diff mbox series

[v27,06/10] x86/cet/ibt: Update arch_prctl functions for Indirect Branch Tracking

Message ID 20210521221531.30168-7-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com (mailing list archive)
State New, archived
Headers show
Series Control-flow Enforcement: Indirect Branch Tracking | expand

Commit Message

Yu-cheng Yu May 21, 2021, 10:15 p.m. UTC
From: "H.J. Lu" <hjl.tools@gmail.com>

Update ARCH_X86_CET_STATUS and ARCH_X86_CET_DISABLE for Indirect Branch
Tracking.

Signed-off-by: H.J. Lu <hjl.tools@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
 arch/x86/kernel/cet_prctl.c | 5 +++++
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)

Comments

Edgecombe, Rick P July 19, 2021, 6:21 p.m. UTC | #1
On Fri, 2021-05-21 at 15:15 -0700, Yu-cheng Yu wrote:
> From: "H.J. Lu" <hjl.tools@gmail.com>
> 
> Update ARCH_X86_CET_STATUS and ARCH_X86_CET_DISABLE for Indirect
> Branch
> Tracking.
> 
> Signed-off-by: H.J. Lu <hjl.tools@gmail.com>
> Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
> ---
>  arch/x86/kernel/cet_prctl.c | 5 +++++
>  1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cet_prctl.c
> b/arch/x86/kernel/cet_prctl.c
> index b426d200e070..bd3c80d402e7 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cet_prctl.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cet_prctl.c
> @@ -22,6 +22,9 @@ static int cet_copy_status_to_user(struct
> thread_shstk *shstk, u64 __user *ubuf)
>                 buf[2] = shstk->size;
>         }
>  
> +       if (shstk->ibt)
> +               buf[0] |= GNU_PROPERTY_X86_FEATURE_1_IBT;
> +
Can you have IBT enabled but not shadow stack via kernel parameters?
Outside this diff it has:
if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK))
	return -ENOTSUPP;

So if "no_user_shstk" is set, this can't be used for IBT. But the
kernel would attempt to enable IBT.

Also if so, the CR4 bit enabling logic needs adjusting in this IBT
series. If not, we should probably mention this in the docs and enforce
it. It would then follow the logic in Kconfig, so maybe the simplest.
Like maybe instead of no_user_shstk, just no_user_cet?

>         return copy_to_user(ubuf, buf, sizeof(buf));
>  }
>  
> @@ -46,6 +49,8 @@ int prctl_cet(int option, u64 arg2)
>                         return -EINVAL;
>                 if (arg2 & GNU_PROPERTY_X86_FEATURE_1_SHSTK)
>                         shstk_disable();
> +               if (arg2 & GNU_PROPERTY_X86_FEATURE_1_IBT)
> +                       ibt_disable();
>                 return 0;
>  
>         case ARCH_X86_CET_LOCK:
Yu-cheng Yu July 20, 2021, 5:09 p.m. UTC | #2
On 7/19/2021 11:21 AM, Edgecombe, Rick P wrote:
> On Fri, 2021-05-21 at 15:15 -0700, Yu-cheng Yu wrote:
>> From: "H.J. Lu" <hjl.tools@gmail.com>
>>
>> Update ARCH_X86_CET_STATUS and ARCH_X86_CET_DISABLE for Indirect
>> Branch
>> Tracking.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: H.J. Lu <hjl.tools@gmail.com>
>> Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
>> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
>> ---
>>   arch/x86/kernel/cet_prctl.c | 5 +++++
>>   1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
>>
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cet_prctl.c
>> b/arch/x86/kernel/cet_prctl.c
>> index b426d200e070..bd3c80d402e7 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cet_prctl.c
>> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cet_prctl.c
>> @@ -22,6 +22,9 @@ static int cet_copy_status_to_user(struct
>> thread_shstk *shstk, u64 __user *ubuf)
>>                  buf[2] = shstk->size;
>>          }
>>   
>> +       if (shstk->ibt)
>> +               buf[0] |= GNU_PROPERTY_X86_FEATURE_1_IBT;
>> +
> Can you have IBT enabled but not shadow stack via kernel parameters?
> Outside this diff it has:
> if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK))
> 	return -ENOTSUPP;

If shadow stack is disabled by the kernel parameter, IBT is also disabled.

> So if "no_user_shstk" is set, this can't be used for IBT. But the
> kernel would attempt to enable IBT.

It will not.

> Also if so, the CR4 bit enabling logic needs adjusting in this IBT
> series. If not, we should probably mention this in the docs and enforce
> it. It would then follow the logic in Kconfig, so maybe the simplest.
> Like maybe instead of no_user_shstk, just no_user_cet?

If shadow stack is disabled (from either Kconfig or kernel 
command-line), then IBT is also disabled.  However, we still need two 
kernel parameters because no_user_ibt can be useful sometimes.  I will 
add a sentence in the document to indicate that IBT depends on shadow 
stack.

Thanks,
Yu-cheng
Edgecombe, Rick P July 20, 2021, 7:45 p.m. UTC | #3
On Tue, 2021-07-20 at 10:09 -0700, Yu, Yu-cheng wrote:
> On 7/19/2021 11:21 AM, Edgecombe, Rick P wrote:
> > On Fri, 2021-05-21 at 15:15 -0700, Yu-cheng Yu wrote:
> > > From: "H.J. Lu" <hjl.tools@gmail.com>
> > > 
> > > Update ARCH_X86_CET_STATUS and ARCH_X86_CET_DISABLE for Indirect
> > > Branch
> > > Tracking.
> > > 
> > > Signed-off-by: H.J. Lu <hjl.tools@gmail.com>
> > > Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
> > > Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
> > > ---
> > >   arch/x86/kernel/cet_prctl.c | 5 +++++
> > >   1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
> > > 
> > > diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cet_prctl.c
> > > b/arch/x86/kernel/cet_prctl.c
> > > index b426d200e070..bd3c80d402e7 100644
> > > --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cet_prctl.c
> > > +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cet_prctl.c
> > > @@ -22,6 +22,9 @@ static int cet_copy_status_to_user(struct
> > > thread_shstk *shstk, u64 __user *ubuf)
> > >                  buf[2] = shstk->size;
> > >          }
> > >   
> > > +       if (shstk->ibt)
> > > +               buf[0] |= GNU_PROPERTY_X86_FEATURE_1_IBT;
> > > +
> > Can you have IBT enabled but not shadow stack via kernel
> > parameters?
> > Outside this diff it has:
> > if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK))
> >         return -ENOTSUPP;
> 
> If shadow stack is disabled by the kernel parameter, IBT is also
> disabled.
Thanks for the clarification.

> 
> > So if "no_user_shstk" is set, this can't be used for IBT. But the
> > kernel would attempt to enable IBT.
> 
> It will not.
Oh yea, I see the cpuid_deps part now. Sorry.

> 
> > Also if so, the CR4 bit enabling logic needs adjusting in this IBT
> > series. If not, we should probably mention this in the docs and
> > enforce
> > it. It would then follow the logic in Kconfig, so maybe the
> > simplest.
> > Like maybe instead of no_user_shstk, just no_user_cet?
> 
> If shadow stack is disabled (from either Kconfig or kernel 
> command-line), then IBT is also disabled.  However, we still need two
> kernel parameters because no_user_ibt can be useful sometimes.  I
> will 
> add a sentence in the document to indicate that IBT depends on shadow
> stack.
> 
> 
Yea, no_user_ibt seems useful. I meant that renaming no_user_shstk to
no_user_cet (or similar) would be more clear and self documenting,
since it intends to disable all user cet features and not just
shadowstack. And leaving no_user_ibt as is. Documentation works as well
though. Not major in any case.
diff mbox series

Patch

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cet_prctl.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cet_prctl.c
index b426d200e070..bd3c80d402e7 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cet_prctl.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cet_prctl.c
@@ -22,6 +22,9 @@  static int cet_copy_status_to_user(struct thread_shstk *shstk, u64 __user *ubuf)
 		buf[2] = shstk->size;
 	}
 
+	if (shstk->ibt)
+		buf[0] |= GNU_PROPERTY_X86_FEATURE_1_IBT;
+
 	return copy_to_user(ubuf, buf, sizeof(buf));
 }
 
@@ -46,6 +49,8 @@  int prctl_cet(int option, u64 arg2)
 			return -EINVAL;
 		if (arg2 & GNU_PROPERTY_X86_FEATURE_1_SHSTK)
 			shstk_disable();
+		if (arg2 & GNU_PROPERTY_X86_FEATURE_1_IBT)
+			ibt_disable();
 		return 0;
 
 	case ARCH_X86_CET_LOCK: