| Message ID | 20210217165058.1336155-1-eric.snowberg@oracle.com (mailing list archive) |
|---|---|
| State | New |
| Headers | show |
| Series | cert: Add kconfig dependency for validate_trust | expand |
Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com> wrote: > The kernel test robot reports when building with Kconfig > CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING defined and > CONFIG_SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION undefined: > > ld.lld: error: undefined symbol: pkcs7_validate_trust > referenced by blacklist.c:128 (certs/blacklist.c:128) > blacklist.o:(is_key_on_revocation_list) in archive certs/built-in.a > > Make CONFIG_SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION a dependency for validate_trust. > > Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> > Signed-off-by: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com> I wonder if it's better to provide a separate config option for the revocation list, say: config SYSTEM_REVOCATION_LIST bool "Add revocation certs to the blacklist keyring" depends on SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_KEYRING depends on PKCS7_MESSAGE_PARSER help ... and use that in blacklist.c. In keys/system_keyring.h, is_key_on_revocation_list() can then be defaulted to return 0 if that is disabled. Btw, I've just noticed that add_key_to_revocation_list() and is_key_on_revocation_list() lack kernel doc comments. David
> On Feb 23, 2021, at 4:47 PM, David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> wrote: > > Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com> wrote: > >> The kernel test robot reports when building with Kconfig >> CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING defined and >> CONFIG_SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION undefined: >> >> ld.lld: error: undefined symbol: pkcs7_validate_trust >> referenced by blacklist.c:128 (certs/blacklist.c:128) >> blacklist.o:(is_key_on_revocation_list) in archive certs/built-in.a >> >> Make CONFIG_SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION a dependency for validate_trust. >> >> Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> >> Signed-off-by: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com> > > I wonder if it's better to provide a separate config option for the revocation > list, say: > > config SYSTEM_REVOCATION_LIST > bool "Add revocation certs to the blacklist keyring" > depends on SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_KEYRING > depends on PKCS7_MESSAGE_PARSER > help > ... > > and use that in blacklist.c. > > In keys/system_keyring.h, is_key_on_revocation_list() can then be defaulted to > return 0 if that is disabled. I tried something like that in the past. The problem I ran into is someone could create a config with PKCS7_MESSAGE_PARSER=m. Then pkcs7_validate_trust would give an undefined reference error. SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION was the only thing I could find that guaranteed everything was available. I supposed I could do: config SYSTEM_REVOCATION_LIST bool "Add revocation certs to the blacklist keyring" depends on SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_KEYRING depends on SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION help … Would you rather I do that instead? > Btw, I've just noticed that add_key_to_revocation_list() and > is_key_on_revocation_list() lack kernel doc comments. I’ll prepare a patch to add the kernel-doc comments.
How about these changes?
I've added an extra config option to turn on SYSTEM_REVOCATION_LIST support.
I've also added kerneldoc comments and moved the functions so that they're not
in the middle of the blacklist-specific stuff.
I'm not sure uefi_revocation_list_x509() needs conditionalising as the
optimiser should just inline it if SYSTEM_REVOCATION_LIST=n (assuming __init
doesn't disable inlining).
David
---
diff --git a/certs/Kconfig b/certs/Kconfig
index c94e93d8bccf..76e469b56a77 100644
--- a/certs/Kconfig
+++ b/certs/Kconfig
@@ -83,4 +83,13 @@ config SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_HASH_LIST
wrapper to incorporate the list into the kernel. Each <hash> should
be a string of hex digits.
+config SYSTEM_REVOCATION_LIST
+ bool "Provide system-wide ring of revocation certificates"
+ depends on SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_KEYRING
+ depends on PKCS7_MESSAGE_PARSER=y
+ help
+ If set, this allows revocation certificates to be stored in the
+ blacklist keyring and implements a hook whereby a PKCS#7 message can
+ be checked to see if it matches such a certificate.
+
endmenu
diff --git a/certs/blacklist.c b/certs/blacklist.c
index e9f5fc632f0d..2b8644123d5f 100644
--- a/certs/blacklist.c
+++ b/certs/blacklist.c
@@ -101,38 +101,6 @@ int mark_hash_blacklisted(const char *hash)
return 0;
}
-int add_key_to_revocation_list(const char *data, size_t size)
-{
- key_ref_t key;
-
- key = key_create_or_update(make_key_ref(blacklist_keyring, true),
- "asymmetric",
- NULL,
- data,
- size,
- ((KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) | KEY_USR_VIEW),
- KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA | KEY_ALLOC_BUILT_IN);
-
- if (IS_ERR(key)) {
- pr_err("Problem with revocation key (%ld)\n", PTR_ERR(key));
- return PTR_ERR(key);
- }
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-int is_key_on_revocation_list(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7)
-{
- int ret;
-
- ret = validate_trust(pkcs7, blacklist_keyring);
-
- if (ret == 0)
- return -EKEYREJECTED;
-
- return -ENOKEY;
-}
-
/**
* is_hash_blacklisted - Determine if a hash is blacklisted
* @hash: The hash to be checked as a binary blob
@@ -177,6 +145,49 @@ int is_binary_blacklisted(const u8 *hash, size_t hash_len)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(is_binary_blacklisted);
+#ifdef CONFIG_SYSTEM_REVOCATION_LIST
+/**
+ * add_key_to_revocation_list - Add a revocation certificate to the blacklist
+ * @data: The data blob containing the certificate
+ * @size: The size of data blob
+ */
+int add_key_to_revocation_list(const char *data, size_t size)
+{
+ key_ref_t key;
+
+ key = key_create_or_update(make_key_ref(blacklist_keyring, true),
+ "asymmetric",
+ NULL,
+ data,
+ size,
+ ((KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) | KEY_USR_VIEW),
+ KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA | KEY_ALLOC_BUILT_IN);
+
+ if (IS_ERR(key)) {
+ pr_err("Problem with revocation key (%ld)\n", PTR_ERR(key));
+ return PTR_ERR(key);
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * is_key_on_revocation_list - Determine if the key for a PKCS#7 message is revoked
+ * @pkcs7: The PKCS#7 message to check
+ */
+int is_key_on_revocation_list(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = pkcs7_validate_trust(pkcs7, blacklist_keyring);
+
+ if (ret == 0)
+ return -EKEYREJECTED;
+
+ return -ENOKEY;
+}
+#endif
+
/*
* Initialise the blacklist
*/
diff --git a/certs/blacklist.h b/certs/blacklist.h
index 420bb7c86e07..51b320cf8574 100644
--- a/certs/blacklist.h
+++ b/certs/blacklist.h
@@ -3,13 +3,3 @@
#include <crypto/pkcs7.h>
extern const char __initconst *const blacklist_hashes[];
-
-#ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING
-#define validate_trust pkcs7_validate_trust
-#else
-static inline int validate_trust(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
- struct key *trust_keyring)
-{
- return -ENOKEY;
-}
-#endif
diff --git a/include/keys/system_keyring.h b/include/keys/system_keyring.h
index 61f98739e8b1..875e002a4180 100644
--- a/include/keys/system_keyring.h
+++ b/include/keys/system_keyring.h
@@ -34,11 +34,9 @@ extern int restrict_link_by_builtin_and_secondary_trusted(
extern struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7;
#ifdef CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_KEYRING
extern int mark_hash_blacklisted(const char *hash);
-extern int add_key_to_revocation_list(const char *data, size_t size);
extern int is_hash_blacklisted(const u8 *hash, size_t hash_len,
const char *type);
extern int is_binary_blacklisted(const u8 *hash, size_t hash_len);
-extern int is_key_on_revocation_list(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7);
#else
static inline int is_hash_blacklisted(const u8 *hash, size_t hash_len,
const char *type)
@@ -50,6 +48,12 @@ static inline int is_binary_blacklisted(const u8 *hash, size_t hash_len)
{
return 0;
}
+#endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SYSTEM_REVOCATION_LIST
+extern int add_key_to_revocation_list(const char *data, size_t size);
+extern int is_key_on_revocation_list(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7);
+#else
static inline int add_key_to_revocation_list(const char *data, size_t size)
{
return 0;
On 24/02/2021 11:51, David Howells wrote: > How about these changes? > > I've added an extra config option to turn on SYSTEM_REVOCATION_LIST support. > > I've also added kerneldoc comments and moved the functions so that they're not > in the middle of the blacklist-specific stuff. > > I'm not sure uefi_revocation_list_x509() needs conditionalising as the > optimiser should just inline it if SYSTEM_REVOCATION_LIST=n (assuming __init > doesn't disable inlining). > > David > --- > diff --git a/certs/Kconfig b/certs/Kconfig > index c94e93d8bccf..76e469b56a77 100644 > --- a/certs/Kconfig > +++ b/certs/Kconfig > @@ -83,4 +83,13 @@ config SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_HASH_LIST > wrapper to incorporate the list into the kernel. Each <hash> should > be a string of hex digits. > > +config SYSTEM_REVOCATION_LIST > + bool "Provide system-wide ring of revocation certificates" > + depends on SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_KEYRING > + depends on PKCS7_MESSAGE_PARSER=y The function verify_pkcs7_message_sig() (which is patched) is only available if CONFIG_SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION is defined. I suggest to use the same dependencies as for my dynamic authenticated blacklist keyring patchset. > + help > + If set, this allows revocation certificates to be stored in the > + blacklist keyring and implements a hook whereby a PKCS#7 message can > + be checked to see if it matches such a certificate. > + > endmenu > diff --git a/certs/blacklist.c b/certs/blacklist.c > index e9f5fc632f0d..2b8644123d5f 100644 > --- a/certs/blacklist.c > +++ b/certs/blacklist.c > @@ -101,38 +101,6 @@ int mark_hash_blacklisted(const char *hash) > return 0; > } > > -int add_key_to_revocation_list(const char *data, size_t size) > -{ > - key_ref_t key; > - > - key = key_create_or_update(make_key_ref(blacklist_keyring, true), > - "asymmetric", > - NULL, > - data, > - size, > - ((KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) | KEY_USR_VIEW), > - KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA | KEY_ALLOC_BUILT_IN); > - > - if (IS_ERR(key)) { > - pr_err("Problem with revocation key (%ld)\n", PTR_ERR(key)); > - return PTR_ERR(key); > - } > - > - return 0; > -} > - > -int is_key_on_revocation_list(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7) > -{ > - int ret; > - > - ret = validate_trust(pkcs7, blacklist_keyring); > - > - if (ret == 0) > - return -EKEYREJECTED; > - > - return -ENOKEY; > -} > - > /** > * is_hash_blacklisted - Determine if a hash is blacklisted > * @hash: The hash to be checked as a binary blob Could you please not move those functions? It makes the patch more readable and avoids merge conflicts (e.g. with the dynamic authenticated blacklist keyring patchset). Thanks. > @@ -177,6 +145,49 @@ int is_binary_blacklisted(const u8 *hash, size_t hash_len) > } > EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(is_binary_blacklisted); > > +#ifdef CONFIG_SYSTEM_REVOCATION_LIST > +/** > + * add_key_to_revocation_list - Add a revocation certificate to the blacklist > + * @data: The data blob containing the certificate > + * @size: The size of data blob > + */ > +int add_key_to_revocation_list(const char *data, size_t size) > +{ > + key_ref_t key; > + > + key = key_create_or_update(make_key_ref(blacklist_keyring, true), > + "asymmetric", > + NULL, > + data, > + size, > + ((KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) | KEY_USR_VIEW), > + KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA | KEY_ALLOC_BUILT_IN); > + > + if (IS_ERR(key)) { > + pr_err("Problem with revocation key (%ld)\n", PTR_ERR(key)); > + return PTR_ERR(key); > + } > + > + return 0; > +} > + > +/** > + * is_key_on_revocation_list - Determine if the key for a PKCS#7 message is revoked > + * @pkcs7: The PKCS#7 message to check > + */ > +int is_key_on_revocation_list(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7) > +{ > + int ret; > + > + ret = pkcs7_validate_trust(pkcs7, blacklist_keyring); > + > + if (ret == 0) > + return -EKEYREJECTED; > + > + return -ENOKEY; > +} > +#endif > + > /* > * Initialise the blacklist > */ > diff --git a/certs/blacklist.h b/certs/blacklist.h > index 420bb7c86e07..51b320cf8574 100644 > --- a/certs/blacklist.h > +++ b/certs/blacklist.h > @@ -3,13 +3,3 @@ > #include <crypto/pkcs7.h> > > extern const char __initconst *const blacklist_hashes[]; > - > -#ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING > -#define validate_trust pkcs7_validate_trust > -#else > -static inline int validate_trust(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7, > - struct key *trust_keyring) > -{ > - return -ENOKEY; > -} > -#endif > diff --git a/include/keys/system_keyring.h b/include/keys/system_keyring.h > index 61f98739e8b1..875e002a4180 100644 > --- a/include/keys/system_keyring.h > +++ b/include/keys/system_keyring.h > @@ -34,11 +34,9 @@ extern int restrict_link_by_builtin_and_secondary_trusted( > extern struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7; > #ifdef CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_KEYRING > extern int mark_hash_blacklisted(const char *hash); > -extern int add_key_to_revocation_list(const char *data, size_t size); > extern int is_hash_blacklisted(const u8 *hash, size_t hash_len, > const char *type); > extern int is_binary_blacklisted(const u8 *hash, size_t hash_len); > -extern int is_key_on_revocation_list(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7); > #else > static inline int is_hash_blacklisted(const u8 *hash, size_t hash_len, > const char *type) > @@ -50,6 +48,12 @@ static inline int is_binary_blacklisted(const u8 *hash, size_t hash_len) > { > return 0; > } > +#endif > + > +#ifdef CONFIG_SYSTEM_REVOCATION_LIST > +extern int add_key_to_revocation_list(const char *data, size_t size); > +extern int is_key_on_revocation_list(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7); > +#else > static inline int add_key_to_revocation_list(const char *data, size_t size) > { > return 0; >
Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> wrote: > > +config SYSTEM_REVOCATION_LIST > > + bool "Provide system-wide ring of revocation certificates" > > + depends on SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_KEYRING > > + depends on PKCS7_MESSAGE_PARSER=y > > The function verify_pkcs7_message_sig() (which is patched) is only > available if CONFIG_SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION is defined. That shouldn't matter, at least from a building point of view, since verify_pkcs7_message_sig() uses the new facility rather than being a dependency of it - and there's a fallback in place in case you don't want SYSTEM_REVOCATION_LIST. Note that SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION also doesn't depend on or select SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_KEYRING - it will use it if it's enabled, but not otherwise. > I suggest to use the same dependencies as for my dynamic authenticated > blacklist keyring patchset. This, you mean? config SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_AUTH_UPDATE bool "Allow root to add signed blacklist keys" depends on SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_KEYRING depends on SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION I.e.: config SYSTEM_REVOCATION_LIST bool "Provide system-wide ring of revocation certificates" depends on SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_KEYRING depends on SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION depends on PKCS7_MESSAGE_PARSER=y I suppose you could argue the it that way since it's only used for that purpose. Note that it does need the PKCS7 dep since it explicitly uses that code. > Could you please not move those functions? It makes the patch more > readable and avoids merge conflicts (e.g. with the dynamic authenticated > blacklist keyring patchset). Thanks. I would suggest merging these changes in so that the error is not found by bisection. But the functions really are mislocated:-/ David
> On Feb 24, 2021, at 3:51 AM, David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> wrote: > > How about these changes? > > I've added an extra config option to turn on SYSTEM_REVOCATION_LIST support. I believe this is ok. However currently, whenever the kernel finds either a EFI_CERT_SHA256_GUID or EFI_CERT_X509_SHA256_GUID entry in the dbx, it loads it into the blacklist keyring. Then anytime signature validation takes place, these entries are referenced. If there is a match, the signature check fails. Now with the inclusion of EFI_CERT_X509_GUID, I question why we want to enable it thru a Kconfig option, when we don’t for the other two types. > I've also added kerneldoc comments Thanks > and moved the functions so that they're not > in the middle of the blacklist-specific stuff. > > I'm not sure uefi_revocation_list_x509() needs conditionalising as the > optimiser should just inline it if SYSTEM_REVOCATION_LIST=n (assuming __init > doesn't disable inlining). > > David > --- > diff --git a/certs/Kconfig b/certs/Kconfig > index c94e93d8bccf..76e469b56a77 100644 > --- a/certs/Kconfig > +++ b/certs/Kconfig > @@ -83,4 +83,13 @@ config SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_HASH_LIST > wrapper to incorporate the list into the kernel. Each <hash> should > be a string of hex digits. > > +config SYSTEM_REVOCATION_LIST > + bool "Provide system-wide ring of revocation certificates” > + depends on SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_KEYRING > + depends on PKCS7_MESSAGE_PARSER=y > + help > + If set, this allows revocation certificates to be stored in the > + blacklist keyring and implements a hook whereby a PKCS#7 message can > + be checked to see if it matches such a certificate. > + > endmenu > diff --git a/certs/blacklist.c b/certs/blacklist.c > index e9f5fc632f0d..2b8644123d5f 100644 > --- a/certs/blacklist.c > +++ b/certs/blacklist.c > @@ -101,38 +101,6 @@ int mark_hash_blacklisted(const char *hash) > return 0; > } > > -int add_key_to_revocation_list(const char *data, size_t size) > -{ > - key_ref_t key; > - > - key = key_create_or_update(make_key_ref(blacklist_keyring, true), > - "asymmetric", > - NULL, > - data, > - size, > - ((KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) | KEY_USR_VIEW), > - KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA | KEY_ALLOC_BUILT_IN); > - > - if (IS_ERR(key)) { > - pr_err("Problem with revocation key (%ld)\n", PTR_ERR(key)); > - return PTR_ERR(key); > - } > - > - return 0; > -} > - > -int is_key_on_revocation_list(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7) > -{ > - int ret; > - > - ret = validate_trust(pkcs7, blacklist_keyring); > - > - if (ret == 0) > - return -EKEYREJECTED; > - > - return -ENOKEY; > -} > - > /** > * is_hash_blacklisted - Determine if a hash is blacklisted > * @hash: The hash to be checked as a binary blob > @@ -177,6 +145,49 @@ int is_binary_blacklisted(const u8 *hash, size_t hash_len) > } > EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(is_binary_blacklisted); > > +#ifdef CONFIG_SYSTEM_REVOCATION_LIST > +/** > + * add_key_to_revocation_list - Add a revocation certificate to the blacklist > + * @data: The data blob containing the certificate > + * @size: The size of data blob > + */ > +int add_key_to_revocation_list(const char *data, size_t size) > +{ > + key_ref_t key; > + > + key = key_create_or_update(make_key_ref(blacklist_keyring, true), > + "asymmetric", > + NULL, > + data, > + size, > + ((KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) | KEY_USR_VIEW), > + KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA | KEY_ALLOC_BUILT_IN); > + > + if (IS_ERR(key)) { > + pr_err("Problem with revocation key (%ld)\n", PTR_ERR(key)); > + return PTR_ERR(key); > + } > + > + return 0; > +} > + > +/** > + * is_key_on_revocation_list - Determine if the key for a PKCS#7 message is revoked > + * @pkcs7: The PKCS#7 message to check > + */ > +int is_key_on_revocation_list(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7) > +{ > + int ret; > + > + ret = pkcs7_validate_trust(pkcs7, blacklist_keyring); > + > + if (ret == 0) > + return -EKEYREJECTED; > + > + return -ENOKEY; > +} > +#endif > + > /* > * Initialise the blacklist > */ > diff --git a/certs/blacklist.h b/certs/blacklist.h > index 420bb7c86e07..51b320cf8574 100644 > --- a/certs/blacklist.h > +++ b/certs/blacklist.h > @@ -3,13 +3,3 @@ > #include <crypto/pkcs7.h> > > extern const char __initconst *const blacklist_hashes[]; > - > -#ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING > -#define validate_trust pkcs7_validate_trust > -#else > -static inline int validate_trust(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7, > - struct key *trust_keyring) > -{ > - return -ENOKEY; > -} > -#endif > diff --git a/include/keys/system_keyring.h b/include/keys/system_keyring.h > index 61f98739e8b1..875e002a4180 100644 > --- a/include/keys/system_keyring.h > +++ b/include/keys/system_keyring.h > @@ -34,11 +34,9 @@ extern int restrict_link_by_builtin_and_secondary_trusted( > extern struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7; > #ifdef CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_KEYRING > extern int mark_hash_blacklisted(const char *hash); > -extern int add_key_to_revocation_list(const char *data, size_t size); > extern int is_hash_blacklisted(const u8 *hash, size_t hash_len, > const char *type); > extern int is_binary_blacklisted(const u8 *hash, size_t hash_len); > -extern int is_key_on_revocation_list(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7); > #else > static inline int is_hash_blacklisted(const u8 *hash, size_t hash_len, > const char *type) > @@ -50,6 +48,12 @@ static inline int is_binary_blacklisted(const u8 *hash, size_t hash_len) > { > return 0; > } > +#endif > + > +#ifdef CONFIG_SYSTEM_REVOCATION_LIST > +extern int add_key_to_revocation_list(const char *data, size_t size); > +extern int is_key_on_revocation_list(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7); > +#else > static inline int add_key_to_revocation_list(const char *data, size_t size) > { > return 0; >
Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com> wrote: > > I've added an extra config option to turn on SYSTEM_REVOCATION_LIST support. > > I believe this is ok. However currently, whenever the kernel finds either a > EFI_CERT_SHA256_GUID or EFI_CERT_X509_SHA256_GUID entry in the dbx, it loads > it into the blacklist keyring. Then anytime signature validation takes > place, these entries are referenced. If there is a match, the signature > check fails. Now with the inclusion of EFI_CERT_X509_GUID, I question why > we want to enable it thru a Kconfig option, when we don’t for the other two > types. But we do. mark_hash_blacklisted(), is_hash_blacklisted() and is_binary_blacklisted() do nothing if CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_KEYRING=n. David
diff --git a/certs/blacklist.h b/certs/blacklist.h index 420bb7c86e07..a86f0b52a033 100644 --- a/certs/blacklist.h +++ b/certs/blacklist.h @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ extern const char __initconst *const blacklist_hashes[]; -#ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING +#if defined(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING) && defined(SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION) #define validate_trust pkcs7_validate_trust #else static inline int validate_trust(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
The kernel test robot reports when building with Kconfig CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING defined and CONFIG_SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION undefined: ld.lld: error: undefined symbol: pkcs7_validate_trust referenced by blacklist.c:128 (certs/blacklist.c:128) blacklist.o:(is_key_on_revocation_list) in archive certs/built-in.a Make CONFIG_SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION a dependency for validate_trust. Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com> --- certs/blacklist.h | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)