Message ID | 20200624175244.25837-26-catalin.marinas@arm.com (mailing list archive) |
---|---|
State | New, archived |
Headers | show |
Series | arm64: Memory Tagging Extension user-space support | expand |
The 06/24/2020 18:52, Catalin Marinas wrote: > From: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com> > > Memory Tagging Extension (part of the ARMv8.5 Extensions) provides > a mechanism to detect the sources of memory related errors which > may be vulnerable to exploitation, including bounds violations, > use-after-free, use-after-return, use-out-of-scope and use before > initialization errors. > > Add Memory Tagging Extension documentation for the arm64 linux > kernel support. > > Signed-off-by: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com> > Co-developed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> > Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> > Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> there are are still libc side discussions, but the linux abi looks ok to me from user space pov. i'm adding libc-alpha on cc, the patch set is e.g. at http://lists.infradead.org/pipermail/linux-arm-kernel/2020-June/579787.html Acked-by: Szabolcs Nagy <szabolcs.nagy@arm.com> with a few comments inline. > --- > > Notes: > v4: > - Document behaviour of madvise(MADV_DONTNEED/MADV_FREE). > - Document the initial process state on fork/execve. > - Clarify when the kernel uaccess checks the tags. > - Minor updates to the example code. > - A few other minor clean-ups following review. > > v3: > - Modify the uaccess checking conditions: only when the sync mode is > selected by the user. In async mode, the kernel uaccesses are not > checked. > - Clarify that an include mask of 0 (exclude mask 0xffff) results in > always generating tag 0. > - Document the ptrace() interface. > > v2: > - Documented the uaccess kernel tag checking mode. > - Removed the BTI definitions from cpu-feature-registers.rst. > - Removed the paragraph stating that MTE depends on the tagged address > ABI (while the Kconfig entry does, there is no requirement for the > user to enable both). > - Changed the GCR_EL1.Exclude handling description following the change > in the prctl() interface (include vs exclude mask). > - Updated the example code. > > Documentation/arm64/cpu-feature-registers.rst | 2 + > Documentation/arm64/elf_hwcaps.rst | 4 + > Documentation/arm64/index.rst | 1 + > .../arm64/memory-tagging-extension.rst | 297 ++++++++++++++++++ > 4 files changed, 304 insertions(+) > create mode 100644 Documentation/arm64/memory-tagging-extension.rst > > diff --git a/Documentation/arm64/cpu-feature-registers.rst b/Documentation/arm64/cpu-feature-registers.rst > index 314fa5bc2655..27d8559d565b 100644 > --- a/Documentation/arm64/cpu-feature-registers.rst > +++ b/Documentation/arm64/cpu-feature-registers.rst > @@ -174,6 +174,8 @@ infrastructure: > +------------------------------+---------+---------+ > | Name | bits | visible | > +------------------------------+---------+---------+ > + | MTE | [11-8] | y | > + +------------------------------+---------+---------+ > | SSBS | [7-4] | y | > +------------------------------+---------+---------+ > | BT | [3-0] | y | > diff --git a/Documentation/arm64/elf_hwcaps.rst b/Documentation/arm64/elf_hwcaps.rst > index 84a9fd2d41b4..bbd9cf54db6c 100644 > --- a/Documentation/arm64/elf_hwcaps.rst > +++ b/Documentation/arm64/elf_hwcaps.rst > @@ -240,6 +240,10 @@ HWCAP2_BTI > > Functionality implied by ID_AA64PFR0_EL1.BT == 0b0001. > > +HWCAP2_MTE > + > + Functionality implied by ID_AA64PFR1_EL1.MTE == 0b0010, as described > + by Documentation/arm64/memory-tagging-extension.rst. OK. > > 4. Unused AT_HWCAP bits > ----------------------- > diff --git a/Documentation/arm64/index.rst b/Documentation/arm64/index.rst > index 09cbb4ed2237..4cd0e696f064 100644 > --- a/Documentation/arm64/index.rst > +++ b/Documentation/arm64/index.rst > @@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ ARM64 Architecture > hugetlbpage > legacy_instructions > memory > + memory-tagging-extension > pointer-authentication > silicon-errata > sve > diff --git a/Documentation/arm64/memory-tagging-extension.rst b/Documentation/arm64/memory-tagging-extension.rst > new file mode 100644 > index 000000000000..e7cdcecb656a > --- /dev/null > +++ b/Documentation/arm64/memory-tagging-extension.rst > @@ -0,0 +1,297 @@ > +=============================================== > +Memory Tagging Extension (MTE) in AArch64 Linux > +=============================================== > + > +Authors: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com> > + Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> > + > +Date: 2020-02-25 > + > +This document describes the provision of the Memory Tagging Extension > +functionality in AArch64 Linux. > + > +Introduction > +============ > + > +ARMv8.5 based processors introduce the Memory Tagging Extension (MTE) > +feature. MTE is built on top of the ARMv8.0 virtual address tagging TBI > +(Top Byte Ignore) feature and allows software to access a 4-bit > +allocation tag for each 16-byte granule in the physical address space. > +Such memory range must be mapped with the Normal-Tagged memory > +attribute. A logical tag is derived from bits 59-56 of the virtual > +address used for the memory access. A CPU with MTE enabled will compare > +the logical tag against the allocation tag and potentially raise an > +exception on mismatch, subject to system registers configuration. > + > +Userspace Support > +================= > + > +When ``CONFIG_ARM64_MTE`` is selected and Memory Tagging Extension is > +supported by the hardware, the kernel advertises the feature to > +userspace via ``HWCAP2_MTE``. OK. > + > +PROT_MTE > +-------- > + > +To access the allocation tags, a user process must enable the Tagged > +memory attribute on an address range using a new ``prot`` flag for > +``mmap()`` and ``mprotect()``: > + > +``PROT_MTE`` - Pages allow access to the MTE allocation tags. > + > +The allocation tag is set to 0 when such pages are first mapped in the > +user address space and preserved on copy-on-write. ``MAP_SHARED`` is > +supported and the allocation tags can be shared between processes. > + > +**Note**: ``PROT_MTE`` is only supported on ``MAP_ANONYMOUS`` and > +RAM-based file mappings (``tmpfs``, ``memfd``). Passing it to other > +types of mapping will result in ``-EINVAL`` returned by these system > +calls. > + > +**Note**: The ``PROT_MTE`` flag (and corresponding memory type) cannot > +be cleared by ``mprotect()``. > + > +**Note**: ``madvise()`` memory ranges with ``MADV_DONTNEED`` and > +``MADV_FREE`` may have the allocation tags cleared (set to 0) at any > +point after the system call. OK. I expect in the future to have a way to query the PROT_MTE status of mappings (e.g. via /proc/self). The MAP_SHARED behaviour is not entirely clear here but i guess it's possible to have PROT_MTE in one process and no PROT_MTE in others on the same mapping. then allocation tags only affect the process where PROT_MTE was used, later on another process may set PROT_MTE and then the shared allocation tags affect that process too. The madvise behaviour looks a bit risky from user space pov since now it's not just the memory content that can disappear after a MADV_DONTNEED, but pointer to that memory can become invalid too. but i think this is OK: in libc we will have to say that madvise on memory returned by malloc is not valid. As noted before, this design is not ideal for stack tagging (mprotecting the initial stack with PROT_MTE may be problematic if we don't know the bounds), but the expectation is to introduce some ELF marking and then linux can just start the process with PROT_MTE stack if the dynamic linker has the marking. Same for the brk area (default PROT_MTE based on ELF marking). > + > +Tag Check Faults > +---------------- > + > +When ``PROT_MTE`` is enabled on an address range and a mismatch between > +the logical and allocation tags occurs on access, there are three > +configurable behaviours: > + > +- *Ignore* - This is the default mode. The CPU (and kernel) ignores the > + tag check fault. > + > +- *Synchronous* - The kernel raises a ``SIGSEGV`` synchronously, with > + ``.si_code = SEGV_MTESERR`` and ``.si_addr = <fault-address>``. The > + memory access is not performed. If ``SIGSEGV`` is ignored or blocked > + by the offending thread, the containing process is terminated with a > + ``coredump``. > + > +- *Asynchronous* - The kernel raises a ``SIGSEGV``, in the offending > + thread, asynchronously following one or multiple tag check faults, > + with ``.si_code = SEGV_MTEAERR`` and ``.si_addr = 0`` (the faulting > + address is unknown). > + > +The user can select the above modes, per thread, using the > +``prctl(PR_SET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL, flags, 0, 0, 0)`` system call where > +``flags`` contain one of the following values in the ``PR_MTE_TCF_MASK`` > +bit-field: > + > +- ``PR_MTE_TCF_NONE`` - *Ignore* tag check faults > +- ``PR_MTE_TCF_SYNC`` - *Synchronous* tag check fault mode > +- ``PR_MTE_TCF_ASYNC`` - *Asynchronous* tag check fault mode > + > +The current tag check fault mode can be read using the > +``prctl(PR_GET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL, 0, 0, 0, 0)`` system call. > + > +Tag checking can also be disabled for a user thread by setting the > +``PSTATE.TCO`` bit with ``MSR TCO, #1``. > + > +**Note**: Signal handlers are always invoked with ``PSTATE.TCO = 0``, > +irrespective of the interrupted context. ``PSTATE.TCO`` is restored on > +``sigreturn()``. > + > +**Note**: There are no *match-all* logical tags available for user > +applications. > + > +**Note**: Kernel accesses to the user address space (e.g. ``read()`` > +system call) are not checked if the user thread tag checking mode is > +``PR_MTE_TCF_NONE`` or ``PR_MTE_TCF_ASYNC``. If the tag checking mode is > +``PR_MTE_TCF_SYNC``, the kernel makes a best effort to check its user > +address accesses, however it cannot always guarantee it. OK. i know the kernel likes to operate on os-threads, but in userspace this causes the slight wart that if somebody wants to use heap tagging with LD_PRELOADed malloc and the first malloc is called after a thread is already created then the malloc implementation cannot set up the prctl right for all threads in the process. (for userspace i think it is only useful to allow threads with different MTE settings if there are some threads in a process that are not managed by the c runtime and don't call into libc, so as far as normal c code is concerned a per process setting would be nicer). for interposers the workaround is to interpose thread creating libc apis, which is not perfect (libc internally may create threads in not interposable ways e.g. for implementing aio and then use heap memory in such threads), but i think early threads before an LD_PRELOAD initializer may run is not a common scenario and this type of MTE usage is for debugging, i.e. does not have to be perfect. as noted before (i think by Kevin) it would be nice to query the tag check status of other threads e.g. via a /proc/ thing (but i don't see an immediate need for this other than debugging MTE faults). > + > +Excluding Tags in the ``IRG``, ``ADDG`` and ``SUBG`` instructions > +----------------------------------------------------------------- > + > +The architecture allows excluding certain tags to be randomly generated > +via the ``GCR_EL1.Exclude`` register bit-field. By default, Linux > +excludes all tags other than 0. A user thread can enable specific tags > +in the randomly generated set using the ``prctl(PR_SET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL, > +flags, 0, 0, 0)`` system call where ``flags`` contains the tags bitmap > +in the ``PR_MTE_TAG_MASK`` bit-field. > + > +**Note**: The hardware uses an exclude mask but the ``prctl()`` > +interface provides an include mask. An include mask of ``0`` (exclusion > +mask ``0xffff``) results in the CPU always generating tag ``0``. OK. > + > +Initial process state > +--------------------- > + > +On ``execve()``, the new process has the following configuration: > + > +- ``PR_TAGGED_ADDR_ENABLE`` set to 0 (disabled) > +- Tag checking mode set to ``PR_MTE_TCF_NONE`` > +- ``PR_MTE_TAG_MASK`` set to 0 (all tags excluded) > +- ``PSTATE.TCO`` set to 0 > +- ``PROT_MTE`` not set on any of the initial memory maps > + > +On ``fork()``, the new process inherits the parent's configuration and > +memory map attributes with the exception of the ``madvise()`` ranges > +with ``MADV_WIPEONFORK`` which will have the data and tags cleared (set > +to 0). OK. > + > +The ``ptrace()`` interface > +-------------------------- > + > +``PTRACE_PEEKMTETAGS`` and ``PTRACE_POKEMTETAGS`` allow a tracer to read > +the tags from or set the tags to a tracee's address space. The > +``ptrace()`` system call is invoked as ``ptrace(request, pid, addr, > +data)`` where: > + > +- ``request`` - one of ``PTRACE_PEEKMTETAGS`` or ``PTRACE_PEEKMTETAGS``. > +- ``pid`` - the tracee's PID. > +- ``addr`` - address in the tracee's address space. > +- ``data`` - pointer to a ``struct iovec`` where ``iov_base`` points to > + a buffer of ``iov_len`` length in the tracer's address space. > + > +The tags in the tracer's ``iov_base`` buffer are represented as one > +4-bit tag per byte and correspond to a 16-byte MTE tag granule in the > +tracee's address space. > + > +**Note**: If ``addr`` is not aligned to a 16-byte granule, the kernel > +will use the corresponding aligned address. > + > +``ptrace()`` return value: > + > +- 0 - tags were copied, the tracer's ``iov_len`` was updated to the > + number of tags transferred. This may be smaller than the requested > + ``iov_len`` if the requested address range in the tracee's or the > + tracer's space cannot be accessed or does not have valid tags. > +- ``-EPERM`` - the specified process cannot be traced. > +- ``-EIO`` - the tracee's address range cannot be accessed (e.g. invalid > + address) and no tags copied. ``iov_len`` not updated. > +- ``-EFAULT`` - fault on accessing the tracer's memory (``struct iovec`` > + or ``iov_base`` buffer) and no tags copied. ``iov_len`` not updated. > +- ``-EOPNOTSUPP`` - the tracee's address does not have valid tags (never > + mapped with the ``PROT_MTE`` flag). ``iov_len`` not updated. > + > +**Note**: There are no transient errors for the requests above, so user > +programs should not retry in case of a non-zero system call return. looks OK. > + > +Example of correct usage > +======================== > + > +*MTE Example code* > + > +.. code-block:: c > + > + /* > + * To be compiled with -march=armv8.5-a+memtag > + */ > + #include <errno.h> > + #include <stdio.h> > + #include <stdlib.h> > + #include <unistd.h> > + #include <sys/auxv.h> > + #include <sys/mman.h> > + #include <sys/prctl.h> > + > + /* > + * From arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/hwcap.h > + */ > + #define HWCAP2_MTE (1 << 18) > + > + /* > + * From arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/mman.h > + */ > + #define PROT_MTE 0x20 > + > + /* > + * From include/uapi/linux/prctl.h > + */ > + #define PR_SET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL 55 > + #define PR_GET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL 56 > + # define PR_TAGGED_ADDR_ENABLE (1UL << 0) > + # define PR_MTE_TCF_SHIFT 1 > + # define PR_MTE_TCF_NONE (0UL << PR_MTE_TCF_SHIFT) > + # define PR_MTE_TCF_SYNC (1UL << PR_MTE_TCF_SHIFT) > + # define PR_MTE_TCF_ASYNC (2UL << PR_MTE_TCF_SHIFT) > + # define PR_MTE_TCF_MASK (3UL << PR_MTE_TCF_SHIFT) > + # define PR_MTE_TAG_SHIFT 3 > + # define PR_MTE_TAG_MASK (0xffffUL << PR_MTE_TAG_SHIFT) > + > + /* > + * Insert a random logical tag into the given pointer. > + */ > + #define insert_random_tag(ptr) ({ \ > + __u64 __val; \ i'd use uint64_t from stdint.h or unsigned long in the example (i.e. not a kernel type) > + asm("irg %0, %1" : "=r" (__val) : "r" (ptr)); \ > + __val; \ > + }) > + > + /* > + * Set the allocation tag on the destination address. > + */ > + #define set_tag(tagged_addr) do { \ > + asm volatile("stg %0, [%0]" : : "r" (tagged_addr) : "memory"); \ > + } while (0) > + > + int main() > + { > + unsigned char *a; > + unsigned long page_sz = sysconf(_SC_PAGESIZE); > + unsigned long hwcap2 = getauxval(AT_HWCAP2); > + > + /* check if MTE is present */ > + if (!(hwcap2 & HWCAP2_MTE)) > + return EXIT_FAILURE; > + > + /* > + * Enable the tagged address ABI, synchronous MTE tag check faults and > + * allow all non-zero tags in the randomly generated set. > + */ > + if (prctl(PR_SET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL, > + PR_TAGGED_ADDR_ENABLE | PR_MTE_TCF_SYNC | (0xfffe << PR_MTE_TAG_SHIFT), > + 0, 0, 0)) { > + perror("prctl() failed"); > + return EXIT_FAILURE; > + } > + > + a = mmap(0, page_sz, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, > + MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0); > + if (a == MAP_FAILED) { > + perror("mmap() failed"); > + return EXIT_FAILURE; > + } > + > + /* > + * Enable MTE on the above anonymous mmap. The flag could be passed > + * directly to mmap() and skip this step. > + */ > + if (mprotect(a, page_sz, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE | PROT_MTE)) { > + perror("mprotect() failed"); > + return EXIT_FAILURE; > + } > + > + /* access with the default tag (0) */ > + a[0] = 1; > + a[1] = 2; > + > + printf("a[0] = %hhu a[1] = %hhu\n", a[0], a[1]); > + > + /* set the logical and allocation tags */ > + a = (unsigned char *)insert_random_tag(a); > + set_tag(a); > + > + printf("%p\n", a); > + > + /* non-zero tag access */ > + a[0] = 3; > + printf("a[0] = %hhu a[1] = %hhu\n", a[0], a[1]); > + > + /* > + * If MTE is enabled correctly the next instruction will generate an > + * exception. > + */ > + printf("Expecting SIGSEGV...\n"); > + a[16] = 0xdd; > + > + /* this should not be printed in the PR_MTE_TCF_SYNC mode */ > + printf("...haven't got one\n"); > + > + return EXIT_FAILURE; > + } OK.
Hi Szabolcs, On Thu, Jun 25, 2020 at 01:22:17PM +0100, Szabolcs Nagy wrote: > The 06/24/2020 18:52, Catalin Marinas wrote: > > From: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com> > > > > Memory Tagging Extension (part of the ARMv8.5 Extensions) provides > > a mechanism to detect the sources of memory related errors which > > may be vulnerable to exploitation, including bounds violations, > > use-after-free, use-after-return, use-out-of-scope and use before > > initialization errors. > > > > Add Memory Tagging Extension documentation for the arm64 linux > > kernel support. > > > > Signed-off-by: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com> > > Co-developed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> > > Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> > > Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> > > there are are still libc side discussions, but the > linux abi looks ok to me from user space pov. > i'm adding libc-alpha on cc, the patch set is e.g. at > http://lists.infradead.org/pipermail/linux-arm-kernel/2020-June/579787.html > > Acked-by: Szabolcs Nagy <szabolcs.nagy@arm.com> Thanks for the review. If there are any ABI changes required as a result of the libc-alpha discussions, please let me know. > > +PROT_MTE > > +-------- > > + > > +To access the allocation tags, a user process must enable the Tagged > > +memory attribute on an address range using a new ``prot`` flag for > > +``mmap()`` and ``mprotect()``: > > + > > +``PROT_MTE`` - Pages allow access to the MTE allocation tags. > > + > > +The allocation tag is set to 0 when such pages are first mapped in the > > +user address space and preserved on copy-on-write. ``MAP_SHARED`` is > > +supported and the allocation tags can be shared between processes. > > + > > +**Note**: ``PROT_MTE`` is only supported on ``MAP_ANONYMOUS`` and > > +RAM-based file mappings (``tmpfs``, ``memfd``). Passing it to other > > +types of mapping will result in ``-EINVAL`` returned by these system > > +calls. > > + > > +**Note**: The ``PROT_MTE`` flag (and corresponding memory type) cannot > > +be cleared by ``mprotect()``. > > + > > +**Note**: ``madvise()`` memory ranges with ``MADV_DONTNEED`` and > > +``MADV_FREE`` may have the allocation tags cleared (set to 0) at any > > +point after the system call. > > OK. > > I expect in the future to have a way to query the > PROT_MTE status of mappings (e.g. via /proc/self). Currently you can do this via /proc/<pid>/smaps. > The MAP_SHARED behaviour is not entirely clear here > but i guess it's possible to have PROT_MTE in one > process and no PROT_MTE in others on the same mapping. Yes, it is. > then allocation tags only affect the process where > PROT_MTE was used, later on another process may set > PROT_MTE and then the shared allocation tags affect > that process too. Yes. Since PROT_MTE allows access to the allocation tags, each process can control it independently. > The madvise behaviour looks a bit risky from user > space pov since now it's not just the memory content > that can disappear after a MADV_DONTNEED, but pointer > to that memory can become invalid too. but i think > this is OK: in libc we will have to say that madvise > on memory returned by malloc is not valid. From a kernel perspective, it never returned a tagged pointer on mmap(), so reverting the allocation tag to 0 is fine. I don't really have a better solution here other than not calling madvise() on malloc'ed memory. A more invasive option may be to return tagged pointers on mmap() and guarantee that the libc will not change them. A subsequent access on DONTNEED memory would restore the original colour. > As noted before, this design is not ideal for stack > tagging (mprotecting the initial stack with PROT_MTE > may be problematic if we don't know the bounds), I don't think you need the bounds (with PROT_GROWSDOWN). Maybe the upper one but functions up the call chain should not use stack tagging anyway. > but > the expectation is to introduce some ELF marking and > then linux can just start the process with PROT_MTE > stack if the dynamic linker has the marking. Same for > the brk area (default PROT_MTE based on ELF marking). This should work. Since stack tagging cannot use instructions in the NOP space anyway and the program needs recompiling, having an ELF marking would help (for heap tagging, you only need to change the libc and dynamic loader). I think we do similar checks for BTI. > > +Tag Check Faults > > +---------------- > > + > > +When ``PROT_MTE`` is enabled on an address range and a mismatch between > > +the logical and allocation tags occurs on access, there are three > > +configurable behaviours: > > + > > +- *Ignore* - This is the default mode. The CPU (and kernel) ignores the > > + tag check fault. > > + > > +- *Synchronous* - The kernel raises a ``SIGSEGV`` synchronously, with > > + ``.si_code = SEGV_MTESERR`` and ``.si_addr = <fault-address>``. The > > + memory access is not performed. If ``SIGSEGV`` is ignored or blocked > > + by the offending thread, the containing process is terminated with a > > + ``coredump``. > > + > > +- *Asynchronous* - The kernel raises a ``SIGSEGV``, in the offending > > + thread, asynchronously following one or multiple tag check faults, > > + with ``.si_code = SEGV_MTEAERR`` and ``.si_addr = 0`` (the faulting > > + address is unknown). > > + > > +The user can select the above modes, per thread, using the > > +``prctl(PR_SET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL, flags, 0, 0, 0)`` system call where > > +``flags`` contain one of the following values in the ``PR_MTE_TCF_MASK`` > > +bit-field: > > + > > +- ``PR_MTE_TCF_NONE`` - *Ignore* tag check faults > > +- ``PR_MTE_TCF_SYNC`` - *Synchronous* tag check fault mode > > +- ``PR_MTE_TCF_ASYNC`` - *Asynchronous* tag check fault mode > > + > > +The current tag check fault mode can be read using the > > +``prctl(PR_GET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL, 0, 0, 0, 0)`` system call. > > + > > +Tag checking can also be disabled for a user thread by setting the > > +``PSTATE.TCO`` bit with ``MSR TCO, #1``. > > + > > +**Note**: Signal handlers are always invoked with ``PSTATE.TCO = 0``, > > +irrespective of the interrupted context. ``PSTATE.TCO`` is restored on > > +``sigreturn()``. > > + > > +**Note**: There are no *match-all* logical tags available for user > > +applications. > > + > > +**Note**: Kernel accesses to the user address space (e.g. ``read()`` > > +system call) are not checked if the user thread tag checking mode is > > +``PR_MTE_TCF_NONE`` or ``PR_MTE_TCF_ASYNC``. If the tag checking mode is > > +``PR_MTE_TCF_SYNC``, the kernel makes a best effort to check its user > > +address accesses, however it cannot always guarantee it. > > OK. > > i know the kernel likes to operate on os-threads, > but in userspace this causes the slight wart that if > somebody wants to use heap tagging with LD_PRELOADed > malloc and the first malloc is called after a thread > is already created then the malloc implementation > cannot set up the prctl right for all threads in the > process. Ah, so you can't have a constructor called with LD_PRELOAD. > (for userspace i think it is only useful to > allow threads with different MTE settings if there > are some threads in a process that are not managed by > the c runtime and don't call into libc, so as far as > normal c code is concerned a per process setting > would be nicer). My assumption was that the c runtime would set this up and all threads inherit the initial configuration. How important is the LD_PRELOAD use-case? The slight trouble with having this setting global is synchronising all the threads. Maybe if we only allow single global configuration (rather than having the option of per-thread and global), user-space could force the synchronisation with something like membarrier(). > for interposers the workaround is > to interpose thread creating libc apis, which is not > perfect (libc internally may create threads in not > interposable ways e.g. for implementing aio and then > use heap memory in such threads), but i think early > threads before an LD_PRELOAD initializer may run is > not a common scenario and this type of MTE usage is > for debugging, i.e. does not have to be perfect. Feedback welcome, both from the glibc and the bionic/Android camps. > as noted before (i think by Kevin) it would be nice > to query the tag check status of other threads e.g. > via a /proc/ thing (but i don't see an immediate need > for this other than debugging MTE faults). I have a plan to add some information in /proc/<pid>/status at some point.
diff --git a/Documentation/arm64/cpu-feature-registers.rst b/Documentation/arm64/cpu-feature-registers.rst index 314fa5bc2655..27d8559d565b 100644 --- a/Documentation/arm64/cpu-feature-registers.rst +++ b/Documentation/arm64/cpu-feature-registers.rst @@ -174,6 +174,8 @@ infrastructure: +------------------------------+---------+---------+ | Name | bits | visible | +------------------------------+---------+---------+ + | MTE | [11-8] | y | + +------------------------------+---------+---------+ | SSBS | [7-4] | y | +------------------------------+---------+---------+ | BT | [3-0] | y | diff --git a/Documentation/arm64/elf_hwcaps.rst b/Documentation/arm64/elf_hwcaps.rst index 84a9fd2d41b4..bbd9cf54db6c 100644 --- a/Documentation/arm64/elf_hwcaps.rst +++ b/Documentation/arm64/elf_hwcaps.rst @@ -240,6 +240,10 @@ HWCAP2_BTI Functionality implied by ID_AA64PFR0_EL1.BT == 0b0001. +HWCAP2_MTE + + Functionality implied by ID_AA64PFR1_EL1.MTE == 0b0010, as described + by Documentation/arm64/memory-tagging-extension.rst. 4. Unused AT_HWCAP bits ----------------------- diff --git a/Documentation/arm64/index.rst b/Documentation/arm64/index.rst index 09cbb4ed2237..4cd0e696f064 100644 --- a/Documentation/arm64/index.rst +++ b/Documentation/arm64/index.rst @@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ ARM64 Architecture hugetlbpage legacy_instructions memory + memory-tagging-extension pointer-authentication silicon-errata sve diff --git a/Documentation/arm64/memory-tagging-extension.rst b/Documentation/arm64/memory-tagging-extension.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..e7cdcecb656a --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/arm64/memory-tagging-extension.rst @@ -0,0 +1,297 @@ +=============================================== +Memory Tagging Extension (MTE) in AArch64 Linux +=============================================== + +Authors: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com> + Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> + +Date: 2020-02-25 + +This document describes the provision of the Memory Tagging Extension +functionality in AArch64 Linux. + +Introduction +============ + +ARMv8.5 based processors introduce the Memory Tagging Extension (MTE) +feature. MTE is built on top of the ARMv8.0 virtual address tagging TBI +(Top Byte Ignore) feature and allows software to access a 4-bit +allocation tag for each 16-byte granule in the physical address space. +Such memory range must be mapped with the Normal-Tagged memory +attribute. A logical tag is derived from bits 59-56 of the virtual +address used for the memory access. A CPU with MTE enabled will compare +the logical tag against the allocation tag and potentially raise an +exception on mismatch, subject to system registers configuration. + +Userspace Support +================= + +When ``CONFIG_ARM64_MTE`` is selected and Memory Tagging Extension is +supported by the hardware, the kernel advertises the feature to +userspace via ``HWCAP2_MTE``. + +PROT_MTE +-------- + +To access the allocation tags, a user process must enable the Tagged +memory attribute on an address range using a new ``prot`` flag for +``mmap()`` and ``mprotect()``: + +``PROT_MTE`` - Pages allow access to the MTE allocation tags. + +The allocation tag is set to 0 when such pages are first mapped in the +user address space and preserved on copy-on-write. ``MAP_SHARED`` is +supported and the allocation tags can be shared between processes. + +**Note**: ``PROT_MTE`` is only supported on ``MAP_ANONYMOUS`` and +RAM-based file mappings (``tmpfs``, ``memfd``). Passing it to other +types of mapping will result in ``-EINVAL`` returned by these system +calls. + +**Note**: The ``PROT_MTE`` flag (and corresponding memory type) cannot +be cleared by ``mprotect()``. + +**Note**: ``madvise()`` memory ranges with ``MADV_DONTNEED`` and +``MADV_FREE`` may have the allocation tags cleared (set to 0) at any +point after the system call. + +Tag Check Faults +---------------- + +When ``PROT_MTE`` is enabled on an address range and a mismatch between +the logical and allocation tags occurs on access, there are three +configurable behaviours: + +- *Ignore* - This is the default mode. The CPU (and kernel) ignores the + tag check fault. + +- *Synchronous* - The kernel raises a ``SIGSEGV`` synchronously, with + ``.si_code = SEGV_MTESERR`` and ``.si_addr = <fault-address>``. The + memory access is not performed. If ``SIGSEGV`` is ignored or blocked + by the offending thread, the containing process is terminated with a + ``coredump``. + +- *Asynchronous* - The kernel raises a ``SIGSEGV``, in the offending + thread, asynchronously following one or multiple tag check faults, + with ``.si_code = SEGV_MTEAERR`` and ``.si_addr = 0`` (the faulting + address is unknown). + +The user can select the above modes, per thread, using the +``prctl(PR_SET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL, flags, 0, 0, 0)`` system call where +``flags`` contain one of the following values in the ``PR_MTE_TCF_MASK`` +bit-field: + +- ``PR_MTE_TCF_NONE`` - *Ignore* tag check faults +- ``PR_MTE_TCF_SYNC`` - *Synchronous* tag check fault mode +- ``PR_MTE_TCF_ASYNC`` - *Asynchronous* tag check fault mode + +The current tag check fault mode can be read using the +``prctl(PR_GET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL, 0, 0, 0, 0)`` system call. + +Tag checking can also be disabled for a user thread by setting the +``PSTATE.TCO`` bit with ``MSR TCO, #1``. + +**Note**: Signal handlers are always invoked with ``PSTATE.TCO = 0``, +irrespective of the interrupted context. ``PSTATE.TCO`` is restored on +``sigreturn()``. + +**Note**: There are no *match-all* logical tags available for user +applications. + +**Note**: Kernel accesses to the user address space (e.g. ``read()`` +system call) are not checked if the user thread tag checking mode is +``PR_MTE_TCF_NONE`` or ``PR_MTE_TCF_ASYNC``. If the tag checking mode is +``PR_MTE_TCF_SYNC``, the kernel makes a best effort to check its user +address accesses, however it cannot always guarantee it. + +Excluding Tags in the ``IRG``, ``ADDG`` and ``SUBG`` instructions +----------------------------------------------------------------- + +The architecture allows excluding certain tags to be randomly generated +via the ``GCR_EL1.Exclude`` register bit-field. By default, Linux +excludes all tags other than 0. A user thread can enable specific tags +in the randomly generated set using the ``prctl(PR_SET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL, +flags, 0, 0, 0)`` system call where ``flags`` contains the tags bitmap +in the ``PR_MTE_TAG_MASK`` bit-field. + +**Note**: The hardware uses an exclude mask but the ``prctl()`` +interface provides an include mask. An include mask of ``0`` (exclusion +mask ``0xffff``) results in the CPU always generating tag ``0``. + +Initial process state +--------------------- + +On ``execve()``, the new process has the following configuration: + +- ``PR_TAGGED_ADDR_ENABLE`` set to 0 (disabled) +- Tag checking mode set to ``PR_MTE_TCF_NONE`` +- ``PR_MTE_TAG_MASK`` set to 0 (all tags excluded) +- ``PSTATE.TCO`` set to 0 +- ``PROT_MTE`` not set on any of the initial memory maps + +On ``fork()``, the new process inherits the parent's configuration and +memory map attributes with the exception of the ``madvise()`` ranges +with ``MADV_WIPEONFORK`` which will have the data and tags cleared (set +to 0). + +The ``ptrace()`` interface +-------------------------- + +``PTRACE_PEEKMTETAGS`` and ``PTRACE_POKEMTETAGS`` allow a tracer to read +the tags from or set the tags to a tracee's address space. The +``ptrace()`` system call is invoked as ``ptrace(request, pid, addr, +data)`` where: + +- ``request`` - one of ``PTRACE_PEEKMTETAGS`` or ``PTRACE_PEEKMTETAGS``. +- ``pid`` - the tracee's PID. +- ``addr`` - address in the tracee's address space. +- ``data`` - pointer to a ``struct iovec`` where ``iov_base`` points to + a buffer of ``iov_len`` length in the tracer's address space. + +The tags in the tracer's ``iov_base`` buffer are represented as one +4-bit tag per byte and correspond to a 16-byte MTE tag granule in the +tracee's address space. + +**Note**: If ``addr`` is not aligned to a 16-byte granule, the kernel +will use the corresponding aligned address. + +``ptrace()`` return value: + +- 0 - tags were copied, the tracer's ``iov_len`` was updated to the + number of tags transferred. This may be smaller than the requested + ``iov_len`` if the requested address range in the tracee's or the + tracer's space cannot be accessed or does not have valid tags. +- ``-EPERM`` - the specified process cannot be traced. +- ``-EIO`` - the tracee's address range cannot be accessed (e.g. invalid + address) and no tags copied. ``iov_len`` not updated. +- ``-EFAULT`` - fault on accessing the tracer's memory (``struct iovec`` + or ``iov_base`` buffer) and no tags copied. ``iov_len`` not updated. +- ``-EOPNOTSUPP`` - the tracee's address does not have valid tags (never + mapped with the ``PROT_MTE`` flag). ``iov_len`` not updated. + +**Note**: There are no transient errors for the requests above, so user +programs should not retry in case of a non-zero system call return. + +Example of correct usage +======================== + +*MTE Example code* + +.. code-block:: c + + /* + * To be compiled with -march=armv8.5-a+memtag + */ + #include <errno.h> + #include <stdio.h> + #include <stdlib.h> + #include <unistd.h> + #include <sys/auxv.h> + #include <sys/mman.h> + #include <sys/prctl.h> + + /* + * From arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/hwcap.h + */ + #define HWCAP2_MTE (1 << 18) + + /* + * From arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/mman.h + */ + #define PROT_MTE 0x20 + + /* + * From include/uapi/linux/prctl.h + */ + #define PR_SET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL 55 + #define PR_GET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL 56 + # define PR_TAGGED_ADDR_ENABLE (1UL << 0) + # define PR_MTE_TCF_SHIFT 1 + # define PR_MTE_TCF_NONE (0UL << PR_MTE_TCF_SHIFT) + # define PR_MTE_TCF_SYNC (1UL << PR_MTE_TCF_SHIFT) + # define PR_MTE_TCF_ASYNC (2UL << PR_MTE_TCF_SHIFT) + # define PR_MTE_TCF_MASK (3UL << PR_MTE_TCF_SHIFT) + # define PR_MTE_TAG_SHIFT 3 + # define PR_MTE_TAG_MASK (0xffffUL << PR_MTE_TAG_SHIFT) + + /* + * Insert a random logical tag into the given pointer. + */ + #define insert_random_tag(ptr) ({ \ + __u64 __val; \ + asm("irg %0, %1" : "=r" (__val) : "r" (ptr)); \ + __val; \ + }) + + /* + * Set the allocation tag on the destination address. + */ + #define set_tag(tagged_addr) do { \ + asm volatile("stg %0, [%0]" : : "r" (tagged_addr) : "memory"); \ + } while (0) + + int main() + { + unsigned char *a; + unsigned long page_sz = sysconf(_SC_PAGESIZE); + unsigned long hwcap2 = getauxval(AT_HWCAP2); + + /* check if MTE is present */ + if (!(hwcap2 & HWCAP2_MTE)) + return EXIT_FAILURE; + + /* + * Enable the tagged address ABI, synchronous MTE tag check faults and + * allow all non-zero tags in the randomly generated set. + */ + if (prctl(PR_SET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL, + PR_TAGGED_ADDR_ENABLE | PR_MTE_TCF_SYNC | (0xfffe << PR_MTE_TAG_SHIFT), + 0, 0, 0)) { + perror("prctl() failed"); + return EXIT_FAILURE; + } + + a = mmap(0, page_sz, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, + MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0); + if (a == MAP_FAILED) { + perror("mmap() failed"); + return EXIT_FAILURE; + } + + /* + * Enable MTE on the above anonymous mmap. The flag could be passed + * directly to mmap() and skip this step. + */ + if (mprotect(a, page_sz, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE | PROT_MTE)) { + perror("mprotect() failed"); + return EXIT_FAILURE; + } + + /* access with the default tag (0) */ + a[0] = 1; + a[1] = 2; + + printf("a[0] = %hhu a[1] = %hhu\n", a[0], a[1]); + + /* set the logical and allocation tags */ + a = (unsigned char *)insert_random_tag(a); + set_tag(a); + + printf("%p\n", a); + + /* non-zero tag access */ + a[0] = 3; + printf("a[0] = %hhu a[1] = %hhu\n", a[0], a[1]); + + /* + * If MTE is enabled correctly the next instruction will generate an + * exception. + */ + printf("Expecting SIGSEGV...\n"); + a[16] = 0xdd; + + /* this should not be printed in the PR_MTE_TCF_SYNC mode */ + printf("...haven't got one\n"); + + return EXIT_FAILURE; + }