diff mbox series

[RFC,v2,14/16] vfio-user: dma read/write operations

Message ID 7b21118256af2cb3d0dfe45b1e4ef9683fabccb5.1629131628.git.elena.ufimtseva@oracle.com (mailing list archive)
State New, archived
Headers show
Series vfio-user implementation | expand

Commit Message

Elena Ufimtseva Aug. 16, 2021, 4:42 p.m. UTC
From: John Johnson <john.g.johnson@oracle.com>

Signed-off-by: Elena Ufimtseva <elena.ufimtseva@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: John G Johnson <john.g.johnson@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Jagannathan Raman <jag.raman@oracle.com>
---
 hw/vfio/user-protocol.h | 11 +++++++
 hw/vfio/user.h          |  1 +
 hw/vfio/pci.c           | 63 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 hw/vfio/user.c          |  7 ++++-
 4 files changed, 80 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

Comments

Stefan Hajnoczi Sept. 8, 2021, 9:51 a.m. UTC | #1
On Mon, Aug 16, 2021 at 09:42:47AM -0700, Elena Ufimtseva wrote:
> diff --git a/hw/vfio/pci.c b/hw/vfio/pci.c
> index 2c9fcb2fa9..29a874c066 100644
> --- a/hw/vfio/pci.c
> +++ b/hw/vfio/pci.c
> @@ -3406,11 +3406,72 @@ type_init(register_vfio_pci_dev_type)
>   * vfio-user routines.
>   */
>  
> -static int vfio_user_pci_process_req(void *opaque, char *buf, VFIOUserFDs *fds)
> +static int vfio_user_dma_read(VFIOPCIDevice *vdev, VFIOUserDMARW *msg)
>  {
> +    PCIDevice *pdev = &vdev->pdev;
> +    char *buf;
> +    int size = msg->count + sizeof(VFIOUserDMARW);

The caller has only checked that hdr->size is large enough for
VFIOUserHdr, not VFIOUserDMARW. We must not access VFIOUserDMARW fields
until this has been checked.

Size should be size_t to avoid signedness issues.

Even then, this can overflow on 32-bit hosts so I suggest moving this
arithmetic expression below the msg->count > vfio_user_max_xfer() check.
That way it's clear that overflow cannot happen.

> +
> +    if (msg->hdr.flags & VFIO_USER_NO_REPLY) {
> +        return -EINVAL;
> +    }
> +    if (msg->count > vfio_user_max_xfer()) {
> +        return -E2BIG;
> +    }

Does vfio-user allow the request to be smaller than the reply? In other
words, is it okay that we're not checking msg->count against hdr->size?

> +
> +    buf = g_malloc0(size);
> +    memcpy(buf, msg, sizeof(*msg));
> +
> +    pci_dma_read(pdev, msg->offset, buf + sizeof(*msg), msg->count);

The vfio-user spec doesn't go into errors but pci_dma_read() can return
errors. Hmm...

> +
> +    vfio_user_send_reply(vdev->vbasedev.proxy, buf, size);
> +    g_free(buf);
>      return 0;
>  }
>  
> +static int vfio_user_dma_write(VFIOPCIDevice *vdev,
> +                               VFIOUserDMARW *msg)
> +{
> +    PCIDevice *pdev = &vdev->pdev;
> +    char *buf = (char *)msg + sizeof(*msg);

Or:

  char *buf = msg->data;

> +
> +    /* make sure transfer count isn't larger than the message data */
> +    if (msg->count > msg->hdr.size - sizeof(*msg)) {
> +        return -E2BIG;
> +    }

msg->count cannot be accessed until we have checked that msg->hdr.size
is large enough for VFIOUserDMARW. Adding the check also eliminates the
underflow in the subtraction if msg->hdr.size was smaller than
sizeof(VFIOUserDMARW).

> +
> +    pci_dma_write(pdev, msg->offset, buf, msg->count);
> +
> +    if ((msg->hdr.flags & VFIO_USER_NO_REPLY) == 0) {
> +        vfio_user_send_reply(vdev->vbasedev.proxy, (char *)msg,
> +                             sizeof(msg->hdr));
> +    }
> +    return 0;
> +}
> +
> +static int vfio_user_pci_process_req(void *opaque, char *buf, VFIOUserFDs *fds)
> +{
> +    VFIOPCIDevice *vdev = opaque;
> +    VFIOUserHdr *hdr = (VFIOUserHdr *)buf;
> +    int ret;
> +
> +    if (fds->recv_fds != 0) {
> +        return -EINVAL;

Where are the fds closed?
John Levon Sept. 8, 2021, 11:03 a.m. UTC | #2
On Wed, Sep 08, 2021 at 10:51:11AM +0100, Stefan Hajnoczi wrote:

> > +
> > +    buf = g_malloc0(size);
> > +    memcpy(buf, msg, sizeof(*msg));
> > +
> > +    pci_dma_read(pdev, msg->offset, buf + sizeof(*msg), msg->count);
> 
> The vfio-user spec doesn't go into errors but pci_dma_read() can return
> errors. Hmm...

It's certainly under-specified in the spec, but in terms of the library, we do
return EINVAL if we decide something invalid happened...

regards
john
diff mbox series

Patch

diff --git a/hw/vfio/user-protocol.h b/hw/vfio/user-protocol.h
index ca53fce5f4..c5d9473f8f 100644
--- a/hw/vfio/user-protocol.h
+++ b/hw/vfio/user-protocol.h
@@ -171,6 +171,17 @@  typedef struct {
     char data[];
 } VFIOUserRegionRW;
 
+/*
+ * VFIO_USER_DMA_READ
+ * VFIO_USER_DMA_WRITE
+ */
+typedef struct {
+    VFIOUserHdr hdr;
+    uint64_t offset;
+    uint32_t count;
+    char data[];
+} VFIOUserDMARW;
+
 /*imported from struct vfio_bitmap */
 typedef struct {
     uint64_t pgsize;
diff --git a/hw/vfio/user.h b/hw/vfio/user.h
index 7786ab57c5..32e8b70d28 100644
--- a/hw/vfio/user.h
+++ b/hw/vfio/user.h
@@ -65,6 +65,7 @@  typedef struct VFIOProxy {
 
 VFIOProxy *vfio_user_connect_dev(SocketAddress *addr, Error **errp);
 void vfio_user_disconnect(VFIOProxy *proxy);
+uint64_t vfio_user_max_xfer(void);
 void vfio_user_set_reqhandler(VFIODevice *vbasdev,
                               int (*handler)(void *opaque, char *buf,
                                              VFIOUserFDs *fds),
diff --git a/hw/vfio/pci.c b/hw/vfio/pci.c
index 2c9fcb2fa9..29a874c066 100644
--- a/hw/vfio/pci.c
+++ b/hw/vfio/pci.c
@@ -3406,11 +3406,72 @@  type_init(register_vfio_pci_dev_type)
  * vfio-user routines.
  */
 
-static int vfio_user_pci_process_req(void *opaque, char *buf, VFIOUserFDs *fds)
+static int vfio_user_dma_read(VFIOPCIDevice *vdev, VFIOUserDMARW *msg)
 {
+    PCIDevice *pdev = &vdev->pdev;
+    char *buf;
+    int size = msg->count + sizeof(VFIOUserDMARW);
+
+    if (msg->hdr.flags & VFIO_USER_NO_REPLY) {
+        return -EINVAL;
+    }
+    if (msg->count > vfio_user_max_xfer()) {
+        return -E2BIG;
+    }
+
+    buf = g_malloc0(size);
+    memcpy(buf, msg, sizeof(*msg));
+
+    pci_dma_read(pdev, msg->offset, buf + sizeof(*msg), msg->count);
+
+    vfio_user_send_reply(vdev->vbasedev.proxy, buf, size);
+    g_free(buf);
     return 0;
 }
 
+static int vfio_user_dma_write(VFIOPCIDevice *vdev,
+                               VFIOUserDMARW *msg)
+{
+    PCIDevice *pdev = &vdev->pdev;
+    char *buf = (char *)msg + sizeof(*msg);
+
+    /* make sure transfer count isn't larger than the message data */
+    if (msg->count > msg->hdr.size - sizeof(*msg)) {
+        return -E2BIG;
+    }
+
+    pci_dma_write(pdev, msg->offset, buf, msg->count);
+
+    if ((msg->hdr.flags & VFIO_USER_NO_REPLY) == 0) {
+        vfio_user_send_reply(vdev->vbasedev.proxy, (char *)msg,
+                             sizeof(msg->hdr));
+    }
+    return 0;
+}
+
+static int vfio_user_pci_process_req(void *opaque, char *buf, VFIOUserFDs *fds)
+{
+    VFIOPCIDevice *vdev = opaque;
+    VFIOUserHdr *hdr = (VFIOUserHdr *)buf;
+    int ret;
+
+    if (fds->recv_fds != 0) {
+        return -EINVAL;
+    }
+    switch (hdr->command) {
+    case VFIO_USER_DMA_READ:
+        ret = vfio_user_dma_read(vdev, (VFIOUserDMARW *)hdr);
+        break;
+    case VFIO_USER_DMA_WRITE:
+        ret = vfio_user_dma_write(vdev, (VFIOUserDMARW *)hdr);
+        break;
+    default:
+        error_printf("vfio_user_process_req unknown cmd %d\n", hdr->command);
+        ret = -ENOSYS;
+    }
+    return ret;
+}
+
 /*
  * Emulated devices don't use host hot reset
  */
diff --git a/hw/vfio/user.c b/hw/vfio/user.c
index 06bcd46e60..fcc041959c 100644
--- a/hw/vfio/user.c
+++ b/hw/vfio/user.c
@@ -54,6 +54,11 @@  static void vfio_user_send_recv(VFIOProxy *proxy, VFIOUserHdr *msg,
  * Functions called by main, CPU, or iothread threads
  */
 
+uint64_t vfio_user_max_xfer(void)
+{
+    return max_xfer_size;
+}
+
 static void vfio_user_shutdown(VFIOProxy *proxy)
 {
     qio_channel_shutdown(proxy->ioc, QIO_CHANNEL_SHUTDOWN_READ, NULL);
@@ -251,7 +256,7 @@  void vfio_user_recv(void *opaque)
         *reply->msg = msg;
         data = (char *)reply->msg + sizeof(msg);
     } else {
-        if (msg.size > max_xfer_size) {
+        if (msg.size > max_xfer_size + sizeof(VFIOUserDMARW)) {
             error_setg(&local_err, "vfio_user_recv request larger than max");
             goto fatal;
         }