diff mbox series

[v26,29/30] mm: Update arch_validate_flags() to test vma anonymous

Message ID 20210427204315.24153-30-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com (mailing list archive)
State New, archived
Headers show
Series Control-flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack | expand

Commit Message

Yu-cheng Yu April 27, 2021, 8:43 p.m. UTC 
When newer VM flags are being created, such as VM_MTE, it becomes necessary
for mmap/mprotect to verify if certain flags are being applied to an
anonymous VMA.

To solve this, one approach is adding a VM flag to track that MAP_ANONYMOUS
is specified [1], and then using the flag in arch_validate_flags().

Another approach is passing the VMA to arch_validate_flags(), and check
vma_is_anonymous().

To prepare the introduction of PROT_SHADOW_STACK, which creates a shadow
stack mapping and can be applied only to an anonymous VMA, update
arch_validate_flags() to pass in the VMA.

[1] commit 9f3419315f3c ("arm64: mte: Add PROT_MTE support to mmap() and mprotect()"),

Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
---
v26:
- Instead of passing vma is anonymous, pass the VMA to arch_validate_flags().

 arch/arm64/include/asm/mman.h | 4 ++--
 arch/sparc/include/asm/mman.h | 4 ++--
 include/linux/mman.h          | 2 +-
 mm/mmap.c                     | 2 +-
 mm/mprotect.c                 | 2 +-
 5 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

Comments

Kirill A. Shutemov May 11, 2021, 11:35 a.m. UTC | #1 
On Tue, Apr 27, 2021 at 01:43:14PM -0700, Yu-cheng Yu wrote:
> When newer VM flags are being created, such as VM_MTE, it becomes necessary
> for mmap/mprotect to verify if certain flags are being applied to an
> anonymous VMA.
> 
> To solve this, one approach is adding a VM flag to track that MAP_ANONYMOUS
> is specified [1], and then using the flag in arch_validate_flags().
> 
> Another approach is passing the VMA to arch_validate_flags(), and check
> vma_is_anonymous().
> 
> To prepare the introduction of PROT_SHADOW_STACK, which creates a shadow
> stack mapping and can be applied only to an anonymous VMA, update
> arch_validate_flags() to pass in the VMA.
> 
> [1] commit 9f3419315f3c ("arm64: mte: Add PROT_MTE support to mmap() and mprotect()"),
> 
> Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>

Reviewed-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
diff mbox series

Patch

diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/mman.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/mman.h
index e3e28f7daf62..7c45e7578f78 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/mman.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/mman.h
@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@  static inline bool arch_validate_prot(unsigned long prot,
 }
 #define arch_validate_prot(prot, addr) arch_validate_prot(prot, addr)
 
-static inline bool arch_validate_flags(unsigned long vm_flags)
+static inline bool arch_validate_flags(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long vm_flags)
 {
 	if (!system_supports_mte())
 		return true;
@@ -82,6 +82,6 @@  static inline bool arch_validate_flags(unsigned long vm_flags)
 	/* only allow VM_MTE if VM_MTE_ALLOWED has been set previously */
 	return !(vm_flags & VM_MTE) || (vm_flags & VM_MTE_ALLOWED);
 }
-#define arch_validate_flags(vm_flags) arch_validate_flags(vm_flags)
+#define arch_validate_flags(vma, vm_flags) arch_validate_flags(vma, vm_flags)
 
 #endif /* ! __ASM_MMAN_H__ */
diff --git a/arch/sparc/include/asm/mman.h b/arch/sparc/include/asm/mman.h
index 274217e7ed70..0ec4975f167d 100644
--- a/arch/sparc/include/asm/mman.h
+++ b/arch/sparc/include/asm/mman.h
@@ -60,11 +60,11 @@  static inline int sparc_validate_prot(unsigned long prot, unsigned long addr)
 	return 1;
 }
 
-#define arch_validate_flags(vm_flags) arch_validate_flags(vm_flags)
+#define arch_validate_flags(vma, vm_flags) arch_validate_flags(vma, vm_flags)
 /* arch_validate_flags() - Ensure combination of flags is valid for a
  *	VMA.
  */
-static inline bool arch_validate_flags(unsigned long vm_flags)
+static inline bool arch_validate_flags(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long vm_flags)
 {
 	/* If ADI is being enabled on this VMA, check for ADI
 	 * capability on the platform and ensure VMA is suitable
diff --git a/include/linux/mman.h b/include/linux/mman.h
index 629cefc4ecba..41d6fbf4e7d9 100644
--- a/include/linux/mman.h
+++ b/include/linux/mman.h
@@ -114,7 +114,7 @@  static inline bool arch_validate_prot(unsigned long prot, unsigned long addr)
  *
  * Returns true if the VM_* flags are valid.
  */
-static inline bool arch_validate_flags(unsigned long flags)
+static inline bool arch_validate_flags(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long flags)
 {
 	return true;
 }
diff --git a/mm/mmap.c b/mm/mmap.c
index 7b2992ef8ee0..b6a2b44b75dc 100644
--- a/mm/mmap.c
+++ b/mm/mmap.c
@@ -1850,7 +1850,7 @@  unsigned long mmap_region(struct file *file, unsigned long addr,
 	}
 
 	/* Allow architectures to sanity-check the vm_flags */
-	if (!arch_validate_flags(vma->vm_flags)) {
+	if (!arch_validate_flags(vma, vma->vm_flags)) {
 		error = -EINVAL;
 		if (file)
 			goto unmap_and_free_vma;
diff --git a/mm/mprotect.c b/mm/mprotect.c
index 3b2f0d75519f..7aef1e1af11a 100644
--- a/mm/mprotect.c
+++ b/mm/mprotect.c
@@ -611,7 +611,7 @@  static int do_mprotect_pkey(unsigned long start, size_t len,
 		}
 
 		/* Allow architectures to sanity-check the new flags */
-		if (!arch_validate_flags(newflags)) {
+		if (!arch_validate_flags(vma, newflags)) {
 			error = -EINVAL;
 			goto out;
 		}