Message ID | 1566218108-12705-3-git-send-email-nayna@linux.ibm.com (mailing list archive) |
---|---|
State | New, archived |
Headers | show |
Series | powerpc: Enabling IMA arch specific secure boot policies | expand |
Hi Nayna, Some more comments below. Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com> writes: > POWER secure boot relies on the kernel IMA security subsystem to > perform the OS kernel image signature verification. Again this is just a design choice we've made, it's not specified anywhere or anything like that. And it only applies to bare metal secure boot, at least so far. AIUI. > Since each secure > boot mode has different IMA policy requirements, dynamic definition of > the policy rules based on the runtime secure boot mode of the system is > required. On systems that support secure boot, but have it disabled, > only measurement policy rules of the kernel image and modules are > defined. It's probably worth mentioning that we intend to use this in our Linux-based boot loader, which uses kexec, and that's one of the reasons why we're particularly interested in defining the rules for kexec? > This patch defines the arch-specific implementation to retrieve the > secure boot mode of the system and accordingly configures the IMA policy > rules. > > This patch provides arch-specific IMA policies if PPC_SECURE_BOOT > config is enabled. > > Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com> > --- > arch/powerpc/Kconfig | 2 ++ > arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile | 2 +- > arch/powerpc/kernel/ima_arch.c | 50 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ > include/linux/ima.h | 3 +- > 4 files changed, 55 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) > create mode 100644 arch/powerpc/kernel/ima_arch.c > > diff --git a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig b/arch/powerpc/Kconfig > index c902a39124dc..42109682b727 100644 > --- a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig > +++ b/arch/powerpc/Kconfig > @@ -917,6 +917,8 @@ config PPC_SECURE_BOOT > bool > default n > depends on PPC64 > + depends on IMA > + depends on IMA_ARCH_POLICY > help > Linux on POWER with firmware secure boot enabled needs to define > security policies to extend secure boot to the OS.This config > diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile b/arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile > index d310ebb4e526..520b1c814197 100644 > --- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile > +++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile > @@ -157,7 +157,7 @@ endif > obj-$(CONFIG_EPAPR_PARAVIRT) += epapr_paravirt.o epapr_hcalls.o > obj-$(CONFIG_KVM_GUEST) += kvm.o kvm_emul.o > > -obj-$(CONFIG_PPC_SECURE_BOOT) += secboot.o > +obj-$(CONFIG_PPC_SECURE_BOOT) += secboot.o ima_arch.o > > # Disable GCOV, KCOV & sanitizers in odd or sensitive code > GCOV_PROFILE_prom_init.o := n > diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/ima_arch.c b/arch/powerpc/kernel/ima_arch.c > new file mode 100644 > index 000000000000..ac90fac83338 > --- /dev/null > +++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/ima_arch.c > @@ -0,0 +1,50 @@ > +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 > +/* > + * Copyright (C) 2019 IBM Corporation > + * Author: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com> > + * > + * ima_arch.c > + * - initialize ima policies for PowerPC Secure Boot > + */ > + > +#include <linux/ima.h> > +#include <asm/secboot.h> > + > +bool arch_ima_get_secureboot(void) > +{ > + return get_powerpc_secureboot(); > +} > + > +/* > + * File signature verification is not needed, include only measurements > + */ > +static const char *const default_arch_rules[] = { > + "measure func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK", > + "measure func=MODULE_CHECK", > + NULL > +}; The rules above seem fairly self explanatory. > + > +/* Both file signature verification and measurements are needed */ > +static const char *const sb_arch_rules[] = { > + "measure func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK template=ima-modsig", > + "appraise func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK appraise_type=imasig|modsig", > +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG) > + "measure func=MODULE_CHECK", > +#else > + "measure func=MODULE_CHECK template=ima-modsig", > + "appraise func=MODULE_CHECK appraise_type=imasig|modsig", > +#endif But these ones are not so obvious, at least to me who knows very little about IMA. Can you add a one line comment to each of the ones in here saying what it does and why we want it? > + NULL > +}; > + > +/* > + * On PowerPC, file measurements are to be added to the IMA measurement list > + * irrespective of the secure boot state of the system. Why? Just because we think it's useful? Would be good to provide some further justification. * Signature verification > + * is conditionally enabled based on the secure boot state. > + */ > +const char *const *arch_get_ima_policy(void) > +{ > + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IMA_ARCH_POLICY) && arch_ima_get_secureboot()) > + return sb_arch_rules; > + return default_arch_rules; > +} > diff --git a/include/linux/ima.h b/include/linux/ima.h > index a20ad398d260..10af09b5b478 100644 > --- a/include/linux/ima.h > +++ b/include/linux/ima.h > @@ -29,7 +29,8 @@ extern void ima_kexec_cmdline(const void *buf, int size); > extern void ima_add_kexec_buffer(struct kimage *image); > #endif > > -#if (defined(CONFIG_X86) && defined(CONFIG_EFI)) || defined(CONFIG_S390) > +#if (defined(CONFIG_X86) && defined(CONFIG_EFI)) || defined(CONFIG_S390) \ > + || defined(CONFIG_PPC_SECURE_BOOT) > extern bool arch_ima_get_secureboot(void); > extern const char * const *arch_get_ima_policy(void); > #else cheers
On 09/02/2019 07:52 AM, Michael Ellerman wrote: > Hi Nayna, Hi Michael, > > Some more comments below. > > Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com> writes: >> POWER secure boot relies on the kernel IMA security subsystem to >> perform the OS kernel image signature verification. > Again this is just a design choice we've made, it's not specified > anywhere or anything like that. And it only applies to bare metal secure > boot, at least so far. AIUI. Yes. I will make it consistent to use "PowerNV". >> Since each secure >> boot mode has different IMA policy requirements, dynamic definition of >> the policy rules based on the runtime secure boot mode of the system is >> required. On systems that support secure boot, but have it disabled, >> only measurement policy rules of the kernel image and modules are >> defined. > It's probably worth mentioning that we intend to use this in our > Linux-based boot loader, which uses kexec, and that's one of the reasons > why we're particularly interested in defining the rules for kexec? Yes. Agreed. I will update patch description to add this. > >> This patch defines the arch-specific implementation to retrieve the >> secure boot mode of the system and accordingly configures the IMA policy >> rules. >> >> This patch provides arch-specific IMA policies if PPC_SECURE_BOOT >> config is enabled. >> >> Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com> >> --- >> arch/powerpc/Kconfig | 2 ++ >> arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile | 2 +- >> arch/powerpc/kernel/ima_arch.c | 50 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ >> include/linux/ima.h | 3 +- >> 4 files changed, 55 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) >> create mode 100644 arch/powerpc/kernel/ima_arch.c >> >> diff --git a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig b/arch/powerpc/Kconfig >> index c902a39124dc..42109682b727 100644 >> --- a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig >> +++ b/arch/powerpc/Kconfig >> @@ -917,6 +917,8 @@ config PPC_SECURE_BOOT >> bool >> default n >> depends on PPC64 >> + depends on IMA >> + depends on IMA_ARCH_POLICY >> help >> Linux on POWER with firmware secure boot enabled needs to define >> security policies to extend secure boot to the OS.This config >> diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile b/arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile >> index d310ebb4e526..520b1c814197 100644 >> --- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile >> +++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile >> @@ -157,7 +157,7 @@ endif >> obj-$(CONFIG_EPAPR_PARAVIRT) += epapr_paravirt.o epapr_hcalls.o >> obj-$(CONFIG_KVM_GUEST) += kvm.o kvm_emul.o >> >> -obj-$(CONFIG_PPC_SECURE_BOOT) += secboot.o >> +obj-$(CONFIG_PPC_SECURE_BOOT) += secboot.o ima_arch.o >> >> # Disable GCOV, KCOV & sanitizers in odd or sensitive code >> GCOV_PROFILE_prom_init.o := n >> diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/ima_arch.c b/arch/powerpc/kernel/ima_arch.c >> new file mode 100644 >> index 000000000000..ac90fac83338 >> --- /dev/null >> +++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/ima_arch.c >> @@ -0,0 +1,50 @@ >> +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 >> +/* >> + * Copyright (C) 2019 IBM Corporation >> + * Author: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com> >> + * >> + * ima_arch.c >> + * - initialize ima policies for PowerPC Secure Boot >> + */ >> + >> +#include <linux/ima.h> >> +#include <asm/secboot.h> >> + >> +bool arch_ima_get_secureboot(void) >> +{ >> + return get_powerpc_secureboot(); >> +} >> + >> +/* >> + * File signature verification is not needed, include only measurements >> + */ >> +static const char *const default_arch_rules[] = { >> + "measure func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK", >> + "measure func=MODULE_CHECK", >> + NULL >> +}; > The rules above seem fairly self explanatory. > >> + >> +/* Both file signature verification and measurements are needed */ >> +static const char *const sb_arch_rules[] = { >> + "measure func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK template=ima-modsig", >> + "appraise func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK appraise_type=imasig|modsig", >> +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG) >> + "measure func=MODULE_CHECK", >> +#else >> + "measure func=MODULE_CHECK template=ima-modsig", >> + "appraise func=MODULE_CHECK appraise_type=imasig|modsig", >> +#endif > But these ones are not so obvious, at least to me who knows very little > about IMA. > > Can you add a one line comment to each of the ones in here saying what > it does and why we want it? Sure. > >> + NULL >> +}; >> + >> +/* >> + * On PowerPC, file measurements are to be added to the IMA measurement list >> + * irrespective of the secure boot state of the system. > Why? Just because we think it's useful? Would be good to provide some > further justification. Sure. I will clarify this in the next version. Thanks & Regards, - Nayna
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig b/arch/powerpc/Kconfig index c902a39124dc..42109682b727 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig +++ b/arch/powerpc/Kconfig @@ -917,6 +917,8 @@ config PPC_SECURE_BOOT bool default n depends on PPC64 + depends on IMA + depends on IMA_ARCH_POLICY help Linux on POWER with firmware secure boot enabled needs to define security policies to extend secure boot to the OS.This config diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile b/arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile index d310ebb4e526..520b1c814197 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile +++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile @@ -157,7 +157,7 @@ endif obj-$(CONFIG_EPAPR_PARAVIRT) += epapr_paravirt.o epapr_hcalls.o obj-$(CONFIG_KVM_GUEST) += kvm.o kvm_emul.o -obj-$(CONFIG_PPC_SECURE_BOOT) += secboot.o +obj-$(CONFIG_PPC_SECURE_BOOT) += secboot.o ima_arch.o # Disable GCOV, KCOV & sanitizers in odd or sensitive code GCOV_PROFILE_prom_init.o := n diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/ima_arch.c b/arch/powerpc/kernel/ima_arch.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..ac90fac83338 --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/ima_arch.c @@ -0,0 +1,50 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * Copyright (C) 2019 IBM Corporation + * Author: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com> + * + * ima_arch.c + * - initialize ima policies for PowerPC Secure Boot + */ + +#include <linux/ima.h> +#include <asm/secboot.h> + +bool arch_ima_get_secureboot(void) +{ + return get_powerpc_secureboot(); +} + +/* + * File signature verification is not needed, include only measurements + */ +static const char *const default_arch_rules[] = { + "measure func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK", + "measure func=MODULE_CHECK", + NULL +}; + +/* Both file signature verification and measurements are needed */ +static const char *const sb_arch_rules[] = { + "measure func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK template=ima-modsig", + "appraise func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK appraise_type=imasig|modsig", +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG) + "measure func=MODULE_CHECK", +#else + "measure func=MODULE_CHECK template=ima-modsig", + "appraise func=MODULE_CHECK appraise_type=imasig|modsig", +#endif + NULL +}; + +/* + * On PowerPC, file measurements are to be added to the IMA measurement list + * irrespective of the secure boot state of the system. Signature verification + * is conditionally enabled based on the secure boot state. + */ +const char *const *arch_get_ima_policy(void) +{ + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IMA_ARCH_POLICY) && arch_ima_get_secureboot()) + return sb_arch_rules; + return default_arch_rules; +} diff --git a/include/linux/ima.h b/include/linux/ima.h index a20ad398d260..10af09b5b478 100644 --- a/include/linux/ima.h +++ b/include/linux/ima.h @@ -29,7 +29,8 @@ extern void ima_kexec_cmdline(const void *buf, int size); extern void ima_add_kexec_buffer(struct kimage *image); #endif -#if (defined(CONFIG_X86) && defined(CONFIG_EFI)) || defined(CONFIG_S390) +#if (defined(CONFIG_X86) && defined(CONFIG_EFI)) || defined(CONFIG_S390) \ + || defined(CONFIG_PPC_SECURE_BOOT) extern bool arch_ima_get_secureboot(void); extern const char * const *arch_get_ima_policy(void); #else
POWER secure boot relies on the kernel IMA security subsystem to perform the OS kernel image signature verification. Since each secure boot mode has different IMA policy requirements, dynamic definition of the policy rules based on the runtime secure boot mode of the system is required. On systems that support secure boot, but have it disabled, only measurement policy rules of the kernel image and modules are defined. This patch defines the arch-specific implementation to retrieve the secure boot mode of the system and accordingly configures the IMA policy rules. This patch provides arch-specific IMA policies if PPC_SECURE_BOOT config is enabled. Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com> --- arch/powerpc/Kconfig | 2 ++ arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile | 2 +- arch/powerpc/kernel/ima_arch.c | 50 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ include/linux/ima.h | 3 +- 4 files changed, 55 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) create mode 100644 arch/powerpc/kernel/ima_arch.c