| Message ID | 20190820001805.241928-11-matthewgarrett@google.com (mailing list archive) |
|---|---|
| State | Not Applicable, archived |
| Headers | show |
| Series | None | expand |
On Tuesday, August 20, 2019 2:17:46 AM CEST Matthew Garrett wrote: > From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org> > > There is currently no way to verify the resume image when returning > from hibernate. This might compromise the signed modules trust model, > so until we can work with signed hibernate images we disable it when the > kernel is locked down. > > Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org> > Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> > Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> > Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> > Cc: rjw@rjwysocki.net > Cc: pavel@ucw.cz > cc: linux-pm@vger.kernel.org > Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com> > --- > include/linux/security.h | 1 + > kernel/power/hibernate.c | 3 ++- > security/lockdown/lockdown.c | 1 + > 3 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) > > diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h > index b607a8ac97fe..80ac7fb27aa9 100644 > --- a/include/linux/security.h > +++ b/include/linux/security.h > @@ -106,6 +106,7 @@ enum lockdown_reason { > LOCKDOWN_MODULE_SIGNATURE, > LOCKDOWN_DEV_MEM, > LOCKDOWN_KEXEC, > + LOCKDOWN_HIBERNATION, > LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX, > LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX, > }; > diff --git a/kernel/power/hibernate.c b/kernel/power/hibernate.c > index cd7434e6000d..3c0a5a8170b0 100644 > --- a/kernel/power/hibernate.c > +++ b/kernel/power/hibernate.c > @@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ > #include <linux/ctype.h> > #include <linux/genhd.h> > #include <linux/ktime.h> > +#include <linux/security.h> > #include <trace/events/power.h> > > #include "power.h" > @@ -68,7 +69,7 @@ static const struct platform_hibernation_ops *hibernation_ops; > > bool hibernation_available(void) > { > - return (nohibernate == 0); > + return nohibernate == 0 && !security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_HIBERNATION); > } > > /** > diff --git a/security/lockdown/lockdown.c b/security/lockdown/lockdown.c > index aaf30ad351f9..3462f7edcaac 100644 > --- a/security/lockdown/lockdown.c > +++ b/security/lockdown/lockdown.c > @@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ static char *lockdown_reasons[LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX+1] = { > [LOCKDOWN_MODULE_SIGNATURE] = "unsigned module loading", > [LOCKDOWN_DEV_MEM] = "/dev/mem,kmem,port", > [LOCKDOWN_KEXEC] = "kexec of unsigned images", > + [LOCKDOWN_HIBERNATION] = "hibernation", > [LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX] = "integrity", > [LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX] = "confidentiality", > }; >
On Mon 2019-08-19 17:17:46, Matthew Garrett wrote: > From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org> > > There is currently no way to verify the resume image when returning > from hibernate. This might compromise the signed modules trust model, > so until we can work with signed hibernate images we disable it when the > kernel is locked down. > > Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org> > Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> > Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> > Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> > Cc: rjw@rjwysocki.net > Cc: pavel@ucw.cz > cc: linux-pm@vger.kernel.org > Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz> Pavel
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h index b607a8ac97fe..80ac7fb27aa9 100644 --- a/include/linux/security.h +++ b/include/linux/security.h @@ -106,6 +106,7 @@ enum lockdown_reason { LOCKDOWN_MODULE_SIGNATURE, LOCKDOWN_DEV_MEM, LOCKDOWN_KEXEC, + LOCKDOWN_HIBERNATION, LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX, LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX, }; diff --git a/kernel/power/hibernate.c b/kernel/power/hibernate.c index cd7434e6000d..3c0a5a8170b0 100644 --- a/kernel/power/hibernate.c +++ b/kernel/power/hibernate.c @@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ #include <linux/ctype.h> #include <linux/genhd.h> #include <linux/ktime.h> +#include <linux/security.h> #include <trace/events/power.h> #include "power.h" @@ -68,7 +69,7 @@ static const struct platform_hibernation_ops *hibernation_ops; bool hibernation_available(void) { - return (nohibernate == 0); + return nohibernate == 0 && !security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_HIBERNATION); } /** diff --git a/security/lockdown/lockdown.c b/security/lockdown/lockdown.c index aaf30ad351f9..3462f7edcaac 100644 --- a/security/lockdown/lockdown.c +++ b/security/lockdown/lockdown.c @@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ static char *lockdown_reasons[LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX+1] = { [LOCKDOWN_MODULE_SIGNATURE] = "unsigned module loading", [LOCKDOWN_DEV_MEM] = "/dev/mem,kmem,port", [LOCKDOWN_KEXEC] = "kexec of unsigned images", + [LOCKDOWN_HIBERNATION] = "hibernation", [LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX] = "integrity", [LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX] = "confidentiality", };