| Message ID | 20200818141554.13945-1-rppt@kernel.org (mailing list archive) |
|---|---|
| Headers | show |
| Series | mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas | expand |
On 18.08.20 16:15, Mike Rapoport wrote: > From: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com> > > Hi, > > This is an implementation of "secret" mappings backed by a file descriptor. > > v4 changes: > * rebase on v5.9-rc1 > * Do not redefine PMD_PAGE_ORDER in fs/dax.c, thanks Kirill > * Make secret mappings exclusive by default and only require flags to > memfd_secret() system call for uncached mappings, thanks again Kirill :) > > v3 changes: > * Squash kernel-parameters.txt update into the commit that added the > command line option. > * Make uncached mode explicitly selectable by architectures. For now enable > it only on x86. > > v2 changes: > * Follow Michael's suggestion and name the new system call 'memfd_secret' > * Add kernel-parameters documentation about the boot option > * Fix i386-tinyconfig regression reported by the kbuild bot. > CONFIG_SECRETMEM now depends on !EMBEDDED to disable it on small systems > from one side and still make it available unconditionally on > architectures that support SET_DIRECT_MAP. > > > The file descriptor backing secret memory mappings is created using a > dedicated memfd_secret system call The desired protection mode for the > memory is configured using flags parameter of the system call. The mmap() > of the file descriptor created with memfd_secret() will create a "secret" > memory mapping. The pages in that mapping will be marked as not present in > the direct map and will have desired protection bits set in the user page > table. For instance, current implementation allows uncached mappings. > > Although normally Linux userspace mappings are protected from other users, > such secret mappings are useful for environments where a hostile tenant is > trying to trick the kernel into giving them access to other tenants > mappings. > > Additionally, the secret mappings may be used as a mean to protect guest > memory in a virtual machine host. > Just a general question. I assume such pages (where the direct mapping was changed) cannot get migrated - I can spot a simple alloc_page(). So essentially a process can just allocate a whole bunch of memory that is unmovable, correct? Is there any limit? Is it properly accounted towards the process (memctl) ?
On Wed, Aug 19, 2020 at 12:47:54PM +0200, David Hildenbrand wrote: > On 18.08.20 16:15, Mike Rapoport wrote: > > From: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com> > > > > Hi, > > > > This is an implementation of "secret" mappings backed by a file descriptor. > > > > v4 changes: > > * rebase on v5.9-rc1 > > * Do not redefine PMD_PAGE_ORDER in fs/dax.c, thanks Kirill > > * Make secret mappings exclusive by default and only require flags to > > memfd_secret() system call for uncached mappings, thanks again Kirill :) > > > > v3 changes: > > * Squash kernel-parameters.txt update into the commit that added the > > command line option. > > * Make uncached mode explicitly selectable by architectures. For now enable > > it only on x86. > > > > v2 changes: > > * Follow Michael's suggestion and name the new system call 'memfd_secret' > > * Add kernel-parameters documentation about the boot option > > * Fix i386-tinyconfig regression reported by the kbuild bot. > > CONFIG_SECRETMEM now depends on !EMBEDDED to disable it on small systems > > from one side and still make it available unconditionally on > > architectures that support SET_DIRECT_MAP. > > > > > > The file descriptor backing secret memory mappings is created using a > > dedicated memfd_secret system call The desired protection mode for the > > memory is configured using flags parameter of the system call. The mmap() > > of the file descriptor created with memfd_secret() will create a "secret" > > memory mapping. The pages in that mapping will be marked as not present in > > the direct map and will have desired protection bits set in the user page > > table. For instance, current implementation allows uncached mappings. > > > > Although normally Linux userspace mappings are protected from other users, > > such secret mappings are useful for environments where a hostile tenant is > > trying to trick the kernel into giving them access to other tenants > > mappings. > > > > Additionally, the secret mappings may be used as a mean to protect guest > > memory in a virtual machine host. > > > > Just a general question. I assume such pages (where the direct mapping > was changed) cannot get migrated - I can spot a simple alloc_page(). So > essentially a process can just allocate a whole bunch of memory that is > unmovable, correct? Is there any limit? Is it properly accounted towards > the process (memctl) ? The memory as accounted in the same way like with mlock(), so normal user won't be able to allocate more than RLIMIT_MEMLOCK. > -- > Thanks, > > David / dhildenb >
On 19.08.20 13:42, Mike Rapoport wrote: > On Wed, Aug 19, 2020 at 12:47:54PM +0200, David Hildenbrand wrote: >> On 18.08.20 16:15, Mike Rapoport wrote: >>> From: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com> >>> >>> Hi, >>> >>> This is an implementation of "secret" mappings backed by a file descriptor. >>> >>> v4 changes: >>> * rebase on v5.9-rc1 >>> * Do not redefine PMD_PAGE_ORDER in fs/dax.c, thanks Kirill >>> * Make secret mappings exclusive by default and only require flags to >>> memfd_secret() system call for uncached mappings, thanks again Kirill :) >>> >>> v3 changes: >>> * Squash kernel-parameters.txt update into the commit that added the >>> command line option. >>> * Make uncached mode explicitly selectable by architectures. For now enable >>> it only on x86. >>> >>> v2 changes: >>> * Follow Michael's suggestion and name the new system call 'memfd_secret' >>> * Add kernel-parameters documentation about the boot option >>> * Fix i386-tinyconfig regression reported by the kbuild bot. >>> CONFIG_SECRETMEM now depends on !EMBEDDED to disable it on small systems >>> from one side and still make it available unconditionally on >>> architectures that support SET_DIRECT_MAP. >>> >>> >>> The file descriptor backing secret memory mappings is created using a >>> dedicated memfd_secret system call The desired protection mode for the >>> memory is configured using flags parameter of the system call. The mmap() >>> of the file descriptor created with memfd_secret() will create a "secret" >>> memory mapping. The pages in that mapping will be marked as not present in >>> the direct map and will have desired protection bits set in the user page >>> table. For instance, current implementation allows uncached mappings. >>> >>> Although normally Linux userspace mappings are protected from other users, >>> such secret mappings are useful for environments where a hostile tenant is >>> trying to trick the kernel into giving them access to other tenants >>> mappings. >>> >>> Additionally, the secret mappings may be used as a mean to protect guest >>> memory in a virtual machine host. >>> >> >> Just a general question. I assume such pages (where the direct mapping >> was changed) cannot get migrated - I can spot a simple alloc_page(). So >> essentially a process can just allocate a whole bunch of memory that is >> unmovable, correct? Is there any limit? Is it properly accounted towards >> the process (memctl) ? > > The memory as accounted in the same way like with mlock(), so normal > user won't be able to allocate more than RLIMIT_MEMLOCK. Okay, thanks. AFAIU the difference to mlock() is that the pages here are not movable, fragment memory, and limit compaction. Hm.
Any comments on this? On Tue, Aug 18, 2020 at 05:15:48PM +0300, Mike Rapoport wrote: > From: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com> > > Hi, > > This is an implementation of "secret" mappings backed by a file descriptor. > > v4 changes: > * rebase on v5.9-rc1 > * Do not redefine PMD_PAGE_ORDER in fs/dax.c, thanks Kirill > * Make secret mappings exclusive by default and only require flags to > memfd_secret() system call for uncached mappings, thanks again Kirill :) > > v3 changes: > * Squash kernel-parameters.txt update into the commit that added the > command line option. > * Make uncached mode explicitly selectable by architectures. For now enable > it only on x86. > > v2 changes: > * Follow Michael's suggestion and name the new system call 'memfd_secret' > * Add kernel-parameters documentation about the boot option > * Fix i386-tinyconfig regression reported by the kbuild bot. > CONFIG_SECRETMEM now depends on !EMBEDDED to disable it on small systems > from one side and still make it available unconditionally on > architectures that support SET_DIRECT_MAP. > > > The file descriptor backing secret memory mappings is created using a > dedicated memfd_secret system call The desired protection mode for the > memory is configured using flags parameter of the system call. The mmap() > of the file descriptor created with memfd_secret() will create a "secret" > memory mapping. The pages in that mapping will be marked as not present in > the direct map and will have desired protection bits set in the user page > table. For instance, current implementation allows uncached mappings. > > Although normally Linux userspace mappings are protected from other users, > such secret mappings are useful for environments where a hostile tenant is > trying to trick the kernel into giving them access to other tenants > mappings. > > Additionally, the secret mappings may be used as a mean to protect guest > memory in a virtual machine host. > > For demonstration of secret memory usage we've created a userspace library > [1] that does two things: the first is act as a preloader for openssl to > redirect all the OPENSSL_malloc calls to secret memory meaning any secret > keys get automatically protected this way and the other thing it does is > expose the API to the user who needs it. We anticipate that a lot of the > use cases would be like the openssl one: many toolkits that deal with > secret keys already have special handling for the memory to try to give > them greater protection, so this would simply be pluggable into the > toolkits without any need for user application modification. > > I've hesitated whether to continue to use new flags to memfd_create() or to > add a new system call and I've decided to use a new system call after I've > started to look into man pages update. There would have been two completely > independent descriptions and I think it would have been very confusing. > > Hiding secret memory mappings behind an anonymous file allows (ab)use of > the page cache for tracking pages allocated for the "secret" mappings as > well as using address_space_operations for e.g. page migration callbacks. > > The anonymous file may be also used implicitly, like hugetlb files, to > implement mmap(MAP_SECRET) and use the secret memory areas with "native" mm > ABIs in the future. > > As the fragmentation of the direct map was one of the major concerns raised > during the previous postings, I've added an amortizing cache of PMD-size > pages to each file descriptor and an ability to reserve large chunks of the > physical memory at boot time and then use this memory as an allocation pool > for the secret memory areas. > > v3: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200804095035.18778-1-rppt@kernel.org > v2: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200727162935.31714-1-rppt@kernel.org > v1: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200720092435.17469-1-rppt@kernel.org/ > rfc-v2: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200706172051.19465-1-rppt@kernel.org/ > rfc-v1: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200130162340.GA14232@rapoport-lnx/ > > Mike Rapoport (6): > mm: add definition of PMD_PAGE_ORDER > mmap: make mlock_future_check() global > mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas > arch, mm: wire up memfd_secret system call were relevant > mm: secretmem: use PMD-size pages to amortize direct map fragmentation > mm: secretmem: add ability to reserve memory at boot > > arch/Kconfig | 7 + > arch/arm64/include/asm/unistd.h | 2 +- > arch/arm64/include/asm/unistd32.h | 2 + > arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/unistd.h | 1 + > arch/riscv/include/asm/unistd.h | 1 + > arch/x86/Kconfig | 1 + > arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl | 1 + > arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl | 1 + > fs/dax.c | 11 +- > include/linux/pgtable.h | 3 + > include/linux/syscalls.h | 1 + > include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h | 7 +- > include/uapi/linux/magic.h | 1 + > include/uapi/linux/secretmem.h | 8 + > kernel/sys_ni.c | 2 + > mm/Kconfig | 4 + > mm/Makefile | 1 + > mm/internal.h | 3 + > mm/mmap.c | 5 +- > mm/secretmem.c | 451 +++++++++++++++++++++++++ > 20 files changed, 501 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) > create mode 100644 include/uapi/linux/secretmem.h > create mode 100644 mm/secretmem.c > > -- > 2.26.2 >
Any updates on this? On Tue, Aug 18, 2020 at 05:15:48PM +0300, Mike Rapoport wrote: > From: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com> > > Hi, > > This is an implementation of "secret" mappings backed by a file descriptor. > > v4 changes: > * rebase on v5.9-rc1 > * Do not redefine PMD_PAGE_ORDER in fs/dax.c, thanks Kirill > * Make secret mappings exclusive by default and only require flags to > memfd_secret() system call for uncached mappings, thanks again Kirill :) > > v3 changes: > * Squash kernel-parameters.txt update into the commit that added the > command line option. > * Make uncached mode explicitly selectable by architectures. For now enable > it only on x86. > > v2 changes: > * Follow Michael's suggestion and name the new system call 'memfd_secret' > * Add kernel-parameters documentation about the boot option > * Fix i386-tinyconfig regression reported by the kbuild bot. > CONFIG_SECRETMEM now depends on !EMBEDDED to disable it on small systems > from one side and still make it available unconditionally on > architectures that support SET_DIRECT_MAP. > > > The file descriptor backing secret memory mappings is created using a > dedicated memfd_secret system call The desired protection mode for the > memory is configured using flags parameter of the system call. The mmap() > of the file descriptor created with memfd_secret() will create a "secret" > memory mapping. The pages in that mapping will be marked as not present in > the direct map and will have desired protection bits set in the user page > table. For instance, current implementation allows uncached mappings. > > Although normally Linux userspace mappings are protected from other users, > such secret mappings are useful for environments where a hostile tenant is > trying to trick the kernel into giving them access to other tenants > mappings. > > Additionally, the secret mappings may be used as a mean to protect guest > memory in a virtual machine host. > > For demonstration of secret memory usage we've created a userspace library > [1] that does two things: the first is act as a preloader for openssl to > redirect all the OPENSSL_malloc calls to secret memory meaning any secret > keys get automatically protected this way and the other thing it does is > expose the API to the user who needs it. We anticipate that a lot of the > use cases would be like the openssl one: many toolkits that deal with > secret keys already have special handling for the memory to try to give > them greater protection, so this would simply be pluggable into the > toolkits without any need for user application modification. > > I've hesitated whether to continue to use new flags to memfd_create() or to > add a new system call and I've decided to use a new system call after I've > started to look into man pages update. There would have been two completely > independent descriptions and I think it would have been very confusing. > > Hiding secret memory mappings behind an anonymous file allows (ab)use of > the page cache for tracking pages allocated for the "secret" mappings as > well as using address_space_operations for e.g. page migration callbacks. > > The anonymous file may be also used implicitly, like hugetlb files, to > implement mmap(MAP_SECRET) and use the secret memory areas with "native" mm > ABIs in the future. > > As the fragmentation of the direct map was one of the major concerns raised > during the previous postings, I've added an amortizing cache of PMD-size > pages to each file descriptor and an ability to reserve large chunks of the > physical memory at boot time and then use this memory as an allocation pool > for the secret memory areas. > > v3: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200804095035.18778-1-rppt@kernel.org > v2: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200727162935.31714-1-rppt@kernel.org > v1: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200720092435.17469-1-rppt@kernel.org/ > rfc-v2: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200706172051.19465-1-rppt@kernel.org/ > rfc-v1: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200130162340.GA14232@rapoport-lnx/ > > Mike Rapoport (6): > mm: add definition of PMD_PAGE_ORDER > mmap: make mlock_future_check() global > mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas > arch, mm: wire up memfd_secret system call were relevant > mm: secretmem: use PMD-size pages to amortize direct map fragmentation > mm: secretmem: add ability to reserve memory at boot > > arch/Kconfig | 7 + > arch/arm64/include/asm/unistd.h | 2 +- > arch/arm64/include/asm/unistd32.h | 2 + > arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/unistd.h | 1 + > arch/riscv/include/asm/unistd.h | 1 + > arch/x86/Kconfig | 1 + > arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl | 1 + > arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl | 1 + > fs/dax.c | 11 +- > include/linux/pgtable.h | 3 + > include/linux/syscalls.h | 1 + > include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h | 7 +- > include/uapi/linux/magic.h | 1 + > include/uapi/linux/secretmem.h | 8 + > kernel/sys_ni.c | 2 + > mm/Kconfig | 4 + > mm/Makefile | 1 + > mm/internal.h | 3 + > mm/mmap.c | 5 +- > mm/secretmem.c | 451 +++++++++++++++++++++++++ > 20 files changed, 501 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) > create mode 100644 include/uapi/linux/secretmem.h > create mode 100644 mm/secretmem.c > > -- > 2.26.2 >
From: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com> Hi, This is an implementation of "secret" mappings backed by a file descriptor. v4 changes: * rebase on v5.9-rc1 * Do not redefine PMD_PAGE_ORDER in fs/dax.c, thanks Kirill * Make secret mappings exclusive by default and only require flags to memfd_secret() system call for uncached mappings, thanks again Kirill :) v3 changes: * Squash kernel-parameters.txt update into the commit that added the command line option. * Make uncached mode explicitly selectable by architectures. For now enable it only on x86. v2 changes: * Follow Michael's suggestion and name the new system call 'memfd_secret' * Add kernel-parameters documentation about the boot option * Fix i386-tinyconfig regression reported by the kbuild bot. CONFIG_SECRETMEM now depends on !EMBEDDED to disable it on small systems from one side and still make it available unconditionally on architectures that support SET_DIRECT_MAP. The file descriptor backing secret memory mappings is created using a dedicated memfd_secret system call The desired protection mode for the memory is configured using flags parameter of the system call. The mmap() of the file descriptor created with memfd_secret() will create a "secret" memory mapping. The pages in that mapping will be marked as not present in the direct map and will have desired protection bits set in the user page table. For instance, current implementation allows uncached mappings. Although normally Linux userspace mappings are protected from other users, such secret mappings are useful for environments where a hostile tenant is trying to trick the kernel into giving them access to other tenants mappings. Additionally, the secret mappings may be used as a mean to protect guest memory in a virtual machine host. For demonstration of secret memory usage we've created a userspace library [1] that does two things: the first is act as a preloader for openssl to redirect all the OPENSSL_malloc calls to secret memory meaning any secret keys get automatically protected this way and the other thing it does is expose the API to the user who needs it. We anticipate that a lot of the use cases would be like the openssl one: many toolkits that deal with secret keys already have special handling for the memory to try to give them greater protection, so this would simply be pluggable into the toolkits without any need for user application modification. I've hesitated whether to continue to use new flags to memfd_create() or to add a new system call and I've decided to use a new system call after I've started to look into man pages update. There would have been two completely independent descriptions and I think it would have been very confusing. Hiding secret memory mappings behind an anonymous file allows (ab)use of the page cache for tracking pages allocated for the "secret" mappings as well as using address_space_operations for e.g. page migration callbacks. The anonymous file may be also used implicitly, like hugetlb files, to implement mmap(MAP_SECRET) and use the secret memory areas with "native" mm ABIs in the future. As the fragmentation of the direct map was one of the major concerns raised during the previous postings, I've added an amortizing cache of PMD-size pages to each file descriptor and an ability to reserve large chunks of the physical memory at boot time and then use this memory as an allocation pool for the secret memory areas. v3: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200804095035.18778-1-rppt@kernel.org v2: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200727162935.31714-1-rppt@kernel.org v1: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200720092435.17469-1-rppt@kernel.org/ rfc-v2: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200706172051.19465-1-rppt@kernel.org/ rfc-v1: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200130162340.GA14232@rapoport-lnx/ Mike Rapoport (6): mm: add definition of PMD_PAGE_ORDER mmap: make mlock_future_check() global mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas arch, mm: wire up memfd_secret system call were relevant mm: secretmem: use PMD-size pages to amortize direct map fragmentation mm: secretmem: add ability to reserve memory at boot arch/Kconfig | 7 + arch/arm64/include/asm/unistd.h | 2 +- arch/arm64/include/asm/unistd32.h | 2 + arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/unistd.h | 1 + arch/riscv/include/asm/unistd.h | 1 + arch/x86/Kconfig | 1 + arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl | 1 + arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl | 1 + fs/dax.c | 11 +- include/linux/pgtable.h | 3 + include/linux/syscalls.h | 1 + include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h | 7 +- include/uapi/linux/magic.h | 1 + include/uapi/linux/secretmem.h | 8 + kernel/sys_ni.c | 2 + mm/Kconfig | 4 + mm/Makefile | 1 + mm/internal.h | 3 + mm/mmap.c | 5 +- mm/secretmem.c | 451 +++++++++++++++++++++++++ 20 files changed, 501 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) create mode 100644 include/uapi/linux/secretmem.h create mode 100644 mm/secretmem.c