Message ID | 20210130165225.54047-5-vincenzo.frascino@arm.com (mailing list archive) |
---|---|
State | New, archived |
Headers | show |
Series | arm64: ARMv8.5-A: MTE: Add async mode support | expand |
On Sat, Jan 30, 2021 at 04:52:24PM +0000, Vincenzo Frascino wrote: > diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/mte.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/mte.c > index 92078e1eb627..7763ac1f2917 100644 > --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/mte.c > +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/mte.c > @@ -182,6 +182,37 @@ bool mte_report_once(void) > return READ_ONCE(report_fault_once); > } > > +#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS > +void mte_check_tfsr_el1(void) > +{ > + u64 tfsr_el1; > + > + if (!system_supports_mte()) > + return; > + > + tfsr_el1 = read_sysreg_s(SYS_TFSR_EL1); > + > + /* > + * The kernel should never trigger an asynchronous fault on a > + * TTBR0 address, so we should never see TF0 set. > + * For futexes we disable checks via PSTATE.TCO. > + */ > + WARN_ONCE(tfsr_el1 & SYS_TFSR_EL1_TF0, > + "Kernel async tag fault on TTBR0 address"); Sorry, I got confused when I suggested this warning. If the user is running in async mode, the TFSR_EL1.TF0 bit may be set by copy_mount_options(), strncpy_from_user() which rely on an actual fault happening (not the case with asynchronous where only a bit is set). With the user MTE support, we never report asynchronous faults caused by the kernel on user addresses as we can't easily track them. So this warning may be triggered on correctly functioning kernel/user. > + > + if (unlikely(tfsr_el1 & SYS_TFSR_EL1_TF1)) { > + /* > + * Note: isb() is not required after this direct write > + * because there is no indirect read subsequent to it > + * (per ARM DDI 0487F.c table D13-1). > + */ > + write_sysreg_s(0, SYS_TFSR_EL1); Zeroing the whole register is still fine, we don't care about the TF0 bit anyway. > + > + kasan_report_async(); > + } > +} > +#endif
On 2/5/21 3:39 PM, Catalin Marinas wrote: > On Sat, Jan 30, 2021 at 04:52:24PM +0000, Vincenzo Frascino wrote: >> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/mte.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/mte.c >> index 92078e1eb627..7763ac1f2917 100644 >> --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/mte.c >> +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/mte.c >> @@ -182,6 +182,37 @@ bool mte_report_once(void) >> return READ_ONCE(report_fault_once); >> } >> >> +#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS >> +void mte_check_tfsr_el1(void) >> +{ >> + u64 tfsr_el1; >> + >> + if (!system_supports_mte()) >> + return; >> + >> + tfsr_el1 = read_sysreg_s(SYS_TFSR_EL1); >> + >> + /* >> + * The kernel should never trigger an asynchronous fault on a >> + * TTBR0 address, so we should never see TF0 set. >> + * For futexes we disable checks via PSTATE.TCO. >> + */ >> + WARN_ONCE(tfsr_el1 & SYS_TFSR_EL1_TF0, >> + "Kernel async tag fault on TTBR0 address"); > > Sorry, I got confused when I suggested this warning. If the user is > running in async mode, the TFSR_EL1.TF0 bit may be set by > copy_mount_options(), strncpy_from_user() which rely on an actual fault > happening (not the case with asynchronous where only a bit is set). With > the user MTE support, we never report asynchronous faults caused by the > kernel on user addresses as we can't easily track them. So this warning > may be triggered on correctly functioning kernel/user. > No issue, I will re-post removing the WARN_ONCE(). >> + >> + if (unlikely(tfsr_el1 & SYS_TFSR_EL1_TF1)) { >> + /* >> + * Note: isb() is not required after this direct write >> + * because there is no indirect read subsequent to it >> + * (per ARM DDI 0487F.c table D13-1). >> + */ >> + write_sysreg_s(0, SYS_TFSR_EL1); > > Zeroing the whole register is still fine, we don't care about the TF0 > bit anyway. > >> + >> + kasan_report_async(); >> + } >> +} >> +#endif >
diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/mte.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/mte.h index d02aff9f493d..237bb2f7309d 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/mte.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/mte.h @@ -92,5 +92,37 @@ static inline void mte_assign_mem_tag_range(void *addr, size_t size) #endif /* CONFIG_ARM64_MTE */ +#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS +void mte_check_tfsr_el1(void); + +static inline void mte_check_tfsr_entry(void) +{ + mte_check_tfsr_el1(); +} + +static inline void mte_check_tfsr_exit(void) +{ + /* + * The asynchronous faults are sync'ed automatically with + * TFSR_EL1 on kernel entry but for exit an explicit dsb() + * is required. + */ + dsb(nsh); + isb(); + + mte_check_tfsr_el1(); +} +#else +static inline void mte_check_tfsr_el1(void) +{ +} +static inline void mte_check_tfsr_entry(void) +{ +} +static inline void mte_check_tfsr_exit(void) +{ +} +#endif /* CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS */ + #endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */ #endif /* __ASM_MTE_H */ diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c index 5346953e4382..31666511ba67 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c @@ -37,6 +37,8 @@ static void noinstr enter_from_kernel_mode(struct pt_regs *regs) lockdep_hardirqs_off(CALLER_ADDR0); rcu_irq_enter_check_tick(); trace_hardirqs_off_finish(); + + mte_check_tfsr_entry(); } /* @@ -47,6 +49,8 @@ static void noinstr exit_to_kernel_mode(struct pt_regs *regs) { lockdep_assert_irqs_disabled(); + mte_check_tfsr_exit(); + if (interrupts_enabled(regs)) { if (regs->exit_rcu) { trace_hardirqs_on_prepare(); @@ -243,6 +247,8 @@ asmlinkage void noinstr enter_from_user_mode(void) asmlinkage void noinstr exit_to_user_mode(void) { + mte_check_tfsr_exit(); + trace_hardirqs_on_prepare(); lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare(CALLER_ADDR0); user_enter_irqoff(); diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/mte.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/mte.c index 92078e1eb627..7763ac1f2917 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/mte.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/mte.c @@ -182,6 +182,37 @@ bool mte_report_once(void) return READ_ONCE(report_fault_once); } +#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS +void mte_check_tfsr_el1(void) +{ + u64 tfsr_el1; + + if (!system_supports_mte()) + return; + + tfsr_el1 = read_sysreg_s(SYS_TFSR_EL1); + + /* + * The kernel should never trigger an asynchronous fault on a + * TTBR0 address, so we should never see TF0 set. + * For futexes we disable checks via PSTATE.TCO. + */ + WARN_ONCE(tfsr_el1 & SYS_TFSR_EL1_TF0, + "Kernel async tag fault on TTBR0 address"); + + if (unlikely(tfsr_el1 & SYS_TFSR_EL1_TF1)) { + /* + * Note: isb() is not required after this direct write + * because there is no indirect read subsequent to it + * (per ARM DDI 0487F.c table D13-1). + */ + write_sysreg_s(0, SYS_TFSR_EL1); + + kasan_report_async(); + } +} +#endif + static void update_sctlr_el1_tcf0(u64 tcf0) { /* ISB required for the kernel uaccess routines */ @@ -247,6 +278,19 @@ void mte_thread_switch(struct task_struct *next) /* avoid expensive SCTLR_EL1 accesses if no change */ if (current->thread.sctlr_tcf0 != next->thread.sctlr_tcf0) update_sctlr_el1_tcf0(next->thread.sctlr_tcf0); + else + isb(); + + /* + * Check if an async tag exception occurred at EL1. + * + * Note: On the context switch path we rely on the dsb() present + * in __switch_to() to guarantee that the indirect writes to TFSR_EL1 + * are synchronized before this point. + * isb() above is required for the same reason. + * + */ + mte_check_tfsr_el1(); } void mte_suspend_exit(void)