages, + nr_desc_pages, vi->measurement); +out: + if (desc) + unmap_fsverity_descriptor(desc, desc_pages, nr_desc_pages); + if (err) { + free_fsverity_info(vi); + vi = ERR_PTR(err); + } + return vi; +} + +/* Ensure the inode has an ->i_verity_info */ +static int setup_fsverity_info(struct inode *inode) +{ + struct fsverity_info *vi = get_fsverity_info(inode); + + if (vi) + return 0; + + vi = create_fsverity_info(inode, false); + if (IS_ERR(vi)) + return PTR_ERR(vi); + + if (!set_fsverity_info(inode, vi)) + free_fsverity_info(vi); + return 0; +} + +/** + * fsverity_file_open - prepare to open a verity file + * @inode: the inode being opened + * @filp: the struct file being set up + * + * When opening a verity file, deny the open if it is for writing. Otherwise, + * set up the inode's ->i_verity_info (if not already done) by parsing the + * verity metadata at the end of the file. + * + * When combined with fscrypt, this must be called after fscrypt_file_open(). + * Otherwise, we won't have the key set up to decrypt the verity metadata. + * + * Return: 0 on success, -errno on failure + */ +int fsverity_file_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp) +{ + if (filp->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) { + pr_debug("Denying opening verity file (ino %lu) for write\n", + inode->i_ino); + return -EPERM; + } + + return setup_fsverity_info(inode); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fsverity_file_open); + +/** + * fsverity_prepare_setattr - prepare to change a verity inode's attributes + * @dentry: dentry through which the inode is being changed + * @attr: attributes to change + * + * Verity files are immutable, so deny truncates. This isn't covered by the + * open-time check because sys_truncate() takes a path, not a file descriptor. + * + * Return: 0 on success, -errno on failure + */ +int fsverity_prepare_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr) +{ + if (attr->ia_valid & ATTR_SIZE) { + pr_debug("Denying truncate of verity file (ino %lu)\n", + d_inode(dentry)->i_ino); + return -EPERM; + } + return 0; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fsverity_prepare_setattr); + +/** + * fsverity_prepare_getattr - prepare to get a verity inode's attributes + * @inode: the inode for which the attributes are being retrieved + * + * For filesystems that set the on-disk i_size to full_i_size rather than to + * data_i_size, to make st_size exclude the verity metadata even before the file + * has been opened for the first time we need to grab the original data size + * from the fs-verity descriptor. Currently, to implement this we just set up + * the ->i_verity_info, like in the ->open() hook. + * + * However, when combined with fscrypt, on an encrypted file this must only be + * called if the encryption key has been set up! + * + * Return: 0 on success, -errno on failure + */ +int fsverity_prepare_getattr(struct inode *inode) +{ + return setup_fsverity_info(inode); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fsverity_prepare_getattr); + +/** + * fsverity_cleanup_inode - free the inode's verity info, if present + * + * Filesystems must call this on inode eviction to free ->i_verity_info. + */ +void fsverity_cleanup_inode(struct inode *inode) +{ + free_fsverity_info(inode->i_verity_info); + inode->i_verity_info = NULL; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fsverity_cleanup_inode); + +/** + * fsverity_full_i_size - get the full (on-disk) file size + * + * If the inode has had its in-memory ->i_size overridden for fs-verity (to + * exclude the metadata at the end of the file), then return the full i_size + * which is stored on-disk. Otherwise, just return the in-memory ->i_size. + * + * Return: the full (on-disk) file size + */ +loff_t fsverity_full_i_size(const struct inode *inode) +{ + struct fsverity_info *vi = get_fsverity_info(inode); + + if (vi) + return vi->full_i_size; + + return i_size_read(inode); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fsverity_full_i_size); + +static int __init fsverity_module_init(void) +{ + fsverity_info_cachep = KMEM_CACHE(fsverity_info, SLAB_RECLAIM_ACCOUNT); + if (!fsverity_info_cachep) + return -ENOMEM; + + fsverity_check_hash_algs(); + + pr_debug("Initialized fs-verity\n"); + return 0; +} + +static void __exit fsverity_module_exit(void) +{ + kmem_cache_destroy(fsverity_info_cachep); + fsverity_exit_hash_algs(); +} + +module_init(fsverity_module_init) +module_exit(fsverity_module_exit); +MODULE_LICENSE("GPL v2"); +MODULE_DESCRIPTION("fs-verity: read-only file-based integrity/authentication"); diff --git a/include/linux/fs.h b/include/linux/fs.h index 805bf22898cf2..26764ebcb7724 100644 --- a/include/linux/fs.h +++ b/include/linux/fs.h @@ -61,6 +61,8 @@ struct workqueue_struct; struct iov_iter; struct fscrypt_info; struct fscrypt_operations; +struct fsverity_info; +struct fsverity_operations; extern void __init inode_init(void); extern void __init inode_init_early(void); @@ -671,6 +673,10 @@ struct inode { struct fscrypt_info *i_crypt_info; #endif +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_FS_VERITY) + struct fsverity_info *i_verity_info; +#endif + void *i_private; /* fs or device private pointer */ } __randomize_layout; @@ -1369,6 +1375,9 @@ struct super_block { const struct xattr_handler **s_xattr; #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION) const struct fscrypt_operations *s_cop; +#endif +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_FS_VERITY) + const struct fsverity_operations *s_vop; #endif struct hlist_bl_head s_roots; /* alternate root dentries for NFS */ struct list_head s_mounts; /* list of mounts; _not_ for fs use */ diff --git a/include/linux/fsverity.h b/include/linux/fsverity.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000..3af55241046aa --- /dev/null +++ b/include/linux/fsverity.h @@ -0,0 +1,62 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +/* + * fs-verity: read-only file-based integrity/authentication + * + * Copyright (C) 2018 Google, Inc. + */ + +#ifndef _LINUX_FSVERITY_H +#define _LINUX_FSVERITY_H + +#include <linux/fs.h> +#include <uapi/linux/fsverity.h> + +/* + * fs-verity operations for filesystems + */ +struct fsverity_operations { + int (*set_verity)(struct inode *inode, loff_t data_i_size); + int (*get_full_i_size)(struct inode *inode, loff_t *full_i_size_ret); +}; + +#if __FS_HAS_VERITY + +/* setup.c */ +extern int fsverity_file_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp); +extern int fsverity_prepare_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr); +extern int fsverity_prepare_getattr(struct inode *inode); +extern void fsverity_cleanup_inode(struct inode *inode); +extern loff_t fsverity_full_i_size(const struct inode *inode); + +#else /* !__FS_HAS_VERITY */ + +/* setup.c */ + +static inline int fsverity_file_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp) +{ + return -EOPNOTSUPP; +} + +static inline int fsverity_prepare_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, + struct iattr *attr) +{ + return -EOPNOTSUPP; +} + +static inline int fsverity_prepare_getattr(struct inode *inode) +{ + return -EOPNOTSUPP; +} + +static inline void fsverity_cleanup_inode(struct inode *inode) +{ +} + +static inline loff_t fsverity_full_i_size(const struct inode *inode) +{ + return i_size_read(inode); +} + +#endif /* !__FS_HAS_VERITY */ + +#endif /* _LINUX_FSVERITY_H */ diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/fsverity.h b/include/uapi/linux/fsverity.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000..24ebb8b6ea0d4 --- /dev/null +++ b/include/uapi/linux/fsverity.h @@ -0,0 +1,86 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note */ +/* + * fs-verity (file-based verity) support + * + * Copyright (C) 2018 Google LLC + */ +#ifndef _UAPI_LINUX_FSVERITY_H +#define _UAPI_LINUX_FSVERITY_H + +#include <linux/limits.h> +#include <linux/ioctl.h> +#include <linux/types.h> + +/* ========== Ioctls ========== */ + +struct fsverity_digest { + __u16 digest_algorithm; + __u16 digest_size; /* input/output */ + __u8 digest[]; +}; + +#define FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY _IO('f', 133) +#define FS_IOC_MEASURE_VERITY _IOWR('f', 134, struct fsverity_digest) + +/* ========== On-disk format ========== */ + +#define FS_VERITY_MAGIC "FSVerity" + +/* Supported hash algorithms */ +#define FS_VERITY_ALG_SHA256 1 + +/* Metadata stored near the end of verity files, after the Merkle tree */ +/* This structure is 64 bytes long */ +struct fsverity_descriptor { + __u8 magic[8]; /* must be FS_VERITY_MAGIC */ + __u8 major_version; /* must be 1 */ + __u8 minor_version; /* must be 0 */ + __u8 log_data_blocksize;/* log2(data-bytes-per-hash), e.g. 12 for 4KB */ + __u8 log_tree_blocksize;/* log2(tree-bytes-per-hash), e.g. 12 for 4KB */ + __le16 data_algorithm; /* hash algorithm for data blocks */ + __le16 tree_algorithm; /* hash algorithm for tree blocks */ + __le32 flags; /* flags */ + __le32 reserved1; /* must be 0 */ + __le64 orig_file_size; /* size of the original, unpadded data */ + __le16 auth_ext_count; /* number of authenticated extensions */ + __u8 reserved2[30]; /* must be 0 */ +}; +/* followed by list of 'auth_ext_count' authenticated extensions */ +/* + * then followed by '__le16 unauth_ext_count' padded to next 8-byte boundary, + * then a list of 'unauth_ext_count' (may be 0) unauthenticated extensions + */ + +/* Extension types */ +#define FS_VERITY_EXT_ROOT_HASH 1 +#define FS_VERITY_EXT_SALT 2 + +/* Header of each extension (variable-length metadata item) */ +struct fsverity_extension { + /* + * Length in bytes, including this header but excluding padding to next + * 8-byte boundary that is applied when advancing to the next extension. + */ + __le32 length; + __le16 type; /* Type of this extension (see codes above) */ + __le16 reserved; /* Reserved, must be 0 */ +}; +/* followed by the payload of 'length - 8' bytes */ + +/* Extension payload formats */ + +/* + * FS_VERITY_EXT_ROOT_HASH payload is just a byte array, with size equal to the + * digest size of the hash algorithm given in the fsverity_descriptor + */ + +/* FS_VERITY_EXT_SALT payload is just a byte array, any size */ + + +/* Fields stored at the very end of the file */ +struct fsverity_footer { + __le32 desc_reverse_offset; /* distance to fsverity_descriptor */ + __u8 magic[8]; /* FS_VERITY_MAGIC */ +} __packed; + +#endif /* _UAPI_LINUX_FSVERITY_H */