diff mbox series

[v2,5/5] arm64/speculation: Support 'mitigations=' cmdline option

Message ID 24039e1370ed57e8075730c0b88c505afd9e0ab7.1555085500.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com (mailing list archive)
State New, archived
Headers show
Series cpu/speculation: Add 'mitigations=' cmdline option | expand

Commit Message

Josh Poimboeuf April 12, 2019, 8:39 p.m. UTC
Configure arm64 runtime CPU speculation bug mitigations in accordance
with the 'mitigations=' cmdline option.  This affects Meltdown, Spectre
v2, and Speculative Store Bypass.

The default behavior is unchanged.

Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
---
NOTE: This is based on top of Jeremy Linton's patches:
      https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190410231237.52506-1-jeremy.linton@arm.com

 Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 8 +++++---
 arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c                  | 6 +++++-
 arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c                  | 8 +++++++-
 3 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

Comments

Randy Dunlap April 12, 2019, 11:34 p.m. UTC | #1
On 4/12/19 1:39 PM, Josh Poimboeuf wrote:
> Configure arm64 runtime CPU speculation bug mitigations in accordance
> with the 'mitigations=' cmdline option.  This affects Meltdown, Spectre
> v2, and Speculative Store Bypass.
> 
> The default behavior is unchanged.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
> ---
> NOTE: This is based on top of Jeremy Linton's patches:
>       https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190410231237.52506-1-jeremy.linton@arm.com
> 
>  Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 8 +++++---
>  arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c                  | 6 +++++-
>  arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c                  | 8 +++++++-
>  3 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
> index e84a01d90e92..79bfc755defe 100644
> --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
> +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
> @@ -2545,8 +2545,8 @@
>  			http://repo.or.cz/w/linux-2.6/mini2440.git
>  
>  	mitigations=
> -			[X86,PPC,S390] Control optional mitigations for CPU
> -			vulnerabilities.  This is a set of curated,
> +			[X86,PPC,S390,ARM64] Control optional mitigations for
> +			CPU vulnerabilities.  This is a set of curated,
>  			arch-independent options, each of which is an
>  			aggregation of existing arch-specific options.
>  
> @@ -2555,11 +2555,13 @@
>  				improves system performance, but it may also
>  				expose users to several CPU vulnerabilities.
>  				Equivalent to: nopti [X86,PPC]
> +					       kpti=0 [ARM64]
>  					       nospectre_v1 [PPC]
>  					       nobp=0 [S390]
> -					       nospectre_v2 [X86,PPC,S390]
> +					       nospectre_v2 [X86,PPC,S390,ARM64]
>  					       spectre_v2_user=off [X86]
>  					       spec_store_bypass_disable=off [X86,PPC]
> +					       ssbd=force-off [ARM64]
>  					       l1tf=off [X86]
>  
>  			auto (default)

Hi,
Do we need to add "ARM64" to Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.rst?
Thomas Gleixner April 16, 2019, 7:26 p.m. UTC | #2
On Fri, 12 Apr 2019, Josh Poimboeuf wrote:

> Configure arm64 runtime CPU speculation bug mitigations in accordance
> with the 'mitigations=' cmdline option.  This affects Meltdown, Spectre
> v2, and Speculative Store Bypass.
> 
> The default behavior is unchanged.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
> ---
> NOTE: This is based on top of Jeremy Linton's patches:
>       https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190410231237.52506-1-jeremy.linton@arm.com

So I keep that out and we have to revisit that once the ARM64 stuff hits a
tree, right? I can have a branch with just the 4 first patches applied
which ARM64 folks can pull in when they apply Jeremy's patches before te
merge window.

Thanks,

	tglx
Josh Poimboeuf April 16, 2019, 8:21 p.m. UTC | #3
On Tue, Apr 16, 2019 at 09:26:13PM +0200, Thomas Gleixner wrote:
> On Fri, 12 Apr 2019, Josh Poimboeuf wrote:
> 
> > Configure arm64 runtime CPU speculation bug mitigations in accordance
> > with the 'mitigations=' cmdline option.  This affects Meltdown, Spectre
> > v2, and Speculative Store Bypass.
> > 
> > The default behavior is unchanged.
> > 
> > Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
> > ---
> > NOTE: This is based on top of Jeremy Linton's patches:
> >       https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190410231237.52506-1-jeremy.linton@arm.com
> 
> So I keep that out and we have to revisit that once the ARM64 stuff hits a
> tree, right? I can have a branch with just the 4 first patches applied
> which ARM64 folks can pull in when they apply Jeremy's patches before te
> merge window.

Sounds good to me (though I guess it's up to the arm64 maintainers how
they want to handle the dependencies).
Will Deacon April 16, 2019, 9:39 p.m. UTC | #4
On Tue, Apr 16, 2019 at 09:26:13PM +0200, Thomas Gleixner wrote:
> On Fri, 12 Apr 2019, Josh Poimboeuf wrote:
> 
> > Configure arm64 runtime CPU speculation bug mitigations in accordance
> > with the 'mitigations=' cmdline option.  This affects Meltdown, Spectre
> > v2, and Speculative Store Bypass.
> > 
> > The default behavior is unchanged.
> > 
> > Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
> > ---
> > NOTE: This is based on top of Jeremy Linton's patches:
> >       https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190410231237.52506-1-jeremy.linton@arm.com
> 
> So I keep that out and we have to revisit that once the ARM64 stuff hits a
> tree, right? I can have a branch with just the 4 first patches applied
> which ARM64 folks can pull in when they apply Jeremy's patches before te
> merge window.

Yes, that would work for us, cheers. I should get to Jeremy's latest version
next week and I'm certainly planning to get them queued up for 5.2.

Will
Will Deacon April 24, 2019, 2:16 p.m. UTC | #5
Hi Thomas,

On Tue, Apr 16, 2019 at 09:26:13PM +0200, Thomas Gleixner wrote:
> On Fri, 12 Apr 2019, Josh Poimboeuf wrote:
> 
> > Configure arm64 runtime CPU speculation bug mitigations in accordance
> > with the 'mitigations=' cmdline option.  This affects Meltdown, Spectre
> > v2, and Speculative Store Bypass.
> > 
> > The default behavior is unchanged.
> > 
> > Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
> > ---
> > NOTE: This is based on top of Jeremy Linton's patches:
> >       https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190410231237.52506-1-jeremy.linton@arm.com
> 
> So I keep that out and we have to revisit that once the ARM64 stuff hits a
> tree, right? I can have a branch with just the 4 first patches applied
> which ARM64 folks can pull in when they apply Jeremy's patches before te
> merge window.

I'm assuming that this refers to the core/speculation branch in tip:

https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip.git/log/?h=core/speculation

but please can you confirm that I'm good to pull that into arm64?

Cheers,

Will
Thomas Gleixner April 24, 2019, 6:19 p.m. UTC | #6
On Wed, 24 Apr 2019, Will Deacon wrote:

> Hi Thomas,
> 
> On Tue, Apr 16, 2019 at 09:26:13PM +0200, Thomas Gleixner wrote:
> > On Fri, 12 Apr 2019, Josh Poimboeuf wrote:
> > 
> > > Configure arm64 runtime CPU speculation bug mitigations in accordance
> > > with the 'mitigations=' cmdline option.  This affects Meltdown, Spectre
> > > v2, and Speculative Store Bypass.
> > > 
> > > The default behavior is unchanged.
> > > 
> > > Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
> > > ---
> > > NOTE: This is based on top of Jeremy Linton's patches:
> > >       https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190410231237.52506-1-jeremy.linton@arm.com
> > 
> > So I keep that out and we have to revisit that once the ARM64 stuff hits a
> > tree, right? I can have a branch with just the 4 first patches applied
> > which ARM64 folks can pull in when they apply Jeremy's patches before te
> > merge window.
> 
> I'm assuming that this refers to the core/speculation branch in tip:
> 
> https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip.git/log/?h=core/speculation
> 
> but please can you confirm that I'm good to pull that into arm64?

Yes. It's all yours :)

Thanks,

	tglx
diff mbox series

Patch

diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
index e84a01d90e92..79bfc755defe 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -2545,8 +2545,8 @@ 
 			http://repo.or.cz/w/linux-2.6/mini2440.git
 
 	mitigations=
-			[X86,PPC,S390] Control optional mitigations for CPU
-			vulnerabilities.  This is a set of curated,
+			[X86,PPC,S390,ARM64] Control optional mitigations for
+			CPU vulnerabilities.  This is a set of curated,
 			arch-independent options, each of which is an
 			aggregation of existing arch-specific options.
 
@@ -2555,11 +2555,13 @@ 
 				improves system performance, but it may also
 				expose users to several CPU vulnerabilities.
 				Equivalent to: nopti [X86,PPC]
+					       kpti=0 [ARM64]
 					       nospectre_v1 [PPC]
 					       nobp=0 [S390]
-					       nospectre_v2 [X86,PPC,S390]
+					       nospectre_v2 [X86,PPC,S390,ARM64]
 					       spectre_v2_user=off [X86]
 					       spec_store_bypass_disable=off [X86,PPC]
+					       ssbd=force-off [ARM64]
 					       l1tf=off [X86]
 
 			auto (default)
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c
index a1f3188c7be0..65bcd7f0cca1 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ 
 #include <linux/arm-smccc.h>
 #include <linux/psci.h>
 #include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/cpu.h>
 #include <asm/cpu.h>
 #include <asm/cputype.h>
 #include <asm/cpufeature.h>
@@ -405,6 +406,9 @@  static bool has_ssbd_mitigation(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry,
 		this_cpu_safe = true;
 	}
 
+	if (cpu_mitigations_off())
+		ssbd_state = ARM64_SSBD_FORCE_DISABLE;
+
 	if (psci_ops.smccc_version == SMCCC_VERSION_1_0) {
 		ssbd_state = ARM64_SSBD_UNKNOWN;
 		if (!this_cpu_safe)
@@ -599,7 +603,7 @@  check_branch_predictor(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry, int scope)
 	}
 
 	/* forced off */
-	if (__nospectre_v2) {
+	if (__nospectre_v2 || cpu_mitigations_off()) {
 		pr_info_once("spectrev2 mitigation disabled by command line option\n");
 		__hardenbp_enab = false;
 		return false;
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c
index 6b7e1556460a..d826b17f7820 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ 
 #include <linux/stop_machine.h>
 #include <linux/types.h>
 #include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/cpu.h>
 #include <asm/cpu.h>
 #include <asm/cpufeature.h>
 #include <asm/cpu_ops.h>
@@ -966,7 +967,7 @@  static bool unmap_kernel_at_el0(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry,
 		MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_HISI_TSV110),
 		{ /* sentinel */ }
 	};
-	char const *str = "command line option";
+	char const *str = "kpti command line option";
 	bool meltdown_safe;
 
 	meltdown_safe = is_midr_in_range_list(read_cpuid_id(), kpti_safe_list);
@@ -988,6 +989,11 @@  static bool unmap_kernel_at_el0(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry,
 		__kpti_forced = -1;
 	}
 
+	if (cpu_mitigations_off() && !__kpti_forced) {
+		str = "mitigations=off";
+		__kpti_forced = -1;
+	}
+
 	/* Useful for KASLR robustness */
 	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE) && kaslr_offset() > 0) {
 		if (!__kpti_forced) {