Message ID | 20181211224651.112510-1-ebiggers@kernel.org (mailing list archive) |
---|---|
Headers | show |
Series | fs-verity: fix !CONFIG_FS_VERITY case | expand |
* Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org> [181211 22:48]: > Replace the two patches that broken the !CONFIG_FS_VERITY case with > fixed verisons. Thanks for fixing these quickly. Mounting ext4 rootfs on SD card now works again for me with these: Tested-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
On Tue, Dec 11, 2018 at 02:46:49PM -0800, Eric Biggers wrote: > Replace the two patches that broken the !CONFIG_FS_VERITY case with > fixed verisons. I had fixed this by simply adding the conditional to the !CONFIG_FS_VERITY versions of fsverity_file_open() and fsverity_prepare_setattr(), before I found your patch in my inbox. I think my version is simpler (and results in a fewer lines of code :-), so I think I'm going to stick with it. The net diff of my changes from the previous version was: diff --git a/include/linux/fsverity.h b/include/linux/fsverity.h index ea8c418bd7d5..6684bb72bbfc 100644 --- a/include/linux/fsverity.h +++ b/include/linux/fsverity.h @@ -60,13 +60,13 @@ static inline int fsverity_ioctl_measure(struct file *filp, void __user *arg) static inline int fsverity_file_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp) { - return -EOPNOTSUPP; + return IS_VERITY(inode) ? -ENOTSUPP : 0; } static inline int fsverity_prepare_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr) { - return -EOPNOTSUPP; + return IS_VERITY(d_inode(dentry)) ? -ENOTSUPP : 0; } static inline int fsverity_prepare_getattr(struct inode *inode) - Ted
Hi Ted, On Tue, Dec 11, 2018 at 09:30:18PM -0500, Theodore Y. Ts'o wrote: > On Tue, Dec 11, 2018 at 02:46:49PM -0800, Eric Biggers wrote: > > Replace the two patches that broken the !CONFIG_FS_VERITY case with > > fixed verisons. > > I had fixed this by simply adding the conditional to the > !CONFIG_FS_VERITY versions of fsverity_file_open() and > fsverity_prepare_setattr(), before I found your patch in my inbox. I > think my version is simpler (and results in a fewer lines of code :-), > so I think I'm going to stick with it. > > The net diff of my changes from the previous version was: > > diff --git a/include/linux/fsverity.h b/include/linux/fsverity.h > index ea8c418bd7d5..6684bb72bbfc 100644 > --- a/include/linux/fsverity.h > +++ b/include/linux/fsverity.h > @@ -60,13 +60,13 @@ static inline int fsverity_ioctl_measure(struct file *filp, void __user *arg) > > static inline int fsverity_file_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp) > { > - return -EOPNOTSUPP; > + return IS_VERITY(inode) ? -ENOTSUPP : 0; > } > > static inline int fsverity_prepare_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, > struct iattr *attr) > { > - return -EOPNOTSUPP; > + return IS_VERITY(d_inode(dentry)) ? -ENOTSUPP : 0; > } > > static inline int fsverity_prepare_getattr(struct inode *inode) > > - Ted Either works, but I slightly prefer my version since it minimizes the overhead on non-verity files when the kconfig option is enabled: it's just an i_flags check, rather than a function call plus an i_flags check. The same approach is used in the fscrypt hooks. Also shouldn't it be EOPNOTSUPP, not ENOTSUPP? - Eric
On Tue, Dec 11, 2018 at 06:42:22PM -0800, Eric Biggers wrote: > > Either works, but I slightly prefer my version since it minimizes the overhead > on non-verity files when the kconfig option is enabled: it's just an i_flags > check, rather than a function call plus an i_flags check. The same approach is > used in the fscrypt hooks. Also shouldn't it be EOPNOTSUPP, not ENOTSUPP? It's the same for both, since in the !CONFIG_FS_VERITY case the two functions are inline functions. There's actually a bigger issue that I've been meaning to raise, which is that right now we'll set S_VERITY even if the VERITY feature flag is not set. What we should do, in my opinion, is to make ext4 fail a r/w mount if it tries to mount the file system with the VERITY feature flag set and the kernel is mounted with the VERITY flag set. Also, if the kernel is compiled without CONFIG_FS_VERITY enabled, IS_VERITY(inode) should be defined to 0, and if the an inode is found with EXT4_VERITY_FL and the VERITY feature is not set, we should declare the file system corrupted. The problem is that f2fs doesn't check **any** file system features at all. If you mount a file system with f2fs features that the kernel doesn't support, the f2fs file system doesn't say boo. I suspect hilarity would ensue if new f2fs file system with new features are mounted on an older kernel, or a kernel where features like encryption and verity are disabled. So I could easily make these changes for ext4, but what we would do for f2fs isn't clear. I think f2fs is very broken here, but I hesitate defining IS_VERITY(x) to 0 if !CONFIG_FS_VERITY might cause f2fs to break even more than it does today. I would prefer to do that since it would remove dead code from ext4 and f2fs in the !CONFIG_FS_VERITY case, but I think we clarify with the f2fs folks why it is that they aren't checking the f2fs feature mask when mounting a file system first. - Ted