| Message ID | 20200907213855.3572-1-nramas@linux.microsoft.com (mailing list archive) |
|---|---|
| State | Superseded |
| Headers | show |
| Series | SELinux: Measure state and hash of policy using IMA | expand |
On Mon, Sep 7, 2020 at 5:39 PM Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com> wrote: > > Critical data structures of security modules are currently not measured. > Therefore an attestation service, for instance, would not be able to > attest whether the security modules are always operating with the policies > and configuration that the system administrator had setup. The policies > and configuration for the security modules could be tampered with by > rogue user mode agents or modified through some inadvertent actions on > the system. Measuring such critical data would enable an attestation > service to reliably assess the security configuration of the system. > > SELinux configuration and policy are some of the critical data for this > security module that needs to be measured. This measurement can be used > by an attestation service, for instance, to verify if the configuration > and policies have been setup correctly and that they haven't been tampered > with at runtime. > > Measure SELinux configuration, policy capabilities settings, and the hash > of the loaded policy by calling the IMA hook ima_measure_critical_data(). > Since the size of the loaded policy can be quite large, hash of the policy > is measured instead of the entire policy to avoid bloating the IMA log. > > Enable early boot measurement for SELinux in IMA since SELinux > initializes its state and policy before custom IMA policy is loaded. > > Sample measurement of SELinux state and hash of the policy: > > 10 e32e...5ac3 ima-buf sha256:86e8...4594 selinux-state-1595389364:287899386 696e697469616c697a65643d313b656e61626c65643d313b656e666f7263696e673d303b636865636b72657170726f743d313b6e6574776f726b5f706565725f636f6e74726f6c733d313b6f70656e5f7065726d733d313b657874656e6465645f736f636b65745f636c6173733d313b616c776179735f636865636b5f6e6574776f726b3d303b6367726f75705f7365636c6162656c3d313b6e6e705f6e6f737569645f7472616e736974696f6e3d313b67656e66735f7365636c6162656c5f73796d6c696e6b733d303 > 10 9e81...0857 ima-buf sha256:4941...68fc selinux-policy-hash-1597335667:462051628 8d1d...1834 > > To verify the measurement check the following: > > Execute the following command to extract the measured data > from the IMA log for SELinux configuration (selinux-state). > > grep -m 1 "selinux-state" /sys/kernel/security/integrity/ima/ascii_runtime_measurements | cut -d' ' -f 6 | xxd -r -p > > The output should be the list of key-value pairs. For example, > initialized=1;enabled=1;enforcing=0;checkreqprot=1;network_peer_controls=1;open_perms=1;extended_socket_class=1;always_check_network=0;cgroup_seclabel=1;nnp_nosuid_transition=1;genfs_seclabel_symlinks=0; > > To verify the measured data with the current SELinux state: > > => enabled should be set to 1 if /sys/fs/selinux folder exists, > 0 otherwise > > For other entries, compare the integer value in the files > => /sys/fs/selinux/enforce > => /sys/fs/selinux/checkreqprot > And, each of the policy capabilities files under > => /sys/fs/selinux/policy_capabilities > > For selinux-policy-hash, the hash of SELinux policy is included > in the IMA log entry. > > To verify the measured data with the current SELinux policy run > the following commands and verify the output hash values match. > > sha256sum /sys/fs/selinux/policy | cut -d' ' -f 1 > > grep -m 1 "selinux-policy-hash" /sys/kernel/security/integrity/ima/ascii_runtime_measurements | cut -d' ' -f 6 > > This patch is based on commit 66ccd2560aff ("selinux: simplify away security_policydb_len()") > in "next" branch in https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux.git > > This patch is dependent on the following patch series and must be > applied in the given order: > https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/11709527/ > https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/11730193/ > https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/11730757/ > > Signed-off-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com> > Suggested-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com> > Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> # error: implicit declaration of function 'vfree' > Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> # error: implicit declaration of function 'crypto_alloc_shash' > Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> # sparse: symbol 'security_read_selinux_policy' was not declared. Should it be static? Not sure these Reported-by lines are useful since they were just on submitted versions of the patch not on an actual merged commit. > diff --git a/security/selinux/measure.c b/security/selinux/measure.c > new file mode 100644 > index 000000000000..caf9107937d9 > --- /dev/null > +++ b/security/selinux/measure.c <snip> > +void selinux_measure_state(struct selinux_state *state, bool policy_mutex_held) > +{ <snip> > + > + if (!policy_mutex_held) > + mutex_lock(&state->policy_mutex); > + > + rc = security_read_policy_kernel(state, &policy, &policy_len); > + > + if (!policy_mutex_held) > + mutex_unlock(&state->policy_mutex); This kind of conditional taking of a mutex is generally frowned upon in my experience. You should likely just always take the mutex in the callers of selinux_measure_state() instead. In some cases, it may be the caller of the caller. Arguably selinuxfs could be taking it around all state modifying operations (e.g. enforce, checkreqprot) not just policy modifying ones although it isn't strictly for that purpose.
On 9/7/20 3:32 PM, Stephen Smalley wrote: >> Signed-off-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com> >> Suggested-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com> >> Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> # error: implicit declaration of function 'vfree' >> Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> # error: implicit declaration of function 'crypto_alloc_shash' >> Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> # sparse: symbol 'security_read_selinux_policy' was not declared. Should it be static? > > Not sure these Reported-by lines are useful since they were just on > submitted versions of the patch not on an actual merged commit. I'll remove them when I update the patch. > >> diff --git a/security/selinux/measure.c b/security/selinux/measure.c >> new file mode 100644 >> index 000000000000..caf9107937d9 >> --- /dev/null >> +++ b/security/selinux/measure.c > <snip> >> +void selinux_measure_state(struct selinux_state *state, bool policy_mutex_held) >> +{ > <snip> >> + >> + if (!policy_mutex_held) >> + mutex_lock(&state->policy_mutex); >> + >> + rc = security_read_policy_kernel(state, &policy, &policy_len); >> + >> + if (!policy_mutex_held) >> + mutex_unlock(&state->policy_mutex); > > This kind of conditional taking of a mutex is generally frowned upon > in my experience. > You should likely just always take the mutex in the callers of > selinux_measure_state() instead. > In some cases, it may be the caller of the caller. Arguably selinuxfs > could be taking it around all state modifying operations (e.g. > enforce, checkreqprot) not just policy modifying ones although it > isn't strictly for that purpose. Since currently policy_mutex is not used to synchronize access to state variables (enforce, checkreqprot, etc.) I am wondering if selinux_measure_state() should measure only state if policy_mutex is not held by the caller - similar to how we skip measuring policy if initialization is not yet completed. /* * Measure SELinux policy only after initialization is * completed. */ if (!initialized) goto out; -lakshmi
On Tue, Sep 8, 2020 at 12:44 AM Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com> wrote: > > On 9/7/20 3:32 PM, Stephen Smalley wrote: > > >> Signed-off-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com> > >> Suggested-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com> > >> Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> # error: implicit declaration of function 'vfree' > >> Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> # error: implicit declaration of function 'crypto_alloc_shash' > >> Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> # sparse: symbol 'security_read_selinux_policy' was not declared. Should it be static? > > > > Not sure these Reported-by lines are useful since they were just on > > submitted versions of the patch not on an actual merged commit. > > I'll remove them when I update the patch. > > > > >> diff --git a/security/selinux/measure.c b/security/selinux/measure.c > >> new file mode 100644 > >> index 000000000000..caf9107937d9 > >> --- /dev/null > >> +++ b/security/selinux/measure.c > > <snip> > >> +void selinux_measure_state(struct selinux_state *state, bool policy_mutex_held) > >> +{ > > <snip> > >> + > >> + if (!policy_mutex_held) > >> + mutex_lock(&state->policy_mutex); > >> + > >> + rc = security_read_policy_kernel(state, &policy, &policy_len); > >> + > >> + if (!policy_mutex_held) > >> + mutex_unlock(&state->policy_mutex); > > > > This kind of conditional taking of a mutex is generally frowned upon > > in my experience. > > You should likely just always take the mutex in the callers of > > selinux_measure_state() instead. > > In some cases, it may be the caller of the caller. Arguably selinuxfs > > could be taking it around all state modifying operations (e.g. > > enforce, checkreqprot) not just policy modifying ones although it > > isn't strictly for that purpose. > > Since currently policy_mutex is not used to synchronize access to state > variables (enforce, checkreqprot, etc.) I am wondering if > selinux_measure_state() should measure only state if policy_mutex is not > held by the caller - similar to how we skip measuring policy if > initialization is not yet completed. No, we want to measure policy whenever there is a policy to measure. Just move the taking of the mutex to the callers of selinux_measure_state() so that it can be unconditional.
On Mon, Sep 7, 2020 at 5:39 PM Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com> wrote: > > Critical data structures of security modules are currently not measured. > Therefore an attestation service, for instance, would not be able to > attest whether the security modules are always operating with the policies > and configuration that the system administrator had setup. The policies > and configuration for the security modules could be tampered with by > rogue user mode agents or modified through some inadvertent actions on > the system. Measuring such critical data would enable an attestation > service to reliably assess the security configuration of the system. > > SELinux configuration and policy are some of the critical data for this > security module that needs to be measured. This measurement can be used > by an attestation service, for instance, to verify if the configuration > and policies have been setup correctly and that they haven't been tampered > with at runtime. > > Measure SELinux configuration, policy capabilities settings, and the hash > of the loaded policy by calling the IMA hook ima_measure_critical_data(). > Since the size of the loaded policy can be quite large, hash of the policy > is measured instead of the entire policy to avoid bloating the IMA log. > > Enable early boot measurement for SELinux in IMA since SELinux > initializes its state and policy before custom IMA policy is loaded. > > Sample measurement of SELinux state and hash of the policy: > > 10 e32e...5ac3 ima-buf sha256:86e8...4594 selinux-state-1595389364:287899386 696e697469616c697a65643d313b656e61626c65643d313b656e666f7263696e673d303b636865636b72657170726f743d313b6e6574776f726b5f706565725f636f6e74726f6c733d313b6f70656e5f7065726d733d313b657874656e6465645f736f636b65745f636c6173733d313b616c776179735f636865636b5f6e6574776f726b3d303b6367726f75705f7365636c6162656c3d313b6e6e705f6e6f737569645f7472616e736974696f6e3d313b67656e66735f7365636c6162656c5f73796d6c696e6b733d303 > 10 9e81...0857 ima-buf sha256:4941...68fc selinux-policy-hash-1597335667:462051628 8d1d...1834 > > To verify the measurement check the following: > > Execute the following command to extract the measured data > from the IMA log for SELinux configuration (selinux-state). > > grep -m 1 "selinux-state" /sys/kernel/security/integrity/ima/ascii_runtime_measurements | cut -d' ' -f 6 | xxd -r -p > > The output should be the list of key-value pairs. For example, > initialized=1;enabled=1;enforcing=0;checkreqprot=1;network_peer_controls=1;open_perms=1;extended_socket_class=1;always_check_network=0;cgroup_seclabel=1;nnp_nosuid_transition=1;genfs_seclabel_symlinks=0; > > To verify the measured data with the current SELinux state: > > => enabled should be set to 1 if /sys/fs/selinux folder exists, > 0 otherwise > > For other entries, compare the integer value in the files > => /sys/fs/selinux/enforce > => /sys/fs/selinux/checkreqprot > And, each of the policy capabilities files under > => /sys/fs/selinux/policy_capabilities > > For selinux-policy-hash, the hash of SELinux policy is included > in the IMA log entry. > > To verify the measured data with the current SELinux policy run > the following commands and verify the output hash values match. > > sha256sum /sys/fs/selinux/policy | cut -d' ' -f 1 > > grep -m 1 "selinux-policy-hash" /sys/kernel/security/integrity/ima/ascii_runtime_measurements | cut -d' ' -f 6 > > This patch is based on commit 66ccd2560aff ("selinux: simplify away security_policydb_len()") > in "next" branch in https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux.git > > This patch is dependent on the following patch series and must be > applied in the given order: > https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/11709527/ > https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/11730193/ > https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/11730757/ > > Signed-off-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com> > Suggested-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com> > --- > > diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig > index 953314d145bb..9bf0f65d720b 100644 > --- a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig > +++ b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig > @@ -324,8 +324,7 @@ config IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS > > config IMA_QUEUE_EARLY_BOOT_DATA > bool > - depends on IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS > - depends on SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING > + depends on (IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS && SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING) || SECURITY_SELINUX > default y I don't see why this is necessary or desirable. We should avoid leaking dependencies on a single security module into other subsystems. It might not yet fully support other security modules but we shouldn't preclude adding that in the future. Up to the IMA maintainer but I would recommend dropping this part. > diff --git a/security/selinux/include/security.h b/security/selinux/include/security.h > index cbdd3c7aff8b..c971ec09d855 100644 > --- a/security/selinux/include/security.h > +++ b/security/selinux/include/security.h > @@ -209,6 +209,11 @@ static inline bool selinux_policycap_genfs_seclabel_symlinks(void) > return state->policycap[POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_GENFS_SECLABEL_SYMLINKS]; > } > > +static inline bool selinux_checkreqprot(const struct selinux_state *state) > +{ > + return READ_ONCE(state->checkreqprot); > +} > + Since you are introducing this helper, you should also convert existing reads of selinux_state.checkreqprot and fsi->state->checkreqprot to use it, and writes to use WRITE_ONCE() just like for enforcing and disabled. The introduction of the helper and conversion to use it could be done as a separate patch before this one. > diff --git a/security/selinux/measure.c b/security/selinux/measure.c > new file mode 100644 > index 000000000000..caf9107937d9 > --- /dev/null > +++ b/security/selinux/measure.c <snip> > +static int read_selinux_state(char **state_str, int *state_str_len, > + struct selinux_state *state) > +{ > + char *buf, *str_fmt = "%s=%d;"; > + int i, buf_len, curr; <snip> > + for (i = 0; i < __POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX; i++) { > + buf_len += snprintf(NULL, 0, str_fmt, > + selinux_policycap_names[i], > + state->policycap[i]); > + } This will need to be converted to use security_policycap_supported(state, i) rather than state->policycap[i] since the latter is going to be removed by Ondrej's patches I think. > + for (i = 0; i < __POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX; i++) { > + curr += snprintf((buf + curr), (buf_len - curr), str_fmt, > + selinux_policycap_names[i], > + state->policycap[i]); Ditto. > diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c > index 45e9efa9bf5b..bb460954de03 100644 > --- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c > +++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c > @@ -176,6 +176,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_enforce(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, > from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_get_loginuid(current)), > audit_get_sessionid(current)); > enforcing_set(state, new_value); > + selinux_measure_state(state, false); I think we should move this to after the avc_ss_reset call so that we don't introduce a potentially long delay between setting the enforcing mode and flushing the AVC at least. Potentially it could be moved to the very end after selnl_notify_setenforce() too so that it doesn't delay notifying userspace, but that's less crucial. > if (new_value) > avc_ss_reset(state->avc, 0); > selnl_notify_setenforce(new_value); > @@ -761,6 +762,8 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_checkreqprot(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, > > fsi->state->checkreqprot = new_value ? 1 : 0; This should switch to using WRITE_ONCE() or a helper that uses it. > diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c > index 8dc111fbe23a..04a9c3d8c19b 100644 > --- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c > +++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c > @@ -3874,6 +3875,30 @@ int security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(struct selinux_state *state, > } > #endif /* CONFIG_NETLABEL */ > > +/** > + * security_read_selinux_policy - read the policy. > + * @policy: SELinux policy > + * @data: binary policy data > + * @len: length of data in bytes > + * > + */ > +static int security_read_selinux_policy(struct selinux_policy *policy, > + void **data, size_t *len) > +{ Since this only uses *data, why not just pass that here? > + int rc; > + struct policy_file fp; > + > + fp.data = *data; > + fp.len = *len; > + > + rc = policydb_write(&policy->policydb, &fp); > + if (rc) > + return rc; > + > + *len = (unsigned long)fp.data - (unsigned long)*data; > + return 0; > +} > + > /** > * security_read_policy - read the policy. > * @data: binary policy data
On Tue, Sep 8, 2020 at 8:28 AM Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com> wrote: > > On Mon, Sep 7, 2020 at 5:39 PM Lakshmi Ramasubramanian > <nramas@linux.microsoft.com> wrote: > > > > Critical data structures of security modules are currently not measured. > > Therefore an attestation service, for instance, would not be able to > > attest whether the security modules are always operating with the policies > > and configuration that the system administrator had setup. The policies > > and configuration for the security modules could be tampered with by > > rogue user mode agents or modified through some inadvertent actions on > > the system. Measuring such critical data would enable an attestation > > service to reliably assess the security configuration of the system. > > > > SELinux configuration and policy are some of the critical data for this > > security module that needs to be measured. This measurement can be used > > by an attestation service, for instance, to verify if the configuration > > and policies have been setup correctly and that they haven't been tampered > > with at runtime. > > > > Measure SELinux configuration, policy capabilities settings, and the hash > > of the loaded policy by calling the IMA hook ima_measure_critical_data(). > > Since the size of the loaded policy can be quite large, hash of the policy > > is measured instead of the entire policy to avoid bloating the IMA log. > > > > Enable early boot measurement for SELinux in IMA since SELinux > > initializes its state and policy before custom IMA policy is loaded. > > > > Sample measurement of SELinux state and hash of the policy: > > > > 10 e32e...5ac3 ima-buf sha256:86e8...4594 selinux-state-1595389364:287899386 696e697469616c697a65643d313b656e61626c65643d313b656e666f7263696e673d303b636865636b72657170726f743d313b6e6574776f726b5f706565725f636f6e74726f6c733d313b6f70656e5f7065726d733d313b657874656e6465645f736f636b65745f636c6173733d313b616c776179735f636865636b5f6e6574776f726b3d303b6367726f75705f7365636c6162656c3d313b6e6e705f6e6f737569645f7472616e736974696f6e3d313b67656e66735f7365636c6162656c5f73796d6c696e6b733d303 > > 10 9e81...0857 ima-buf sha256:4941...68fc selinux-policy-hash-1597335667:462051628 8d1d...1834 > > > > To verify the measurement check the following: > > > > Execute the following command to extract the measured data > > from the IMA log for SELinux configuration (selinux-state). > > > > grep -m 1 "selinux-state" /sys/kernel/security/integrity/ima/ascii_runtime_measurements | cut -d' ' -f 6 | xxd -r -p > > > > The output should be the list of key-value pairs. For example, > > initialized=1;enabled=1;enforcing=0;checkreqprot=1;network_peer_controls=1;open_perms=1;extended_socket_class=1;always_check_network=0;cgroup_seclabel=1;nnp_nosuid_transition=1;genfs_seclabel_symlinks=0; > > > > To verify the measured data with the current SELinux state: > > > > => enabled should be set to 1 if /sys/fs/selinux folder exists, > > 0 otherwise > > > > For other entries, compare the integer value in the files > > => /sys/fs/selinux/enforce > > => /sys/fs/selinux/checkreqprot > > And, each of the policy capabilities files under > > => /sys/fs/selinux/policy_capabilities > > > > For selinux-policy-hash, the hash of SELinux policy is included > > in the IMA log entry. > > > > To verify the measured data with the current SELinux policy run > > the following commands and verify the output hash values match. > > > > sha256sum /sys/fs/selinux/policy | cut -d' ' -f 1 > > > > grep -m 1 "selinux-policy-hash" /sys/kernel/security/integrity/ima/ascii_runtime_measurements | cut -d' ' -f 6 > > > > This patch is based on commit 66ccd2560aff ("selinux: simplify away security_policydb_len()") > > in "next" branch in https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux.git > > > > This patch is dependent on the following patch series and must be > > applied in the given order: > > https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/11709527/ > > https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/11730193/ > > https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/11730757/ > > > > Signed-off-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com> > > Suggested-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com> > > --- > > > > diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig > > index 953314d145bb..9bf0f65d720b 100644 > > --- a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig > > +++ b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig > > @@ -324,8 +324,7 @@ config IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS > > > > config IMA_QUEUE_EARLY_BOOT_DATA > > bool > > - depends on IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS > > - depends on SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING > > + depends on (IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS && SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING) || SECURITY_SELINUX > > default y > > I don't see why this is necessary or desirable. We should avoid > leaking dependencies on a single security module into other > subsystems. > It might not yet fully support other security modules but we shouldn't > preclude adding that in the future. > Up to the IMA maintainer but I would recommend dropping this part. Sorry, I misread this part; it doesn't make IMA depend on SELinux it just allows enabling this early boot data feature if SELinux is enabled since SELinux is a user of it. Still, it seems unfortunate to have to explicitly enumerate each consumer of this facility here whenever a new one is introduced. Is there a reason for doing so and not just allowing it to be enabled as long as the things on which it depends are enabled (i.e. not based on its consumers)?
On Tue, Sep 8, 2020 at 2:37 PM Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com> wrote: > On Mon, Sep 7, 2020 at 5:39 PM Lakshmi Ramasubramanian > <nramas@linux.microsoft.com> wrote: <snip> > > diff --git a/security/selinux/measure.c b/security/selinux/measure.c > > new file mode 100644 > > index 000000000000..caf9107937d9 > > --- /dev/null > > +++ b/security/selinux/measure.c > <snip> > > +static int read_selinux_state(char **state_str, int *state_str_len, > > + struct selinux_state *state) > > +{ > > + char *buf, *str_fmt = "%s=%d;"; > > + int i, buf_len, curr; > <snip> > > + for (i = 0; i < __POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX; i++) { > > + buf_len += snprintf(NULL, 0, str_fmt, > > + selinux_policycap_names[i], > > + state->policycap[i]); > > + } > > This will need to be converted to use > security_policycap_supported(state, i) rather than state->policycap[i] > since the latter is going to be removed by Ondrej's patches I think. Based on my testing so far, even with just moving the array under struct selinux_policy, the RCU accessing still brings a significant overhead (relative to the whole syscalls it is probably negligible, but relative to the rest of the simpler hooks it is about 30%), so I don't think it is necessary to adapt other patches to it yet. It will be my responsibility to adapt to the newly added code when/if I rebase and respin my patch. > > > + for (i = 0; i < __POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX; i++) { > > + curr += snprintf((buf + curr), (buf_len - curr), str_fmt, > > + selinux_policycap_names[i], > > + state->policycap[i]); > > Ditto. >
On 9/8/20 4:58 AM, Stephen Smalley wrote: > On Tue, Sep 8, 2020 at 12:44 AM Lakshmi Ramasubramanian > <nramas@linux.microsoft.com> wrote: >> >> On 9/7/20 3:32 PM, Stephen Smalley wrote: >> >>>> Signed-off-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com> >>>> Suggested-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com> >>>> Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> # error: implicit declaration of function 'vfree' >>>> Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> # error: implicit declaration of function 'crypto_alloc_shash' >>>> Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> # sparse: symbol 'security_read_selinux_policy' was not declared. Should it be static? >>> >>> Not sure these Reported-by lines are useful since they were just on >>> submitted versions of the patch not on an actual merged commit. >> >> I'll remove them when I update the patch. >> >>> >>>> diff --git a/security/selinux/measure.c b/security/selinux/measure.c >>>> new file mode 100644 >>>> index 000000000000..caf9107937d9 >>>> --- /dev/null >>>> +++ b/security/selinux/measure.c >>> <snip> >>>> +void selinux_measure_state(struct selinux_state *state, bool policy_mutex_held) >>>> +{ >>> <snip> >>>> + >>>> + if (!policy_mutex_held) >>>> + mutex_lock(&state->policy_mutex); >>>> + >>>> + rc = security_read_policy_kernel(state, &policy, &policy_len); >>>> + >>>> + if (!policy_mutex_held) >>>> + mutex_unlock(&state->policy_mutex); >>> >>> This kind of conditional taking of a mutex is generally frowned upon >>> in my experience. >>> You should likely just always take the mutex in the callers of >>> selinux_measure_state() instead. >>> In some cases, it may be the caller of the caller. Arguably selinuxfs >>> could be taking it around all state modifying operations (e.g. >>> enforce, checkreqprot) not just policy modifying ones although it >>> isn't strictly for that purpose. >> >> Since currently policy_mutex is not used to synchronize access to state >> variables (enforce, checkreqprot, etc.) I am wondering if >> selinux_measure_state() should measure only state if policy_mutex is not >> held by the caller - similar to how we skip measuring policy if >> initialization is not yet completed. > > No, we want to measure policy whenever there is a policy to measure. > Just move the taking of the mutex to the callers of > selinux_measure_state() so that it can be unconditional. > Will do. -lakshmi
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig index 953314d145bb..9bf0f65d720b 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig +++ b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig @@ -324,8 +324,7 @@ config IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS config IMA_QUEUE_EARLY_BOOT_DATA bool - depends on IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS - depends on SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING + depends on (IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS && SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING) || SECURITY_SELINUX default y config IMA_SECURE_AND_OR_TRUSTED_BOOT diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h index 422fe833037d..710648eeb21b 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h @@ -230,6 +230,7 @@ struct modsig; #define __ima_supported_kernel_data_sources(source) \ source(MIN_SOURCE, min_source) \ + source(SELINUX, selinux) \ source(MAX_SOURCE, max_source) #define __ima_enum_stringify(ENUM, str) (#str), diff --git a/security/selinux/Makefile b/security/selinux/Makefile index 4d8e0e8adf0b..83d512116341 100644 --- a/security/selinux/Makefile +++ b/security/selinux/Makefile @@ -16,6 +16,8 @@ selinux-$(CONFIG_NETLABEL) += netlabel.o selinux-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND) += ibpkey.o +selinux-$(CONFIG_IMA) += measure.o + ccflags-y := -I$(srctree)/security/selinux -I$(srctree)/security/selinux/include $(addprefix $(obj)/,$(selinux-y)): $(obj)/flask.h diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index 6210e98219a5..222c8473e5b5 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -7402,6 +7402,7 @@ int selinux_disable(struct selinux_state *state) } selinux_mark_disabled(state); + selinux_measure_state(state, false); pr_info("SELinux: Disabled at runtime.\n"); diff --git a/security/selinux/include/security.h b/security/selinux/include/security.h index cbdd3c7aff8b..c971ec09d855 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/security.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/security.h @@ -209,6 +209,11 @@ static inline bool selinux_policycap_genfs_seclabel_symlinks(void) return state->policycap[POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_GENFS_SECLABEL_SYMLINKS]; } +static inline bool selinux_checkreqprot(const struct selinux_state *state) +{ + return READ_ONCE(state->checkreqprot); +} + int security_mls_enabled(struct selinux_state *state); int security_load_policy(struct selinux_state *state, void *data, size_t len, @@ -219,7 +224,8 @@ void selinux_policy_cancel(struct selinux_state *state, struct selinux_policy *policy); int security_read_policy(struct selinux_state *state, void **data, size_t *len); - +int security_read_policy_kernel(struct selinux_state *state, + void **data, size_t *len); int security_policycap_supported(struct selinux_state *state, unsigned int req_cap); @@ -436,4 +442,14 @@ extern void ebitmap_cache_init(void); extern void hashtab_cache_init(void); extern int security_sidtab_hash_stats(struct selinux_state *state, char *page); +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA +extern void selinux_measure_state(struct selinux_state *selinux_state, + bool policy_mutex_held); +#else +static inline void selinux_measure_state(struct selinux_state *selinux_state, + bool policy_mutex_held) +{ +} +#endif + #endif /* _SELINUX_SECURITY_H_ */ diff --git a/security/selinux/measure.c b/security/selinux/measure.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..caf9107937d9 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/selinux/measure.c @@ -0,0 +1,156 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later +/* + * Measure SELinux state using IMA subsystem. + */ +#include <linux/vmalloc.h> +#include <linux/ktime.h> +#include <linux/ima.h> +#include "security.h" + +/* + * This function creates an unique name by appending the timestamp to + * the given string. This string is passed as "event name" to the IMA + * hook to measure the given SELinux data. + * + * The data provided by SELinux to the IMA subsystem for measuring may have + * already been measured (for instance the same state existed earlier). + * But for SELinux the current data represents a state change and hence + * needs to be measured again. To enable this, pass an unique "Event Name" + * to the IMA hook so that IMA subsystem will always measure the given data. + * + * For example, + * At time T0 SELinux data to be measured is "foo". IMA measures it. + * At time T1 the data is changed to "bar". IMA measures it. + * At time T2 the data is changed to "foo" again. IMA will not measure it + * (since it was already measured) unless the event name, for instance, + * is different in this call. + */ +static char *selinux_event_name(const char *name_prefix) +{ + char *event_name = NULL; + struct timespec64 cur_time; + + ktime_get_real_ts64(&cur_time); + event_name = kasprintf(GFP_KERNEL, "%s-%lld:%09ld", name_prefix, + cur_time.tv_sec, cur_time.tv_nsec); + if (!event_name) { + pr_err("%s: event name not allocated.\n", __func__); + return NULL; + } + + return event_name; +} + +static int read_selinux_state(char **state_str, int *state_str_len, + struct selinux_state *state) +{ + char *buf, *str_fmt = "%s=%d;"; + int i, buf_len, curr; + bool initialized = selinux_initialized(state); + bool enabled = !selinux_disabled(state); + bool enforcing = enforcing_enabled(state); + bool checkreqprot = selinux_checkreqprot(state); + + buf_len = snprintf(NULL, 0, str_fmt, "initialized", initialized); + buf_len += snprintf(NULL, 0, str_fmt, "enabled", enabled); + buf_len += snprintf(NULL, 0, str_fmt, "enforcing", enforcing); + buf_len += snprintf(NULL, 0, str_fmt, "checkreqprot", checkreqprot); + + for (i = 0; i < __POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX; i++) { + buf_len += snprintf(NULL, 0, str_fmt, + selinux_policycap_names[i], + state->policycap[i]); + } + ++buf_len; + + buf = kzalloc(buf_len, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!buf) + return -ENOMEM; + + curr = snprintf(buf, buf_len, str_fmt, + "initialized", initialized); + curr += snprintf((buf + curr), (buf_len - curr), str_fmt, + "enabled", enabled); + curr += snprintf((buf + curr), (buf_len - curr), str_fmt, + "enforcing", enforcing); + curr += snprintf((buf + curr), (buf_len - curr), str_fmt, + "checkreqprot", checkreqprot); + + for (i = 0; i < __POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX; i++) { + curr += snprintf((buf + curr), (buf_len - curr), str_fmt, + selinux_policycap_names[i], + state->policycap[i]); + } + + *state_str = buf; + *state_str_len = curr; + + return 0; +} + +void selinux_measure_state(struct selinux_state *state, bool policy_mutex_held) +{ + void *policy = NULL; + char *state_event_name = NULL; + char *policy_event_name = NULL; + char *state_str = NULL; + size_t policy_len; + int state_str_len, rc = 0; + bool initialized = selinux_initialized(state); + + rc = read_selinux_state(&state_str, &state_str_len, state); + if (rc) { + pr_err("%s: Failed to read selinux state.\n", __func__); + return; + } + + /* + * Get an unique string for measuring the current SELinux state. + */ + state_event_name = selinux_event_name("selinux-state"); + if (!state_event_name) { + pr_err("%s: Event name for state not allocated.\n", + __func__); + rc = -ENOMEM; + goto out; + } + + rc = ima_measure_critical_data(state_event_name, "selinux", + state_str, state_str_len, false); + if (rc) + goto out; + + /* + * Measure SELinux policy only after initialization is completed. + */ + if (!initialized) + goto out; + + if (!policy_mutex_held) + mutex_lock(&state->policy_mutex); + + rc = security_read_policy_kernel(state, &policy, &policy_len); + + if (!policy_mutex_held) + mutex_unlock(&state->policy_mutex); + + if (rc) + goto out; + + policy_event_name = selinux_event_name("selinux-policy-hash"); + if (!policy_event_name) { + pr_err("%s: Event name for policy not allocated.\n", + __func__); + rc = -ENOMEM; + goto out; + } + + rc = ima_measure_critical_data(policy_event_name, "selinux", + policy, policy_len, true); + +out: + kfree(state_event_name); + kfree(policy_event_name); + kfree(state_str); + vfree(policy); +} diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c index 45e9efa9bf5b..bb460954de03 100644 --- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c +++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c @@ -176,6 +176,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_enforce(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_get_loginuid(current)), audit_get_sessionid(current)); enforcing_set(state, new_value); + selinux_measure_state(state, false); if (new_value) avc_ss_reset(state->avc, 0); selnl_notify_setenforce(new_value); @@ -761,6 +762,8 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_checkreqprot(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, fsi->state->checkreqprot = new_value ? 1 : 0; length = count; + selinux_measure_state(fsi->state, false); + out: kfree(page); return length; diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c index 8dc111fbe23a..04a9c3d8c19b 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c +++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c @@ -2179,6 +2179,7 @@ static void selinux_notify_policy_change(struct selinux_state *state, selinux_status_update_policyload(state, seqno); selinux_netlbl_cache_invalidate(); selinux_xfrm_notify_policyload(); + selinux_measure_state(state, true); } void selinux_policy_commit(struct selinux_state *state, @@ -3874,6 +3875,30 @@ int security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(struct selinux_state *state, } #endif /* CONFIG_NETLABEL */ +/** + * security_read_selinux_policy - read the policy. + * @policy: SELinux policy + * @data: binary policy data + * @len: length of data in bytes + * + */ +static int security_read_selinux_policy(struct selinux_policy *policy, + void **data, size_t *len) +{ + int rc; + struct policy_file fp; + + fp.data = *data; + fp.len = *len; + + rc = policydb_write(&policy->policydb, &fp); + if (rc) + return rc; + + *len = (unsigned long)fp.data - (unsigned long)*data; + return 0; +} + /** * security_read_policy - read the policy. * @data: binary policy data @@ -3884,8 +3909,6 @@ int security_read_policy(struct selinux_state *state, void **data, size_t *len) { struct selinux_policy *policy; - int rc; - struct policy_file fp; policy = rcu_dereference_protected( state->policy, lockdep_is_held(&state->policy_mutex)); @@ -3897,14 +3920,43 @@ int security_read_policy(struct selinux_state *state, if (!*data) return -ENOMEM; - fp.data = *data; - fp.len = *len; + return security_read_selinux_policy(policy, data, len); +} - rc = policydb_write(&policy->policydb, &fp); - if (rc) - return rc; +/** + * security_read_policy_kernel - read the policy. + * @state: selinux_state + * @data: binary policy data + * @len: length of data in bytes + * + * Allocates kernel memory for reading SELinux policy. + * This function is for internal use only and should not + * be used for returning data to user space. + * + * This function must be called with policy_mutex held. + */ +int security_read_policy_kernel(struct selinux_state *state, + void **data, size_t *len) +{ + struct selinux_policy *policy; + int rc = 0; - *len = (unsigned long)fp.data - (unsigned long)*data; - return 0; + policy = rcu_dereference_protected( + state->policy, lockdep_is_held(&state->policy_mutex)); + if (!policy) { + rc = -EINVAL; + goto out; + } + *len = policy->policydb.len; + *data = vmalloc(*len); + if (!*data) { + rc = -ENOMEM; + goto out; + } + + rc = security_read_selinux_policy(policy, data, len); + +out: + return rc; }
Critical data structures of security modules are currently not measured. Therefore an attestation service, for instance, would not be able to attest whether the security modules are always operating with the policies and configuration that the system administrator had setup. The policies and configuration for the security modules could be tampered with by rogue user mode agents or modified through some inadvertent actions on the system. Measuring such critical data would enable an attestation service to reliably assess the security configuration of the system. SELinux configuration and policy are some of the critical data for this security module that needs to be measured. This measurement can be used by an attestation service, for instance, to verify if the configuration and policies have been setup correctly and that they haven't been tampered with at runtime. Measure SELinux configuration, policy capabilities settings, and the hash of the loaded policy by calling the IMA hook ima_measure_critical_data(). Since the size of the loaded policy can be quite large, hash of the policy is measured instead of the entire policy to avoid bloating the IMA log. Enable early boot measurement for SELinux in IMA since SELinux initializes its state and policy before custom IMA policy is loaded. Sample measurement of SELinux state and hash of the policy: 10 e32e...5ac3 ima-buf sha256:86e8...4594 selinux-state-1595389364:287899386 696e697469616c697a65643d313b656e61626c65643d313b656e666f7263696e673d303b636865636b72657170726f743d313b6e6574776f726b5f706565725f636f6e74726f6c733d313b6f70656e5f7065726d733d313b657874656e6465645f736f636b65745f636c6173733d313b616c776179735f636865636b5f6e6574776f726b3d303b6367726f75705f7365636c6162656c3d313b6e6e705f6e6f737569645f7472616e736974696f6e3d313b67656e66735f7365636c6162656c5f73796d6c696e6b733d303 10 9e81...0857 ima-buf sha256:4941...68fc selinux-policy-hash-1597335667:462051628 8d1d...1834 To verify the measurement check the following: Execute the following command to extract the measured data from the IMA log for SELinux configuration (selinux-state). grep -m 1 "selinux-state" /sys/kernel/security/integrity/ima/ascii_runtime_measurements | cut -d' ' -f 6 | xxd -r -p The output should be the list of key-value pairs. For example, initialized=1;enabled=1;enforcing=0;checkreqprot=1;network_peer_controls=1;open_perms=1;extended_socket_class=1;always_check_network=0;cgroup_seclabel=1;nnp_nosuid_transition=1;genfs_seclabel_symlinks=0; To verify the measured data with the current SELinux state: => enabled should be set to 1 if /sys/fs/selinux folder exists, 0 otherwise For other entries, compare the integer value in the files => /sys/fs/selinux/enforce => /sys/fs/selinux/checkreqprot And, each of the policy capabilities files under => /sys/fs/selinux/policy_capabilities For selinux-policy-hash, the hash of SELinux policy is included in the IMA log entry. To verify the measured data with the current SELinux policy run the following commands and verify the output hash values match. sha256sum /sys/fs/selinux/policy | cut -d' ' -f 1 grep -m 1 "selinux-policy-hash" /sys/kernel/security/integrity/ima/ascii_runtime_measurements | cut -d' ' -f 6 This patch is based on commit 66ccd2560aff ("selinux: simplify away security_policydb_len()") in "next" branch in https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux.git This patch is dependent on the following patch series and must be applied in the given order: https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/11709527/ https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/11730193/ https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/11730757/ Signed-off-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com> Suggested-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com> Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> # error: implicit declaration of function 'vfree' Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> # error: implicit declaration of function 'crypto_alloc_shash' Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> # sparse: symbol 'security_read_selinux_policy' was not declared. Should it be static? --- security/integrity/ima/Kconfig | 3 +- security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 1 + security/selinux/Makefile | 2 + security/selinux/hooks.c | 1 + security/selinux/include/security.h | 18 +++- security/selinux/measure.c | 156 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ security/selinux/selinuxfs.c | 3 + security/selinux/ss/services.c | 70 +++++++++++-- 8 files changed, 242 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) create mode 100644 security/selinux/measure.c