| Message ID | 20210303162209.8609-1-rppt@kernel.org (mailing list archive) |
|---|---|
| Headers | show |
| Series | mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas | expand |
On Wed, 3 Mar 2021 18:22:00 +0200 Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org> wrote: > This is an implementation of "secret" mappings backed by a file descriptor. > > The file descriptor backing secret memory mappings is created using a > dedicated memfd_secret system call The desired protection mode for the > memory is configured using flags parameter of the system call. The mmap() > of the file descriptor created with memfd_secret() will create a "secret" > memory mapping. The pages in that mapping will be marked as not present in > the direct map and will be present only in the page table of the owning mm. > > Although normally Linux userspace mappings are protected from other users, > such secret mappings are useful for environments where a hostile tenant is > trying to trick the kernel into giving them access to other tenants > mappings. I continue to struggle with this and I don't recall seeing much enthusiasm from others. Perhaps we're all missing the value point and some additional selling is needed. Am I correct in understanding that the overall direction here is to protect keys (and perhaps other things) from kernel bugs? That if the kernel was bug-free then there would be no need for this feature? If so, that's a bit sad. But realistic I guess. Is this intended to protect keys/etc after the attacker has gained the ability to run arbitrary kernel-mode code? If so, that seems optimistic, doesn't it? I think that a very complete description of the threats which this feature addresses would be helpful.
On Wed, 2021-05-05 at 12:08 -0700, Andrew Morton wrote: > On Wed, 3 Mar 2021 18:22:00 +0200 Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org> > wrote: > > > This is an implementation of "secret" mappings backed by a file > > descriptor. > > > > The file descriptor backing secret memory mappings is created using > > a dedicated memfd_secret system call The desired protection mode > > for the memory is configured using flags parameter of the system > > call. The mmap() of the file descriptor created with memfd_secret() > > will create a "secret" memory mapping. The pages in that mapping > > will be marked as not present in the direct map and will be present > > only in the page table of the owning mm. > > > > Although normally Linux userspace mappings are protected from other > > users, such secret mappings are useful for environments where a > > hostile tenant is trying to trick the kernel into giving them > > access to other tenants mappings. > > I continue to struggle with this and I don't recall seeing much > enthusiasm from others. Perhaps we're all missing the value point > and some additional selling is needed. > > Am I correct in understanding that the overall direction here is to > protect keys (and perhaps other things) from kernel bugs? That if > the kernel was bug-free then there would be no need for this > feature? If so, that's a bit sad. But realistic I guess. Secret memory really serves several purposes. The "increase the level of difficulty of secret exfiltration" you describe. And, as you say, if the kernel were bug free this wouldn't be necessary. But also: 1. Memory safety for use space code. Once the secret memory is allocated, the user can't accidentally pass it into the kernel to be transmitted somewhere. 2. It also serves as a basis for context protection of virtual machines, but other groups are working on this aspect, and it is broadly similar to the secret exfiltration from the kernel problem. > > Is this intended to protect keys/etc after the attacker has gained > the ability to run arbitrary kernel-mode code? If so, that seems > optimistic, doesn't it? Not exactly: there are many types of kernel attack, but mostly the attacker either manages to effect a privilege escalation to root or gets the ability to run a ROP gadget. The object of this code is to be completely secure against root trying to extract the secret (some what similar to the lockdown idea), thus defeating privilege escalation and to provide "sufficient" protection against ROP gadgets. The ROP gadget thing needs more explanation: the usual defeatist approach is to say that once the attacker gains the stack, they can do anything because they can find enough ROP gadgets to be turing complete. However, in the real world, given the kernel stack size limit and address space layout randomization making finding gadgets really hard, usually the attacker gets one or at most two gadgets to string together. Not having any in-kernel primitive for accessing secret memory means the one gadget ROP attack can't work. Since the only way to access secret memory is to reconstruct the missing mapping entry, the attacker has to recover the physical page and insert a PTE pointing to it in the kernel and then retrieve the contents. That takes at least three gadgets which is a level of difficulty beyond most standard attacks. > I think that a very complete description of the threats which this > feature addresses would be helpful. It's designed to protect against three different threats: 1. Detection of user secret memory mismanagement 2. significant protection against privilege escalation 3. enhanced protection (in conjunction with all the other in-kernel attack prevention systems) against ROP attacks. Do you want us to add this to one of the patch descriptions? James
On 06.05.21 17:26, James Bottomley wrote: > On Wed, 2021-05-05 at 12:08 -0700, Andrew Morton wrote: >> On Wed, 3 Mar 2021 18:22:00 +0200 Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org> >> wrote: >> >>> This is an implementation of "secret" mappings backed by a file >>> descriptor. >>> >>> The file descriptor backing secret memory mappings is created using >>> a dedicated memfd_secret system call The desired protection mode >>> for the memory is configured using flags parameter of the system >>> call. The mmap() of the file descriptor created with memfd_secret() >>> will create a "secret" memory mapping. The pages in that mapping >>> will be marked as not present in the direct map and will be present >>> only in the page table of the owning mm. >>> >>> Although normally Linux userspace mappings are protected from other >>> users, such secret mappings are useful for environments where a >>> hostile tenant is trying to trick the kernel into giving them >>> access to other tenants mappings. >> >> I continue to struggle with this and I don't recall seeing much >> enthusiasm from others. Perhaps we're all missing the value point >> and some additional selling is needed. >> >> Am I correct in understanding that the overall direction here is to >> protect keys (and perhaps other things) from kernel bugs? That if >> the kernel was bug-free then there would be no need for this >> feature? If so, that's a bit sad. But realistic I guess. > > Secret memory really serves several purposes. The "increase the level > of difficulty of secret exfiltration" you describe. And, as you say, > if the kernel were bug free this wouldn't be necessary. > > But also: > > 1. Memory safety for use space code. Once the secret memory is > allocated, the user can't accidentally pass it into the kernel to be > transmitted somewhere. That's an interesting point I didn't realize so far. > 2. It also serves as a basis for context protection of virtual > machines, but other groups are working on this aspect, and it is > broadly similar to the secret exfiltration from the kernel problem. > I was wondering if this also helps against CPU microcode issues like spectre and friends. >> >> Is this intended to protect keys/etc after the attacker has gained >> the ability to run arbitrary kernel-mode code? If so, that seems >> optimistic, doesn't it? > > Not exactly: there are many types of kernel attack, but mostly the > attacker either manages to effect a privilege escalation to root or > gets the ability to run a ROP gadget. The object of this code is to be > completely secure against root trying to extract the secret (some what > similar to the lockdown idea), thus defeating privilege escalation and > to provide "sufficient" protection against ROP gadget. What stops "root" from mapping /dev/mem and reading that memory? IOW, would we want to enforce "CONFIG_STRICT_DEVMEM" with CONFIG_SECRETMEM? Also, there is a way to still read that memory when root by 1. Having kdump active (which would often be the case, but maybe not to dump user pages ) 2. Triggering a kernel crash (easy via proc as root) 3. Waiting for the reboot after kump() created the dump and then reading the content from disk. Or, as an attacker, load a custom kexec() kernel and read memory from the new environment. Of course, the latter two are advanced mechanisms, but they are possible when root. We might be able to mitigate, for example, by zeroing out secretmem pages before booting into the kexec kernel, if we care :)
On Thu, 2021-05-06 at 18:45 +0200, David Hildenbrand wrote: > On 06.05.21 17:26, James Bottomley wrote: > > On Wed, 2021-05-05 at 12:08 -0700, Andrew Morton wrote: > > > On Wed, 3 Mar 2021 18:22:00 +0200 Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org > > > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > This is an implementation of "secret" mappings backed by a file > > > > descriptor. > > > > > > > > The file descriptor backing secret memory mappings is created > > > > using a dedicated memfd_secret system call The desired > > > > protection mode for the memory is configured using flags > > > > parameter of the system call. The mmap() of the file descriptor > > > > created with memfd_secret() will create a "secret" memory > > > > mapping. The pages in that mapping will be marked as not > > > > present in the direct map and will be present only in the page > > > > table of the owning mm. > > > > > > > > Although normally Linux userspace mappings are protected from > > > > other users, such secret mappings are useful for environments > > > > where a hostile tenant is trying to trick the kernel into > > > > giving them access to other tenants mappings. > > > > > > I continue to struggle with this and I don't recall seeing much > > > enthusiasm from others. Perhaps we're all missing the value > > > point and some additional selling is needed. > > > > > > Am I correct in understanding that the overall direction here is > > > to protect keys (and perhaps other things) from kernel > > > bugs? That if the kernel was bug-free then there would be no > > > need for this feature? If so, that's a bit sad. But realistic I > > > guess. > > > > Secret memory really serves several purposes. The "increase the > > level of difficulty of secret exfiltration" you describe. And, as > > you say, if the kernel were bug free this wouldn't be necessary. > > > > But also: > > > > 1. Memory safety for use space code. Once the secret memory is > > allocated, the user can't accidentally pass it into the > > kernel to be > > transmitted somewhere. > > That's an interesting point I didn't realize so far. > > > 2. It also serves as a basis for context protection of virtual > > machines, but other groups are working on this aspect, and > > it is > > broadly similar to the secret exfiltration from the kernel > > problem. > > > > I was wondering if this also helps against CPU microcode issues like > spectre and friends. It can for VMs, but not really for the user space secret memory use cases ... the in-kernel mitigations already present are much more effective. > > > > Is this intended to protect keys/etc after the attacker has > > > gained the ability to run arbitrary kernel-mode code? If so, > > > that seems optimistic, doesn't it? > > > > Not exactly: there are many types of kernel attack, but mostly the > > attacker either manages to effect a privilege escalation to root or > > gets the ability to run a ROP gadget. The object of this code is > > to be completely secure against root trying to extract the secret > > (some what similar to the lockdown idea), thus defeating privilege > > escalation and to provide "sufficient" protection against ROP > > gadget. > > What stops "root" from mapping /dev/mem and reading that memory? /dev/mem uses the direct map for the copy at least for read/write, so it gets a fault in the same way root trying to use ptrace does. I think we've protected mmap, but Mike would know that better than I. > IOW, would we want to enforce "CONFIG_STRICT_DEVMEM" with > CONFIG_SECRETMEM? Unless there's a corner case I haven't thought of, I don't think it adds much. However, doing a full lockdown on a public system where users want to use secret memory is best practice I think (except I think you want it to be the full secure boot lockdown to close all the root holes). > Also, there is a way to still read that memory when root by > > 1. Having kdump active (which would often be the case, but maybe not > to dump user pages ) > 2. Triggering a kernel crash (easy via proc as root) > 3. Waiting for the reboot after kump() created the dump and then > reading the content from disk. Anything that can leave physical memory intact but boot to a kernel where the missing direct map entry is restored could theoretically extract the secret. However, it's not exactly going to be a stealthy extraction ... > Or, as an attacker, load a custom kexec() kernel and read memory > from the new environment. Of course, the latter two are advanced > mechanisms, but they are possible when root. We might be able to > mitigate, for example, by zeroing out secretmem pages before booting > into the kexec kernel, if we care :) I think we could handle it by marking the region, yes, and a zero on shutdown might be useful ... it would prevent all warm reboot type attacks. James
>>>> Is this intended to protect keys/etc after the attacker has >>>> gained the ability to run arbitrary kernel-mode code? If so, >>>> that seems optimistic, doesn't it? >>> >>> Not exactly: there are many types of kernel attack, but mostly the >>> attacker either manages to effect a privilege escalation to root or >>> gets the ability to run a ROP gadget. The object of this code is >>> to be completely secure against root trying to extract the secret >>> (some what similar to the lockdown idea), thus defeating privilege >>> escalation and to provide "sufficient" protection against ROP >>> gadget. >> >> What stops "root" from mapping /dev/mem and reading that memory? > > /dev/mem uses the direct map for the copy at least for read/write, so > it gets a fault in the same way root trying to use ptrace does. I > think we've protected mmap, but Mike would know that better than I. > I'm more concerned about the mmap case -> remap_pfn_range(). Anybody going via the VMA shouldn't see the struct page, at least when vma_normal_page() is properly used; so you cannot detect secretmem memory mapped via /dev/mem reliably. At least that's my theory :) [...] >> Also, there is a way to still read that memory when root by >> >> 1. Having kdump active (which would often be the case, but maybe not >> to dump user pages ) >> 2. Triggering a kernel crash (easy via proc as root) >> 3. Waiting for the reboot after kump() created the dump and then >> reading the content from disk. > > Anything that can leave physical memory intact but boot to a kernel > where the missing direct map entry is restored could theoretically > extract the secret. However, it's not exactly going to be a stealthy > extraction ... > >> Or, as an attacker, load a custom kexec() kernel and read memory >> from the new environment. Of course, the latter two are advanced >> mechanisms, but they are possible when root. We might be able to >> mitigate, for example, by zeroing out secretmem pages before booting >> into the kexec kernel, if we care :) > > I think we could handle it by marking the region, yes, and a zero on > shutdown might be useful ... it would prevent all warm reboot type > attacks. Right. But I guess when you're actually root, you can just write a kernel module to extract the information you need (unless we have signed modules, so it could be harder/impossible).
On Thu, May 06, 2021 at 08:26:41AM -0700, James Bottomley wrote: > On Wed, 2021-05-05 at 12:08 -0700, Andrew Morton wrote: > > On Wed, 3 Mar 2021 18:22:00 +0200 Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org> > > wrote: > > > > > This is an implementation of "secret" mappings backed by a file > > > descriptor. tl;dr: I like this series, I think there are number of clarifications needed, though. See below. > > > > > > The file descriptor backing secret memory mappings is created using > > > a dedicated memfd_secret system call The desired protection mode > > > for the memory is configured using flags parameter of the system > > > call. The mmap() of the file descriptor created with memfd_secret() > > > will create a "secret" memory mapping. The pages in that mapping > > > will be marked as not present in the direct map and will be present > > > only in the page table of the owning mm. > > > > > > Although normally Linux userspace mappings are protected from other > > > users, such secret mappings are useful for environments where a > > > hostile tenant is trying to trick the kernel into giving them > > > access to other tenants mappings. > > > > I continue to struggle with this and I don't recall seeing much > > enthusiasm from others. Perhaps we're all missing the value point > > and some additional selling is needed. > > > > Am I correct in understanding that the overall direction here is to > > protect keys (and perhaps other things) from kernel bugs? That if > > the kernel was bug-free then there would be no need for this > > feature? If so, that's a bit sad. But realistic I guess. > > Secret memory really serves several purposes. The "increase the level > of difficulty of secret exfiltration" you describe. And, as you say, > if the kernel were bug free this wouldn't be necessary. > > But also: > > 1. Memory safety for user space code. Once the secret memory is > allocated, the user can't accidentally pass it into the kernel to be > transmitted somewhere. In my first read through, I didn't see how cross-userspace operations were blocked, but it looks like it's the various gup paths where {vma,page}_is_secretmem() is called. (Thank you for the self-test! That helped me follow along.) I think this access pattern should be more clearly spelled out in the cover later (i.e. "This will block things like process_vm_readv()"). I like the results (inaccessible outside the process), though I suspect this will absolutely melt gdb or other ptracers that try to see into the memory. Don't get me wrong, I'm a big fan of such concepts[0], but I see nothing in the cover letter about it (e.g. the effects on "ptrace" or "gdb" are not mentioned.) There is also a risk here of this becoming a forensics nightmare: userspace malware will just download their entire executable region into a memfd_secret region. Can we, perhaps, disallow mmap/mprotect with PROT_EXEC when vma_is_secretmem()? The OpenSSL example, for example, certainly doesn't need PROT_EXEC. What's happening with O_CLOEXEC in this code? I don't see that mentioned in the cover letter either. Why is it disallowed? That seems a strange limitation for something trying to avoid leaking secrets into other processes. And just so I'm sure I understand: if a vma_is_secretmem() check is missed in future mm code evolutions, it seems there is nothing to block the kernel from accessing the contents directly through copy_from_user() via the userspace virtual address, yes? > 2. It also serves as a basis for context protection of virtual > machines, but other groups are working on this aspect, and it is > broadly similar to the secret exfiltration from the kernel problem. > > > > > Is this intended to protect keys/etc after the attacker has gained > > the ability to run arbitrary kernel-mode code? If so, that seems > > optimistic, doesn't it? > > Not exactly: there are many types of kernel attack, but mostly the > attacker either manages to effect a privilege escalation to root or > gets the ability to run a ROP gadget. The object of this code is to be > completely secure against root trying to extract the secret (some what > similar to the lockdown idea), thus defeating privilege escalation and > to provide "sufficient" protection against ROP gadgets. > > The ROP gadget thing needs more explanation: the usual defeatist > approach is to say that once the attacker gains the stack, they can do > anything because they can find enough ROP gadgets to be turing > complete. However, in the real world, given the kernel stack size > limit and address space layout randomization making finding gadgets > really hard, usually the attacker gets one or at most two gadgets to > string together. Not having any in-kernel primitive for accessing > secret memory means the one gadget ROP attack can't work. Since the > only way to access secret memory is to reconstruct the missing mapping > entry, the attacker has to recover the physical page and insert a PTE > pointing to it in the kernel and then retrieve the contents. That > takes at least three gadgets which is a level of difficulty beyond most > standard attacks. As for protecting against exploited kernel flaws I also see benefits here. While the kernel is already blocked from directly reading contents from userspace virtual addresses (i.e. SMAP), this feature does help by blocking the kernel from directly reading contents via the direct map alias. (i.e. this feature is a specialized version of XPFO[1], which tried to do this for ALL user memory.) So in that regard, yes, this has value in the sense that to perform exfiltration, an attacker would need a significant level of control over kernel execution or over page table contents. Sufficient control over PTE allocation and positioning is possible without kernel execution control[3], and "only" having an arbitrary write primitive can lead to direct PTE control. Because of this, it would be nice to have page tables strongly protected[2] in the kernel. They remain a viable "data only" attack given a sufficiently "capable" write flaw. I would argue that page table entries are a more important asset to protect than userspace secrets, but given the difficulties with XPFO and the not-yet-available PKS I can understand starting here. It does, absolutely, narrow the ways exploits must be written to exfiltrate secret contents. (We are starting to now constrict[4] many attack methods into attacking the page table itself, which is good in the sense that protecting page tables will be a big win, and bad in the sense that focusing attack research on page tables means we're going to see some very powerful attacks.) > > I think that a very complete description of the threats which this > > feature addresses would be helpful. > > It's designed to protect against three different threats: > > 1. Detection of user secret memory mismanagement I would say "cross-process secret userspace memory exposures" (via a number of common interfaces by blocking it at the GUP level). > 2. significant protection against privilege escalation I don't see how this series protects against privilege escalation. (It protects against exfiltration.) Maybe you mean include this in the first bullet point (i.e. "cross-process secret userspace memory exposures, even in the face of privileged processes")? > 3. enhanced protection (in conjunction with all the other in-kernel > attack prevention systems) against ROP attacks. Same here, I don't see it preventing ROP, but I see it making "simple" ROP insufficient to perform exfiltration. -Kees [0] https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/tree/security/yama/yama_lsm.c?h=v5.12#n410 [1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/cover.1554248001.git.khalid.aziz@oracle.com/ [2] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20210505003032.489164-1-rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com/ [3] https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2015/03/exploiting-dram-rowhammer-bug-to-gain.html [4] https://git.kernel.org/linus/cf68fffb66d60d96209446bfc4a15291dc5a5d41
On Thu, 2021-05-06 at 10:33 -0700, Kees Cook wrote: > On Thu, May 06, 2021 at 08:26:41AM -0700, James Bottomley wrote: [...] > > 1. Memory safety for user space code. Once the secret memory is > > allocated, the user can't accidentally pass it into the > > kernel to be > > transmitted somewhere. > > In my first read through, I didn't see how cross-userspace operations > were blocked, but it looks like it's the various gup paths where > {vma,page}_is_secretmem() is called. (Thank you for the self-test! > That helped me follow along.) I think this access pattern should be > more clearly spelled out in the cover later (i.e. "This will block > things like process_vm_readv()"). I'm sure Mike can add it. > I like the results (inaccessible outside the process), though I > suspect this will absolutely melt gdb or other ptracers that try to > see into the memory. I wouldn't say "melt" ... one of the Demos we did a FOSDEM was using gdb/ptrace to extract secrets and then showing it couldn't be done if secret memory was used. You can still trace the execution of the process (and thus you could extract the secret as it's processed in registers, for instance) but you just can't extract the actual secret memory contents ... that's a fairly limited and well defined restriction. > Don't get me wrong, I'm a big fan of such concepts[0], but I see > nothing in the cover letter about it (e.g. the effects on "ptrace" or > "gdb" are not mentioned.) Sure, but we thought "secret" covered it. It wouldn't be secret if gdb/ptrace from another process could see it. > There is also a risk here of this becoming a forensics nightmare: > userspace malware will just download their entire executable region > into a memfd_secret region. Can we, perhaps, disallow mmap/mprotect > with PROT_EXEC when vma_is_secretmem()? The OpenSSL example, for > example, certainly doesn't need PROT_EXEC. I think disallowing PROT_EXEC is a great enhancement. > What's happening with O_CLOEXEC in this code? I don't see that > mentioned in the cover letter either. Why is it disallowed? That > seems a strange limitation for something trying to avoid leaking > secrets into other processes. I actually thought we forced it, so I'll let Mike address this. I think allowing it is great, so the secret memory isn't inherited by children, but I can see use cases where a process would want its child to inherit the secrets. > And just so I'm sure I understand: if a vma_is_secretmem() check is > missed in future mm code evolutions, it seems there is nothing to > block the kernel from accessing the contents directly through > copy_from_user() via the userspace virtual address, yes? Technically no because copy_from_user goes via the userspace page tables which do have access. > > 2. It also serves as a basis for context protection of virtual > > machines, but other groups are working on this aspect, and it > > is > > broadly similar to the secret exfiltration from the kernel > > problem. > > > > > Is this intended to protect keys/etc after the attacker has > > > gained the ability to run arbitrary kernel-mode code? If so, > > > that seems optimistic, doesn't it? > > > > Not exactly: there are many types of kernel attack, but mostly the > > attacker either manages to effect a privilege escalation to root or > > gets the ability to run a ROP gadget. The object of this code is > > to be completely secure against root trying to extract the secret > > (some what similar to the lockdown idea), thus defeating privilege > > escalation and to provide "sufficient" protection against ROP > > gadgets. > > > > The ROP gadget thing needs more explanation: the usual defeatist > > approach is to say that once the attacker gains the stack, they can > > do anything because they can find enough ROP gadgets to be turing > > complete. However, in the real world, given the kernel stack size > > limit and address space layout randomization making finding gadgets > > really hard, usually the attacker gets one or at most two gadgets > > to string together. Not having any in-kernel primitive for > > accessing secret memory means the one gadget ROP attack can't > > work. Since the only way to access secret memory is to reconstruct > > the missing mapping entry, the attacker has to recover the physical > > page and insert a PTE pointing to it in the kernel and then > > retrieve the contents. That takes at least three gadgets which is > > a level of difficulty beyond most standard attacks. > > As for protecting against exploited kernel flaws I also see benefits > here. While the kernel is already blocked from directly reading > contents from userspace virtual addresses (i.e. SMAP), this feature > does help by blocking the kernel from directly reading contents via > the direct map alias. (i.e. this feature is a specialized version of > XPFO[1], which tried to do this for ALL user memory.) So in that > regard, yes, this has value in the sense that to perform > exfiltration, an attacker would need a significant level of control > over kernel execution or over page table contents. > > Sufficient control over PTE allocation and positioning is possible > without kernel execution control[3], and "only" having an arbitrary > write primitive can lead to direct PTE control. Because of this, it > would be nice to have page tables strongly protected[2] in the > kernel. They remain a viable "data only" attack given a sufficiently > "capable" write flaw. Right, but this is on the radar of several people and when fixed will strengthen the value of secret memory. > I would argue that page table entries are a more important asset to > protect than userspace secrets, but given the difficulties with XPFO > and the not-yet-available PKS I can understand starting here. It > does, absolutely, narrow the ways exploits must be written to > exfiltrate secret contents. (We are starting to now constrict[4] many > attack methods into attacking the page table itself, which is good in > the sense that protecting page tables will be a big win, and bad in > the sense that focusing attack research on page tables means we're > going to see some very powerful attacks.) > > > > I think that a very complete description of the threats which > > > this feature addresses would be helpful. > > > > It's designed to protect against three different threats: > > > > 1. Detection of user secret memory mismanagement > > I would say "cross-process secret userspace memory exposures" (via a > number of common interfaces by blocking it at the GUP level). > > > 2. significant protection against privilege escalation > > I don't see how this series protects against privilege escalation. > (It protects against exfiltration.) Maybe you mean include this in > the first bullet point (i.e. "cross-process secret userspace memory > exposures, even in the face of privileged processes")? It doesn't prevent privilege escalation from happening in the first place, but once the escalation has happened it protects against exfiltration by the newly minted root attacker. > > 3. enhanced protection (in conjunction with all the other in- > > kernel > > attack prevention systems) against ROP attacks. > > Same here, I don't see it preventing ROP, but I see it making > "simple" ROP insufficient to perform exfiltration. Right, that's why I call it "enhanced protection". With ROP the design goal is to take exfiltration beyond the simple, and require increasing complexity in the attack ... the usual security whack-a-mole approach ... in the hope that script kiddies get bored by the level of difficulty and move on to something easier. James
Στις 2021-05-06 20:05, James Bottomley έγραψε: > On Thu, 2021-05-06 at 18:45 +0200, David Hildenbrand wrote: >> >> Also, there is a way to still read that memory when root by >> >> 1. Having kdump active (which would often be the case, but maybe not >> to dump user pages ) >> 2. Triggering a kernel crash (easy via proc as root) >> 3. Waiting for the reboot after kump() created the dump and then >> reading the content from disk. > > Anything that can leave physical memory intact but boot to a kernel > where the missing direct map entry is restored could theoretically > extract the secret. However, it's not exactly going to be a stealthy > extraction ... > >> Or, as an attacker, load a custom kexec() kernel and read memory >> from the new environment. Of course, the latter two are advanced >> mechanisms, but they are possible when root. We might be able to >> mitigate, for example, by zeroing out secretmem pages before booting >> into the kexec kernel, if we care :) > > I think we could handle it by marking the region, yes, and a zero on > shutdown might be useful ... it would prevent all warm reboot type > attacks. > I had similar concerns about recovering secrets with kdump, and considered cleaning up keyrings before jumping to the new kernel. The problem is we can't provide guarantees in that case, once the kernel has crashed and we are on our way to run crashkernel, we can't be sure we can reliably zero-out anything, the more code we add to that path the more risky it gets. However during reboot/normal kexec() we should do some cleanup, it makes sense and secretmem can indeed be useful in that case. Regarding loading custom kexec() kernels, we mitigate this with the kexec file-based API where we can verify the signature of the loaded kimage (assuming the system runs a kernel provided by a trusted 3rd party and we 've maintained a chain of trust since booting).
On 07.05.21 01:16, Nick Kossifidis wrote: > Στις 2021-05-06 20:05, James Bottomley έγραψε: >> On Thu, 2021-05-06 at 18:45 +0200, David Hildenbrand wrote: >>> >>> Also, there is a way to still read that memory when root by >>> >>> 1. Having kdump active (which would often be the case, but maybe not >>> to dump user pages ) >>> 2. Triggering a kernel crash (easy via proc as root) >>> 3. Waiting for the reboot after kump() created the dump and then >>> reading the content from disk. >> >> Anything that can leave physical memory intact but boot to a kernel >> where the missing direct map entry is restored could theoretically >> extract the secret. However, it's not exactly going to be a stealthy >> extraction ... >> >>> Or, as an attacker, load a custom kexec() kernel and read memory >>> from the new environment. Of course, the latter two are advanced >>> mechanisms, but they are possible when root. We might be able to >>> mitigate, for example, by zeroing out secretmem pages before booting >>> into the kexec kernel, if we care :) >> >> I think we could handle it by marking the region, yes, and a zero on >> shutdown might be useful ... it would prevent all warm reboot type >> attacks. >> > > I had similar concerns about recovering secrets with kdump, and > considered cleaning up keyrings before jumping to the new kernel. The > problem is we can't provide guarantees in that case, once the kernel has > crashed and we are on our way to run crashkernel, we can't be sure we > can reliably zero-out anything, the more code we add to that path the Well, I think it depends. Assume we do the following 1) Zero out any secretmem pages when handing them back to the buddy. (alternative: init_on_free=1) -- if not already done, I didn't check the code. 2) On kdump(), zero out all allocated secretmem. It'd be easier if we'd just allocated from a fixed physical memory area; otherwise we have to walk process page tables or use a PFN walker. And zeroing out secretmem pages without a direct mapping is a different challenge. Now, during 2) it can happen that a) We crash in our clearing code (e.g., something is seriously messed up) and fail to start the kdump kernel. That's actually good, instead of leaking data we fail hard. b) We don't find all secretmem pages, for example, because process page tables are messed up or something messed up our memmap (if we'd use that to identify secretmem pages via a PFN walker somehow) But for the simple cases (e.g., malicious root tries to crash the kernel via /proc/sysrq-trigger) both a) and b) wouldn't apply. Obviously, if an admin would want to mitigate right now, he would want to disable kdump completely, meaning any attempt to load a crashkernel would fail and cannot be enabled again for that kernel (also not via cmdline an attacker could modify to reboot into a system with the option for a crashkernel). Disabling kdump in the kernel when secretmem pages are allocated is one approach, although sub-optimal. > more risky it gets. However during reboot/normal kexec() we should do > some cleanup, it makes sense and secretmem can indeed be useful in that > case. Regarding loading custom kexec() kernels, we mitigate this with > the kexec file-based API where we can verify the signature of the loaded > kimage (assuming the system runs a kernel provided by a trusted 3rd > party and we 've maintained a chain of trust since booting). For example in VMs (like QEMU), we often don't clear physical memory during a reboot. So if an attacker manages to load a kernel that you can trick into reading random physical memory areas, we can leak secretmem data I think. And there might be ways to achieve that just using the cmdline, not necessarily loading a different kernel. For example if you limit the kernel footprint ("mem=256M") and disable strict_iomem_checks ("strict_iomem_checks=relaxed") you can just extract that memory via /dev/mem if I am not wrong. So as an attacker, modify the (grub) cmdline to "mem=256M strict_iomem_checks=relaxed", reboot, and read all memory via /dev/mem. Or load a signed kexec kernel with that cmdline and boot into it. Interesting problem :)
On Thu, May 06, 2021 at 11:47:47AM -0700, James Bottomley wrote: > On Thu, 2021-05-06 at 10:33 -0700, Kees Cook wrote: > > On Thu, May 06, 2021 at 08:26:41AM -0700, James Bottomley wrote: > [...] > > > > I think that a very complete description of the threats which > > > > this feature addresses would be helpful. > > > > > > It's designed to protect against three different threats: > > > > > > 1. Detection of user secret memory mismanagement > > > > I would say "cross-process secret userspace memory exposures" (via a > > number of common interfaces by blocking it at the GUP level). > > > > > 2. significant protection against privilege escalation > > > > I don't see how this series protects against privilege escalation. > > (It protects against exfiltration.) Maybe you mean include this in > > the first bullet point (i.e. "cross-process secret userspace memory > > exposures, even in the face of privileged processes")? > > It doesn't prevent privilege escalation from happening in the first > place, but once the escalation has happened it protects against > exfiltration by the newly minted root attacker. So, after thinking a bit more about this, I don't think there is protection here against privileged execution. This feature kind of helps against cross-process read/write attempts, but it doesn't help with sufficiently privileged (i.e. ptraced) execution, since we can just ask the process itself to do the reading: $ gdb ./memfd_secret ... ready: 0x7ffff7ffb000 Breakpoint 1, ... (gdb) compile code unsigned long addr = 0x7ffff7ffb000UL; printf("%016lx\n", *((unsigned long *)addr)); 55555555555555555 And since process_vm_readv() requires PTRACE_ATTACH, there's very little difference in effort between process_vm_readv() and the above. So, what other paths through GUP exist that aren't covered by PTRACE_ATTACH? And if none, then should this actually just be done by setting the process undumpable? (This is already what things like gnupg do.) So, the user-space side of this doesn't seem to really help. The kernel side protection is interesting for kernel read/write flaws, though, in the sense that the process is likely not being attacked from "current", so a kernel-side attack would need to either walk the page tables and create new ones, or spawn a new userspace process to do the ptracing. So, while I like the idea of this stuff, and I see how it provides certain coverages, I'm curious to learn more about the threat model to make sure it's actually providing meaningful hurdles to attacks.
On Thu, May 06, 2021 at 11:47:47AM -0700, James Bottomley wrote: > On Thu, 2021-05-06 at 10:33 -0700, Kees Cook wrote: > > On Thu, May 06, 2021 at 08:26:41AM -0700, James Bottomley wrote: > > > What's happening with O_CLOEXEC in this code? I don't see that > > mentioned in the cover letter either. Why is it disallowed? That > > seems a strange limitation for something trying to avoid leaking > > secrets into other processes. > > I actually thought we forced it, so I'll let Mike address this. I > think allowing it is great, so the secret memory isn't inherited by > children, but I can see use cases where a process would want its child > to inherit the secrets. We do not enforce O_CLOEXEC, but if the user explicitly requested O_CLOEXEC it would be passed to get_unused_fd_flags().
From: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com> Hi, @Andrew, this is based on v5.12-rc1, I can rebase whatever way you prefer. This is an implementation of "secret" mappings backed by a file descriptor. The file descriptor backing secret memory mappings is created using a dedicated memfd_secret system call The desired protection mode for the memory is configured using flags parameter of the system call. The mmap() of the file descriptor created with memfd_secret() will create a "secret" memory mapping. The pages in that mapping will be marked as not present in the direct map and will be present only in the page table of the owning mm. Although normally Linux userspace mappings are protected from other users, such secret mappings are useful for environments where a hostile tenant is trying to trick the kernel into giving them access to other tenants mappings. Additionally, in the future the secret mappings may be used as a mean to protect guest memory in a virtual machine host. For demonstration of secret memory usage we've created a userspace library https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jejb/secret-memory-preloader.git that does two things: the first is act as a preloader for openssl to redirect all the OPENSSL_malloc calls to secret memory meaning any secret keys get automatically protected this way and the other thing it does is expose the API to the user who needs it. We anticipate that a lot of the use cases would be like the openssl one: many toolkits that deal with secret keys already have special handling for the memory to try to give them greater protection, so this would simply be pluggable into the toolkits without any need for user application modification. Hiding secret memory mappings behind an anonymous file allows usage of the page cache for tracking pages allocated for the "secret" mappings as well as using address_space_operations for e.g. page migration callbacks. The anonymous file may be also used implicitly, like hugetlb files, to implement mmap(MAP_SECRET) and use the secret memory areas with "native" mm ABIs in the future. Removing of the pages from the direct map may cause its fragmentation on architectures that use large pages to map the physical memory which affects the system performance. However, the original Kconfig text for CONFIG_DIRECT_GBPAGES said that gigabyte pages in the direct map "... can improve the kernel's performance a tiny bit ..." (commit 00d1c5e05736 ("x86: add gbpages switches")) and the recent report [1] showed that "... although 1G mappings are a good default choice, there is no compelling evidence that it must be the only choice". Hence, it is sufficient to have secretmem disabled by default with the ability of a system administrator to enable it at boot time. In addition, there is also a long term goal to improve management of the direct map. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/213b4567-46ce-f116-9cdf-bbd0c884eb3c@linux.intel.com/ v18: * rebase on v5.12-rc1 * merge kfence fix into the original patch * massage commit message of the patch introducing the memfd_secret syscall v17: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20210208084920.2884-1-rppt@kernel.org * Remove pool of large pages backing secretmem allocations, per Michal Hocko * Add secretmem pages to unevictable LRU, per Michal Hocko * Use GFP_HIGHUSER as secretmem mapping mask, per Michal Hocko * Make secretmem an opt-in feature that is disabled by default v16: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20210121122723.3446-1-rppt@kernel.org * Fix memory leak intorduced in v15 * Clean the data left from previous page user before handing the page to the userspace v15: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20210120180612.1058-1-rppt@kernel.org * Add riscv/Kconfig update to disable set_memory operations for nommu builds (patch 3) * Update the code around add_to_page_cache() per Matthew's comments (patches 6,7) * Add fixups for build/checkpatch errors discovered by CI systems v14: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20201203062949.5484-1-rppt@kernel.org * Finally s/mod_node_page_state/mod_lruvec_page_state/ v13: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20201201074559.27742-1-rppt@kernel.org * Added Reviewed-by, thanks Catalin and David * s/mod_node_page_state/mod_lruvec_page_state/ as Shakeel suggested Older history: v12: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20201125092208.12544-1-rppt@kernel.org v11: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20201124092556.12009-1-rppt@kernel.org v10: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20201123095432.5860-1-rppt@kernel.org v9: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20201117162932.13649-1-rppt@kernel.org v8: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20201110151444.20662-1-rppt@kernel.org v7: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20201026083752.13267-1-rppt@kernel.org v6: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200924132904.1391-1-rppt@kernel.org v5: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200916073539.3552-1-rppt@kernel.org v4: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200818141554.13945-1-rppt@kernel.org v3: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200804095035.18778-1-rppt@kernel.org v2: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200727162935.31714-1-rppt@kernel.org v1: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200720092435.17469-1-rppt@kernel.org rfc-v2: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200706172051.19465-1-rppt@kernel.org/ rfc-v1: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200130162340.GA14232@rapoport-lnx/ rfc-v0: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/1572171452-7958-1-git-send-email-rppt@kernel.org/ Mike Rapoport (9): mm: add definition of PMD_PAGE_ORDER mmap: make mlock_future_check() global riscv/Kconfig: make direct map manipulation options depend on MMU set_memory: allow set_direct_map_*_noflush() for multiple pages set_memory: allow querying whether set_direct_map_*() is actually enabled mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas PM: hibernate: disable when there are active secretmem users arch, mm: wire up memfd_secret system call where relevant secretmem: test: add basic selftest for memfd_secret(2) arch/arm64/include/asm/Kbuild | 1 - arch/arm64/include/asm/cacheflush.h | 6 - arch/arm64/include/asm/kfence.h | 2 +- arch/arm64/include/asm/set_memory.h | 17 ++ arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/unistd.h | 1 + arch/arm64/kernel/machine_kexec.c | 1 + arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c | 6 +- arch/arm64/mm/pageattr.c | 23 +- arch/riscv/Kconfig | 4 +- arch/riscv/include/asm/set_memory.h | 4 +- arch/riscv/include/asm/unistd.h | 1 + arch/riscv/mm/pageattr.c | 8 +- arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl | 1 + arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl | 1 + arch/x86/include/asm/set_memory.h | 4 +- arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c | 8 +- fs/dax.c | 11 +- include/linux/pgtable.h | 3 + include/linux/secretmem.h | 30 +++ include/linux/set_memory.h | 16 +- include/linux/syscalls.h | 1 + include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h | 6 +- include/uapi/linux/magic.h | 1 + kernel/power/hibernate.c | 5 +- kernel/power/snapshot.c | 4 +- kernel/sys_ni.c | 2 + mm/Kconfig | 3 + mm/Makefile | 1 + mm/gup.c | 10 + mm/internal.h | 3 + mm/mlock.c | 3 +- mm/mmap.c | 5 +- mm/secretmem.c | 261 +++++++++++++++++++ mm/vmalloc.c | 5 +- scripts/checksyscalls.sh | 4 + tools/testing/selftests/vm/.gitignore | 1 + tools/testing/selftests/vm/Makefile | 3 +- tools/testing/selftests/vm/memfd_secret.c | 296 ++++++++++++++++++++++ tools/testing/selftests/vm/run_vmtests.sh | 17 ++ 39 files changed, 726 insertions(+), 53 deletions(-) create mode 100644 arch/arm64/include/asm/set_memory.h create mode 100644 include/linux/secretmem.h create mode 100644 mm/secretmem.c create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/vm/memfd_secret.c