| Message ID | 20200302122759.5204-7-James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com (mailing list archive) |
|---|---|
| State | New |
| Headers | show |
| Series | TPM 2.0 trusted keys with attached policy | expand |
On Mon, Mar 02, 2020 at 07:27:59AM -0500, James Bottomley wrote: > This is actually a generic policy allowing a range of comparisons > against any value set in the TPM Clock, which includes things like the > reset count, a monotonic millisecond count and the restart count. The > most useful comparison is against the millisecond count for expiring > keys. However, you have to remember that currently Linux doesn't try > to sync the epoch timer with the TPM, so the expiration is actually > measured in how long the TPM itself has been powered on ... the TPM > timer doesn't count while the system is powered down. The millisecond > counter is a u64 quantity found at offset 8 in the timer structure, > and the <= comparision operand is 9, so a policy set to expire after the > TPM has been up for 100 seconds would look like > > 0000016d00000000000f424000080009 > > Where 0x16d is the counter timer policy code and 0xf4240 is 100 000 in > hex. > > Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> It is techincally possible to merge 1-5 without this and have something functional? /Jarkko
On Tue, 2020-03-03 at 22:08 +0200, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote: > On Mon, Mar 02, 2020 at 07:27:59AM -0500, James Bottomley wrote: > > This is actually a generic policy allowing a range of comparisons > > against any value set in the TPM Clock, which includes things like > > the reset count, a monotonic millisecond count and the restart > > count. The most useful comparison is against the millisecond count > > for expiring keys. However, you have to remember that currently > > Linux doesn't try to sync the epoch timer with the TPM, so the > > expiration is actually measured in how long the TPM itself has been > > powered on ... the TPM timer doesn't count while the system is > > powered down. The millisecond counter is a u64 quantity found at > > offset 8 in the timer structure, and the <= comparision operand is > > 9, so a policy set to expire after the TPM has been up for 100 > > seconds would look like > > > > 0000016d00000000000f424000080009 > > > > Where 0x16d is the counter timer policy code and 0xf4240 is 100 000 > > in hex. > > > > Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.c > > om> > > It is techincally possible to merge 1-5 without this and have > something functional? Yes: it just adds to the policy types we understand, but we can still do password and PCR policies without this. James
On Tue, Mar 03, 2020 at 03:40:41PM -0500, James Bottomley wrote: > On Tue, 2020-03-03 at 22:08 +0200, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote: > > On Mon, Mar 02, 2020 at 07:27:59AM -0500, James Bottomley wrote: > > > This is actually a generic policy allowing a range of comparisons > > > against any value set in the TPM Clock, which includes things like > > > the reset count, a monotonic millisecond count and the restart > > > count. The most useful comparison is against the millisecond count > > > for expiring keys. However, you have to remember that currently > > > Linux doesn't try to sync the epoch timer with the TPM, so the > > > expiration is actually measured in how long the TPM itself has been > > > powered on ... the TPM timer doesn't count while the system is > > > powered down. The millisecond counter is a u64 quantity found at > > > offset 8 in the timer structure, and the <= comparision operand is > > > 9, so a policy set to expire after the TPM has been up for 100 > > > seconds would look like > > > > > > 0000016d00000000000f424000080009 > > > > > > Where 0x16d is the counter timer policy code and 0xf4240 is 100 000 > > > in hex. > > > > > > Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.c > > > om> > > > > It is techincally possible to merge 1-5 without this and have > > something functional? > > Yes: it just adds to the policy types we understand, but we can still > do password and PCR policies without this. OK, cool. Did not mean that I'd have any particular problem to merge it. Just want to know the constraints that I live in. /Jarkko
diff --git a/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst b/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst index b68d3eb73f00..53a6196c7df9 100644 --- a/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst +++ b/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst @@ -241,3 +241,32 @@ about the usage can be found in the file Another new format 'enc32' has been defined in order to support encrypted keys with payload size of 32 bytes. This will initially be used for nvdimm security but may expand to other usages that require 32 bytes payload. + +Appendix +-------- + +TPM 2.0 Policies +---------------- + +The current TPM supports PCR lock policies as documented above and +CounterTimer policies which can be used to create expiring keys. One +caveat with expiring keys is that the TPM millisecond counter does not +update while a system is powered off and Linux does not sync the TPM +millisecond count with its internal clock, so the best you can expire +in is in terms of how long any given TPM has been powered on. (FIXME: +Linux should simply update the millisecond clock to the current number +of seconds past the epoch on boot). + +A CounterTimer policy is expressed in terms of length and offset +against the TPM clock structure (TPMS_TIME_INFO), which looks like the +packed structure:: + + struct tpms_time_info { + u64 uptime; /* time in ms since last start or reset */ + u64 clock; /* cumulative uptime in ms */ + u32 resetcount; /* numer of times the TPM has been reset */ + u32 restartcount; /* number of times the TPM has been restarted */ + u8 safe /* time was safely loaded from NVRam */ + }; + +The usual comparison for expiring keys is against clock, at offset 8. diff --git a/include/linux/tpm.h b/include/linux/tpm.h index e32e9728adce..5026a06977e1 100644 --- a/include/linux/tpm.h +++ b/include/linux/tpm.h @@ -233,6 +233,7 @@ enum tpm2_command_codes { TPM2_CC_PCR_EXTEND = 0x0182, TPM2_CC_EVENT_SEQUENCE_COMPLETE = 0x0185, TPM2_CC_HASH_SEQUENCE_START = 0x0186, + TPM2_CC_POLICY_PASSWORD = 0x018c, TPM2_CC_CREATE_LOADED = 0x0191, TPM2_CC_LAST = 0x0193, /* Spec 1.36 */ }; diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/tpm2-policy.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/tpm2-policy.c index 4cc478feaeb1..90da9fa4ca02 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/tpm2-policy.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/tpm2-policy.c @@ -197,7 +197,8 @@ int tpm2_generate_policy_digest(struct tpm2_policies *pols, len = *plen; } - crypto_shash_update(sdesc, policy, len); + if (len) + crypto_shash_update(sdesc, policy, len); /* now output the intermediate to the policydigest */ crypto_shash_final(sdesc, policydigest); @@ -332,6 +333,16 @@ int tpm2_get_policy_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm2_policies *pols, u32 cmd = pols->code[i]; struct tpm_buf buf; + if (cmd == TPM2_CC_POLICY_AUTHVALUE) + /* + * both PolicyAuthValue and PolicyPassword + * hash to the same thing, but one triggers + * HMAC authentication and the other simple + * authentication. Since we have no HMAC + * code, we're choosing the simple + */ + cmd = TPM2_CC_POLICY_PASSWORD; + rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS, cmd); if (rc) return rc; @@ -352,8 +363,35 @@ int tpm2_get_policy_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm2_policies *pols, tpm_buf_append(&buf, pols->policies[i], pols->len[i] - pols->hash_size); break; + + case TPM2_CC_POLICY_COUNTER_TIMER: { + /* + * the format of this is the last two u16 + * quantities are the offset and operation + * respectively. The rest is operandB which + * must be zero padded in a hash digest + */ + u16 opb_len = pols->len[i] - 4; + + if (opb_len > pols->hash_size) + return -EINVAL; + + tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, opb_len); + tpm_buf_append(&buf, pols->policies[i], opb_len); + + /* offset and operand*/ + tpm_buf_append(&buf, pols->policies[i] + opb_len, 4); + failure = "Counter Timer"; + + break; + } + default: failure = "unknown policy"; + if (pols->len[i]) + tpm_buf_append(&buf, pols->policies[i], + pols->len[i]); + break; } diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c index 293db0aaada6..63b0ff1d3385 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c @@ -248,6 +248,7 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 flags; int i; int rc; + static const int POLICY_SIZE = 2 * PAGE_SIZE; for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(tpm2_hash_map); i++) { if (options->hash == tpm2_hash_map[i].crypto_id) { @@ -268,7 +269,7 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, /* 4 array len, 2 hash alg */ const int len = 4 + 2 + options->pcrinfo_len; - pols = kmalloc(sizeof(*pols) + len, GFP_KERNEL); + pols = kmalloc(POLICY_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL); if (!pols) return -ENOMEM; @@ -289,6 +290,39 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, return -EINVAL; } + /* + * if we already have a policy, we have to add authorization + * to it. If we don't, we can simply follow the usual + * non-policy route. + */ + if (options->blobauth_len != 0 && payload->policies) { + struct tpm2_policies *pols; + static u8 *scratch; + int i; + bool found = false; + + pols = payload->policies; + + /* make sure it's not already in policy */ + for (i = 0; i < pols->count; i++) { + if (pols->code[i] == TPM2_CC_POLICY_AUTHVALUE) { + found = true; + + break; + } + } + + if (!found) { + i = pols->count++; + scratch = pols->policies[i - 1] + pols->len[i - 1]; + + /* the TPM2_PolicyPassword command has no payload */ + pols->policies[i] = scratch; + pols->len[i] = 0; + pols->code[i] = TPM2_CC_POLICY_AUTHVALUE; + } + } + if (payload->policies) { rc = tpm2_generate_policy_digest(payload->policies, options->hash,
This is actually a generic policy allowing a range of comparisons against any value set in the TPM Clock, which includes things like the reset count, a monotonic millisecond count and the restart count. The most useful comparison is against the millisecond count for expiring keys. However, you have to remember that currently Linux doesn't try to sync the epoch timer with the TPM, so the expiration is actually measured in how long the TPM itself has been powered on ... the TPM timer doesn't count while the system is powered down. The millisecond counter is a u64 quantity found at offset 8 in the timer structure, and the <= comparision operand is 9, so a policy set to expire after the TPM has been up for 100 seconds would look like 0000016d00000000000f424000080009 Where 0x16d is the counter timer policy code and 0xf4240 is 100 000 in hex. Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> --- Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst | 29 ++++++++++++++++ include/linux/tpm.h | 1 + security/keys/trusted-keys/tpm2-policy.c | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++- security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c | 36 +++++++++++++++++++- 4 files changed, 104 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)