| Message ID | a5dfc703ddd7eacda0ee0da083c7afad44afff8c.1609871239.git.andreyknvl@google.com (mailing list archive) |
|---|---|
| State | New, archived |
| Headers | show |
| Series | kasan: HW_TAGS tests support and fixes | expand |
On Tue, Jan 5, 2021 at 7:28 PM Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> wrote: > > Mention in the documentation that enabling CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS > always results in in-kernel TBI (Top Byte Ignore) being enabled. > > Also do a few minor documentation cleanups. > > Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> > Link: https://linux-review.googlesource.com/id/Iba2a6697e3c6304cb53f89ec61dedc77fa29e3ae Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> > --- > Documentation/dev-tools/kasan.rst | 16 +++++++++++----- > 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/Documentation/dev-tools/kasan.rst b/Documentation/dev-tools/kasan.rst > index 0fc3fb1860c4..26c99852a852 100644 > --- a/Documentation/dev-tools/kasan.rst > +++ b/Documentation/dev-tools/kasan.rst > @@ -147,15 +147,14 @@ negative values to distinguish between different kinds of inaccessible memory > like redzones or freed memory (see mm/kasan/kasan.h). > > In the report above the arrows point to the shadow byte 03, which means that > -the accessed address is partially accessible. > - > -For tag-based KASAN this last report section shows the memory tags around the > -accessed address (see `Implementation details`_ section). > +the accessed address is partially accessible. For tag-based KASAN modes this > +last report section shows the memory tags around the accessed address > +(see the `Implementation details`_ section). > > Boot parameters > ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ > > -Hardware tag-based KASAN mode (see the section about different mode below) is > +Hardware tag-based KASAN mode (see the section about various modes below) is > intended for use in production as a security mitigation. Therefore it supports > boot parameters that allow to disable KASAN competely or otherwise control > particular KASAN features. > @@ -305,6 +304,13 @@ reserved to tag freed memory regions. > Hardware tag-based KASAN currently only supports tagging of > kmem_cache_alloc/kmalloc and page_alloc memory. > > +If the hardware doesn't support MTE (pre ARMv8.5), hardware tag-based KASAN > +won't be enabled. In this case all boot parameters are ignored. > + > +Note, that enabling CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS always results in in-kernel TBI being > +enabled. Even when kasan.mode=off is provided, or when the hardware doesn't > +support MTE (but supports TBI). > + > What memory accesses are sanitised by KASAN? > -------------------------------------------- > > -- > 2.29.2.729.g45daf8777d-goog >
On Tue, Jan 05, 2021 at 07:27PM +0100, Andrey Konovalov wrote: > Mention in the documentation that enabling CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS > always results in in-kernel TBI (Top Byte Ignore) being enabled. > > Also do a few minor documentation cleanups. > > Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> > Link: https://linux-review.googlesource.com/id/Iba2a6697e3c6304cb53f89ec61dedc77fa29e3ae Reviewed-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> > --- > Documentation/dev-tools/kasan.rst | 16 +++++++++++----- > 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/Documentation/dev-tools/kasan.rst b/Documentation/dev-tools/kasan.rst > index 0fc3fb1860c4..26c99852a852 100644 > --- a/Documentation/dev-tools/kasan.rst > +++ b/Documentation/dev-tools/kasan.rst > @@ -147,15 +147,14 @@ negative values to distinguish between different kinds of inaccessible memory > like redzones or freed memory (see mm/kasan/kasan.h). > > In the report above the arrows point to the shadow byte 03, which means that > -the accessed address is partially accessible. > - > -For tag-based KASAN this last report section shows the memory tags around the > -accessed address (see `Implementation details`_ section). > +the accessed address is partially accessible. For tag-based KASAN modes this > +last report section shows the memory tags around the accessed address > +(see the `Implementation details`_ section). > > Boot parameters > ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ > > -Hardware tag-based KASAN mode (see the section about different mode below) is > +Hardware tag-based KASAN mode (see the section about various modes below) is > intended for use in production as a security mitigation. Therefore it supports > boot parameters that allow to disable KASAN competely or otherwise control > particular KASAN features. > @@ -305,6 +304,13 @@ reserved to tag freed memory regions. > Hardware tag-based KASAN currently only supports tagging of > kmem_cache_alloc/kmalloc and page_alloc memory. > > +If the hardware doesn't support MTE (pre ARMv8.5), hardware tag-based KASAN > +won't be enabled. In this case all boot parameters are ignored. > + > +Note, that enabling CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS always results in in-kernel TBI being > +enabled. Even when kasan.mode=off is provided, or when the hardware doesn't > +support MTE (but supports TBI). > + > What memory accesses are sanitised by KASAN? > -------------------------------------------- > > -- > 2.29.2.729.g45daf8777d-goog >
diff --git a/Documentation/dev-tools/kasan.rst b/Documentation/dev-tools/kasan.rst index 0fc3fb1860c4..26c99852a852 100644 --- a/Documentation/dev-tools/kasan.rst +++ b/Documentation/dev-tools/kasan.rst @@ -147,15 +147,14 @@ negative values to distinguish between different kinds of inaccessible memory like redzones or freed memory (see mm/kasan/kasan.h). In the report above the arrows point to the shadow byte 03, which means that -the accessed address is partially accessible. - -For tag-based KASAN this last report section shows the memory tags around the -accessed address (see `Implementation details`_ section). +the accessed address is partially accessible. For tag-based KASAN modes this +last report section shows the memory tags around the accessed address +(see the `Implementation details`_ section). Boot parameters ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ -Hardware tag-based KASAN mode (see the section about different mode below) is +Hardware tag-based KASAN mode (see the section about various modes below) is intended for use in production as a security mitigation. Therefore it supports boot parameters that allow to disable KASAN competely or otherwise control particular KASAN features. @@ -305,6 +304,13 @@ reserved to tag freed memory regions. Hardware tag-based KASAN currently only supports tagging of kmem_cache_alloc/kmalloc and page_alloc memory. +If the hardware doesn't support MTE (pre ARMv8.5), hardware tag-based KASAN +won't be enabled. In this case all boot parameters are ignored. + +Note, that enabling CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS always results in in-kernel TBI being +enabled. Even when kasan.mode=off is provided, or when the hardware doesn't +support MTE (but supports TBI). + What memory accesses are sanitised by KASAN? --------------------------------------------
Mention in the documentation that enabling CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS always results in in-kernel TBI (Top Byte Ignore) being enabled. Also do a few minor documentation cleanups. Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Link: https://linux-review.googlesource.com/id/Iba2a6697e3c6304cb53f89ec61dedc77fa29e3ae --- Documentation/dev-tools/kasan.rst | 16 +++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)