| Message ID | 20190723065059.30101-1-omosnace@redhat.com (mailing list archive) |
|---|---|
| State | Accepted |
| Headers | show |
| Series | [v2] selinux: check sidtab limit before adding a new entry | expand |
On Tue, Jul 23, 2019 at 08:50:59AM +0200, Ondrej Mosnacek wrote: > We need to error out when trying to add an entry above SIDTAB_MAX in > sidtab_reverse_lookup() to avoid overflow on the odd chance that this > happens. > > Fixes: ee1a84fdfeed ("selinux: overhaul sidtab to fix bug and improve performance") > Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> -Kees > --- > security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c | 5 +++++ > 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) > > diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c b/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c > index e63a90ff2728..1f0a6eaa2d6a 100644 > --- a/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c > +++ b/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c > @@ -286,6 +286,11 @@ static int sidtab_reverse_lookup(struct sidtab *s, struct context *context, > ++count; > } > > + /* bail out if we already reached max entries */ > + rc = -EOVERFLOW; > + if (count >= SIDTAB_MAX) > + goto out_unlock; > + > /* insert context into new entry */ > rc = -ENOMEM; > dst = sidtab_do_lookup(s, count, 1); > -- > 2.21.0 >
On Tue, Jul 23, 2019 at 2:51 AM Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> wrote: > > We need to error out when trying to add an entry above SIDTAB_MAX in > sidtab_reverse_lookup() to avoid overflow on the odd chance that this > happens. > > Fixes: ee1a84fdfeed ("selinux: overhaul sidtab to fix bug and improve performance") > Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> > --- > security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c | 5 +++++ > 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) Thanks. This looks like -stable material to me so I've marked it as such and merged it into selinux/stable-5.3; assuming it passes testing, and as long as I don't hear any objections, I'll send it up to Linus later this week. > diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c b/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c > index e63a90ff2728..1f0a6eaa2d6a 100644 > --- a/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c > +++ b/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c > @@ -286,6 +286,11 @@ static int sidtab_reverse_lookup(struct sidtab *s, struct context *context, > ++count; > } > > + /* bail out if we already reached max entries */ > + rc = -EOVERFLOW; > + if (count >= SIDTAB_MAX) > + goto out_unlock; > + > /* insert context into new entry */ > rc = -ENOMEM; > dst = sidtab_do_lookup(s, count, 1); > -- > 2.21.0
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c b/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c index e63a90ff2728..1f0a6eaa2d6a 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c +++ b/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c @@ -286,6 +286,11 @@ static int sidtab_reverse_lookup(struct sidtab *s, struct context *context, ++count; } + /* bail out if we already reached max entries */ + rc = -EOVERFLOW; + if (count >= SIDTAB_MAX) + goto out_unlock; + /* insert context into new entry */ rc = -ENOMEM; dst = sidtab_do_lookup(s, count, 1);
We need to error out when trying to add an entry above SIDTAB_MAX in sidtab_reverse_lookup() to avoid overflow on the odd chance that this happens. Fixes: ee1a84fdfeed ("selinux: overhaul sidtab to fix bug and improve performance") Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> --- security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)