Message ID | 20181010121254.12220-1-vt@altlinux.org (mailing list archive) |
---|---|
Headers | show |
Series | crypto: streebog - add Streebog hash function | expand |
On Wed, Oct 10, 2018 at 03:12:50PM +0300, Vitaly Chikunov wrote: > Add GOST/IETF Streebog hash function (GOST R 34.11-2012, RFC 6986) > generic hash transformation with appropriate testmgr and tcrypt > tests and vectors. > > Streebog Hash Function (GOST R 34.11-2012, RFC 6986) is one of the Russian > cryptographic standard algorithms (called GOST algorithms). > > References: > https://tc26.ru/upload/iblock/fed/feddbb4d26b685903faa2ba11aea43f6.pdf > https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6986 > > Tested using testmgr and tcrypt on x86_64, arm, arm64, and s390x on qemu. We don't add algorithms purely used by user-space. So please clarify who is going to be using this algorithm *within* the kernel. Thanks,
On Fri, Oct 12, 2018 at 02:16:59PM +0800, Herbert Xu wrote: > On Wed, Oct 10, 2018 at 03:12:50PM +0300, Vitaly Chikunov wrote: > > Add GOST/IETF Streebog hash function (GOST R 34.11-2012, RFC 6986) > > generic hash transformation with appropriate testmgr and tcrypt > > tests and vectors. > > > > Streebog Hash Function (GOST R 34.11-2012, RFC 6986) is one of the Russian > > cryptographic standard algorithms (called GOST algorithms). > > > > References: > > https://tc26.ru/upload/iblock/fed/feddbb4d26b685903faa2ba11aea43f6.pdf > > https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6986 > > > > Tested using testmgr and tcrypt on x86_64, arm, arm64, and s390x on qemu. > > We don't add algorithms purely used by user-space. > > So please clarify who is going to be using this algorithm *within* > the kernel. It is the first part of attempts to add to the Integrity subsystem ability of verifying file and module signatures by Russian GOST algorithms. Thanks,
On Fri, Oct 12, 2018 at 09:41:05AM +0300, Vitaly Chikunov wrote: > > It is the first part of attempts to add to the Integrity subsystem > ability of verifying file and module signatures by Russian GOST > algorithms. It would be better if these patches are posted together. That way we don't end up with a situation where the algorithm goes into the kernel but the ultimate user is rejected. Thanks,
Herbert, On Wed, Oct 17, 2018 at 02:08:51PM +0800, Herbert Xu wrote: > On Fri, Oct 12, 2018 at 09:41:05AM +0300, Vitaly Chikunov wrote: > > > > It is the first part of attempts to add to the Integrity subsystem > > ability of verifying file and module signatures by Russian GOST > > algorithms. > > It would be better if these patches are posted together. That > way we don't end up with a situation where the algorithm goes into > the kernel but the ultimate user is rejected. IMA does not need any particular patching inside of their subtree to support new hash, because it is using any hash registered in Hash Info which is still under crypto subtree. I added appropriate patch into v3 which is already posted a week ago, and tested it to work correctly with ima_appraise=fix. Thanks,
On Sat, 2018-11-03 at 08:51 +0300, Vitaly Chikunov wrote: > Herbert, > > On Wed, Oct 17, 2018 at 02:08:51PM +0800, Herbert Xu wrote: > > On Fri, Oct 12, 2018 at 09:41:05AM +0300, Vitaly Chikunov wrote: > > > > > > It is the first part of attempts to add to the Integrity subsystem > > > ability of verifying file and module signatures by Russian GOST > > > algorithms. > > > > It would be better if these patches are posted together. That > > way we don't end up with a situation where the algorithm goes into > > the kernel but the ultimate user is rejected. > > IMA does not need any particular patching inside of their subtree to > support new hash, because it is using any hash registered in Hash Info > which is still under crypto subtree. I added appropriate patch into v3 > which is already posted a week ago, and tested it to work correctly with > ima_appraise=fix. That's true, but the target subsystem should be made aware of the new usage. Thanks, Herbert. Mimi
Mimi, On Mon, Nov 05, 2018 at 07:48:33AM -0500, Mimi Zohar wrote: > On Sat, 2018-11-03 at 08:51 +0300, Vitaly Chikunov wrote: > > On Wed, Oct 17, 2018 at 02:08:51PM +0800, Herbert Xu wrote: > > > On Fri, Oct 12, 2018 at 09:41:05AM +0300, Vitaly Chikunov wrote: > > > > > > > > It is the first part of attempts to add to the Integrity subsystem > > > > ability of verifying file and module signatures by Russian GOST > > > > algorithms. > > > > > > It would be better if these patches are posted together. That > > > way we don't end up with a situation where the algorithm goes into > > > the kernel but the ultimate user is rejected. > > > > IMA does not need any particular patching inside of their subtree to > > support new hash, because it is using any hash registered in Hash Info > > which is still under crypto subtree. I added appropriate patch into v3 > > which is already posted a week ago, and tested it to work correctly with > > ima_appraise=fix. > > That's true, but the target subsystem should be made aware of the new > usage. Did you mean by re-sending the patch with Cc to linux-integrity? Or something more? Thanks,
On Mon, 2018-11-05 at 15:55 +0300, Vitaly Chikunov wrote: > Mimi, > > On Mon, Nov 05, 2018 at 07:48:33AM -0500, Mimi Zohar wrote: > > On Sat, 2018-11-03 at 08:51 +0300, Vitaly Chikunov wrote: > > > On Wed, Oct 17, 2018 at 02:08:51PM +0800, Herbert Xu wrote: > > > > On Fri, Oct 12, 2018 at 09:41:05AM +0300, Vitaly Chikunov wrote: > > > > > > > > > > It is the first part of attempts to add to the Integrity subsystem > > > > > ability of verifying file and module signatures by Russian GOST > > > > > algorithms. > > > > > > > > It would be better if these patches are posted together. That > > > > way we don't end up with a situation where the algorithm goes into > > > > the kernel but the ultimate user is rejected. > > > > > > IMA does not need any particular patching inside of their subtree to > > > support new hash, because it is using any hash registered in Hash Info > > > which is still under crypto subtree. I added appropriate patch into v3 > > > which is already posted a week ago, and tested it to work correctly with > > > ima_appraise=fix. > > > > That's true, but the target subsystem should be made aware of the new > > usage. > > Did you mean by re-sending the patch with Cc to linux-integrity? Or > something more? Just as future reference. For now, please feel free to add my Reviewed-by on the "crypto: streebog - register Streebog in hash info for IMA" patch. Mimi