| Message ID | 20200813170707.2659-3-nramas@linux.microsoft.com (mailing list archive) |
|---|---|
| State | New, archived |
| Headers | show |
| Series | SELinux: Measure state and hash of policy using IMA | expand |
On 8/13/20 1:07 PM, Lakshmi Ramasubramanian wrote: > SELinux configuration and policy are some of the critical data for this > security module that needs to be measured. This measurement can be used > by an attestation service, for instance, to verify if the configuration > and policies have been setup correctly and that they haven't been tampered > with at runtime. > > Measure SELinux configuration, policy capabilities settings, and the hash > of the loaded policy by calling the IMA hook ima_measure_critical_data(). > > Sample measurement of SELinux state and hash of the policy: > > 10 e32e...5ac3 ima-buf sha256:86e8...4594 selinux-state-1595389364:287899386 696e697469616c697a65643d313b656e61626c65643d313b656e666f7263696e673d303b636865636b72657170726f743d313b6e6574776f726b5f706565725f636f6e74726f6c733d313b6f70656e5f7065726d733d313b657874656e6465645f736f636b65745f636c6173733d313b616c776179735f636865636b5f6e6574776f726b3d303b6367726f75705f7365636c6162656c3d313b6e6e705f6e6f737569645f7472616e736974696f6e3d313b67656e66735f7365636c6162656c5f73796d6c696e6b733d303 > 10 9e81...0857 ima-buf sha256:4941...68fc selinux-policy-hash-1597335667:462051628 8d1d...1834 > > To verify the measurement check the following: > > Execute the following command to extract the measured data > from the IMA log for SELinux configuration (selinux-state). > > grep -m 1 "selinux-state" /sys/kernel/security/integrity/ima/ascii_runtime_measurements | cut -d' ' -f 6 | xxd -r -p > > The output should be the list of key-value pairs. For example, > initialized=1;enabled=1;enforcing=0;checkreqprot=1;network_peer_controls=1;open_perms=1;extended_socket_class=1;always_check_network=0;cgroup_seclabel=1;nnp_nosuid_transition=1;genfs_seclabel_symlinks=0; > > To verify the measured data with the current SELinux state: > > => enabled should be set to 1 if /sys/fs/selinux folder exists, > 0 otherwise > > For other entries, compare the integer value in the files > => /sys/fs/selinux/enforce > => /sys/fs/selinux/checkreqprot > And, each of the policy capabilities files under > => /sys/fs/selinux/policy_capabilities > > For selinux-policy-hash, the hash of SELinux policy is included > in the IMA log entry. > > To verify the measured data with the current SELinux policy run > the following commands and verify the output hash values match. > > sha256sum /sys/fs/selinux/policy | cut -d' ' -f 1 > > grep -m 1 "selinux-policy-hash" /sys/kernel/security/integrity/ima/ascii_runtime_measurements | cut -d' ' -f 6 > > Signed-off-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com> > Suggested-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com> > Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> # error: implicit declaration of function 'vfree' > Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> # error: implicit declaration of function 'crypto_alloc_shash' > Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> # sparse: symbol 'security_read_selinux_policy' was not declared. Should it be static? > --- > > diff --git a/security/selinux/measure.c b/security/selinux/measure.c > new file mode 100644 > index 000000000000..f21b7de4e2ae > --- /dev/null > +++ b/security/selinux/measure.c > @@ -0,0 +1,204 @@ > +static int selinux_hash_buffer(void *buf, size_t buf_len, > + void **buf_hash, int *buf_hash_len) > +{ > + struct crypto_shash *tfm; > + struct shash_desc *desc = NULL; > + void *digest = NULL; > + int desc_size; > + int digest_size; > + int ret = 0; > + > + tfm = crypto_alloc_shash("sha256", 0, 0); > + if (IS_ERR(tfm)) > + return PTR_ERR(tfm); Can we make the algorithm selectable via kernel parameter and/or writing to a new selinuxfs node?
On 8/13/20 10:42 AM, Stephen Smalley wrote: >> diff --git a/security/selinux/measure.c b/security/selinux/measure.c >> new file mode 100644 >> index 000000000000..f21b7de4e2ae >> --- /dev/null >> +++ b/security/selinux/measure.c >> @@ -0,0 +1,204 @@ >> +static int selinux_hash_buffer(void *buf, size_t buf_len, >> + void **buf_hash, int *buf_hash_len) >> +{ >> + struct crypto_shash *tfm; >> + struct shash_desc *desc = NULL; >> + void *digest = NULL; >> + int desc_size; >> + int digest_size; >> + int ret = 0; >> + >> + tfm = crypto_alloc_shash("sha256", 0, 0); >> + if (IS_ERR(tfm)) >> + return PTR_ERR(tfm); > Can we make the algorithm selectable via kernel parameter and/or writing > to a new selinuxfs node? I can add a kernel parameter to select this hash algorithm. -lakshmi
On Thu, Aug 13, 2020 at 1:52 PM Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com> wrote: > > On 8/13/20 10:42 AM, Stephen Smalley wrote: > > >> diff --git a/security/selinux/measure.c b/security/selinux/measure.c > >> new file mode 100644 > >> index 000000000000..f21b7de4e2ae > >> --- /dev/null > >> +++ b/security/selinux/measure.c > >> @@ -0,0 +1,204 @@ > >> +static int selinux_hash_buffer(void *buf, size_t buf_len, > >> + void **buf_hash, int *buf_hash_len) > >> +{ > >> + struct crypto_shash *tfm; > >> + struct shash_desc *desc = NULL; > >> + void *digest = NULL; > >> + int desc_size; > >> + int digest_size; > >> + int ret = 0; > >> + > >> + tfm = crypto_alloc_shash("sha256", 0, 0); > >> + if (IS_ERR(tfm)) > >> + return PTR_ERR(tfm); > > Can we make the algorithm selectable via kernel parameter and/or writing > > to a new selinuxfs node? > > I can add a kernel parameter to select this hash algorithm. Also can we provide a Kconfig option for the default value like IMA does?
On 8/13/20 10:58 AM, Stephen Smalley wrote: > On Thu, Aug 13, 2020 at 1:52 PM Lakshmi Ramasubramanian > <nramas@linux.microsoft.com> wrote: >> >> On 8/13/20 10:42 AM, Stephen Smalley wrote: >> >>>> diff --git a/security/selinux/measure.c b/security/selinux/measure.c >>>> new file mode 100644 >>>> index 000000000000..f21b7de4e2ae >>>> --- /dev/null >>>> +++ b/security/selinux/measure.c >>>> @@ -0,0 +1,204 @@ >>>> +static int selinux_hash_buffer(void *buf, size_t buf_len, >>>> + void **buf_hash, int *buf_hash_len) >>>> +{ >>>> + struct crypto_shash *tfm; >>>> + struct shash_desc *desc = NULL; >>>> + void *digest = NULL; >>>> + int desc_size; >>>> + int digest_size; >>>> + int ret = 0; >>>> + >>>> + tfm = crypto_alloc_shash("sha256", 0, 0); >>>> + if (IS_ERR(tfm)) >>>> + return PTR_ERR(tfm); >>> Can we make the algorithm selectable via kernel parameter and/or writing >>> to a new selinuxfs node? >> >> I can add a kernel parameter to select this hash algorithm. > > Also can we provide a Kconfig option for the default value like IMA does? > Would we need both - Kconfig and kernel param? The other option is to provide an IMA function to return the current hash algorithm used for measurement. That way a consistent hash algorithm can be employed by both IMA and the callers. Would that be better? -lakshmi
On Thu, Aug 13, 2020 at 2:03 PM Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com> wrote: > > On 8/13/20 10:58 AM, Stephen Smalley wrote: > > On Thu, Aug 13, 2020 at 1:52 PM Lakshmi Ramasubramanian > > <nramas@linux.microsoft.com> wrote: > >> > >> On 8/13/20 10:42 AM, Stephen Smalley wrote: > >> > >>>> diff --git a/security/selinux/measure.c b/security/selinux/measure.c > >>>> new file mode 100644 > >>>> index 000000000000..f21b7de4e2ae > >>>> --- /dev/null > >>>> +++ b/security/selinux/measure.c > >>>> @@ -0,0 +1,204 @@ > >>>> +static int selinux_hash_buffer(void *buf, size_t buf_len, > >>>> + void **buf_hash, int *buf_hash_len) > >>>> +{ > >>>> + struct crypto_shash *tfm; > >>>> + struct shash_desc *desc = NULL; > >>>> + void *digest = NULL; > >>>> + int desc_size; > >>>> + int digest_size; > >>>> + int ret = 0; > >>>> + > >>>> + tfm = crypto_alloc_shash("sha256", 0, 0); > >>>> + if (IS_ERR(tfm)) > >>>> + return PTR_ERR(tfm); > >>> Can we make the algorithm selectable via kernel parameter and/or writing > >>> to a new selinuxfs node? > >> > >> I can add a kernel parameter to select this hash algorithm. > > > > Also can we provide a Kconfig option for the default value like IMA does? > > > > Would we need both - Kconfig and kernel param? > > The other option is to provide an IMA function to return the current > hash algorithm used for measurement. That way a consistent hash > algorithm can be employed by both IMA and the callers. Would that be better? This is why I preferred just passing the serialized policy buffer to IMA and letting it handle the hashing. But apparently that approach wouldn't fly. IMA appears to support both a Kconfig option for selecting a default algorithm and a kernel parameter for overriding it. I assume the idea is that the distros can pick a reasonable default and then the end users can override that if they have specific requirements. I'd want the same for SELinux. If IMA is willing to export its hash algorithm to external components, then I'm willing to reuse that but not sure if that's a layering violation.
On Thu, 2020-08-13 at 14:13 -0400, Stephen Smalley wrote: > On Thu, Aug 13, 2020 at 2:03 PM Lakshmi Ramasubramanian > <nramas@linux.microsoft.com> wrote: > > On 8/13/20 10:58 AM, Stephen Smalley wrote: > > > On Thu, Aug 13, 2020 at 1:52 PM Lakshmi Ramasubramanian > > > <nramas@linux.microsoft.com> wrote: > > > > On 8/13/20 10:42 AM, Stephen Smalley wrote: > > > > > > > > > > diff --git a/security/selinux/measure.c b/security/selinux/measure.c > > > > > > new file mode 100644 > > > > > > index 000000000000..f21b7de4e2ae > > > > > > --- /dev/null > > > > > > +++ b/security/selinux/measure.c > > > > > > @@ -0,0 +1,204 @@ > > > > > > +static int selinux_hash_buffer(void *buf, size_t buf_len, > > > > > > + void **buf_hash, int *buf_hash_len) > > > > > > +{ > > > > > > + struct crypto_shash *tfm; > > > > > > + struct shash_desc *desc = NULL; > > > > > > + void *digest = NULL; > > > > > > + int desc_size; > > > > > > + int digest_size; > > > > > > + int ret = 0; > > > > > > + > > > > > > + tfm = crypto_alloc_shash("sha256", 0, 0); > > > > > > + if (IS_ERR(tfm)) > > > > > > + return PTR_ERR(tfm); > > > > > Can we make the algorithm selectable via kernel parameter and/or writing > > > > > to a new selinuxfs node? > > > > > > > > I can add a kernel parameter to select this hash algorithm. > > > > > > Also can we provide a Kconfig option for the default value like IMA does? > > > > > > > Would we need both - Kconfig and kernel param? > > > > The other option is to provide an IMA function to return the current > > hash algorithm used for measurement. That way a consistent hash > > algorithm can be employed by both IMA and the callers. Would that be better? > > This is why I preferred just passing the serialized policy buffer to > IMA and letting it handle the hashing. But apparently that approach > wouldn't fly. IMA appears to support both a Kconfig option for > selecting a default algorithm and a kernel parameter for overriding > it. I assume the idea is that the distros can pick a reasonable > default and then the end users can override that if they have specific > requirements. I'd want the same for SELinux. If IMA is willing to > export its hash algorithm to external components, then I'm willing to > reuse that but not sure if that's a layering violation. With the new ima_measure_critical_data() hook, I agree with you and Casey it doesn't make sense for each caller to have to write their own function. Casey suggested exporting IMA's hash function or defining a new common hash function. There's nothing specific to IMA. Should the common hash function be prefixed with "security_"? Like when we add a new security hook call, the new LSM call is separate from any other change. Please break up this patch with the SELinux specific pieces separated from the ima_measure_critical_data() call as much as possible. thanks, Mimi
On 8/17/2020 2:31 PM, Mimi Zohar wrote: > On Thu, 2020-08-13 at 14:13 -0400, Stephen Smalley wrote: >> On Thu, Aug 13, 2020 at 2:03 PM Lakshmi Ramasubramanian >> <nramas@linux.microsoft.com> wrote: >>> On 8/13/20 10:58 AM, Stephen Smalley wrote: >>>> On Thu, Aug 13, 2020 at 1:52 PM Lakshmi Ramasubramanian >>>> <nramas@linux.microsoft.com> wrote: >>>>> On 8/13/20 10:42 AM, Stephen Smalley wrote: >>>>> >>>>>>> diff --git a/security/selinux/measure.c b/security/selinux/measure.c >>>>>>> new file mode 100644 >>>>>>> index 000000000000..f21b7de4e2ae >>>>>>> --- /dev/null >>>>>>> +++ b/security/selinux/measure.c >>>>>>> @@ -0,0 +1,204 @@ >>>>>>> +static int selinux_hash_buffer(void *buf, size_t buf_len, >>>>>>> + void **buf_hash, int *buf_hash_len) >>>>>>> +{ >>>>>>> + struct crypto_shash *tfm; >>>>>>> + struct shash_desc *desc = NULL; >>>>>>> + void *digest = NULL; >>>>>>> + int desc_size; >>>>>>> + int digest_size; >>>>>>> + int ret = 0; >>>>>>> + >>>>>>> + tfm = crypto_alloc_shash("sha256", 0, 0); >>>>>>> + if (IS_ERR(tfm)) >>>>>>> + return PTR_ERR(tfm); >>>>>> Can we make the algorithm selectable via kernel parameter and/or writing >>>>>> to a new selinuxfs node? >>>>> I can add a kernel parameter to select this hash algorithm. >>>> Also can we provide a Kconfig option for the default value like IMA does? >>>> >>> Would we need both - Kconfig and kernel param? >>> >>> The other option is to provide an IMA function to return the current >>> hash algorithm used for measurement. That way a consistent hash >>> algorithm can be employed by both IMA and the callers. Would that be better? >> This is why I preferred just passing the serialized policy buffer to >> IMA and letting it handle the hashing. But apparently that approach >> wouldn't fly. IMA appears to support both a Kconfig option for >> selecting a default algorithm and a kernel parameter for overriding >> it. I assume the idea is that the distros can pick a reasonable >> default and then the end users can override that if they have specific >> requirements. I'd want the same for SELinux. If IMA is willing to >> export its hash algorithm to external components, then I'm willing to >> reuse that but not sure if that's a layering violation. > With the new ima_measure_critical_data() hook, I agree with you and > Casey it doesn't make sense for each caller to have to write their own > function. Casey suggested exporting IMA's hash function or defining a > new common hash function. There's nothing specific to IMA. Except that no one is going to use the function unless they're doing an IMA operation. > Should > the common hash function be prefixed with "security_"? Yuck. That prefix is for interfaces that are exported outside the security sub-system. We're talking about a function that is provided for use within the security sub-system, but not for any one particular security module or non-module feature. We're currently using the lsm_ prefix for interfaces used within the security subsystem, so I suggest lsm_hash_brown_potatoes() might be the way to go. > > Like when we add a new security hook call, the new LSM call is separate > from any other change. Please break up this patch with the SELinux > specific pieces separated from the ima_measure_critical_data() call as > much as possible. > > thanks, > > Mimi >
On 8/17/20 3:00 PM, Casey Schaufler wrote: > On 8/17/2020 2:31 PM, Mimi Zohar wrote: >> On Thu, 2020-08-13 at 14:13 -0400, Stephen Smalley wrote: >>> On Thu, Aug 13, 2020 at 2:03 PM Lakshmi Ramasubramanian >>> <nramas@linux.microsoft.com> wrote: >>>> On 8/13/20 10:58 AM, Stephen Smalley wrote: >>>>> On Thu, Aug 13, 2020 at 1:52 PM Lakshmi Ramasubramanian >>>>> <nramas@linux.microsoft.com> wrote: >>>>>> On 8/13/20 10:42 AM, Stephen Smalley wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>>> diff --git a/security/selinux/measure.c b/security/selinux/measure.c >>>>>>>> new file mode 100644 >>>>>>>> index 000000000000..f21b7de4e2ae >>>>>>>> --- /dev/null >>>>>>>> +++ b/security/selinux/measure.c >>>>>>>> @@ -0,0 +1,204 @@ >>>>>>>> +static int selinux_hash_buffer(void *buf, size_t buf_len, >>>>>>>> + void **buf_hash, int *buf_hash_len) >>>>>>>> +{ >>>>>>>> + struct crypto_shash *tfm; >>>>>>>> + struct shash_desc *desc = NULL; >>>>>>>> + void *digest = NULL; >>>>>>>> + int desc_size; >>>>>>>> + int digest_size; >>>>>>>> + int ret = 0; >>>>>>>> + >>>>>>>> + tfm = crypto_alloc_shash("sha256", 0, 0); >>>>>>>> + if (IS_ERR(tfm)) >>>>>>>> + return PTR_ERR(tfm); >>>>>>> Can we make the algorithm selectable via kernel parameter and/or writing >>>>>>> to a new selinuxfs node? >>>>>> I can add a kernel parameter to select this hash algorithm. >>>>> Also can we provide a Kconfig option for the default value like IMA does? >>>>> >>>> Would we need both - Kconfig and kernel param? >>>> >>>> The other option is to provide an IMA function to return the current >>>> hash algorithm used for measurement. That way a consistent hash >>>> algorithm can be employed by both IMA and the callers. Would that be better? >>> This is why I preferred just passing the serialized policy buffer to >>> IMA and letting it handle the hashing. But apparently that approach >>> wouldn't fly. IMA appears to support both a Kconfig option for >>> selecting a default algorithm and a kernel parameter for overriding >>> it. I assume the idea is that the distros can pick a reasonable >>> default and then the end users can override that if they have specific >>> requirements. I'd want the same for SELinux. If IMA is willing to >>> export its hash algorithm to external components, then I'm willing to >>> reuse that but not sure if that's a layering violation. >> With the new ima_measure_critical_data() hook, I agree with you and >> Casey it doesn't make sense for each caller to have to write their own >> function. Casey suggested exporting IMA's hash function or defining a >> new common hash function. There's nothing specific to IMA. > > Except that no one is going to use the function unless they're > doing an IMA operation. Can we do the following instead: In ima_measure_critical_data() IMA hook, we can add another param for the caller to indicate whether => The contents of "buf" needs to be measured OR => Hash of the contents of "buf" needs to be measured. This way IMA doesn't need to export any new function to meet the hashing requirement. -lakshmi > >> Should >> the common hash function be prefixed with "security_"? > > Yuck. That prefix is for interfaces that are exported outside the > security sub-system. We're talking about a function that is provided > for use within the security sub-system, but not for any one particular > security module or non-module feature. We're currently using the lsm_ > prefix for interfaces used within the security subsystem, so I suggest > lsm_hash_brown_potatoes() might be the way to go. > >> >> Like when we add a new security hook call, the new LSM call is separate >> from any other change. Please break up this patch with the SELinux >> specific pieces separated from the ima_measure_critical_data() call as >> much as possible. >>
On Mon, 2020-08-17 at 15:33 -0700, Lakshmi Ramasubramanian wrote: > On 8/17/20 3:00 PM, Casey Schaufler wrote: > > On 8/17/2020 2:31 PM, Mimi Zohar wrote: > > > On Thu, 2020-08-13 at 14:13 -0400, Stephen Smalley wrote: > > > > On Thu, Aug 13, 2020 at 2:03 PM Lakshmi Ramasubramanian > > > > <nramas@linux.microsoft.com> wrote: > > > > > On 8/13/20 10:58 AM, Stephen Smalley wrote: > > > > > > On Thu, Aug 13, 2020 at 1:52 PM Lakshmi Ramasubramanian > > > > > > <nramas@linux.microsoft.com> wrote: > > > > > > > On 8/13/20 10:42 AM, Stephen Smalley wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > diff --git a/security/selinux/measure.c b/security/selinux/measure.c > > > > > > > > > new file mode 100644 > > > > > > > > > index 000000000000..f21b7de4e2ae > > > > > > > > > --- /dev/null > > > > > > > > > +++ b/security/selinux/measure.c > > > > > > > > > @@ -0,0 +1,204 @@ > > > > > > > > > +static int selinux_hash_buffer(void *buf, size_t buf_len, > > > > > > > > > + void **buf_hash, int *buf_hash_len) > > > > > > > > > +{ > > > > > > > > > + struct crypto_shash *tfm; > > > > > > > > > + struct shash_desc *desc = NULL; > > > > > > > > > + void *digest = NULL; > > > > > > > > > + int desc_size; > > > > > > > > > + int digest_size; > > > > > > > > > + int ret = 0; > > > > > > > > > + > > > > > > > > > + tfm = crypto_alloc_shash("sha256", 0, 0); > > > > > > > > > + if (IS_ERR(tfm)) > > > > > > > > > + return PTR_ERR(tfm); > > > > > > > > Can we make the algorithm selectable via kernel parameter and/or writing > > > > > > > > to a new selinuxfs node? > > > > > > > I can add a kernel parameter to select this hash algorithm. > > > > > > Also can we provide a Kconfig option for the default value like IMA does? > > > > > > > > > > > Would we need both - Kconfig and kernel param? > > > > > > > > > > The other option is to provide an IMA function to return the current > > > > > hash algorithm used for measurement. That way a consistent hash > > > > > algorithm can be employed by both IMA and the callers. Would that be better? > > > > This is why I preferred just passing the serialized policy buffer to > > > > IMA and letting it handle the hashing. But apparently that approach > > > > wouldn't fly. IMA appears to support both a Kconfig option for > > > > selecting a default algorithm and a kernel parameter for overriding > > > > it. I assume the idea is that the distros can pick a reasonable > > > > default and then the end users can override that if they have specific > > > > requirements. I'd want the same for SELinux. If IMA is willing to > > > > export its hash algorithm to external components, then I'm willing to > > > > reuse that but not sure if that's a layering violation. > > > With the new ima_measure_critical_data() hook, I agree with you and > > > Casey it doesn't make sense for each caller to have to write their own > > > function. Casey suggested exporting IMA's hash function or defining a > > > new common hash function. There's nothing specific to IMA. > > > > Except that no one is going to use the function unless they're > > doing an IMA operation. > > Can we do the following instead: > > In ima_measure_critical_data() IMA hook, we can add another param for > the caller to indicate whether > > => The contents of "buf" needs to be measured > OR > => Hash of the contents of "buf" needs to be measured. > > This way IMA doesn't need to export any new function to meet the hashing > requirement. I'm not sure overloading the parameters is a good idea, but extending ima_measure_critical_data() to calculate a simple buffer hash should be fine. Mimi
On 8/17/20 4:11 PM, Mimi Zohar wrote: > On Mon, 2020-08-17 at 15:33 -0700, Lakshmi Ramasubramanian wrote: >> On 8/17/20 3:00 PM, Casey Schaufler wrote: >>> On 8/17/2020 2:31 PM, Mimi Zohar wrote: >>>> On Thu, 2020-08-13 at 14:13 -0400, Stephen Smalley wrote: >>>>> On Thu, Aug 13, 2020 at 2:03 PM Lakshmi Ramasubramanian >>>>> <nramas@linux.microsoft.com> wrote: >>>>>> On 8/13/20 10:58 AM, Stephen Smalley wrote: >>>>>>> On Thu, Aug 13, 2020 at 1:52 PM Lakshmi Ramasubramanian >>>>>>> <nramas@linux.microsoft.com> wrote: >>>>>>>> On 8/13/20 10:42 AM, Stephen Smalley wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> diff --git a/security/selinux/measure.c b/security/selinux/measure.c >>>>>>>>>> new file mode 100644 >>>>>>>>>> index 000000000000..f21b7de4e2ae >>>>>>>>>> --- /dev/null >>>>>>>>>> +++ b/security/selinux/measure.c >>>>>>>>>> @@ -0,0 +1,204 @@ >>>>>>>>>> +static int selinux_hash_buffer(void *buf, size_t buf_len, >>>>>>>>>> + void **buf_hash, int *buf_hash_len) >>>>>>>>>> +{ >>>>>>>>>> + struct crypto_shash *tfm; >>>>>>>>>> + struct shash_desc *desc = NULL; >>>>>>>>>> + void *digest = NULL; >>>>>>>>>> + int desc_size; >>>>>>>>>> + int digest_size; >>>>>>>>>> + int ret = 0; >>>>>>>>>> + >>>>>>>>>> + tfm = crypto_alloc_shash("sha256", 0, 0); >>>>>>>>>> + if (IS_ERR(tfm)) >>>>>>>>>> + return PTR_ERR(tfm); >>>>>>>>> Can we make the algorithm selectable via kernel parameter and/or writing >>>>>>>>> to a new selinuxfs node? >>>>>>>> I can add a kernel parameter to select this hash algorithm. >>>>>>> Also can we provide a Kconfig option for the default value like IMA does? >>>>>>> >>>>>> Would we need both - Kconfig and kernel param? >>>>>> >>>>>> The other option is to provide an IMA function to return the current >>>>>> hash algorithm used for measurement. That way a consistent hash >>>>>> algorithm can be employed by both IMA and the callers. Would that be better? >>>>> This is why I preferred just passing the serialized policy buffer to >>>>> IMA and letting it handle the hashing. But apparently that approach >>>>> wouldn't fly. IMA appears to support both a Kconfig option for >>>>> selecting a default algorithm and a kernel parameter for overriding >>>>> it. I assume the idea is that the distros can pick a reasonable >>>>> default and then the end users can override that if they have specific >>>>> requirements. I'd want the same for SELinux. If IMA is willing to >>>>> export its hash algorithm to external components, then I'm willing to >>>>> reuse that but not sure if that's a layering violation. >>>> With the new ima_measure_critical_data() hook, I agree with you and >>>> Casey it doesn't make sense for each caller to have to write their own >>>> function. Casey suggested exporting IMA's hash function or defining a >>>> new common hash function. There's nothing specific to IMA. >>> >>> Except that no one is going to use the function unless they're >>> doing an IMA operation. >> >> Can we do the following instead: >> >> In ima_measure_critical_data() IMA hook, we can add another param for >> the caller to indicate whether >> >> => The contents of "buf" needs to be measured >> OR >> => Hash of the contents of "buf" needs to be measured. >> >> This way IMA doesn't need to export any new function to meet the hashing >> requirement. > > I'm not sure overloading the parameters is a good idea, but extending > ima_measure_critical_data() to calculate a simple buffer hash should be > fine. > Sorry I wasn't clear - I didn't mean to say overload existing parameters, but extending the IMA hook to calculate the hash of the buffer - like the following: int ima_measure_critical_data(const char *event_name, const char *event_data_source, const void *buf, int buf_len, bool measure_buf_hash); If measure_buf_hash is true, IMA will calculate the hash of contents of "buf" and measure the hash. Else, IMA will measure the contents of "buf". -lakshmi
diff --git a/security/selinux/Makefile b/security/selinux/Makefile index 4d8e0e8adf0b..83d512116341 100644 --- a/security/selinux/Makefile +++ b/security/selinux/Makefile @@ -16,6 +16,8 @@ selinux-$(CONFIG_NETLABEL) += netlabel.o selinux-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND) += ibpkey.o +selinux-$(CONFIG_IMA) += measure.o + ccflags-y := -I$(srctree)/security/selinux -I$(srctree)/security/selinux/include $(addprefix $(obj)/,$(selinux-y)): $(obj)/flask.h diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index efa6108b1ce9..5521dfc1900b 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -7394,6 +7394,7 @@ int selinux_disable(struct selinux_state *state) } selinux_mark_disabled(state); + selinux_measure_state(state); pr_info("SELinux: Disabled at runtime.\n"); diff --git a/security/selinux/include/security.h b/security/selinux/include/security.h index b0e02cfe3ce1..77f42d9b544b 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/security.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/security.h @@ -222,16 +222,31 @@ static inline bool selinux_policycap_genfs_seclabel_symlinks(void) return state->policycap[POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_GENFS_SECLABEL_SYMLINKS]; } +static inline bool selinux_checkreqprot(const struct selinux_state *state) +{ + return READ_ONCE(state->checkreqprot); +} + int security_mls_enabled(struct selinux_state *state); int security_load_policy(struct selinux_state *state, void *data, size_t len); int security_read_policy(struct selinux_state *state, void **data, size_t *len); +int security_read_policy_kernel(struct selinux_state *state, + void **data, size_t *len); size_t security_policydb_len(struct selinux_state *state); int security_policycap_supported(struct selinux_state *state, unsigned int req_cap); +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA +extern void selinux_measure_state(struct selinux_state *selinux_state); +#else +static inline void selinux_measure_state(struct selinux_state *selinux_state) +{ +} +#endif + #define SEL_VEC_MAX 32 struct av_decision { u32 allowed; diff --git a/security/selinux/measure.c b/security/selinux/measure.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..f21b7de4e2ae --- /dev/null +++ b/security/selinux/measure.c @@ -0,0 +1,204 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later +/* + * Measure SELinux state using IMA subsystem. + */ +#include <linux/vmalloc.h> +#include <linux/ktime.h> +#include <linux/crypto.h> +#include <crypto/hash.h> +#include <crypto/hash_info.h> +#include <linux/ima.h> +#include "security.h" + +/* + * This function creates an unique name by appending the timestamp to + * the given string. This string is passed as "event name" to the IMA + * hook to measure the given SELinux data. + * + * The data provided by SELinux to the IMA subsystem for measuring may have + * already been measured (for instance the same state existed earlier). + * But for SELinux the current data represents a state change and hence + * needs to be measured again. To enable this, pass an unique "Event Name" + * to the IMA hook so that IMA subsystem will always measure the given data. + * + * For example, + * At time T0 SELinux data to be measured is "foo". IMA measures it. + * At time T1 the data is changed to "bar". IMA measures it. + * At time T2 the data is changed to "foo" again. IMA will not measure it + * (since it was already measured) unless the event name, for instance, + * is different in this call. + */ +static char *selinux_event_name(const char *name_prefix) +{ + char *event_name = NULL; + struct timespec64 curr_time; + + ktime_get_real_ts64(&curr_time); + event_name = kasprintf(GFP_KERNEL, "%s-%lld:%09ld", name_prefix, + curr_time.tv_sec, curr_time.tv_nsec); + if (!event_name) { + pr_warn("%s: event name not allocated.\n", __func__); + return NULL; + } + + return event_name; +} + +static int read_selinux_state(char **state_str, int *state_str_len, + struct selinux_state *state) +{ + char *buf, *str_fmt = "%s=%d;"; + int i, buf_len, curr; + + buf_len = snprintf(NULL, 0, str_fmt, "initialized", 0); + buf_len += snprintf(NULL, 0, str_fmt, "enabled", 0); + buf_len += snprintf(NULL, 0, str_fmt, "enforcing", 0); + buf_len += snprintf(NULL, 0, str_fmt, "checkreqprot", 0); + + for (i = 0; i < __POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX; i++) { + buf_len += snprintf(NULL, 0, str_fmt, + selinux_policycap_names[i], 0); + } + ++buf_len; + + buf = kzalloc(buf_len, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!buf) + return -ENOMEM; + + curr = snprintf(buf, buf_len, str_fmt, + "initialized", selinux_initialized(state)); + curr += snprintf((buf + curr), (buf_len - curr), str_fmt, + "enabled", !selinux_disabled(state)); + curr += snprintf((buf + curr), (buf_len - curr), str_fmt, + "enforcing", enforcing_enabled(state)); + curr += snprintf((buf + curr), (buf_len - curr), str_fmt, + "checkreqprot", selinux_checkreqprot(state)); + + for (i = 0; i < __POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX; i++) { + curr += snprintf((buf + curr), (buf_len - curr), str_fmt, + selinux_policycap_names[i], + state->policycap[i]); + } + + *state_str = buf; + *state_str_len = curr; + + return 0; +} + +static int selinux_hash_buffer(void *buf, size_t buf_len, + void **buf_hash, int *buf_hash_len) +{ + struct crypto_shash *tfm; + struct shash_desc *desc = NULL; + void *digest = NULL; + int desc_size; + int digest_size; + int ret = 0; + + tfm = crypto_alloc_shash("sha256", 0, 0); + if (IS_ERR(tfm)) + return PTR_ERR(tfm); + + desc_size = crypto_shash_descsize(tfm) + sizeof(*desc); + digest_size = crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm); + + digest = kmalloc(digest_size, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!digest) { + ret = -ENOMEM; + goto error; + } + + desc = kzalloc(desc_size, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!desc) { + ret = -ENOMEM; + goto error; + } + + desc->tfm = tfm; + + ret = crypto_shash_digest(desc, buf, buf_len, digest); + if (ret < 0) + goto error; + + *buf_hash_len = digest_size; + *buf_hash = digest; + digest = NULL; + +error: + kfree(desc); + kfree(digest); + + crypto_free_shash(tfm); + + return ret; +} + +void selinux_measure_state(struct selinux_state *state) +{ + void *policy = NULL; + void *policy_hash = NULL; + char *event_name = NULL; + char *state_str = NULL; + size_t policy_len; + int state_str_len, policy_hash_len, rc = 0; + bool initialized = selinux_initialized(state); + + rc = read_selinux_state(&state_str, &state_str_len, state); + if (rc) { + pr_warn("%s: Failed to read selinux state.\n", __func__); + return; + } + + /* + * Get an unique string for measuring the current SELinux state. + */ + event_name = selinux_event_name("selinux-state"); + if (!event_name) { + pr_warn("%s: Event name for state not allocated.\n", + __func__); + rc = -ENOMEM; + goto out; + } + + rc = ima_measure_critical_data(event_name, "selinux", + state_str, state_str_len); + + kfree(event_name); + event_name = NULL; + + if (rc) + goto out; + + /* + * Measure SELinux policy only after initialization is completed. + */ + if (!initialized) + goto out; + + rc = security_read_policy_kernel(state, &policy, &policy_len); + if (rc) + goto out; + + rc = selinux_hash_buffer(policy, policy_len, + &policy_hash, &policy_hash_len); + if (rc) + goto out; + + event_name = selinux_event_name("selinux-policy-hash"); + if (!event_name) { + pr_warn("%s: Event name for policy not allocated.\n", + __func__); + rc = -ENOMEM; + goto out; + } + + rc = ima_measure_critical_data(event_name, "selinux", + policy_hash, policy_hash_len); + +out: + kfree(event_name); + kfree(state_str); + kfree(policy_hash); + vfree(policy); +} diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c index 4781314c2510..6d46eaef5c92 100644 --- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c +++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c @@ -173,6 +173,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_enforce(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_get_loginuid(current)), audit_get_sessionid(current)); enforcing_set(state, new_value); + selinux_measure_state(state); if (new_value) avc_ss_reset(state->avc, 0); selnl_notify_setenforce(new_value); @@ -678,6 +679,8 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_checkreqprot(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, fsi->state->checkreqprot = new_value ? 1 : 0; length = count; + + selinux_measure_state(fsi->state); out: kfree(page); return length; diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c index ef0afd878bfc..3978c804c361 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c +++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c @@ -2182,6 +2182,7 @@ int security_load_policy(struct selinux_state *state, void *data, size_t len) selinux_status_update_policyload(state, seqno); selinux_netlbl_cache_invalidate(); selinux_xfrm_notify_policyload(); + selinux_measure_state(state); return 0; } @@ -2270,6 +2271,7 @@ int security_load_policy(struct selinux_state *state, void *data, size_t len) selinux_status_update_policyload(state, seqno); selinux_netlbl_cache_invalidate(); selinux_xfrm_notify_policyload(); + selinux_measure_state(state); rc = 0; goto out; @@ -2941,6 +2943,7 @@ int security_set_bools(struct selinux_state *state, u32 len, int *values) selnl_notify_policyload(seqno); selinux_status_update_policyload(state, seqno); selinux_xfrm_notify_policyload(); + selinux_measure_state(state); } return rc; } @@ -3720,14 +3723,23 @@ int security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(struct selinux_state *state, } #endif /* CONFIG_NETLABEL */ +static int security_read_policy_len(struct selinux_state *state, size_t *len) +{ + if (!selinux_initialized(state)) + return -EINVAL; + + *len = security_policydb_len(state); + return 0; +} + /** - * security_read_policy - read the policy. + * security_read_selinux_policy - read the policy. * @data: binary policy data * @len: length of data in bytes * */ -int security_read_policy(struct selinux_state *state, - void **data, size_t *len) +static int security_read_selinux_policy(struct selinux_state *state, + void **data, size_t *len) { struct policydb *policydb = &state->ss->policydb; int rc; @@ -3736,12 +3748,6 @@ int security_read_policy(struct selinux_state *state, if (!selinux_initialized(state)) return -EINVAL; - *len = security_policydb_len(state); - - *data = vmalloc_user(*len); - if (!*data) - return -ENOMEM; - fp.data = *data; fp.len = *len; @@ -3754,5 +3760,52 @@ int security_read_policy(struct selinux_state *state, *len = (unsigned long)fp.data - (unsigned long)*data; return 0; +} + +/** + * security_read_policy - read the policy. + * @data: binary policy data + * @len: length of data in bytes + * + */ +int security_read_policy(struct selinux_state *state, + void **data, size_t *len) +{ + int rc; + + rc = security_read_policy_len(state, len); + if (rc) + return rc; + + *data = vmalloc_user(*len); + if (!*data) + return -ENOMEM; + + return security_read_selinux_policy(state, data, len); +} + +/** + * security_read_policy_kernel - read the policy. + * @data: binary policy data + * @len: length of data in bytes + * + * Allocates kernel memory for reading SELinux policy. + * This function is for internal use only and should not + * be used for returning data to user space + * + */ +int security_read_policy_kernel(struct selinux_state *state, + void **data, size_t *len) +{ + int rc; + + rc = security_read_policy_len(state, len); + if (rc) + return rc; + + *data = vmalloc(*len); + if (!*data) + return -ENOMEM; + return security_read_selinux_policy(state, data, len); }
SELinux configuration and policy are some of the critical data for this security module that needs to be measured. This measurement can be used by an attestation service, for instance, to verify if the configuration and policies have been setup correctly and that they haven't been tampered with at runtime. Measure SELinux configuration, policy capabilities settings, and the hash of the loaded policy by calling the IMA hook ima_measure_critical_data(). Sample measurement of SELinux state and hash of the policy: 10 e32e...5ac3 ima-buf sha256:86e8...4594 selinux-state-1595389364:287899386 696e697469616c697a65643d313b656e61626c65643d313b656e666f7263696e673d303b636865636b72657170726f743d313b6e6574776f726b5f706565725f636f6e74726f6c733d313b6f70656e5f7065726d733d313b657874656e6465645f736f636b65745f636c6173733d313b616c776179735f636865636b5f6e6574776f726b3d303b6367726f75705f7365636c6162656c3d313b6e6e705f6e6f737569645f7472616e736974696f6e3d313b67656e66735f7365636c6162656c5f73796d6c696e6b733d303 10 9e81...0857 ima-buf sha256:4941...68fc selinux-policy-hash-1597335667:462051628 8d1d...1834 To verify the measurement check the following: Execute the following command to extract the measured data from the IMA log for SELinux configuration (selinux-state). grep -m 1 "selinux-state" /sys/kernel/security/integrity/ima/ascii_runtime_measurements | cut -d' ' -f 6 | xxd -r -p The output should be the list of key-value pairs. For example, initialized=1;enabled=1;enforcing=0;checkreqprot=1;network_peer_controls=1;open_perms=1;extended_socket_class=1;always_check_network=0;cgroup_seclabel=1;nnp_nosuid_transition=1;genfs_seclabel_symlinks=0; To verify the measured data with the current SELinux state: => enabled should be set to 1 if /sys/fs/selinux folder exists, 0 otherwise For other entries, compare the integer value in the files => /sys/fs/selinux/enforce => /sys/fs/selinux/checkreqprot And, each of the policy capabilities files under => /sys/fs/selinux/policy_capabilities For selinux-policy-hash, the hash of SELinux policy is included in the IMA log entry. To verify the measured data with the current SELinux policy run the following commands and verify the output hash values match. sha256sum /sys/fs/selinux/policy | cut -d' ' -f 1 grep -m 1 "selinux-policy-hash" /sys/kernel/security/integrity/ima/ascii_runtime_measurements | cut -d' ' -f 6 Signed-off-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com> Suggested-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com> Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> # error: implicit declaration of function 'vfree' Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> # error: implicit declaration of function 'crypto_alloc_shash' Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> # sparse: symbol 'security_read_selinux_policy' was not declared. Should it be static? --- security/selinux/Makefile | 2 + security/selinux/hooks.c | 1 + security/selinux/include/security.h | 15 ++ security/selinux/measure.c | 204 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ security/selinux/selinuxfs.c | 3 + security/selinux/ss/services.c | 71 ++++++++-- 6 files changed, 287 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) create mode 100644 security/selinux/measure.c