| Message ID | 20190614092922.22517-1-ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org (mailing list archive) |
|---|---|
| State | Superseded |
| Delegated to: | Johannes Berg |
| Headers | show |
| Series | lib80211: use crypto API ccm(aes) transform for CCMP processing | expand |
Hi Ard, On Fri, Jun 14, 2019 at 11:29:22AM +0200, Ard Biesheuvel wrote: > -static void ccmp_init_blocks(struct crypto_cipher *tfm, > - struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr, > - u8 * pn, size_t dlen, u8 * b0, u8 * auth, u8 * s0) > +static void ccmp_init_blocks(struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr, > + u8 * pn, size_t dlen, u8 * b0, u8 * aad) > { > u8 *pos, qc = 0; > size_t aad_len; > int a4_included, qc_included; > - u8 aad[2 * AES_BLOCK_LEN]; > > a4_included = ieee80211_has_a4(hdr->frame_control); > qc_included = ieee80211_is_data_qos(hdr->frame_control); > @@ -131,17 +123,19 @@ static void ccmp_init_blocks(struct crypto_cipher *tfm, > aad_len += 2; > } > > - /* CCM Initial Block: > - * Flag (Include authentication header, M=3 (8-octet MIC), > - * L=1 (2-octet Dlen)) > - * Nonce: 0x00 | A2 | PN > - * Dlen */ > - b0[0] = 0x59; > + /* In CCM, the initial vectors (IV) used for CTR mode encryption and CBC > + * mode authentication are not allowed to collide, yet both are derived > + * from this vector b0. We only set L := 1 here to indicate that the > + * data size can be represented in (L+1) bytes. The CCM layer will take > + * care of storing the data length in the top (L+1) bytes and setting > + * and clearing the other bits as is required to derive the two IVs. > + */ > + b0[0] = 0x1; > + > + /* Nonce: QC | A2 | PN */ > b0[1] = qc; > memcpy(b0 + 2, hdr->addr2, ETH_ALEN); > memcpy(b0 + 8, pn, CCMP_PN_LEN); > - b0[14] = (dlen >> 8) & 0xff; > - b0[15] = dlen & 0xff; > > /* AAD: > * FC with bits 4..6 and 11..13 masked to zero; 14 is always one > @@ -166,16 +160,6 @@ static void ccmp_init_blocks(struct crypto_cipher *tfm, > aad[a4_included ? 30 : 24] = qc; > /* rest of QC masked */ > } > - > - /* Start with the first block and AAD */ > - lib80211_ccmp_aes_encrypt(tfm, b0, auth); > - xor_block(auth, aad, AES_BLOCK_LEN); > - lib80211_ccmp_aes_encrypt(tfm, auth, auth); > - xor_block(auth, &aad[AES_BLOCK_LEN], AES_BLOCK_LEN); > - lib80211_ccmp_aes_encrypt(tfm, auth, auth); > - b0[0] &= 0x07; > - b0[14] = b0[15] = 0; > - lib80211_ccmp_aes_encrypt(tfm, b0, s0); > } How about shifting the contents of aad over by 2 bytes and returning the AAD length from this function instead? It's confusing to still manually format the AAD length for CCM mode, when actually it's ignored now. Also I suggest fixing up the naming: ccmp_init_blocks() => ccmp_init_iv_and_aad() b0 => iv > > static int lib80211_ccmp_hdr(struct sk_buff *skb, int hdr_len, > @@ -218,13 +202,13 @@ static int lib80211_ccmp_hdr(struct sk_buff *skb, int hdr_len, > static int lib80211_ccmp_encrypt(struct sk_buff *skb, int hdr_len, void *priv) > { > struct lib80211_ccmp_data *key = priv; > - int data_len, i, blocks, last, len; > - u8 *pos, *mic; > struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr; > - u8 *b0 = key->tx_b0; > - u8 *b = key->tx_b; > - u8 *e = key->tx_e; > - u8 *s0 = key->tx_s0; > + struct aead_request *req; > + struct scatterlist sg[2]; > + u8 *aad = key->tx_aad; > + u8 b0[AES_BLOCK_LEN]; > + int len, data_len; > + int ret; > > if (skb_tailroom(skb) < CCMP_MIC_LEN || skb->len < hdr_len) > return -1; > @@ -234,31 +218,29 @@ static int lib80211_ccmp_encrypt(struct sk_buff *skb, int hdr_len, void *priv) > if (len < 0) > return -1; > > - pos = skb->data + hdr_len + CCMP_HDR_LEN; > + req = kzalloc(sizeof(*req) + crypto_aead_reqsize(key->tfm), GFP_ATOMIC); > + if (!req) > + return -ENOMEM; > + Why not kzalloc() and kzfree() instead of aead_request_alloc() and aead_request_free()? Same in lib80211_ccmp_decrypt(). Otherwise this patch looks good, though I'd like for someone to test it. Thanks for doing this! - Eric
On Sun, 16 Jun 2019 at 21:01, Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org> wrote: > > Hi Ard, > > On Fri, Jun 14, 2019 at 11:29:22AM +0200, Ard Biesheuvel wrote: > > -static void ccmp_init_blocks(struct crypto_cipher *tfm, > > - struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr, > > - u8 * pn, size_t dlen, u8 * b0, u8 * auth, u8 * s0) > > +static void ccmp_init_blocks(struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr, > > + u8 * pn, size_t dlen, u8 * b0, u8 * aad) > > { > > u8 *pos, qc = 0; > > size_t aad_len; > > int a4_included, qc_included; > > - u8 aad[2 * AES_BLOCK_LEN]; > > > > a4_included = ieee80211_has_a4(hdr->frame_control); > > qc_included = ieee80211_is_data_qos(hdr->frame_control); > > @@ -131,17 +123,19 @@ static void ccmp_init_blocks(struct crypto_cipher *tfm, > > aad_len += 2; > > } > > > > - /* CCM Initial Block: > > - * Flag (Include authentication header, M=3 (8-octet MIC), > > - * L=1 (2-octet Dlen)) > > - * Nonce: 0x00 | A2 | PN > > - * Dlen */ > > - b0[0] = 0x59; > > + /* In CCM, the initial vectors (IV) used for CTR mode encryption and CBC > > + * mode authentication are not allowed to collide, yet both are derived > > + * from this vector b0. We only set L := 1 here to indicate that the > > + * data size can be represented in (L+1) bytes. The CCM layer will take > > + * care of storing the data length in the top (L+1) bytes and setting > > + * and clearing the other bits as is required to derive the two IVs. > > + */ > > + b0[0] = 0x1; > > + > > + /* Nonce: QC | A2 | PN */ > > b0[1] = qc; > > memcpy(b0 + 2, hdr->addr2, ETH_ALEN); > > memcpy(b0 + 8, pn, CCMP_PN_LEN); > > - b0[14] = (dlen >> 8) & 0xff; > > - b0[15] = dlen & 0xff; > > > > /* AAD: > > * FC with bits 4..6 and 11..13 masked to zero; 14 is always one > > @@ -166,16 +160,6 @@ static void ccmp_init_blocks(struct crypto_cipher *tfm, > > aad[a4_included ? 30 : 24] = qc; > > /* rest of QC masked */ > > } > > - > > - /* Start with the first block and AAD */ > > - lib80211_ccmp_aes_encrypt(tfm, b0, auth); > > - xor_block(auth, aad, AES_BLOCK_LEN); > > - lib80211_ccmp_aes_encrypt(tfm, auth, auth); > > - xor_block(auth, &aad[AES_BLOCK_LEN], AES_BLOCK_LEN); > > - lib80211_ccmp_aes_encrypt(tfm, auth, auth); > > - b0[0] &= 0x07; > > - b0[14] = b0[15] = 0; > > - lib80211_ccmp_aes_encrypt(tfm, b0, s0); > > } > > How about shifting the contents of aad over by 2 bytes and returning the AAD > length from this function instead? It's confusing to still manually format the > AAD length for CCM mode, when actually it's ignored now. > > Also I suggest fixing up the naming: > > ccmp_init_blocks() => ccmp_init_iv_and_aad() > b0 => iv > > > > > static int lib80211_ccmp_hdr(struct sk_buff *skb, int hdr_len, > > @@ -218,13 +202,13 @@ static int lib80211_ccmp_hdr(struct sk_buff *skb, int hdr_len, > > static int lib80211_ccmp_encrypt(struct sk_buff *skb, int hdr_len, void *priv) > > { > > struct lib80211_ccmp_data *key = priv; > > - int data_len, i, blocks, last, len; > > - u8 *pos, *mic; > > struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr; > > - u8 *b0 = key->tx_b0; > > - u8 *b = key->tx_b; > > - u8 *e = key->tx_e; > > - u8 *s0 = key->tx_s0; > > + struct aead_request *req; > > + struct scatterlist sg[2]; > > + u8 *aad = key->tx_aad; > > + u8 b0[AES_BLOCK_LEN]; > > + int len, data_len; > > + int ret; > > > > if (skb_tailroom(skb) < CCMP_MIC_LEN || skb->len < hdr_len) > > return -1; > > @@ -234,31 +218,29 @@ static int lib80211_ccmp_encrypt(struct sk_buff *skb, int hdr_len, void *priv) > > if (len < 0) > > return -1; > > > > - pos = skb->data + hdr_len + CCMP_HDR_LEN; > > + req = kzalloc(sizeof(*req) + crypto_aead_reqsize(key->tfm), GFP_ATOMIC); > > + if (!req) > > + return -ENOMEM; > > + > > Why not kzalloc() and kzfree() instead of aead_request_alloc() and > aead_request_free()? Same in lib80211_ccmp_decrypt(). > Why kzalloc, right? (i.e., without the 'not'). Good question, I'll change that. > Otherwise this patch looks good, though I'd like for someone to test it. > > Thanks for doing this! > As you know, I want to get rid of all the crypto cobbled together using the cipher interface. I guess it's my turn to clean up some of this mess :-)
On Sun, Jun 16, 2019 at 12:01:38PM -0700, Eric Biggers wrote: > Hi Ard, > > On Fri, Jun 14, 2019 at 11:29:22AM +0200, Ard Biesheuvel wrote: > > -static void ccmp_init_blocks(struct crypto_cipher *tfm, > > - struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr, > > - u8 * pn, size_t dlen, u8 * b0, u8 * auth, u8 * s0) > > +static void ccmp_init_blocks(struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr, > > + u8 * pn, size_t dlen, u8 * b0, u8 * aad) > > { > > u8 *pos, qc = 0; > > size_t aad_len; > > int a4_included, qc_included; > > - u8 aad[2 * AES_BLOCK_LEN]; > > > > a4_included = ieee80211_has_a4(hdr->frame_control); > > qc_included = ieee80211_is_data_qos(hdr->frame_control); > > @@ -131,17 +123,19 @@ static void ccmp_init_blocks(struct crypto_cipher *tfm, > > aad_len += 2; > > } > > > > - /* CCM Initial Block: > > - * Flag (Include authentication header, M=3 (8-octet MIC), > > - * L=1 (2-octet Dlen)) > > - * Nonce: 0x00 | A2 | PN > > - * Dlen */ > > - b0[0] = 0x59; > > + /* In CCM, the initial vectors (IV) used for CTR mode encryption and CBC > > + * mode authentication are not allowed to collide, yet both are derived > > + * from this vector b0. We only set L := 1 here to indicate that the > > + * data size can be represented in (L+1) bytes. The CCM layer will take > > + * care of storing the data length in the top (L+1) bytes and setting > > + * and clearing the other bits as is required to derive the two IVs. > > + */ > > + b0[0] = 0x1; > > + > > + /* Nonce: QC | A2 | PN */ > > b0[1] = qc; > > memcpy(b0 + 2, hdr->addr2, ETH_ALEN); > > memcpy(b0 + 8, pn, CCMP_PN_LEN); > > - b0[14] = (dlen >> 8) & 0xff; > > - b0[15] = dlen & 0xff; > > > > /* AAD: > > * FC with bits 4..6 and 11..13 masked to zero; 14 is always one > > @@ -166,16 +160,6 @@ static void ccmp_init_blocks(struct crypto_cipher *tfm, > > aad[a4_included ? 30 : 24] = qc; > > /* rest of QC masked */ > > } > > - > > - /* Start with the first block and AAD */ > > - lib80211_ccmp_aes_encrypt(tfm, b0, auth); > > - xor_block(auth, aad, AES_BLOCK_LEN); > > - lib80211_ccmp_aes_encrypt(tfm, auth, auth); > > - xor_block(auth, &aad[AES_BLOCK_LEN], AES_BLOCK_LEN); > > - lib80211_ccmp_aes_encrypt(tfm, auth, auth); > > - b0[0] &= 0x07; > > - b0[14] = b0[15] = 0; > > - lib80211_ccmp_aes_encrypt(tfm, b0, s0); > > } > > How about shifting the contents of aad over by 2 bytes and returning the AAD > length from this function instead? It's confusing to still manually format the > AAD length for CCM mode, when actually it's ignored now. > > Also I suggest fixing up the naming: > > ccmp_init_blocks() => ccmp_init_iv_and_aad() > b0 => iv > Okay, couple more things. The 'dlen' parameter is no longer used so should be removed. Also consider constifying 'hdr' and 'pn' to make it clear what's input vs. output. Also, xor_block() is no longer used so should be removed. - Eric
On Sun, Jun 16, 2019 at 09:07:28PM +0200, Ard Biesheuvel wrote: > On Sun, 16 Jun 2019 at 21:01, Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org> wrote: > > > > Hi Ard, > > > > On Fri, Jun 14, 2019 at 11:29:22AM +0200, Ard Biesheuvel wrote: > > > -static void ccmp_init_blocks(struct crypto_cipher *tfm, > > > - struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr, > > > - u8 * pn, size_t dlen, u8 * b0, u8 * auth, u8 * s0) > > > +static void ccmp_init_blocks(struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr, > > > + u8 * pn, size_t dlen, u8 * b0, u8 * aad) > > > { > > > u8 *pos, qc = 0; > > > size_t aad_len; > > > int a4_included, qc_included; > > > - u8 aad[2 * AES_BLOCK_LEN]; > > > > > > a4_included = ieee80211_has_a4(hdr->frame_control); > > > qc_included = ieee80211_is_data_qos(hdr->frame_control); > > > @@ -131,17 +123,19 @@ static void ccmp_init_blocks(struct crypto_cipher *tfm, > > > aad_len += 2; > > > } > > > > > > - /* CCM Initial Block: > > > - * Flag (Include authentication header, M=3 (8-octet MIC), > > > - * L=1 (2-octet Dlen)) > > > - * Nonce: 0x00 | A2 | PN > > > - * Dlen */ > > > - b0[0] = 0x59; > > > + /* In CCM, the initial vectors (IV) used for CTR mode encryption and CBC > > > + * mode authentication are not allowed to collide, yet both are derived > > > + * from this vector b0. We only set L := 1 here to indicate that the > > > + * data size can be represented in (L+1) bytes. The CCM layer will take > > > + * care of storing the data length in the top (L+1) bytes and setting > > > + * and clearing the other bits as is required to derive the two IVs. > > > + */ > > > + b0[0] = 0x1; > > > + > > > + /* Nonce: QC | A2 | PN */ > > > b0[1] = qc; > > > memcpy(b0 + 2, hdr->addr2, ETH_ALEN); > > > memcpy(b0 + 8, pn, CCMP_PN_LEN); > > > - b0[14] = (dlen >> 8) & 0xff; > > > - b0[15] = dlen & 0xff; > > > > > > /* AAD: > > > * FC with bits 4..6 and 11..13 masked to zero; 14 is always one > > > @@ -166,16 +160,6 @@ static void ccmp_init_blocks(struct crypto_cipher *tfm, > > > aad[a4_included ? 30 : 24] = qc; > > > /* rest of QC masked */ > > > } > > > - > > > - /* Start with the first block and AAD */ > > > - lib80211_ccmp_aes_encrypt(tfm, b0, auth); > > > - xor_block(auth, aad, AES_BLOCK_LEN); > > > - lib80211_ccmp_aes_encrypt(tfm, auth, auth); > > > - xor_block(auth, &aad[AES_BLOCK_LEN], AES_BLOCK_LEN); > > > - lib80211_ccmp_aes_encrypt(tfm, auth, auth); > > > - b0[0] &= 0x07; > > > - b0[14] = b0[15] = 0; > > > - lib80211_ccmp_aes_encrypt(tfm, b0, s0); > > > } > > > > How about shifting the contents of aad over by 2 bytes and returning the AAD > > length from this function instead? It's confusing to still manually format the > > AAD length for CCM mode, when actually it's ignored now. > > > > Also I suggest fixing up the naming: > > > > ccmp_init_blocks() => ccmp_init_iv_and_aad() > > b0 => iv > > > > > > > > static int lib80211_ccmp_hdr(struct sk_buff *skb, int hdr_len, > > > @@ -218,13 +202,13 @@ static int lib80211_ccmp_hdr(struct sk_buff *skb, int hdr_len, > > > static int lib80211_ccmp_encrypt(struct sk_buff *skb, int hdr_len, void *priv) > > > { > > > struct lib80211_ccmp_data *key = priv; > > > - int data_len, i, blocks, last, len; > > > - u8 *pos, *mic; > > > struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr; > > > - u8 *b0 = key->tx_b0; > > > - u8 *b = key->tx_b; > > > - u8 *e = key->tx_e; > > > - u8 *s0 = key->tx_s0; > > > + struct aead_request *req; > > > + struct scatterlist sg[2]; > > > + u8 *aad = key->tx_aad; > > > + u8 b0[AES_BLOCK_LEN]; > > > + int len, data_len; > > > + int ret; > > > > > > if (skb_tailroom(skb) < CCMP_MIC_LEN || skb->len < hdr_len) > > > return -1; > > > @@ -234,31 +218,29 @@ static int lib80211_ccmp_encrypt(struct sk_buff *skb, int hdr_len, void *priv) > > > if (len < 0) > > > return -1; > > > > > > - pos = skb->data + hdr_len + CCMP_HDR_LEN; > > > + req = kzalloc(sizeof(*req) + crypto_aead_reqsize(key->tfm), GFP_ATOMIC); > > > + if (!req) > > > + return -ENOMEM; > > > + > > > > Why not kzalloc() and kzfree() instead of aead_request_alloc() and > > aead_request_free()? Same in lib80211_ccmp_decrypt(). > > > > Why kzalloc, right? (i.e., without the 'not'). Good question, I'll change that. > Yes ignore the "not", sorry. - Eric
diff --git a/net/wireless/Kconfig b/net/wireless/Kconfig index 578cce4fbe6c..5e3183c6cbd6 100644 --- a/net/wireless/Kconfig +++ b/net/wireless/Kconfig @@ -217,6 +217,8 @@ config LIB80211_CRYPT_WEP config LIB80211_CRYPT_CCMP tristate + select CRYPTO_AES + select CRYPTO_CCM config LIB80211_CRYPT_TKIP tristate diff --git a/net/wireless/lib80211_crypt_ccmp.c b/net/wireless/lib80211_crypt_ccmp.c index 55214fe925b2..568fc02381e5 100644 --- a/net/wireless/lib80211_crypt_ccmp.c +++ b/net/wireless/lib80211_crypt_ccmp.c @@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ #include <linux/ieee80211.h> #include <linux/crypto.h> +#include <crypto/aead.h> #include <net/lib80211.h> @@ -52,20 +53,13 @@ struct lib80211_ccmp_data { int key_idx; - struct crypto_cipher *tfm; + struct crypto_aead *tfm; /* scratch buffers for virt_to_page() (crypto API) */ - u8 tx_b0[AES_BLOCK_LEN], tx_b[AES_BLOCK_LEN], - tx_e[AES_BLOCK_LEN], tx_s0[AES_BLOCK_LEN]; - u8 rx_b0[AES_BLOCK_LEN], rx_b[AES_BLOCK_LEN], rx_a[AES_BLOCK_LEN]; + u8 tx_aad[2 * AES_BLOCK_LEN]; + u8 rx_aad[2 * AES_BLOCK_LEN]; }; -static inline void lib80211_ccmp_aes_encrypt(struct crypto_cipher *tfm, - const u8 pt[16], u8 ct[16]) -{ - crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(tfm, ct, pt); -} - static void *lib80211_ccmp_init(int key_idx) { struct lib80211_ccmp_data *priv; @@ -75,7 +69,7 @@ static void *lib80211_ccmp_init(int key_idx) goto fail; priv->key_idx = key_idx; - priv->tfm = crypto_alloc_cipher("aes", 0, 0); + priv->tfm = crypto_alloc_aead("ccm(aes)", 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC); if (IS_ERR(priv->tfm)) { priv->tfm = NULL; goto fail; @@ -86,7 +80,7 @@ static void *lib80211_ccmp_init(int key_idx) fail: if (priv) { if (priv->tfm) - crypto_free_cipher(priv->tfm); + crypto_free_aead(priv->tfm); kfree(priv); } @@ -97,7 +91,7 @@ static void lib80211_ccmp_deinit(void *priv) { struct lib80211_ccmp_data *_priv = priv; if (_priv && _priv->tfm) - crypto_free_cipher(_priv->tfm); + crypto_free_aead(_priv->tfm); kfree(priv); } @@ -108,14 +102,12 @@ static inline void xor_block(u8 * b, u8 * a, size_t len) b[i] ^= a[i]; } -static void ccmp_init_blocks(struct crypto_cipher *tfm, - struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr, - u8 * pn, size_t dlen, u8 * b0, u8 * auth, u8 * s0) +static void ccmp_init_blocks(struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr, + u8 * pn, size_t dlen, u8 * b0, u8 * aad) { u8 *pos, qc = 0; size_t aad_len; int a4_included, qc_included; - u8 aad[2 * AES_BLOCK_LEN]; a4_included = ieee80211_has_a4(hdr->frame_control); qc_included = ieee80211_is_data_qos(hdr->frame_control); @@ -131,17 +123,19 @@ static void ccmp_init_blocks(struct crypto_cipher *tfm, aad_len += 2; } - /* CCM Initial Block: - * Flag (Include authentication header, M=3 (8-octet MIC), - * L=1 (2-octet Dlen)) - * Nonce: 0x00 | A2 | PN - * Dlen */ - b0[0] = 0x59; + /* In CCM, the initial vectors (IV) used for CTR mode encryption and CBC + * mode authentication are not allowed to collide, yet both are derived + * from this vector b0. We only set L := 1 here to indicate that the + * data size can be represented in (L+1) bytes. The CCM layer will take + * care of storing the data length in the top (L+1) bytes and setting + * and clearing the other bits as is required to derive the two IVs. + */ + b0[0] = 0x1; + + /* Nonce: QC | A2 | PN */ b0[1] = qc; memcpy(b0 + 2, hdr->addr2, ETH_ALEN); memcpy(b0 + 8, pn, CCMP_PN_LEN); - b0[14] = (dlen >> 8) & 0xff; - b0[15] = dlen & 0xff; /* AAD: * FC with bits 4..6 and 11..13 masked to zero; 14 is always one @@ -166,16 +160,6 @@ static void ccmp_init_blocks(struct crypto_cipher *tfm, aad[a4_included ? 30 : 24] = qc; /* rest of QC masked */ } - - /* Start with the first block and AAD */ - lib80211_ccmp_aes_encrypt(tfm, b0, auth); - xor_block(auth, aad, AES_BLOCK_LEN); - lib80211_ccmp_aes_encrypt(tfm, auth, auth); - xor_block(auth, &aad[AES_BLOCK_LEN], AES_BLOCK_LEN); - lib80211_ccmp_aes_encrypt(tfm, auth, auth); - b0[0] &= 0x07; - b0[14] = b0[15] = 0; - lib80211_ccmp_aes_encrypt(tfm, b0, s0); } static int lib80211_ccmp_hdr(struct sk_buff *skb, int hdr_len, @@ -218,13 +202,13 @@ static int lib80211_ccmp_hdr(struct sk_buff *skb, int hdr_len, static int lib80211_ccmp_encrypt(struct sk_buff *skb, int hdr_len, void *priv) { struct lib80211_ccmp_data *key = priv; - int data_len, i, blocks, last, len; - u8 *pos, *mic; struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr; - u8 *b0 = key->tx_b0; - u8 *b = key->tx_b; - u8 *e = key->tx_e; - u8 *s0 = key->tx_s0; + struct aead_request *req; + struct scatterlist sg[2]; + u8 *aad = key->tx_aad; + u8 b0[AES_BLOCK_LEN]; + int len, data_len; + int ret; if (skb_tailroom(skb) < CCMP_MIC_LEN || skb->len < hdr_len) return -1; @@ -234,31 +218,29 @@ static int lib80211_ccmp_encrypt(struct sk_buff *skb, int hdr_len, void *priv) if (len < 0) return -1; - pos = skb->data + hdr_len + CCMP_HDR_LEN; + req = kzalloc(sizeof(*req) + crypto_aead_reqsize(key->tfm), GFP_ATOMIC); + if (!req) + return -ENOMEM; + hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data; - ccmp_init_blocks(key->tfm, hdr, key->tx_pn, data_len, b0, b, s0); - - blocks = DIV_ROUND_UP(data_len, AES_BLOCK_LEN); - last = data_len % AES_BLOCK_LEN; - - for (i = 1; i <= blocks; i++) { - len = (i == blocks && last) ? last : AES_BLOCK_LEN; - /* Authentication */ - xor_block(b, pos, len); - lib80211_ccmp_aes_encrypt(key->tfm, b, b); - /* Encryption, with counter */ - b0[14] = (i >> 8) & 0xff; - b0[15] = i & 0xff; - lib80211_ccmp_aes_encrypt(key->tfm, b0, e); - xor_block(pos, e, len); - pos += len; - } + ccmp_init_blocks(hdr, key->tx_pn, data_len, b0, aad); - mic = skb_put(skb, CCMP_MIC_LEN); - for (i = 0; i < CCMP_MIC_LEN; i++) - mic[i] = b[i] ^ s0[i]; + skb_put(skb, CCMP_MIC_LEN); - return 0; + sg_init_table(sg, 2); + sg_set_buf(&sg[0], aad + 2, be16_to_cpup((__be16 *)aad)); + sg_set_buf(&sg[1], skb->data + hdr_len + CCMP_HDR_LEN, + data_len + CCMP_MIC_LEN); + + aead_request_set_tfm(req, key->tfm); + aead_request_set_callback(req, 0, NULL, NULL); + aead_request_set_ad(req, sg[0].length); + aead_request_set_crypt(req, sg, sg, data_len, b0); + + ret = crypto_aead_encrypt(req); + kzfree(req); + + return ret; } /* @@ -287,13 +269,13 @@ static int lib80211_ccmp_decrypt(struct sk_buff *skb, int hdr_len, void *priv) struct lib80211_ccmp_data *key = priv; u8 keyidx, *pos; struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr; - u8 *b0 = key->rx_b0; - u8 *b = key->rx_b; - u8 *a = key->rx_a; + struct aead_request *req; + struct scatterlist sg[2]; + u8 *aad = key->rx_aad; + u8 b0[AES_BLOCK_LEN]; u8 pn[6]; - int i, blocks, last, len; + int ret; size_t data_len = skb->len - hdr_len - CCMP_HDR_LEN - CCMP_MIC_LEN; - u8 *mic = skb->data + skb->len - CCMP_MIC_LEN; if (skb->len < hdr_len + CCMP_HDR_LEN + CCMP_MIC_LEN) { key->dot11RSNAStatsCCMPFormatErrors++; @@ -341,28 +323,27 @@ static int lib80211_ccmp_decrypt(struct sk_buff *skb, int hdr_len, void *priv) return -4; } - ccmp_init_blocks(key->tfm, hdr, pn, data_len, b0, a, b); - xor_block(mic, b, CCMP_MIC_LEN); - - blocks = DIV_ROUND_UP(data_len, AES_BLOCK_LEN); - last = data_len % AES_BLOCK_LEN; - - for (i = 1; i <= blocks; i++) { - len = (i == blocks && last) ? last : AES_BLOCK_LEN; - /* Decrypt, with counter */ - b0[14] = (i >> 8) & 0xff; - b0[15] = i & 0xff; - lib80211_ccmp_aes_encrypt(key->tfm, b0, b); - xor_block(pos, b, len); - /* Authentication */ - xor_block(a, pos, len); - lib80211_ccmp_aes_encrypt(key->tfm, a, a); - pos += len; - } + req = kzalloc(sizeof(*req) + crypto_aead_reqsize(key->tfm), GFP_ATOMIC); + if (!req) + return -ENOMEM; - if (memcmp(mic, a, CCMP_MIC_LEN) != 0) { - net_dbg_ratelimited("CCMP: decrypt failed: STA=%pM\n", - hdr->addr2); + ccmp_init_blocks(hdr, pn, data_len, b0, aad); + + sg_init_table(sg, 2); + sg_set_buf(&sg[0], aad + 2, be16_to_cpup((__be16 *)aad)); + sg_set_buf(&sg[1], pos, data_len + CCMP_MIC_LEN); + + aead_request_set_tfm(req, key->tfm); + aead_request_set_callback(req, 0, NULL, NULL); + aead_request_set_ad(req, sg[0].length); + aead_request_set_crypt(req, sg, sg, data_len + CCMP_MIC_LEN, b0); + + ret = crypto_aead_decrypt(req); + kzfree(req); + + if (ret) { + net_dbg_ratelimited("CCMP: decrypt failed: STA=%pM (%d)\n", + hdr->addr2, ret); key->dot11RSNAStatsCCMPDecryptErrors++; return -5; } @@ -381,7 +362,7 @@ static int lib80211_ccmp_set_key(void *key, int len, u8 * seq, void *priv) { struct lib80211_ccmp_data *data = priv; int keyidx; - struct crypto_cipher *tfm = data->tfm; + struct crypto_aead *tfm = data->tfm; keyidx = data->key_idx; memset(data, 0, sizeof(*data)); @@ -398,7 +379,9 @@ static int lib80211_ccmp_set_key(void *key, int len, u8 * seq, void *priv) data->rx_pn[4] = seq[1]; data->rx_pn[5] = seq[0]; } - crypto_cipher_setkey(data->tfm, data->key, CCMP_TK_LEN); + if (crypto_aead_setauthsize(data->tfm, CCMP_MIC_LEN) || + crypto_aead_setkey(data->tfm, data->key, CCMP_TK_LEN)) + return -1; } else if (len == 0) data->key_set = 0; else
Instead of open coding the CCM aead mode in the driver, and invoking the AES block cipher block by block, use a ccm(aes) aead transform which already encapsulates this functionality. This is a cleaner use of the crypto API, and permits optimized implementations to be used, which are typically much faster and deal more efficiently with the SIMD register file, which usually needs to be preserved/restored in order to use special AES instructions. Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> --- NOTE: build tested only, since I don't have the hardware Two other instances of this code exist in staging/. I should be able to find someone who is willing to apply the same changes there, as a training exercise (once we confirm that it works as expected) net/wireless/Kconfig | 2 + net/wireless/lib80211_crypt_ccmp.c | 165 +++++++++----------- 2 files changed, 76 insertions(+), 91 deletions(-)