diff mbox series

[08/12] KVM: X86: Introduce KVM_HC_PAGE_ENC_STATUS hypercall

Message ID fc5e111e0a4eda0e6ea1ee3923327384906aff36.1581555616.git.ashish.kalra@amd.com (mailing list archive)
State New, archived
Headers show
Series SEV Live Migration Patchset. | expand

Commit Message

Kalra, Ashish Feb. 13, 2020, 1:17 a.m. UTC
From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>

This hypercall is used by the SEV guest to notify a change in the page
encryption status to the hypervisor. The hypercall should be invoked
only when the encryption attribute is changed from encrypted -> decrypted
and vice versa. By default all guest pages are considered encrypted.

Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: "Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
---
 Documentation/virt/kvm/hypercalls.txt | 14 ++++
 arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h       |  2 +
 arch/x86/kvm/svm.c                    | 94 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c                |  1 +
 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c                    |  6 ++
 include/uapi/linux/kvm_para.h         |  1 +
 6 files changed, 118 insertions(+)

Comments

Steve Rutherford Feb. 20, 2020, 2:39 a.m. UTC | #1
On Wed, Feb 12, 2020 at 5:17 PM Ashish Kalra <Ashish.Kalra@amd.com> wrote:
> +static int sev_resize_page_enc_bitmap(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long new_size)
> +{
> +       struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
> +       unsigned long *map;
> +       unsigned long sz;
> +
> +       if (sev->page_enc_bmap_size >= new_size)
> +               return 0;
> +
> +       sz = ALIGN(new_size, BITS_PER_LONG) / 8;
> +
> +       map = vmalloc(sz);
> +       if (!map) {
> +               pr_err_once("Failed to allocate encrypted bitmap size %lx\n",
> +                               sz);
> +               return -ENOMEM;
> +       }
> +
> +       /* mark the page encrypted (by default) */
> +       memset(map, 0xff, sz);
> +
> +       bitmap_copy(map, sev->page_enc_bmap, sev->page_enc_bmap_size);
Personally, I would do the arithmetic and swap the `memset(map, 0xff,
sz);` for `memset(map + sev->page_enc_bmap_size, 0xff, sz -
sev->page_enc_bmap_size);`, but gcc might be smart enough to do this
for you.

> +       kvfree(sev->page_enc_bmap);
> +
> +       sev->page_enc_bmap = map;
> +       sev->page_enc_bmap_size = new_size;
> +
> +       return 0;
> +}
> +
> +static int svm_page_enc_status_hc(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long gpa,
> +                                 unsigned long npages, unsigned long enc)
> +{
> +       struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
> +       gfn_t gfn_start, gfn_end;
> +       int ret;
> +
> +       if (!sev_guest(kvm))
> +               return -EINVAL;
> +
> +       if (!npages)
> +               return 0;
> +
> +       gfn_start = gpa_to_gfn(gpa);
> +       gfn_end = gfn_start + npages;
> +
> +       /* out of bound access error check */
> +       if (gfn_end <= gfn_start)
> +               return -EINVAL;
> +
> +       /* lets make sure that gpa exist in our memslot */
> +       pfn_start = gfn_to_pfn(kvm, gfn_start);
> +       pfn_end = gfn_to_pfn(kvm, gfn_end);
I believe these functions assume as_id==0, which is probably fine in
practice. If one were to want to migrate a VM with SMM support (which
I believe is the only current usage of non-zero as_ids), it feels like
SMM would need to be in control of its own c-bit tracking, but that
doesn't seem super feasible (otherwise the guest kernel could corrupt
SMM by passing invalid c-bit statuses). I'm not certain anyone wants
SMM with SEV anyway?

> +
> +       if (is_error_noslot_pfn(pfn_start) && !is_noslot_pfn(pfn_start)) {
> +               /*
> +                * Allow guest MMIO range(s) to be added
> +                * to the page encryption bitmap.
> +                */
> +               return -EINVAL;
> +       }
> +
> +       if (is_error_noslot_pfn(pfn_end) && !is_noslot_pfn(pfn_end)) {
> +               /*
> +                * Allow guest MMIO range(s) to be added
> +                * to the page encryption bitmap.
> +                */
> +               return -EINVAL;
> +       }
> +
> +       mutex_lock(&kvm->lock);
> +       ret = sev_resize_page_enc_bitmap(kvm, gfn_end);
> +       if (ret)
> +               goto unlock;
> +
> +       if (enc)
> +               __bitmap_set(sev->page_enc_bmap, gfn_start,
> +                               gfn_end - gfn_start);
> +       else
> +               __bitmap_clear(sev->page_enc_bmap, gfn_start,
> +                               gfn_end - gfn_start);
> +
> +unlock:
> +       mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
> +       return ret;
> +}
> +
>  static int svm_mem_enc_op(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp)
>  {
>         struct kvm_sev_cmd sev_cmd;
> @@ -7972,6 +8064,8 @@ static struct kvm_x86_ops svm_x86_ops __ro_after_init = {
>         .need_emulation_on_page_fault = svm_need_emulation_on_page_fault,
>
>         .apic_init_signal_blocked = svm_apic_init_signal_blocked,
> +
> +       .page_enc_status_hc = svm_page_enc_status_hc,
>  };
>
>  static int __init svm_init(void)
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
> index 9a6664886f2e..7963f2979fdf 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
> @@ -7879,6 +7879,7 @@ static struct kvm_x86_ops vmx_x86_ops __ro_after_init = {
>         .nested_get_evmcs_version = NULL,
>         .need_emulation_on_page_fault = vmx_need_emulation_on_page_fault,
>         .apic_init_signal_blocked = vmx_apic_init_signal_blocked,
> +       .page_enc_status_hc = NULL,
>  };
>
>  static void vmx_cleanup_l1d_flush(void)
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> index fbabb2f06273..298627fa3d39 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> @@ -7547,6 +7547,12 @@ int kvm_emulate_hypercall(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>                 kvm_sched_yield(vcpu->kvm, a0);
>                 ret = 0;
>                 break;
> +       case KVM_HC_PAGE_ENC_STATUS:
> +               ret = -KVM_ENOSYS;
> +               if (kvm_x86_ops->page_enc_status_hc)
> +                       ret = kvm_x86_ops->page_enc_status_hc(vcpu->kvm,
> +                                       a0, a1, a2);
> +               break;
>         default:
>                 ret = -KVM_ENOSYS;
>                 break;
Add a cap to kvm_vm_ioctl_enable_cap so that the vmm can configure
whether or not this hypercall is offered. Moving to an enable cap
would also allow the vmm to pass down the expected size of the c-bit
tracking buffer, so that you don't need to handle dynamic resizing in
response to guest hypercall, otherwise KVM will sporadically start
copying around large buffers when working with large VMs.

Stepping back a bit, I'm a little surprised by the fact that you don't
treat the c-bit buffers the same way as the dirty tracking buffers and
put them alongside the memslots. That's probably more effort, and the
strategy of using one large buffer should work fine (assuming you
don't need to support non-zero as_ids).
Kalra, Ashish Feb. 20, 2020, 5:28 a.m. UTC | #2
On Wed, Feb 19, 2020 at 06:39:39PM -0800, Steve Rutherford wrote:
> On Wed, Feb 12, 2020 at 5:17 PM Ashish Kalra <Ashish.Kalra@amd.com> wrote:
> >
> >  static void vmx_cleanup_l1d_flush(void)
> > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> > index fbabb2f06273..298627fa3d39 100644
> > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> > @@ -7547,6 +7547,12 @@ int kvm_emulate_hypercall(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> >                 kvm_sched_yield(vcpu->kvm, a0);
> >                 ret = 0;
> >                 break;
> > +       case KVM_HC_PAGE_ENC_STATUS:
> > +               ret = -KVM_ENOSYS;
> > +               if (kvm_x86_ops->page_enc_status_hc)
> > +                       ret = kvm_x86_ops->page_enc_status_hc(vcpu->kvm,
> > +                                       a0, a1, a2);
> > +               break;
> >         default:
> >                 ret = -KVM_ENOSYS;
> >                 break;
> Add a cap to kvm_vm_ioctl_enable_cap so that the vmm can configure
> whether or not this hypercall is offered. Moving to an enable cap
> would also allow the vmm to pass down the expected size of the c-bit
> tracking buffer, so that you don't need to handle dynamic resizing in
> response to guest hypercall, otherwise KVM will sporadically start
> copying around large buffers when working with large VMs.
> 

Yes, that is something we have been looking at adding.

But, how will VMM know the expected size of the c-bit tracking buffer ?

The guest kernel and firmware make the hypercall to mark page encryption
status and depending on the GPA range being marked, the kernel's page
encryption bitmap needs to be dynamically resized as response to the guest
hypercall.

> Stepping back a bit, I'm a little surprised by the fact that you don't
> treat the c-bit buffers the same way as the dirty tracking buffers and
> put them alongside the memslots. That's probably more effort, and the
> strategy of using one large buffer should work fine (assuming you
> don't need to support non-zero as_ids).

Thanks,
Ashish
Kalra, Ashish Feb. 20, 2020, 9:21 p.m. UTC | #3
On Thu, Feb 20, 2020 at 05:28:21AM +0000, Ashish Kalra wrote:
> On Wed, Feb 19, 2020 at 06:39:39PM -0800, Steve Rutherford wrote:
> > On Wed, Feb 12, 2020 at 5:17 PM Ashish Kalra <Ashish.Kalra@amd.com> wrote:
> > >
> > >  static void vmx_cleanup_l1d_flush(void)
> > > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> > > index fbabb2f06273..298627fa3d39 100644
> > > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> > > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> > > @@ -7547,6 +7547,12 @@ int kvm_emulate_hypercall(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> > >                 kvm_sched_yield(vcpu->kvm, a0);
> > >                 ret = 0;
> > >                 break;
> > > +       case KVM_HC_PAGE_ENC_STATUS:
> > > +               ret = -KVM_ENOSYS;
> > > +               if (kvm_x86_ops->page_enc_status_hc)
> > > +                       ret = kvm_x86_ops->page_enc_status_hc(vcpu->kvm,
> > > +                                       a0, a1, a2);
> > > +               break;
> > >         default:
> > >                 ret = -KVM_ENOSYS;
> > >                 break;
> > Add a cap to kvm_vm_ioctl_enable_cap so that the vmm can configure
> > whether or not this hypercall is offered. Moving to an enable cap
> > would also allow the vmm to pass down the expected size of the c-bit
> > tracking buffer, so that you don't need to handle dynamic resizing in
> > response to guest hypercall, otherwise KVM will sporadically start
> > copying around large buffers when working with large VMs.
> > 
> 
> Yes, that is something we have been looking at adding.
> 
> But, how will VMM know the expected size of the c-bit tracking buffer ?
> 
> The guest kernel and firmware make the hypercall to mark page encryption
> status and depending on the GPA range being marked, the kernel's page
> encryption bitmap needs to be dynamically resized as response to the guest
> hypercall.
> 

Discussed this with Brijesh, though KVM can provide a hint about
the expected (max.) size of the c-bit tracking buffer, but there is
still an issue for hotplugged guest memory, hence dynamically sized 
encryption bitmap is probably the right approach.

Thanks,
Ashish
diff mbox series

Patch

diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/hypercalls.txt b/Documentation/virt/kvm/hypercalls.txt
index 5f6d291bd004..8ff0e4adcb13 100644
--- a/Documentation/virt/kvm/hypercalls.txt
+++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/hypercalls.txt
@@ -152,3 +152,17 @@  a0: destination APIC ID
 
 Usage example: When sending a call-function IPI-many to vCPUs, yield if
 any of the IPI target vCPUs was preempted.
+
+8. KVM_HC_PAGE_ENC_STATUS
+-------------------------
+Architecture: x86
+Status: active
+Purpose: Notify the encryption status changes in guest page table (SEV guest)
+
+a0: the guest physical address of the start page
+a1: the number of pages
+a2: encryption attribute
+
+   Where:
+	* 1: Encryption attribute is set
+	* 0: Encryption attribute is cleared
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
index 4dffbc10d3f8..4ae7293033b2 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
@@ -1256,6 +1256,8 @@  struct kvm_x86_ops {
 
 	bool (*apic_init_signal_blocked)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
 	int (*enable_direct_tlbflush)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+	int (*page_enc_status_hc)(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long gpa,
+				  unsigned long sz, unsigned long mode);
 };
 
 struct kvm_arch_async_pf {
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
index d86b02bece3a..f09791109075 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
@@ -134,6 +134,8 @@  struct kvm_sev_info {
 	int fd;			/* SEV device fd */
 	unsigned long pages_locked; /* Number of pages locked */
 	struct list_head regions_list;  /* List of registered regions */
+	unsigned long *page_enc_bmap;
+	unsigned long page_enc_bmap_size;
 };
 
 struct kvm_svm {
@@ -1992,6 +1994,9 @@  static void sev_vm_destroy(struct kvm *kvm)
 
 	sev_unbind_asid(kvm, sev->handle);
 	sev_asid_free(sev->asid);
+
+	kvfree(sev->page_enc_bmap);
+	sev->page_enc_bmap = NULL;
 }
 
 static void avic_vm_destroy(struct kvm *kvm)
@@ -7581,6 +7586,93 @@  static int sev_receive_finish(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
 	return ret;
 }
 
+static int sev_resize_page_enc_bitmap(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long new_size)
+{
+	struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
+	unsigned long *map;
+	unsigned long sz;
+
+	if (sev->page_enc_bmap_size >= new_size)
+		return 0;
+
+	sz = ALIGN(new_size, BITS_PER_LONG) / 8;
+
+	map = vmalloc(sz);
+	if (!map) {
+		pr_err_once("Failed to allocate encrypted bitmap size %lx\n",
+				sz);
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+
+	/* mark the page encrypted (by default) */
+	memset(map, 0xff, sz);
+
+	bitmap_copy(map, sev->page_enc_bmap, sev->page_enc_bmap_size);
+	kvfree(sev->page_enc_bmap);
+
+	sev->page_enc_bmap = map;
+	sev->page_enc_bmap_size = new_size;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int svm_page_enc_status_hc(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long gpa,
+				  unsigned long npages, unsigned long enc)
+{
+	struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
+	gfn_t gfn_start, gfn_end;
+	int ret;
+
+	if (!sev_guest(kvm))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!npages)
+		return 0;
+
+	gfn_start = gpa_to_gfn(gpa);
+	gfn_end = gfn_start + npages;
+
+	/* out of bound access error check */
+	if (gfn_end <= gfn_start)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/* lets make sure that gpa exist in our memslot */
+	pfn_start = gfn_to_pfn(kvm, gfn_start);
+	pfn_end = gfn_to_pfn(kvm, gfn_end);
+
+	if (is_error_noslot_pfn(pfn_start) && !is_noslot_pfn(pfn_start)) {
+		/*
+		 * Allow guest MMIO range(s) to be added
+		 * to the page encryption bitmap.
+		 */
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if (is_error_noslot_pfn(pfn_end) && !is_noslot_pfn(pfn_end)) {
+		/*
+		 * Allow guest MMIO range(s) to be added
+		 * to the page encryption bitmap.
+		 */
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	mutex_lock(&kvm->lock);
+	ret = sev_resize_page_enc_bitmap(kvm, gfn_end);
+	if (ret)
+		goto unlock;
+
+	if (enc)
+		__bitmap_set(sev->page_enc_bmap, gfn_start,
+				gfn_end - gfn_start);
+	else
+		__bitmap_clear(sev->page_enc_bmap, gfn_start,
+				gfn_end - gfn_start);
+
+unlock:
+	mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
+	return ret;
+}
+
 static int svm_mem_enc_op(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp)
 {
 	struct kvm_sev_cmd sev_cmd;
@@ -7972,6 +8064,8 @@  static struct kvm_x86_ops svm_x86_ops __ro_after_init = {
 	.need_emulation_on_page_fault = svm_need_emulation_on_page_fault,
 
 	.apic_init_signal_blocked = svm_apic_init_signal_blocked,
+
+	.page_enc_status_hc = svm_page_enc_status_hc,
 };
 
 static int __init svm_init(void)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
index 9a6664886f2e..7963f2979fdf 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -7879,6 +7879,7 @@  static struct kvm_x86_ops vmx_x86_ops __ro_after_init = {
 	.nested_get_evmcs_version = NULL,
 	.need_emulation_on_page_fault = vmx_need_emulation_on_page_fault,
 	.apic_init_signal_blocked = vmx_apic_init_signal_blocked,
+	.page_enc_status_hc = NULL,
 };
 
 static void vmx_cleanup_l1d_flush(void)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
index fbabb2f06273..298627fa3d39 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -7547,6 +7547,12 @@  int kvm_emulate_hypercall(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 		kvm_sched_yield(vcpu->kvm, a0);
 		ret = 0;
 		break;
+	case KVM_HC_PAGE_ENC_STATUS:
+		ret = -KVM_ENOSYS;
+		if (kvm_x86_ops->page_enc_status_hc)
+			ret = kvm_x86_ops->page_enc_status_hc(vcpu->kvm,
+					a0, a1, a2);
+		break;
 	default:
 		ret = -KVM_ENOSYS;
 		break;
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/kvm_para.h b/include/uapi/linux/kvm_para.h
index 8b86609849b9..847b83b75dc8 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/kvm_para.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/kvm_para.h
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ 
 #define KVM_HC_CLOCK_PAIRING		9
 #define KVM_HC_SEND_IPI		10
 #define KVM_HC_SCHED_YIELD		11
+#define KVM_HC_PAGE_ENC_STATUS		12
 
 /*
  * hypercalls use architecture specific