Message ID | fee7c8c751dbf871e957935c347fcf7f1ca49beb.1612208222.git.andreyknvl@google.com (mailing list archive) |
---|---|
State | New, archived |
Headers | show |
Series | kasan: optimizations and fixes for HW_TAGS | expand |
On Mon, Feb 01, 2021 at 08:43PM +0100, Andrey Konovalov wrote: > A previous changes d99f6a10c161 ("kasan: don't round_up too much") > attempted to simplify the code by adding a round_up(size) call into > kasan_poison(). While this allows to have less round_up() calls around > the code, this results in round_up() being called multiple times. > > This patch removes round_up() of size from kasan_poison() and ensures > that all callers round_up() the size explicitly. This patch also adds > WARN_ON() alignment checks for address and size to kasan_poison() and > kasan_unpoison(). > > Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Reviewed-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> > --- > mm/kasan/common.c | 9 ++++++--- > mm/kasan/kasan.h | 33 ++++++++++++++++++++------------- > mm/kasan/shadow.c | 37 ++++++++++++++++++++++--------------- > 3 files changed, 48 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/mm/kasan/common.c b/mm/kasan/common.c > index a51d6ea580b0..5691cca69397 100644 > --- a/mm/kasan/common.c > +++ b/mm/kasan/common.c > @@ -261,7 +261,8 @@ void __kasan_unpoison_object_data(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object) > > void __kasan_poison_object_data(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object) > { > - kasan_poison(object, cache->object_size, KASAN_KMALLOC_REDZONE); > + kasan_poison(object, round_up(cache->object_size, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE), > + KASAN_KMALLOC_REDZONE); > } > > /* > @@ -348,7 +349,8 @@ static bool ____kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object, > return true; > } > > - kasan_poison(object, cache->object_size, KASAN_KMALLOC_FREE); > + kasan_poison(object, round_up(cache->object_size, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE), > + KASAN_KMALLOC_FREE); > > if ((IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC) && !quarantine)) > return false; > @@ -490,7 +492,8 @@ static void *____kasan_kmalloc(struct kmem_cache *cache, const void *object, > /* Poison the aligned part of the redzone. */ > redzone_start = round_up((unsigned long)(object + size), > KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE); > - redzone_end = (unsigned long)object + cache->object_size; > + redzone_end = round_up((unsigned long)(object + cache->object_size), > + KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE); > kasan_poison((void *)redzone_start, redzone_end - redzone_start, > KASAN_KMALLOC_REDZONE); > > diff --git a/mm/kasan/kasan.h b/mm/kasan/kasan.h > index 6a2882997f23..2f7400a3412f 100644 > --- a/mm/kasan/kasan.h > +++ b/mm/kasan/kasan.h > @@ -321,30 +321,37 @@ static inline u8 kasan_random_tag(void) { return 0; } > > #ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS > > -static inline void kasan_poison(const void *address, size_t size, u8 value) > +static inline void kasan_poison(const void *addr, size_t size, u8 value) > { > - address = kasan_reset_tag(address); > + addr = kasan_reset_tag(addr); > > /* Skip KFENCE memory if called explicitly outside of sl*b. */ > - if (is_kfence_address(address)) > + if (is_kfence_address(addr)) > return; > > - hw_set_mem_tag_range((void *)address, > - round_up(size, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE), value); > + if (WARN_ON((u64)addr & KASAN_GRANULE_MASK)) > + return; > + if (WARN_ON(size & KASAN_GRANULE_MASK)) > + return; > + > + hw_set_mem_tag_range((void *)addr, size, value); > } > > -static inline void kasan_unpoison(const void *address, size_t size) > +static inline void kasan_unpoison(const void *addr, size_t size) > { > - u8 tag = get_tag(address); > + u8 tag = get_tag(addr); > > - address = kasan_reset_tag(address); > + addr = kasan_reset_tag(addr); > > /* Skip KFENCE memory if called explicitly outside of sl*b. */ > - if (is_kfence_address(address)) > + if (is_kfence_address(addr)) > return; > > - hw_set_mem_tag_range((void *)address, > - round_up(size, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE), tag); > + if (WARN_ON((u64)addr & KASAN_GRANULE_MASK)) > + return; > + size = round_up(size, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE); > + > + hw_set_mem_tag_range((void *)addr, size, tag); > } > > static inline bool kasan_byte_accessible(const void *addr) > @@ -361,7 +368,7 @@ static inline bool kasan_byte_accessible(const void *addr) > /** > * kasan_poison - mark the memory range as unaccessible > * @addr - range start address, must be aligned to KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE > - * @size - range size > + * @size - range size, must be aligned to KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE > * @value - value that's written to metadata for the range > * > * The size gets aligned to KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE before marking the range. > @@ -371,7 +378,7 @@ void kasan_poison(const void *addr, size_t size, u8 value); > /** > * kasan_unpoison - mark the memory range as accessible > * @addr - range start address, must be aligned to KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE > - * @size - range size > + * @size - range size, can be unaligned > * > * For the tag-based modes, the @size gets aligned to KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE before > * marking the range. > diff --git a/mm/kasan/shadow.c b/mm/kasan/shadow.c > index 1ed7817e4ee6..c97f51c557ea 100644 > --- a/mm/kasan/shadow.c > +++ b/mm/kasan/shadow.c > @@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ void *memcpy(void *dest, const void *src, size_t len) > return __memcpy(dest, src, len); > } > > -void kasan_poison(const void *address, size_t size, u8 value) > +void kasan_poison(const void *addr, size_t size, u8 value) > { > void *shadow_start, *shadow_end; > > @@ -78,55 +78,62 @@ void kasan_poison(const void *address, size_t size, u8 value) > * some of the callers (e.g. kasan_poison_object_data) pass tagged > * addresses to this function. > */ > - address = kasan_reset_tag(address); > + addr = kasan_reset_tag(addr); > > /* Skip KFENCE memory if called explicitly outside of sl*b. */ > - if (is_kfence_address(address)) > + if (is_kfence_address(addr)) > return; > > - size = round_up(size, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE); > - shadow_start = kasan_mem_to_shadow(address); > - shadow_end = kasan_mem_to_shadow(address + size); > + if (WARN_ON((u64)addr & KASAN_GRANULE_MASK)) > + return; > + if (WARN_ON(size & KASAN_GRANULE_MASK)) > + return; > + > + shadow_start = kasan_mem_to_shadow(addr); > + shadow_end = kasan_mem_to_shadow(addr + size); > > __memset(shadow_start, value, shadow_end - shadow_start); > } > EXPORT_SYMBOL(kasan_poison); > > #ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC > -void kasan_poison_last_granule(const void *address, size_t size) > +void kasan_poison_last_granule(const void *addr, size_t size) > { > if (size & KASAN_GRANULE_MASK) { > - u8 *shadow = (u8 *)kasan_mem_to_shadow(address + size); > + u8 *shadow = (u8 *)kasan_mem_to_shadow(addr + size); > *shadow = size & KASAN_GRANULE_MASK; > } > } > #endif > > -void kasan_unpoison(const void *address, size_t size) > +void kasan_unpoison(const void *addr, size_t size) > { > - u8 tag = get_tag(address); > + u8 tag = get_tag(addr); > > /* > * Perform shadow offset calculation based on untagged address, as > * some of the callers (e.g. kasan_unpoison_object_data) pass tagged > * addresses to this function. > */ > - address = kasan_reset_tag(address); > + addr = kasan_reset_tag(addr); > > /* > * Skip KFENCE memory if called explicitly outside of sl*b. Also note > * that calls to ksize(), where size is not a multiple of machine-word > * size, would otherwise poison the invalid portion of the word. > */ > - if (is_kfence_address(address)) > + if (is_kfence_address(addr)) > + return; > + > + if (WARN_ON((u64)addr & KASAN_GRANULE_MASK)) > return; > > - /* Unpoison round_up(size, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE) bytes. */ > - kasan_poison(address, size, tag); > + /* Unpoison all granules that cover the object. */ > + kasan_poison(addr, round_up(size, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE), tag); > > /* Partially poison the last granule for the generic mode. */ > if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC)) > - kasan_poison_last_granule(address, size); > + kasan_poison_last_granule(addr, size); > } > > #ifdef CONFIG_MEMORY_HOTPLUG > -- > 2.30.0.365.g02bc693789-goog >
diff --git a/mm/kasan/common.c b/mm/kasan/common.c index a51d6ea580b0..5691cca69397 100644 --- a/mm/kasan/common.c +++ b/mm/kasan/common.c @@ -261,7 +261,8 @@ void __kasan_unpoison_object_data(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object) void __kasan_poison_object_data(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object) { - kasan_poison(object, cache->object_size, KASAN_KMALLOC_REDZONE); + kasan_poison(object, round_up(cache->object_size, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE), + KASAN_KMALLOC_REDZONE); } /* @@ -348,7 +349,8 @@ static bool ____kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object, return true; } - kasan_poison(object, cache->object_size, KASAN_KMALLOC_FREE); + kasan_poison(object, round_up(cache->object_size, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE), + KASAN_KMALLOC_FREE); if ((IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC) && !quarantine)) return false; @@ -490,7 +492,8 @@ static void *____kasan_kmalloc(struct kmem_cache *cache, const void *object, /* Poison the aligned part of the redzone. */ redzone_start = round_up((unsigned long)(object + size), KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE); - redzone_end = (unsigned long)object + cache->object_size; + redzone_end = round_up((unsigned long)(object + cache->object_size), + KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE); kasan_poison((void *)redzone_start, redzone_end - redzone_start, KASAN_KMALLOC_REDZONE); diff --git a/mm/kasan/kasan.h b/mm/kasan/kasan.h index 6a2882997f23..2f7400a3412f 100644 --- a/mm/kasan/kasan.h +++ b/mm/kasan/kasan.h @@ -321,30 +321,37 @@ static inline u8 kasan_random_tag(void) { return 0; } #ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS -static inline void kasan_poison(const void *address, size_t size, u8 value) +static inline void kasan_poison(const void *addr, size_t size, u8 value) { - address = kasan_reset_tag(address); + addr = kasan_reset_tag(addr); /* Skip KFENCE memory if called explicitly outside of sl*b. */ - if (is_kfence_address(address)) + if (is_kfence_address(addr)) return; - hw_set_mem_tag_range((void *)address, - round_up(size, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE), value); + if (WARN_ON((u64)addr & KASAN_GRANULE_MASK)) + return; + if (WARN_ON(size & KASAN_GRANULE_MASK)) + return; + + hw_set_mem_tag_range((void *)addr, size, value); } -static inline void kasan_unpoison(const void *address, size_t size) +static inline void kasan_unpoison(const void *addr, size_t size) { - u8 tag = get_tag(address); + u8 tag = get_tag(addr); - address = kasan_reset_tag(address); + addr = kasan_reset_tag(addr); /* Skip KFENCE memory if called explicitly outside of sl*b. */ - if (is_kfence_address(address)) + if (is_kfence_address(addr)) return; - hw_set_mem_tag_range((void *)address, - round_up(size, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE), tag); + if (WARN_ON((u64)addr & KASAN_GRANULE_MASK)) + return; + size = round_up(size, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE); + + hw_set_mem_tag_range((void *)addr, size, tag); } static inline bool kasan_byte_accessible(const void *addr) @@ -361,7 +368,7 @@ static inline bool kasan_byte_accessible(const void *addr) /** * kasan_poison - mark the memory range as unaccessible * @addr - range start address, must be aligned to KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE - * @size - range size + * @size - range size, must be aligned to KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE * @value - value that's written to metadata for the range * * The size gets aligned to KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE before marking the range. @@ -371,7 +378,7 @@ void kasan_poison(const void *addr, size_t size, u8 value); /** * kasan_unpoison - mark the memory range as accessible * @addr - range start address, must be aligned to KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE - * @size - range size + * @size - range size, can be unaligned * * For the tag-based modes, the @size gets aligned to KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE before * marking the range. diff --git a/mm/kasan/shadow.c b/mm/kasan/shadow.c index 1ed7817e4ee6..c97f51c557ea 100644 --- a/mm/kasan/shadow.c +++ b/mm/kasan/shadow.c @@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ void *memcpy(void *dest, const void *src, size_t len) return __memcpy(dest, src, len); } -void kasan_poison(const void *address, size_t size, u8 value) +void kasan_poison(const void *addr, size_t size, u8 value) { void *shadow_start, *shadow_end; @@ -78,55 +78,62 @@ void kasan_poison(const void *address, size_t size, u8 value) * some of the callers (e.g. kasan_poison_object_data) pass tagged * addresses to this function. */ - address = kasan_reset_tag(address); + addr = kasan_reset_tag(addr); /* Skip KFENCE memory if called explicitly outside of sl*b. */ - if (is_kfence_address(address)) + if (is_kfence_address(addr)) return; - size = round_up(size, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE); - shadow_start = kasan_mem_to_shadow(address); - shadow_end = kasan_mem_to_shadow(address + size); + if (WARN_ON((u64)addr & KASAN_GRANULE_MASK)) + return; + if (WARN_ON(size & KASAN_GRANULE_MASK)) + return; + + shadow_start = kasan_mem_to_shadow(addr); + shadow_end = kasan_mem_to_shadow(addr + size); __memset(shadow_start, value, shadow_end - shadow_start); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(kasan_poison); #ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC -void kasan_poison_last_granule(const void *address, size_t size) +void kasan_poison_last_granule(const void *addr, size_t size) { if (size & KASAN_GRANULE_MASK) { - u8 *shadow = (u8 *)kasan_mem_to_shadow(address + size); + u8 *shadow = (u8 *)kasan_mem_to_shadow(addr + size); *shadow = size & KASAN_GRANULE_MASK; } } #endif -void kasan_unpoison(const void *address, size_t size) +void kasan_unpoison(const void *addr, size_t size) { - u8 tag = get_tag(address); + u8 tag = get_tag(addr); /* * Perform shadow offset calculation based on untagged address, as * some of the callers (e.g. kasan_unpoison_object_data) pass tagged * addresses to this function. */ - address = kasan_reset_tag(address); + addr = kasan_reset_tag(addr); /* * Skip KFENCE memory if called explicitly outside of sl*b. Also note * that calls to ksize(), where size is not a multiple of machine-word * size, would otherwise poison the invalid portion of the word. */ - if (is_kfence_address(address)) + if (is_kfence_address(addr)) + return; + + if (WARN_ON((u64)addr & KASAN_GRANULE_MASK)) return; - /* Unpoison round_up(size, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE) bytes. */ - kasan_poison(address, size, tag); + /* Unpoison all granules that cover the object. */ + kasan_poison(addr, round_up(size, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE), tag); /* Partially poison the last granule for the generic mode. */ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC)) - kasan_poison_last_granule(address, size); + kasan_poison_last_granule(addr, size); } #ifdef CONFIG_MEMORY_HOTPLUG
A previous changes d99f6a10c161 ("kasan: don't round_up too much") attempted to simplify the code by adding a round_up(size) call into kasan_poison(). While this allows to have less round_up() calls around the code, this results in round_up() being called multiple times. This patch removes round_up() of size from kasan_poison() and ensures that all callers round_up() the size explicitly. This patch also adds WARN_ON() alignment checks for address and size to kasan_poison() and kasan_unpoison(). Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> --- mm/kasan/common.c | 9 ++++++--- mm/kasan/kasan.h | 33 ++++++++++++++++++++------------- mm/kasan/shadow.c | 37 ++++++++++++++++++++++--------------- 3 files changed, 48 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-)