Message ID | YMI08apUwu1Y7Tc5@zeniv-ca.linux.org.uk (mailing list archive) |
---|---|
State | Accepted |
Delegated to: | Paul Moore |
Headers | show |
Series | [1/2] selinux: slow_avc_audit has become non-blocking | expand |
On Thu, Jun 10, 2021 at 11:51 AM Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> wrote: > > [followup to dump_common_audit_data() changes from this winter; in vfs.git#work.audit] > Does anybody have objections to the below? > > From 663a40ab49308b5acaba8a335190fce66e17d969 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 > From: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> > Date: Sat, 16 Jan 2021 15:40:54 -0500 > Subject: [PATCH 1/2] selinux: slow_avc_audit has become non-blocking > > dump_common_audit_data() is safe to use under rcu_read_lock() now; > no need for AVC_NONBLOCKING and games around it > > Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> > --- > security/selinux/avc.c | 28 ++++++++-------------------- > security/selinux/hooks.c | 13 ++----------- > security/selinux/include/avc.h | 4 ---- > 3 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-) This looks okay to me, thanks Al. If you want to fix patch 2/2 I can pull both into selinux/next.
On Thu, Jun 10, 2021 at 07:12:15PM -0400, Paul Moore wrote: > On Thu, Jun 10, 2021 at 11:51 AM Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> wrote: > > > > [followup to dump_common_audit_data() changes from this winter; in vfs.git#work.audit] > > Does anybody have objections to the below? > > > > From 663a40ab49308b5acaba8a335190fce66e17d969 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 > > From: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> > > Date: Sat, 16 Jan 2021 15:40:54 -0500 > > Subject: [PATCH 1/2] selinux: slow_avc_audit has become non-blocking > > > > dump_common_audit_data() is safe to use under rcu_read_lock() now; > > no need for AVC_NONBLOCKING and games around it > > > > Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> > > --- > > security/selinux/avc.c | 28 ++++++++-------------------- > > security/selinux/hooks.c | 13 ++----------- > > security/selinux/include/avc.h | 4 ---- > > 3 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-) > > This looks okay to me, thanks Al. If you want to fix patch 2/2 I can > pull both into selinux/next. Done and force-pushed into the same branch... Do you want a formal pull request?
On Thu, Jun 10, 2021 at 9:45 PM Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> wrote: > On Thu, Jun 10, 2021 at 07:12:15PM -0400, Paul Moore wrote: > > On Thu, Jun 10, 2021 at 11:51 AM Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> wrote: > > > > > > [followup to dump_common_audit_data() changes from this winter; in vfs.git#work.audit] > > > Does anybody have objections to the below? > > > > > > From 663a40ab49308b5acaba8a335190fce66e17d969 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 > > > From: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> > > > Date: Sat, 16 Jan 2021 15:40:54 -0500 > > > Subject: [PATCH 1/2] selinux: slow_avc_audit has become non-blocking > > > > > > dump_common_audit_data() is safe to use under rcu_read_lock() now; > > > no need for AVC_NONBLOCKING and games around it > > > > > > Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> > > > --- > > > security/selinux/avc.c | 28 ++++++++-------------------- > > > security/selinux/hooks.c | 13 ++----------- > > > security/selinux/include/avc.h | 4 ---- > > > 3 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-) > > > > This looks okay to me, thanks Al. If you want to fix patch 2/2 I can > > pull both into selinux/next. > > Done and force-pushed into the same branch... Do you want a formal pull request? Thanks for the offer, but I can just pull those top two patches from work.audit. However, this mail came in just as I was shutting down for the evening so I'll take care of it tomorrow.
On Thu, Jun 10, 2021 at 9:51 PM Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> wrote: > On Thu, Jun 10, 2021 at 9:45 PM Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> wrote: > > On Thu, Jun 10, 2021 at 07:12:15PM -0400, Paul Moore wrote: > > > On Thu, Jun 10, 2021 at 11:51 AM Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> wrote: > > > > > > > > [followup to dump_common_audit_data() changes from this winter; in vfs.git#work.audit] > > > > Does anybody have objections to the below? > > > > > > > > From 663a40ab49308b5acaba8a335190fce66e17d969 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 > > > > From: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> > > > > Date: Sat, 16 Jan 2021 15:40:54 -0500 > > > > Subject: [PATCH 1/2] selinux: slow_avc_audit has become non-blocking > > > > > > > > dump_common_audit_data() is safe to use under rcu_read_lock() now; > > > > no need for AVC_NONBLOCKING and games around it > > > > > > > > Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> > > > > --- > > > > security/selinux/avc.c | 28 ++++++++-------------------- > > > > security/selinux/hooks.c | 13 ++----------- > > > > security/selinux/include/avc.h | 4 ---- > > > > 3 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-) > > > > > > This looks okay to me, thanks Al. If you want to fix patch 2/2 I can > > > pull both into selinux/next. > > > > Done and force-pushed into the same branch... Do you want a formal pull request? > > Thanks for the offer, but I can just pull those top two patches from > work.audit. However, this mail came in just as I was shutting down > for the evening so I'll take care of it tomorrow. Both are now in selinux/next, thanks Al.
diff --git a/security/selinux/avc.c b/security/selinux/avc.c index ad451cf9375e..9c3d2a29616a 100644 --- a/security/selinux/avc.c +++ b/security/selinux/avc.c @@ -758,7 +758,11 @@ static void avc_audit_post_callback(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *a) } } -/* This is the slow part of avc audit with big stack footprint */ +/* + * This is the slow part of avc audit with big stack footprint. + * Note that it is non-blocking and can be called from under + * rcu_read_lock(). + */ noinline int slow_avc_audit(struct selinux_state *state, u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, u32 requested, u32 audited, u32 denied, int result, @@ -825,7 +829,7 @@ int __init avc_add_callback(int (*callback)(u32 event), u32 events) * @ssid,@tsid,@tclass : identifier of an AVC entry * @seqno : sequence number when decision was made * @xpd: extended_perms_decision to be added to the node - * @flags: the AVC_* flags, e.g. AVC_NONBLOCKING, AVC_EXTENDED_PERMS, or 0. + * @flags: the AVC_* flags, e.g. AVC_EXTENDED_PERMS, or 0. * * if a valid AVC entry doesn't exist,this function returns -ENOENT. * if kmalloc() called internal returns NULL, this function returns -ENOMEM. @@ -844,21 +848,6 @@ static int avc_update_node(struct selinux_avc *avc, struct hlist_head *head; spinlock_t *lock; - /* - * If we are in a non-blocking code path, e.g. VFS RCU walk, - * then we must not add permissions to a cache entry - * because we will not audit the denial. Otherwise, - * during the subsequent blocking retry (e.g. VFS ref walk), we - * will find the permissions already granted in the cache entry - * and won't audit anything at all, leading to silent denials in - * permissive mode that only appear when in enforcing mode. - * - * See the corresponding handling of MAY_NOT_BLOCK in avc_audit() - * and selinux_inode_permission(). - */ - if (flags & AVC_NONBLOCKING) - return 0; - node = avc_alloc_node(avc); if (!node) { rc = -ENOMEM; @@ -1119,7 +1108,7 @@ int avc_has_extended_perms(struct selinux_state *state, * @tsid: target security identifier * @tclass: target security class * @requested: requested permissions, interpreted based on @tclass - * @flags: AVC_STRICT, AVC_NONBLOCKING, or 0 + * @flags: AVC_STRICT or 0 * @avd: access vector decisions * * Check the AVC to determine whether the @requested permissions are granted @@ -1204,8 +1193,7 @@ int avc_has_perm_flags(struct selinux_state *state, struct av_decision avd; int rc, rc2; - rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(state, ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, - (flags & MAY_NOT_BLOCK) ? AVC_NONBLOCKING : 0, + rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(state, ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, 0, &avd); rc2 = avc_audit(state, ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, &avd, rc, diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index eaea837d89d1..f22ad1229471 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -3164,17 +3164,13 @@ static noinline int audit_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, { struct common_audit_data ad; struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode); - int rc; ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE; ad.u.inode = inode; - rc = slow_avc_audit(&selinux_state, + return slow_avc_audit(&selinux_state, current_sid(), isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, audited, denied, result, &ad); - if (rc) - return rc; - return 0; } static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask) @@ -3209,8 +3205,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask) return PTR_ERR(isec); rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(&selinux_state, - sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, - no_block ? AVC_NONBLOCKING : 0, + sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, 0, &avd); audited = avc_audit_required(perms, &avd, rc, from_access ? FILE__AUDIT_ACCESS : 0, @@ -3218,10 +3213,6 @@ static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask) if (likely(!audited)) return rc; - /* fall back to ref-walk if we have to generate audit */ - if (no_block) - return -ECHILD; - rc2 = audit_inode_permission(inode, perms, audited, denied, rc); if (rc2) return rc2; diff --git a/security/selinux/include/avc.h b/security/selinux/include/avc.h index cf4cc3ef959b..c3bbfc8e8b46 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/avc.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/avc.h @@ -134,9 +134,6 @@ static inline int avc_audit(struct selinux_state *state, audited = avc_audit_required(requested, avd, result, 0, &denied); if (likely(!audited)) return 0; - /* fall back to ref-walk if we have to generate audit */ - if (flags & MAY_NOT_BLOCK) - return -ECHILD; return slow_avc_audit(state, ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, audited, denied, result, a); @@ -144,7 +141,6 @@ static inline int avc_audit(struct selinux_state *state, #define AVC_STRICT 1 /* Ignore permissive mode. */ #define AVC_EXTENDED_PERMS 2 /* update extended permissions */ -#define AVC_NONBLOCKING 4 /* non blocking */ int avc_has_perm_noaudit(struct selinux_state *state, u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, u32 requested,