| Message ID | 797d6524e4e6386fc343cd5d0bcdd53878a6593e.1625083099.git.boris@bur.io (mailing list archive) |
|---|---|
| State | Not Applicable |
| Headers | show |
| Series | btrfs: support fsverity | expand |
On Wed, Jun 30, 2021 at 01:01:49PM -0700, Boris Burkov wrote: > Add support for fsverity in btrfs. To support the generic interface in > fs/verity, we add two new item types in the fs tree for inodes with > verity enabled. One stores the per-file verity descriptor and btrfs > verity item and the other stores the Merkle tree data itself. > > Verity checking is done in end_page_read just before a page is marked > uptodate. This naturally handles a variety of edge cases like holes, > preallocated extents, and inline extents. Some care needs to be taken to > not try to verity pages past the end of the file, which are accessed by > the generic buffered file reading code under some circumstances like > reading to the end of the last page and trying to read again. Direct IO > on a verity file falls back to buffered reads. > > Verity relies on PageChecked for the Merkle tree data itself to avoid > re-walking up shared paths in the tree. For this reason, we need to > cache the Merkle tree data. Since the file is immutable after verity is > turned on, we can cache it at an index past EOF. > > Use the new inode ro_flags to store verity on the inode item, so that we > can enable verity on a file, then rollback to an older kernel and still > mount the file system and read the file. Since we can't safely write the > file anymore without ruining the invariants of the Merkle tree, we mark > a ro_compat flag on the file system when a file has verity enabled. > > Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> > Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> > Co-developed-by: Chris Mason <clm@fb.com> > Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <clm@fb.com> > Signed-off-by: Boris Burkov <boris@bur.io> Generally looks good, feel free to add: Acked-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> A few minor comments below: > @@ -2688,7 +2677,14 @@ static void end_page_read(struct page *page, bool uptodate, u64 start, u32 len) > start + len <= page_offset(page) + PAGE_SIZE); > > if (uptodate) { > - btrfs_page_set_uptodate(fs_info, page, start, len); > + if (!PageError(page) && !PageUptodate(page) && > + start < i_size_read(page->mapping->host) && > + fsverity_active(page->mapping->host) && > + !fsverity_verify_page(page)) { > + btrfs_page_set_error(fs_info, page, start, len); > + } else { > + btrfs_page_set_uptodate(fs_info, page, start, len); > + } When is it ever the case that PageError(page) or PageUptodate(page) here? Also: in general, fsverity_active() should be checked first, in order to avoid any overhead when !CONFIG_FS_VERITY. > @@ -5014,6 +5020,10 @@ long btrfs_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int > return btrfs_ioctl_get_subvol_rootref(file, argp); > case BTRFS_IOC_INO_LOOKUP_USER: > return btrfs_ioctl_ino_lookup_user(file, argp); > + case FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY: > + return fsverity_ioctl_enable(file, (const void __user *)argp); > + case FS_IOC_MEASURE_VERITY: > + return fsverity_ioctl_measure(file, argp); You could wire up FS_IOC_READ_VERITY_METADATA as well. It should just work without having to do anything else. > + * The merkle tree items: > + * [ inode objectid, BTRFS_VERITY_MERKLE_ITEM_KEY, offset ] > + * > + * These also start at offset 0, and correspond to the merkle tree bytes. > + * So when fsverity asks for page 0 of the merkle tree, we pull up one page > + * starting at offset 0 for this key type. These are also opaque to btrfs, > + * we're blindly storing whatever fsverity sends down. > + */ Is it defined which offsets, specifically, the Merkle tree items start at? Or is any arrangement valid -- say, one filesystem might use one item per Merkle tree block, while another might have multiple blocks per item, while another might have multiple items per block? What about the degenerate case where there is a separate btrfs item for each individual Merkle tree byte, and maybe even some empty items -- is that being considered a valid/supported on-disk format, or is there a limit? > +static loff_t merkle_file_pos(const struct inode *inode) > +{ > + loff_t ret; > + u64 sz = inode->i_size; > + u64 rounded = round_up(sz, MERKLE_START_ALIGN); > + > + if (rounded > inode->i_sb->s_maxbytes) > + return -EFBIG; > + ret = rounded; > + return ret; > +} The 'ret' variable is unnecessary; this can just 'return rounded'. > +/* > + * Drop all the items for this inode with this key_type. > + * > + * @inode: The inode to drop items for > + * @key_type: The type of items to drop (VERITY_DESC_ITEM or > + * VERITY_MERKLE_ITEM) BTRFS_VERITY_DESC_ITEM_KEY or BTRFS_VERITY_MERKLE_ITEM_KEY > + * > + * Before doing a verity enable we cleanup any existing verity items. > + * This is also used to clean up if a verity enable failed half way > + * through. > + * > + * Returns number of dropped items on success, negative error code on failure. > + */ > +static int drop_verity_items(struct btrfs_inode *inode, u8 key_type) The caller doesn't actually care about the number of dropped items, so this could just return 0 on success or a negative error code on failure. > + while (1) { > + /* > + * 1 for the item being dropped > + */ > + trans = btrfs_start_transaction(root, 1); > + if (IS_ERR(trans)) { > + ret = PTR_ERR(trans); > + goto out; > + } > + > + /* > + * Walk backwards through all the items until we find one > + * that isn't from our key type or objectid > + */ > + key.objectid = btrfs_ino(inode); > + key.type = key_type; > + key.offset = (u64)-1; > + > + ret = btrfs_search_slot(trans, root, &key, path, -1, 1); > + if (ret > 0) { > + ret = 0; > + /* No more keys of this type, we're done */ > + if (path->slots[0] == 0) > + break; > + path->slots[0]--; > + } else if (ret < 0) { > + btrfs_end_transaction(trans); > + goto out; > + } Pardon my unfamiliarity with btrfs, but it looks like if the key isn't present, then btrfs_search_slot() returns the position where the key would be inserted. What if the previous leaf is completely full -- does btrfs_search_slot() return a new leaf, or does it return a pointer past the end of the previous one? (It looks like the latter is assumed here.) The comment for btrfs_search_slot() doesn't make this clear. > +int btrfs_drop_verity_items(struct btrfs_inode *inode) > +{ > + int ret; > + > + ret = drop_verity_items(inode, BTRFS_VERITY_DESC_ITEM_KEY); > + if (ret < 0) > + goto out; > + ret = drop_verity_items(inode, BTRFS_VERITY_MERKLE_ITEM_KEY); > + if (ret < 0) > + goto out; > + ret = 0; > +out: > + return ret; > +} This could be simplified a bit if drop_verity_items() returned 0 on success. > +/* > + * Insert and write inode items with a given key type and offset. > + * > + * @inode: The inode to insert for. > + * @key_type: The key type to insert. > + * @offset: The item offset to insert at. > + * @src: Source data to write. > + * @len: Length of source data to write. > + * > + * Write len bytes from src into items of up to 1k length. > + * The inserted items will have key <ino, key_type, offset + off> where > + * off is consecutively increasing from 0 up to the last item ending at > + * offset + len. > + * > + * Returns 0 on success and a negative error code on failure. > + */ > +static int write_key_bytes(struct btrfs_inode *inode, u8 key_type, u64 offset, > + const char *src, u64 len) The comment says items of up to 1k length, but the code uses 2K. > +/* > + * Read inode items of the given key type and offset from the btree. > + * > + * @inode: The inode to read items of. > + * @key_type: The key type to read. > + * @offset: The item offset to read from. > + * @dest: The buffer to read into. This parameter has slightly tricky > + * semantics. If it is NULL, the function will not do any copying > + * and will just return the size of all the items up to len bytes. > + * If dest_page is passed, then the function will kmap_local the > + * page and ignore dest, but it must still be non-NULL to avoid the > + * counting-only behavior. > + * @len: Length in bytes to read. > + * @dest_page: Copy into this page instead of the dest buffer. > + * > + * Helper function to read items from the btree. This returns the number > + * of bytes read or < 0 for errors. We can return short reads if the > + * items don't exist on disk or aren't big enough to fill the desired length. > + * Supports reading into a provided buffer (dest) or into the page cache > + * > + * Returns number of bytes read or a negative error code on failure. > + */ > +static int read_key_bytes(struct btrfs_inode *inode, u8 key_type, u64 offset, > + char *dest, u64 len, struct page *dest_page) > +{ > + struct btrfs_path *path; > + struct btrfs_root *root = inode->root; > + struct extent_buffer *leaf; > + struct btrfs_key key; > + u64 item_end; > + u64 copy_end; > + int copied = 0; > + u32 copy_offset; > + unsigned long copy_bytes; > + unsigned long dest_offset = 0; > + void *data; > + char *kaddr = dest; > + int ret; > + > + path = btrfs_alloc_path(); > + if (!path) > + return -ENOMEM; > + > + if (dest_page) > + path->reada = READA_FORWARD; > + > + key.objectid = btrfs_ino(inode); > + key.type = key_type; > + key.offset = offset; > + > + ret = btrfs_search_slot(NULL, root, &key, path, 0, 0); > + if (ret < 0) { > + goto out; > + } else if (ret > 0) { > + ret = 0; > + if (path->slots[0] == 0) > + goto out; > + path->slots[0]--; > + } Same question about btrfs_search_slot() here. If the key isn't found and the previous leaf is completely full, will it return a pointer past the end of it? > +/* > + * fsverity op that begins enabling verity. > + * > + * @filp: the file to enable verity on > + * > + * Begin enabling fsverity for the file. We drop any existing verity items > + * and set the in progress bit. > + * > + * Returns 0 on success, negative error code on failure. > + */ > +static int btrfs_begin_enable_verity(struct file *filp) > +{ > + struct btrfs_inode *inode = BTRFS_I(file_inode(filp)); > + int ret; > + > + ASSERT(inode_is_locked(file_inode(filp))); > + > + if (test_bit(BTRFS_INODE_VERITY_IN_PROGRESS, &inode->runtime_flags)) { > + ret = -EBUSY; > + goto out; > + } > + > + ret = btrfs_drop_verity_items(inode); > + if (ret) > + goto out; > + > + set_bit(BTRFS_INODE_VERITY_IN_PROGRESS, &inode->runtime_flags); > +out: > + return ret; > +} There's no need for 'goto out' if no cleanup is being done. Just return directly instead. > +static struct page *btrfs_read_merkle_tree_page(struct inode *inode, > + pgoff_t index, > + unsigned long num_ra_pages) > +{ > + struct page *page; > + u64 off = (u64)index << PAGE_SHIFT; > + loff_t merkle_pos = merkle_file_pos(inode); > + int ret; > + > + if (merkle_pos < 0) > + return ERR_PTR(merkle_pos); > + if (merkle_pos > inode->i_sb->s_maxbytes - off - PAGE_SIZE) > + return ERR_PTR(-EFBIG); > + index += merkle_pos >> PAGE_SHIFT; > +again: > + page = find_get_page_flags(inode->i_mapping, index, FGP_ACCESSED); > + if (page) { > + if (PageUptodate(page)) > + return page; > + > + lock_page(page); > + /* > + * We only insert uptodate pages, so !Uptodate has to be > + * an error > + */ > + if (!PageUptodate(page)) { > + unlock_page(page); > + put_page(page); > + return ERR_PTR(-EIO); > + } > + unlock_page(page); > + return page; As per the comment above, aren't the Merkle tree pages marked Uptodate before being inserted into the page cache? If so, isn't it unnecessary to re-check Uptodate under the page lock? > +struct btrfs_verity_descriptor_item { > + /* size of the verity descriptor in bytes */ > + __le64 size; > + /* > + * When we implement support for fscrypt, we will need to encrypt the > + * Merkle tree for encrypted verity files. These 128 bits are for the > + * eventual storage of an fscrypt initialization vector. > + */ > + __le64 reserved[2]; > + __u8 encryption; > +} __attribute__ ((__packed__)); Do you have something in mind for how an initialization vector stored here would be used? I'd have thought that if/when fscrypt support is added, you'd either derive a new per-file key for encrypting the verity metadata specifically, or you'd encrypt the verity metadata with the regular per-file key using IVs that are chosen as if the verity metadata were appended to the file contents. Neither case would require that any additional information be stored here. - Eric
On Sun, Jul 11, 2021 at 09:52:56AM -0500, Eric Biggers wrote: > On Wed, Jun 30, 2021 at 01:01:49PM -0700, Boris Burkov wrote: > > Add support for fsverity in btrfs. To support the generic interface in > > fs/verity, we add two new item types in the fs tree for inodes with > > verity enabled. One stores the per-file verity descriptor and btrfs > > verity item and the other stores the Merkle tree data itself. > > > > Verity checking is done in end_page_read just before a page is marked > > uptodate. This naturally handles a variety of edge cases like holes, > > preallocated extents, and inline extents. Some care needs to be taken to > > not try to verity pages past the end of the file, which are accessed by > > the generic buffered file reading code under some circumstances like > > reading to the end of the last page and trying to read again. Direct IO > > on a verity file falls back to buffered reads. > > > > Verity relies on PageChecked for the Merkle tree data itself to avoid > > re-walking up shared paths in the tree. For this reason, we need to > > cache the Merkle tree data. Since the file is immutable after verity is > > turned on, we can cache it at an index past EOF. > > > > Use the new inode ro_flags to store verity on the inode item, so that we > > can enable verity on a file, then rollback to an older kernel and still > > mount the file system and read the file. Since we can't safely write the > > file anymore without ruining the invariants of the Merkle tree, we mark > > a ro_compat flag on the file system when a file has verity enabled. > > > > Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> > > Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> > > Co-developed-by: Chris Mason <clm@fb.com> > > Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <clm@fb.com> > > Signed-off-by: Boris Burkov <boris@bur.io> > > Generally looks good, feel free to add: > > Acked-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> > > A few minor comments below: Thanks for the comments. Lots of them are minor fixups, I can do that when applying the patch. There are some questions that I'll leave to Boris to answer, I don't think they'd prevent merging the patches now and fixing up later.
On Wed, Jun 30, 2021 at 01:01:49PM -0700, Boris Burkov wrote: > +struct btrfs_verity_descriptor_item { > + /* size of the verity descriptor in bytes */ > + __le64 size; > + /* > + * When we implement support for fscrypt, we will need to encrypt the > + * Merkle tree for encrypted verity files. These 128 bits are for the > + * eventual storage of an fscrypt initialization vector. > + */ > + __le64 reserved[2]; This does 2 for known extensions, do you think more would be desirable? Eg. reserving 256 bits. We can detect that also at runtime by the item size so it's extensible but just in case this could be done from the beginning. > + __u8 encryption; > +} __attribute__ ((__packed__)); > + > #endif /* _BTRFS_CTREE_H_ */ > -- > 2.31.1
Hi Boris, On Wed, Jun 30, 2021 at 01:01:49PM -0700, Boris Burkov wrote: > Add support for fsverity in btrfs. To support the generic interface in > fs/verity, we add two new item types in the fs tree for inodes with > verity enabled. One stores the per-file verity descriptor and btrfs > verity item and the other stores the Merkle tree data itself. > > Verity checking is done in end_page_read just before a page is marked > uptodate. This naturally handles a variety of edge cases like holes, > preallocated extents, and inline extents. Some care needs to be taken to > not try to verity pages past the end of the file, which are accessed by > the generic buffered file reading code under some circumstances like > reading to the end of the last page and trying to read again. Direct IO > on a verity file falls back to buffered reads. > > Verity relies on PageChecked for the Merkle tree data itself to avoid > re-walking up shared paths in the tree. For this reason, we need to > cache the Merkle tree data. Since the file is immutable after verity is > turned on, we can cache it at an index past EOF. > > Use the new inode ro_flags to store verity on the inode item, so that we > can enable verity on a file, then rollback to an older kernel and still > mount the file system and read the file. Since we can't safely write the > file anymore without ruining the invariants of the Merkle tree, we mark > a ro_compat flag on the file system when a file has verity enabled. I want to mention the btrfs verity support in Documentation/filesystems/fsverity.rst, and I have a couple questions: 1. Is the ro_compat filesystem flag still a thing? The commit message claims it is, and BTRFS_FEATURE_COMPAT_RO_VERITY is defined in the code, but it doesn't seem to actually be used. It's not needed since you found a way to make the inode flags ro_compat instead, right? 2. Is there a minimum version of btrfs-progs that is required to use btrfs verity? With ext4 and f2fs, the fsck tools had to be updated, so there were minimum versions of the userspace tools required. Thanks, - Eric
On Tue, Sep 14, 2021 at 10:32:59AM -0700, Eric Biggers wrote: > Hi Boris, > > On Wed, Jun 30, 2021 at 01:01:49PM -0700, Boris Burkov wrote: > > Add support for fsverity in btrfs. To support the generic interface in > > fs/verity, we add two new item types in the fs tree for inodes with > > verity enabled. One stores the per-file verity descriptor and btrfs > > verity item and the other stores the Merkle tree data itself. > > > > Verity checking is done in end_page_read just before a page is marked > > uptodate. This naturally handles a variety of edge cases like holes, > > preallocated extents, and inline extents. Some care needs to be taken to > > not try to verity pages past the end of the file, which are accessed by > > the generic buffered file reading code under some circumstances like > > reading to the end of the last page and trying to read again. Direct IO > > on a verity file falls back to buffered reads. > > > > Verity relies on PageChecked for the Merkle tree data itself to avoid > > re-walking up shared paths in the tree. For this reason, we need to > > cache the Merkle tree data. Since the file is immutable after verity is > > turned on, we can cache it at an index past EOF. > > > > Use the new inode ro_flags to store verity on the inode item, so that we > > can enable verity on a file, then rollback to an older kernel and still > > mount the file system and read the file. Since we can't safely write the > > file anymore without ruining the invariants of the Merkle tree, we mark > > a ro_compat flag on the file system when a file has verity enabled. > > I want to mention the btrfs verity support in > Documentation/filesystems/fsverity.rst, and I have a couple questions: > > 1. Is the ro_compat filesystem flag still a thing? The commit message claims it > is, and BTRFS_FEATURE_COMPAT_RO_VERITY is defined in the code, but it doesn't > seem to actually be used. It's not needed since you found a way to make the > inode flags ro_compat instead, right? I believe it is still being used, unless I messed up the patch I sent in the end. Taking a quick look, I think it's set at fs/btrfs/verity.c:558. btrfs_set_fs_compat_ro(root->fs_info, VERITY); I believe I still needed it because the tree checker doesn't scan every inode on the filesystem when you mount, so it would only freak out about a ro-compat inode later on if the inode didn't happen to be in a leaf that was being checked at mount time. > > 2. Is there a minimum version of btrfs-progs that is required to use btrfs > verity? With ext4 and f2fs, the fsck tools had to be updated, so there were > minimum versions of the userspace tools required. Hmm. I didn't update fsck, but now that you mention it, I think I need to... I'll test it right away and get back to you, but I suspect I need to hurry up and implement it. Boris > > Thanks, > > - Eric
On Tue, Sep 14, 2021 at 10:49:33AM -0700, Boris Burkov wrote: > On Tue, Sep 14, 2021 at 10:32:59AM -0700, Eric Biggers wrote: > > Hi Boris, > > > > On Wed, Jun 30, 2021 at 01:01:49PM -0700, Boris Burkov wrote: > > > Add support for fsverity in btrfs. To support the generic interface in > > > fs/verity, we add two new item types in the fs tree for inodes with > > > verity enabled. One stores the per-file verity descriptor and btrfs > > > verity item and the other stores the Merkle tree data itself. > > > > > > Verity checking is done in end_page_read just before a page is marked > > > uptodate. This naturally handles a variety of edge cases like holes, > > > preallocated extents, and inline extents. Some care needs to be taken to > > > not try to verity pages past the end of the file, which are accessed by > > > the generic buffered file reading code under some circumstances like > > > reading to the end of the last page and trying to read again. Direct IO > > > on a verity file falls back to buffered reads. > > > > > > Verity relies on PageChecked for the Merkle tree data itself to avoid > > > re-walking up shared paths in the tree. For this reason, we need to > > > cache the Merkle tree data. Since the file is immutable after verity is > > > turned on, we can cache it at an index past EOF. > > > > > > Use the new inode ro_flags to store verity on the inode item, so that we > > > can enable verity on a file, then rollback to an older kernel and still > > > mount the file system and read the file. Since we can't safely write the > > > file anymore without ruining the invariants of the Merkle tree, we mark > > > a ro_compat flag on the file system when a file has verity enabled. > > > > I want to mention the btrfs verity support in > > Documentation/filesystems/fsverity.rst, and I have a couple questions: > > > > 1. Is the ro_compat filesystem flag still a thing? The commit message claims it > > is, and BTRFS_FEATURE_COMPAT_RO_VERITY is defined in the code, but it doesn't > > seem to actually be used. It's not needed since you found a way to make the > > inode flags ro_compat instead, right? > > I believe it is still being used, unless I messed up the patch I sent in > the end. Taking a quick look, I think it's set at fs/btrfs/verity.c:558. > > btrfs_set_fs_compat_ro(root->fs_info, VERITY); > > I believe I still needed it because the tree checker doesn't scan every > inode on the filesystem when you mount, so it would only freak out about > a ro-compat inode later on if the inode didn't happen to be in a leaf > that was being checked at mount time. > Okay, so it is used. (Due to the macro, it didn't show up when grepping.) Doesn't it defeat the purpose of a ro_compat inode flag if the whole filesystem is marked with a ro_compat feature flag, though? I thought that the point of the ro_compat inode flag is to allow old kernels to mount the filesystem read-write, with only verity files being forced to read-only. That would be more flexible than ext4's implementation of fs-verity which forces the whole filesystem to read-only. But it seems you're forcing the whole filesystem to read-only anyway? - Eric
On Tue, Sep 14, 2021 at 10:49:33AM -0700, Boris Burkov wrote: > > inode flags ro_compat instead, right? > > I believe it is still being used, unless I messed up the patch I sent in > the end. Taking a quick look, I think it's set at fs/btrfs/verity.c:558. > > btrfs_set_fs_compat_ro(root->fs_info, VERITY); > > I believe I still needed it because the tree checker doesn't scan every > inode on the filesystem when you mount, so it would only freak out about > a ro-compat inode later on if the inode didn't happen to be in a leaf > that was being checked at mount time. > > > > > 2. Is there a minimum version of btrfs-progs that is required to use btrfs > > verity? With ext4 and f2fs, the fsck tools had to be updated, so there were > > minimum versions of the userspace tools required. > > Hmm. I didn't update fsck, but now that you mention it, I think I need to... > I'll test it right away and get back to you, but I suspect I need to > hurry up and implement it. The timing of kernel features and btrfs-progs is to have them at the same release number at the latest, but it could be any time earlier as it also makes testing easier (released vs git snapshot).
On Sun, Jul 11, 2021 at 09:52:56AM -0500, Eric Biggers wrote: > On Wed, Jun 30, 2021 at 01:01:49PM -0700, Boris Burkov wrote: > > Add support for fsverity in btrfs. To support the generic interface in > > fs/verity, we add two new item types in the fs tree for inodes with > > verity enabled. One stores the per-file verity descriptor and btrfs > > verity item and the other stores the Merkle tree data itself. > > > > Verity checking is done in end_page_read just before a page is marked > > uptodate. This naturally handles a variety of edge cases like holes, > > preallocated extents, and inline extents. Some care needs to be taken to > > not try to verity pages past the end of the file, which are accessed by > > the generic buffered file reading code under some circumstances like > > reading to the end of the last page and trying to read again. Direct IO > > on a verity file falls back to buffered reads. > > > > Verity relies on PageChecked for the Merkle tree data itself to avoid > > re-walking up shared paths in the tree. For this reason, we need to > > cache the Merkle tree data. Since the file is immutable after verity is > > turned on, we can cache it at an index past EOF. > > > > Use the new inode ro_flags to store verity on the inode item, so that we > > can enable verity on a file, then rollback to an older kernel and still > > mount the file system and read the file. Since we can't safely write the > > file anymore without ruining the invariants of the Merkle tree, we mark > > a ro_compat flag on the file system when a file has verity enabled. > > > > Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> > > Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> > > Co-developed-by: Chris Mason <clm@fb.com> > > Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <clm@fb.com> > > Signed-off-by: Boris Burkov <boris@bur.io> > > Generally looks good, feel free to add: > > Acked-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> > > A few minor comments below: I was on vacation when you sent this (and thanks again for all your reviewing) but I forgot to get back to your questions. Hopefully, the answers are still useful. > > > @@ -2688,7 +2677,14 @@ static void end_page_read(struct page *page, bool uptodate, u64 start, u32 len) > > start + len <= page_offset(page) + PAGE_SIZE); > > > > if (uptodate) { > > - btrfs_page_set_uptodate(fs_info, page, start, len); > > + if (!PageError(page) && !PageUptodate(page) && > > + start < i_size_read(page->mapping->host) && > > + fsverity_active(page->mapping->host) && > > + !fsverity_verify_page(page)) { > > + btrfs_page_set_error(fs_info, page, start, len); > > + } else { > > + btrfs_page_set_uptodate(fs_info, page, start, len); > > + } > > When is it ever the case that PageError(page) or PageUptodate(page) here? I suspect that the sub-page refactor which consolidated a ton of this logic made some of these checks redundant. I definitely hit the PageUptodate case while testing an earlier version, but I can't recall the exact circumstance now. > > Also: in general, fsverity_active() should be checked first, in order to avoid > any overhead when !CONFIG_FS_VERITY. > > > @@ -5014,6 +5020,10 @@ long btrfs_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int > > return btrfs_ioctl_get_subvol_rootref(file, argp); > > case BTRFS_IOC_INO_LOOKUP_USER: > > return btrfs_ioctl_ino_lookup_user(file, argp); > > + case FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY: > > + return fsverity_ioctl_enable(file, (const void __user *)argp); > > + case FS_IOC_MEASURE_VERITY: > > + return fsverity_ioctl_measure(file, argp); > > You could wire up FS_IOC_READ_VERITY_METADATA as well. It should just work > without having to do anything else. Good point, will do. > > > + * The merkle tree items: > > + * [ inode objectid, BTRFS_VERITY_MERKLE_ITEM_KEY, offset ] > > + * > > + * These also start at offset 0, and correspond to the merkle tree bytes. > > + * So when fsverity asks for page 0 of the merkle tree, we pull up one page > > + * starting at offset 0 for this key type. These are also opaque to btrfs, > > + * we're blindly storing whatever fsverity sends down. > > + */ > > Is it defined which offsets, specifically, the Merkle tree items start at? Or > is any arrangement valid -- say, one filesystem might use one item per Merkle > tree block, while another might have multiple blocks per item, while another > might have multiple items per block? What about the degenerate case where there > is a separate btrfs item for each individual Merkle tree byte, and maybe even > some empty items -- is that being considered a valid/supported on-disk format, > or is there a limit? The "offsets" here are a logical concept for arranging items by btrfs keys in the btree. Really it's just an arbitrary u64 that is the least significant part of the (objectid, type, offset) triple. e.g., for the desc item, we use offset 0 to signal our internal item and offset 1+ for the fsverity_descriptor struct. With that said, read_key_bytes will iterate through this logical space and shouldn't care how the items/leafs are laid out, so if we happened to write items in the ways you described, I think it would work just fine. I haven't tested this beyond maybe 1k vs 2k items, though. > > > +static loff_t merkle_file_pos(const struct inode *inode) > > +{ > > + loff_t ret; > > + u64 sz = inode->i_size; > > + u64 rounded = round_up(sz, MERKLE_START_ALIGN); > > + > > + if (rounded > inode->i_sb->s_maxbytes) > > + return -EFBIG; > > + ret = rounded; > > + return ret; > > +} > > The 'ret' variable is unnecessary; this can just 'return rounded'. > > > +/* > > + * Drop all the items for this inode with this key_type. > > + * > > + * @inode: The inode to drop items for > > + * @key_type: The type of items to drop (VERITY_DESC_ITEM or > > + * VERITY_MERKLE_ITEM) > > BTRFS_VERITY_DESC_ITEM_KEY or BTRFS_VERITY_MERKLE_ITEM_KEY > > > + * > > + * Before doing a verity enable we cleanup any existing verity items. > > + * This is also used to clean up if a verity enable failed half way > > + * through. > > + * > > + * Returns number of dropped items on success, negative error code on failure. > > + */ > > +static int drop_verity_items(struct btrfs_inode *inode, u8 key_type) > > The caller doesn't actually care about the number of dropped items, so this > could just return 0 on success or a negative error code on failure. > > > + while (1) { > > + /* > > + * 1 for the item being dropped > > + */ > > + trans = btrfs_start_transaction(root, 1); > > + if (IS_ERR(trans)) { > > + ret = PTR_ERR(trans); > > + goto out; > > + } > > + > > + /* > > + * Walk backwards through all the items until we find one > > + * that isn't from our key type or objectid > > + */ > > + key.objectid = btrfs_ino(inode); > > + key.type = key_type; > > + key.offset = (u64)-1; > > + > > + ret = btrfs_search_slot(trans, root, &key, path, -1, 1); > > + if (ret > 0) { > > + ret = 0; > > + /* No more keys of this type, we're done */ > > + if (path->slots[0] == 0) > > + break; > > + path->slots[0]--; > > + } else if (ret < 0) { > > + btrfs_end_transaction(trans); > > + goto out; > > + } > > Pardon my unfamiliarity with btrfs, but it looks like if the key isn't present, > then btrfs_search_slot() returns the position where the key would be inserted. > What if the previous leaf is completely full -- does btrfs_search_slot() return > a new leaf, or does it return a pointer past the end of the previous one? (It > looks like the latter is assumed here.) The comment for btrfs_search_slot() > doesn't make this clear. I believe that depends on the ins_len parameter. If ins_len is >0, search_slot can do splitting and return a new leaf with the appropriate new slot. If ins_len is <= 0, I believe it will return a slot at the end of the leaf (see btrfs_bin_search/generic_bin_search). In this case, ins_len is -1, so we don't expect it to split nodes/leaves. > > > +int btrfs_drop_verity_items(struct btrfs_inode *inode) > > +{ > > + int ret; > > + > > + ret = drop_verity_items(inode, BTRFS_VERITY_DESC_ITEM_KEY); > > + if (ret < 0) > > + goto out; > > + ret = drop_verity_items(inode, BTRFS_VERITY_MERKLE_ITEM_KEY); > > + if (ret < 0) > > + goto out; > > + ret = 0; > > +out: > > + return ret; > > +} > > This could be simplified a bit if drop_verity_items() returned 0 on success. > > > +/* > > + * Insert and write inode items with a given key type and offset. > > + * > > + * @inode: The inode to insert for. > > + * @key_type: The key type to insert. > > + * @offset: The item offset to insert at. > > + * @src: Source data to write. > > + * @len: Length of source data to write. > > + * > > + * Write len bytes from src into items of up to 1k length. > > + * The inserted items will have key <ino, key_type, offset + off> where > > + * off is consecutively increasing from 0 up to the last item ending at > > + * offset + len. > > + * > > + * Returns 0 on success and a negative error code on failure. > > + */ > > +static int write_key_bytes(struct btrfs_inode *inode, u8 key_type, u64 offset, > > + const char *src, u64 len) > > The comment says items of up to 1k length, but the code uses 2K. > > > +/* > > + * Read inode items of the given key type and offset from the btree. > > + * > > + * @inode: The inode to read items of. > > + * @key_type: The key type to read. > > + * @offset: The item offset to read from. > > + * @dest: The buffer to read into. This parameter has slightly tricky > > + * semantics. If it is NULL, the function will not do any copying > > + * and will just return the size of all the items up to len bytes. > > + * If dest_page is passed, then the function will kmap_local the > > + * page and ignore dest, but it must still be non-NULL to avoid the > > + * counting-only behavior. > > + * @len: Length in bytes to read. > > + * @dest_page: Copy into this page instead of the dest buffer. > > + * > > + * Helper function to read items from the btree. This returns the number > > + * of bytes read or < 0 for errors. We can return short reads if the > > + * items don't exist on disk or aren't big enough to fill the desired length. > > + * Supports reading into a provided buffer (dest) or into the page cache > > + * > > + * Returns number of bytes read or a negative error code on failure. > > + */ > > +static int read_key_bytes(struct btrfs_inode *inode, u8 key_type, u64 offset, > > + char *dest, u64 len, struct page *dest_page) > > +{ > > + struct btrfs_path *path; > > + struct btrfs_root *root = inode->root; > > + struct extent_buffer *leaf; > > + struct btrfs_key key; > > + u64 item_end; > > + u64 copy_end; > > + int copied = 0; > > + u32 copy_offset; > > + unsigned long copy_bytes; > > + unsigned long dest_offset = 0; > > + void *data; > > + char *kaddr = dest; > > + int ret; > > + > > + path = btrfs_alloc_path(); > > + if (!path) > > + return -ENOMEM; > > + > > + if (dest_page) > > + path->reada = READA_FORWARD; > > + > > + key.objectid = btrfs_ino(inode); > > + key.type = key_type; > > + key.offset = offset; > > + > > + ret = btrfs_search_slot(NULL, root, &key, path, 0, 0); > > + if (ret < 0) { > > + goto out; > > + } else if (ret > 0) { > > + ret = 0; > > + if (path->slots[0] == 0) > > + goto out; > > + path->slots[0]--; > > + } > > Same question about btrfs_search_slot() here. If the key isn't found and the > previous leaf is completely full, will it return a pointer past the end of it? > > > +/* > > + * fsverity op that begins enabling verity. > > + * > > + * @filp: the file to enable verity on > > + * > > + * Begin enabling fsverity for the file. We drop any existing verity items > > + * and set the in progress bit. > > + * > > + * Returns 0 on success, negative error code on failure. > > + */ > > +static int btrfs_begin_enable_verity(struct file *filp) > > +{ > > + struct btrfs_inode *inode = BTRFS_I(file_inode(filp)); > > + int ret; > > + > > + ASSERT(inode_is_locked(file_inode(filp))); > > + > > + if (test_bit(BTRFS_INODE_VERITY_IN_PROGRESS, &inode->runtime_flags)) { > > + ret = -EBUSY; > > + goto out; > > + } > > + > > + ret = btrfs_drop_verity_items(inode); > > + if (ret) > > + goto out; > > + > > + set_bit(BTRFS_INODE_VERITY_IN_PROGRESS, &inode->runtime_flags); > > +out: > > + return ret; > > +} > > There's no need for 'goto out' if no cleanup is being done. Just return > directly instead. > > > +static struct page *btrfs_read_merkle_tree_page(struct inode *inode, > > + pgoff_t index, > > + unsigned long num_ra_pages) > > +{ > > + struct page *page; > > + u64 off = (u64)index << PAGE_SHIFT; > > + loff_t merkle_pos = merkle_file_pos(inode); > > + int ret; > > + > > + if (merkle_pos < 0) > > + return ERR_PTR(merkle_pos); > > + if (merkle_pos > inode->i_sb->s_maxbytes - off - PAGE_SIZE) > > + return ERR_PTR(-EFBIG); > > + index += merkle_pos >> PAGE_SHIFT; > > +again: > > + page = find_get_page_flags(inode->i_mapping, index, FGP_ACCESSED); > > + if (page) { > > + if (PageUptodate(page)) > > + return page; > > + > > + lock_page(page); > > + /* > > + * We only insert uptodate pages, so !Uptodate has to be > > + * an error > > + */ > > + if (!PageUptodate(page)) { > > + unlock_page(page); > > + put_page(page); > > + return ERR_PTR(-EIO); > > + } > > + unlock_page(page); > > + return page; > > As per the comment above, aren't the Merkle tree pages marked Uptodate before > being inserted into the page cache? If so, isn't it unnecessary to re-check > Uptodate under the page lock? I feel like this might be caused by me being confused about the metadata metadata page in the btree getting an error and the merkle tree page which only we write to. I'll think about it a little more to make sure there's not a different explanation. > > > +struct btrfs_verity_descriptor_item { > > + /* size of the verity descriptor in bytes */ > > + __le64 size; > > + /* > > + * When we implement support for fscrypt, we will need to encrypt the > > + * Merkle tree for encrypted verity files. These 128 bits are for the > > + * eventual storage of an fscrypt initialization vector. > > + */ > > + __le64 reserved[2]; > > + __u8 encryption; > > +} __attribute__ ((__packed__)); > > Do you have something in mind for how an initialization vector stored here would > be used? I'd have thought that if/when fscrypt support is added, you'd either > derive a new per-file key for encrypting the verity metadata specifically, or > you'd encrypt the verity metadata with the regular per-file key using IVs that > are chosen as if the verity metadata were appended to the file contents. > Neither case would require that any additional information be stored here. Unfortunately, I can't give an intelligent answer to this one. Omar Sandoval is working on fscrypt for btrfs and I spoke with him to figure out what he needed for the verity metadata. I'll ask him to chime in here :) > > - Eric
On Tue, Sep 14, 2021 at 10:56:28AM -0700, Eric Biggers wrote: > On Tue, Sep 14, 2021 at 10:49:33AM -0700, Boris Burkov wrote: > > On Tue, Sep 14, 2021 at 10:32:59AM -0700, Eric Biggers wrote: > > > Hi Boris, > > > > > > On Wed, Jun 30, 2021 at 01:01:49PM -0700, Boris Burkov wrote: > > > > Add support for fsverity in btrfs. To support the generic interface in > > > > fs/verity, we add two new item types in the fs tree for inodes with > > > > verity enabled. One stores the per-file verity descriptor and btrfs > > > > verity item and the other stores the Merkle tree data itself. > > > > > > > > Verity checking is done in end_page_read just before a page is marked > > > > uptodate. This naturally handles a variety of edge cases like holes, > > > > preallocated extents, and inline extents. Some care needs to be taken to > > > > not try to verity pages past the end of the file, which are accessed by > > > > the generic buffered file reading code under some circumstances like > > > > reading to the end of the last page and trying to read again. Direct IO > > > > on a verity file falls back to buffered reads. > > > > > > > > Verity relies on PageChecked for the Merkle tree data itself to avoid > > > > re-walking up shared paths in the tree. For this reason, we need to > > > > cache the Merkle tree data. Since the file is immutable after verity is > > > > turned on, we can cache it at an index past EOF. > > > > > > > > Use the new inode ro_flags to store verity on the inode item, so that we > > > > can enable verity on a file, then rollback to an older kernel and still > > > > mount the file system and read the file. Since we can't safely write the > > > > file anymore without ruining the invariants of the Merkle tree, we mark > > > > a ro_compat flag on the file system when a file has verity enabled. > > > > > > I want to mention the btrfs verity support in > > > Documentation/filesystems/fsverity.rst, and I have a couple questions: > > > > > > 1. Is the ro_compat filesystem flag still a thing? The commit message claims it > > > is, and BTRFS_FEATURE_COMPAT_RO_VERITY is defined in the code, but it doesn't > > > seem to actually be used. It's not needed since you found a way to make the > > > inode flags ro_compat instead, right? > > > > I believe it is still being used, unless I messed up the patch I sent in > > the end. Taking a quick look, I think it's set at fs/btrfs/verity.c:558. > > > > btrfs_set_fs_compat_ro(root->fs_info, VERITY); > > > > I believe I still needed it because the tree checker doesn't scan every > > inode on the filesystem when you mount, so it would only freak out about > > a ro-compat inode later on if the inode didn't happen to be in a leaf > > that was being checked at mount time. > > > > Okay, so it is used. (Due to the macro, it didn't show up when grepping.) > > Doesn't it defeat the purpose of a ro_compat inode flag if the whole filesystem > is marked with a ro_compat feature flag, though? I thought that the point of > the ro_compat inode flag is to allow old kernels to mount the filesystem > read-write, with only verity files being forced to read-only. That would be > more flexible than ext4's implementation of fs-verity which forces the whole > filesystem to read-only. But it seems you're forcing the whole filesystem to > read-only anyway? > > - Eric I was thinking of it in terms of "RO compat is the goal" and having new inode flags totally broke that and was treated as a corruption of the inode regardless of the fs being ro/rw. I think a check on a live fs would just flip the fs ro, which was the goal anyway, but a check that happened during mount would fail the mount, even for a read-only fs. Making it fully per file would be pretty cool! The only thing really missing as far as I can tell is a way to mark a file read only with the same semantics fsverity uses from within btrfs. Boris
On Tue, Sep 14, 2021 at 11:34:29AM -0700, Boris Burkov wrote: > > Okay, so it is used. (Due to the macro, it didn't show up when grepping.) > > > > Doesn't it defeat the purpose of a ro_compat inode flag if the whole filesystem > > is marked with a ro_compat feature flag, though? I thought that the point of > > the ro_compat inode flag is to allow old kernels to mount the filesystem > > read-write, with only verity files being forced to read-only. That would be > > more flexible than ext4's implementation of fs-verity which forces the whole > > filesystem to read-only. But it seems you're forcing the whole filesystem to > > read-only anyway? > > > > - Eric > > I was thinking of it in terms of "RO compat is the goal" and having new > inode flags totally broke that and was treated as a corruption of the > inode regardless of the fs being ro/rw. I think a check on a live fs > would just flip the fs ro, which was the goal anyway, but a check that > happened during mount would fail the mount, even for a read-only fs. > > Making it fully per file would be pretty cool! The only thing > really missing as far as I can tell is a way to mark a file read only > with the same semantics fsverity uses from within btrfs. I don't understand. Why are you bothering with the ro_compat inode flag at all if it doesn't actually work? - Eric
On Wed, Sep 15, 2021 at 01:45:23PM -0700, Eric Biggers wrote: > On Tue, Sep 14, 2021 at 11:34:29AM -0700, Boris Burkov wrote: > > > Okay, so it is used. (Due to the macro, it didn't show up when grepping.) > > > > > > Doesn't it defeat the purpose of a ro_compat inode flag if the whole filesystem > > > is marked with a ro_compat feature flag, though? I thought that the point of > > > the ro_compat inode flag is to allow old kernels to mount the filesystem > > > read-write, with only verity files being forced to read-only. That would be > > > more flexible than ext4's implementation of fs-verity which forces the whole > > > filesystem to read-only. But it seems you're forcing the whole filesystem to > > > read-only anyway? > > > > > > - Eric > > > > I was thinking of it in terms of "RO compat is the goal" and having new > > inode flags totally broke that and was treated as a corruption of the > > inode regardless of the fs being ro/rw. I think a check on a live fs > > would just flip the fs ro, which was the goal anyway, but a check that > > happened during mount would fail the mount, even for a read-only fs. > > > > Making it fully per file would be pretty cool! The only thing > > really missing as far as I can tell is a way to mark a file read only > > with the same semantics fsverity uses from within btrfs. > > I don't understand. Why are you bothering with the ro_compat inode flag at all > if it doesn't actually work? > > - Eric Sorry I explained that really badly. My first try was ro-compat bit only, that failed because btrfs couldn't add an inode flag in a ro-compat way before my changes, as it could fail to mount. To fix that, I had to work on the inode flag compatibility, which evolved into this notion of inode ro-compat flags, which does work as expected: if you see a file with an unknown ro-compat flag it's an error if you aren't read-only. Read-only mount will never fail. I think changing the semantics of the ro-compat inodes from: "an unknown ro inode flag -> fs ro" to "an unknown ro inode flag -> file ro" could be a big win. I don't think there is a rush to do that, though? If I add it now, on top of the existing code, then you might go back to a kernel that can only mount the fs read-only or you might go back to one which is clever enough to only force the file read-only. Hope I'm making a bit more sense, now.
On Wed, Sep 15, 2021 at 02:01:12PM -0700, Boris Burkov wrote: > On Wed, Sep 15, 2021 at 01:45:23PM -0700, Eric Biggers wrote: > > On Tue, Sep 14, 2021 at 11:34:29AM -0700, Boris Burkov wrote: > > > > Okay, so it is used. (Due to the macro, it didn't show up when grepping.) > > > > > > > > Doesn't it defeat the purpose of a ro_compat inode flag if the whole filesystem > > > > is marked with a ro_compat feature flag, though? I thought that the point of > > > > the ro_compat inode flag is to allow old kernels to mount the filesystem > > > > read-write, with only verity files being forced to read-only. That would be > > > > more flexible than ext4's implementation of fs-verity which forces the whole > > > > filesystem to read-only. But it seems you're forcing the whole filesystem to > > > > read-only anyway? > > > > > > > > - Eric > > > > > > I was thinking of it in terms of "RO compat is the goal" and having new > > > inode flags totally broke that and was treated as a corruption of the > > > inode regardless of the fs being ro/rw. I think a check on a live fs > > > would just flip the fs ro, which was the goal anyway, but a check that > > > happened during mount would fail the mount, even for a read-only fs. > > > > > > Making it fully per file would be pretty cool! The only thing > > > really missing as far as I can tell is a way to mark a file read only > > > with the same semantics fsverity uses from within btrfs. > > > > I don't understand. Why are you bothering with the ro_compat inode flag at all > > if it doesn't actually work? > > > > - Eric > > Sorry I explained that really badly. > > My first try was ro-compat bit only, that failed because btrfs couldn't > add an inode flag in a ro-compat way before my changes, as it could > fail to mount. > > To fix that, I had to work on the inode flag compatibility, which > evolved into this notion of inode ro-compat flags, which does work as > expected: if you see a file with an unknown ro-compat flag it's an error > if you aren't read-only. Read-only mount will never fail. > > I think changing the semantics of the ro-compat inodes from: > "an unknown ro inode flag -> fs ro" to > "an unknown ro inode flag -> file ro" > could be a big win. I don't think there is a rush to do that, though? If you're forcing the filesystem to read-only anyway, why not just rely on the filesystem-wide ro_compat flag, which you already implemented and which already does that? What benefit does the per-file ro_compat flag have, if it doesn't actually make just the file read-only (which would be the expected behavior)? You might as well just use a "regular" inode flag in that case. - Eric
On Wed, Sep 15, 2021 at 02:12:37PM -0700, Eric Biggers wrote: > On Wed, Sep 15, 2021 at 02:01:12PM -0700, Boris Burkov wrote: > > On Wed, Sep 15, 2021 at 01:45:23PM -0700, Eric Biggers wrote: > > > On Tue, Sep 14, 2021 at 11:34:29AM -0700, Boris Burkov wrote: > > > > > Okay, so it is used. (Due to the macro, it didn't show up when grepping.) > > > > > > > > > > Doesn't it defeat the purpose of a ro_compat inode flag if the whole filesystem > > > > > is marked with a ro_compat feature flag, though? I thought that the point of > > > > > the ro_compat inode flag is to allow old kernels to mount the filesystem > > > > > read-write, with only verity files being forced to read-only. That would be > > > > > more flexible than ext4's implementation of fs-verity which forces the whole > > > > > filesystem to read-only. But it seems you're forcing the whole filesystem to > > > > > read-only anyway? > > > > > > > > > > - Eric > > > > > > > > I was thinking of it in terms of "RO compat is the goal" and having new > > > > inode flags totally broke that and was treated as a corruption of the > > > > inode regardless of the fs being ro/rw. I think a check on a live fs > > > > would just flip the fs ro, which was the goal anyway, but a check that > > > > happened during mount would fail the mount, even for a read-only fs. > > > > > > > > Making it fully per file would be pretty cool! The only thing > > > > really missing as far as I can tell is a way to mark a file read only > > > > with the same semantics fsverity uses from within btrfs. > > > > > > I don't understand. Why are you bothering with the ro_compat inode flag at all > > > if it doesn't actually work? > > > > > > - Eric > > > > Sorry I explained that really badly. > > > > My first try was ro-compat bit only, that failed because btrfs couldn't > > add an inode flag in a ro-compat way before my changes, as it could > > fail to mount. > > > > To fix that, I had to work on the inode flag compatibility, which > > evolved into this notion of inode ro-compat flags, which does work as > > expected: if you see a file with an unknown ro-compat flag it's an error > > if you aren't read-only. Read-only mount will never fail. > > > > I think changing the semantics of the ro-compat inodes from: > > "an unknown ro inode flag -> fs ro" to > > "an unknown ro inode flag -> file ro" > > could be a big win. I don't think there is a rush to do that, though? > > If you're forcing the filesystem to read-only anyway, why not just rely on the > filesystem-wide ro_compat flag, which you already implemented and which already > does that? What benefit does the per-file ro_compat flag have, if it doesn't > actually make just the file read-only (which would be the expected behavior)? > You might as well just use a "regular" inode flag in that case. > > - Eric I couldn't use a regular inode flag because the btrfs tree checker will call it an error when it sees a flag it doesn't recognize, regardless of compat bits or fs read-only status. This is extra painful if the inode with verity enabled is in a leaf that gets read in at mount time and gets checked then. a fake example of what was happening: mkfs.btrfs dev mount dev mnt touch /mnt/foo fsverity enable /mnt/foo <reboot to old kernel> mount dev mnt !!!FAIL!!! mount -o ro dev mnt !!!FAIL!!! To get around this, I added a new flag field that wasn't checked as aggressively -- and didn't call it an error on ro mount. There is more excruciating detail, that I won't poorly re-create here, in the commit message of: "btrfs: add ro compat flags to inodes" However, I really do agree that having done the work to add the new class of flags, it makes sense to try to take advantage of it the way you suggest, since per-file ro compat sounds a lot cooler than fs ro compat. I was just trying to do what I could to make the fs compat bit work at all.
diff --git a/fs/btrfs/Makefile b/fs/btrfs/Makefile index cec88a66bd6c..3dcf9bcc2326 100644 --- a/fs/btrfs/Makefile +++ b/fs/btrfs/Makefile @@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ btrfs-$(CONFIG_BTRFS_FS_POSIX_ACL) += acl.o btrfs-$(CONFIG_BTRFS_FS_CHECK_INTEGRITY) += check-integrity.o btrfs-$(CONFIG_BTRFS_FS_REF_VERIFY) += ref-verify.o btrfs-$(CONFIG_BLK_DEV_ZONED) += zoned.o +btrfs-$(CONFIG_FS_VERITY) += verity.o btrfs-$(CONFIG_BTRFS_FS_RUN_SANITY_TESTS) += tests/free-space-tests.o \ tests/extent-buffer-tests.o tests/btrfs-tests.o \ diff --git a/fs/btrfs/btrfs_inode.h b/fs/btrfs/btrfs_inode.h index 1093b00130be..76ee1452c57b 100644 --- a/fs/btrfs/btrfs_inode.h +++ b/fs/btrfs/btrfs_inode.h @@ -51,6 +51,13 @@ enum { * the file range, inode's io_tree). */ BTRFS_INODE_NO_DELALLOC_FLUSH, + /* + * Set when we are working on enabling verity for a file. Computing and + * writing the whole Merkle tree can take a while so we want to prevent + * races where two separate tasks attempt to simultaneously start verity + * on the same file. + */ + BTRFS_INODE_VERITY_IN_PROGRESS, }; /* in memory btrfs inode */ diff --git a/fs/btrfs/ctree.h b/fs/btrfs/ctree.h index 422bcc93977e..63a99319f6f4 100644 --- a/fs/btrfs/ctree.h +++ b/fs/btrfs/ctree.h @@ -281,7 +281,8 @@ struct btrfs_super_block { #define BTRFS_FEATURE_COMPAT_RO_SUPP \ (BTRFS_FEATURE_COMPAT_RO_FREE_SPACE_TREE | \ - BTRFS_FEATURE_COMPAT_RO_FREE_SPACE_TREE_VALID) + BTRFS_FEATURE_COMPAT_RO_FREE_SPACE_TREE_VALID | \ + BTRFS_FEATURE_COMPAT_RO_VERITY) #define BTRFS_FEATURE_COMPAT_RO_SAFE_SET 0ULL #define BTRFS_FEATURE_COMPAT_RO_SAFE_CLEAR 0ULL @@ -1516,7 +1517,9 @@ do { \ BTRFS_INODE_COMPRESS | \ BTRFS_INODE_ROOT_ITEM_INIT) -#define BTRFS_INODE_RO_FLAG_MASK (0) +#define BTRFS_INODE_RO_VERITY (1U << 0) + +#define BTRFS_INODE_RO_FLAG_MASK (BTRFS_INODE_RO_VERITY) struct btrfs_map_token { struct extent_buffer *eb; @@ -3783,6 +3786,24 @@ static inline int btrfs_defrag_cancelled(struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info) return signal_pending(current); } +/* verity.c */ +#ifdef CONFIG_FS_VERITY +extern const struct fsverity_operations btrfs_verityops; +int btrfs_drop_verity_items(struct btrfs_inode *inode); +BTRFS_SETGET_FUNCS(verity_descriptor_encryption, struct btrfs_verity_descriptor_item, + encryption, 8); +BTRFS_SETGET_FUNCS(verity_descriptor_size, struct btrfs_verity_descriptor_item, size, 64); +BTRFS_SETGET_STACK_FUNCS(stack_verity_descriptor_encryption, struct btrfs_verity_descriptor_item, + encryption, 8); +BTRFS_SETGET_STACK_FUNCS(stack_verity_descriptor_size, struct btrfs_verity_descriptor_item, + size, 64); +#else +static inline int btrfs_drop_verity_items(struct btrfs_inode *inode) +{ + return 0; +} +#endif + /* Sanity test specific functions */ #ifdef CONFIG_BTRFS_FS_RUN_SANITY_TESTS void btrfs_test_destroy_inode(struct inode *inode); diff --git a/fs/btrfs/extent_io.c b/fs/btrfs/extent_io.c index 9e81d25dea70..aeaf8fe342dc 100644 --- a/fs/btrfs/extent_io.c +++ b/fs/btrfs/extent_io.c @@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ #include <linux/pagevec.h> #include <linux/prefetch.h> #include <linux/cleancache.h> +#include <linux/fsverity.h> #include "misc.h" #include "extent_io.h" #include "extent-io-tree.h" @@ -2245,18 +2246,6 @@ int test_range_bit(struct extent_io_tree *tree, u64 start, u64 end, return bitset; } -/* - * helper function to set a given page up to date if all the - * extents in the tree for that page are up to date - */ -static void check_page_uptodate(struct extent_io_tree *tree, struct page *page) -{ - u64 start = page_offset(page); - u64 end = start + PAGE_SIZE - 1; - if (test_range_bit(tree, start, end, EXTENT_UPTODATE, 1, NULL)) - SetPageUptodate(page); -} - int free_io_failure(struct extent_io_tree *failure_tree, struct extent_io_tree *io_tree, struct io_failure_record *rec) @@ -2688,7 +2677,14 @@ static void end_page_read(struct page *page, bool uptodate, u64 start, u32 len) start + len <= page_offset(page) + PAGE_SIZE); if (uptodate) { - btrfs_page_set_uptodate(fs_info, page, start, len); + if (!PageError(page) && !PageUptodate(page) && + start < i_size_read(page->mapping->host) && + fsverity_active(page->mapping->host) && + !fsverity_verify_page(page)) { + btrfs_page_set_error(fs_info, page, start, len); + } else { + btrfs_page_set_uptodate(fs_info, page, start, len); + } } else { btrfs_page_clear_uptodate(fs_info, page, start, len); btrfs_page_set_error(fs_info, page, start, len); @@ -3097,7 +3093,7 @@ static void end_bio_extent_readpage(struct bio *bio) /* Update page status and unlock */ end_page_read(page, uptodate, start, len); endio_readpage_release_extent(&processed, BTRFS_I(inode), - start, end, uptodate); + start, end, PageUptodate(page)); } /* Release the last extent */ endio_readpage_release_extent(&processed, NULL, 0, 0, false); @@ -3627,7 +3623,6 @@ int btrfs_do_readpage(struct page *page, struct extent_map **em_cached, /* the get_extent function already copied into the page */ if (test_range_bit(tree, cur, cur_end, EXTENT_UPTODATE, 1, NULL)) { - check_page_uptodate(tree, page); unlock_extent(tree, cur, cur + iosize - 1); end_page_read(page, true, cur, iosize); cur = cur + iosize; diff --git a/fs/btrfs/file.c b/fs/btrfs/file.c index 28a05ba47060..78503b125261 100644 --- a/fs/btrfs/file.c +++ b/fs/btrfs/file.c @@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ #include <linux/btrfs.h> #include <linux/uio.h> #include <linux/iversion.h> +#include <linux/fsverity.h> #include "ctree.h" #include "disk-io.h" #include "transaction.h" @@ -3605,7 +3606,13 @@ static loff_t btrfs_file_llseek(struct file *file, loff_t offset, int whence) static int btrfs_file_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp) { + int ret; + filp->f_mode |= FMODE_NOWAIT | FMODE_BUF_RASYNC; + + ret = fsverity_file_open(inode, filp); + if (ret) + return ret; return generic_file_open(inode, filp); } @@ -3634,6 +3641,9 @@ static ssize_t btrfs_direct_read(struct kiocb *iocb, struct iov_iter *to) struct inode *inode = file_inode(iocb->ki_filp); ssize_t ret; + if (fsverity_active(inode)) + return 0; + if (check_direct_read(btrfs_sb(inode->i_sb), to, iocb->ki_pos)) return 0; diff --git a/fs/btrfs/inode.c b/fs/btrfs/inode.c index be27cccea1a9..9f176a840446 100644 --- a/fs/btrfs/inode.c +++ b/fs/btrfs/inode.c @@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ #include <linux/sched/mm.h> #include <linux/iomap.h> #include <asm/unaligned.h> +#include <linux/fsverity.h> #include "misc.h" #include "ctree.h" #include "disk-io.h" @@ -5437,6 +5438,7 @@ void btrfs_evict_inode(struct inode *inode) trace_btrfs_inode_evict(inode); if (!root) { + fsverity_cleanup_inode(inode); clear_inode(inode); return; } @@ -5519,6 +5521,7 @@ void btrfs_evict_inode(struct inode *inode) * to retry these periodically in the future. */ btrfs_remove_delayed_node(BTRFS_I(inode)); + fsverity_cleanup_inode(inode); clear_inode(inode); } @@ -9090,6 +9093,7 @@ static int btrfs_getattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode = d_inode(path->dentry); u32 blocksize = inode->i_sb->s_blocksize; u32 bi_flags = BTRFS_I(inode)->flags; + u32 bi_ro_flags = BTRFS_I(inode)->ro_flags; stat->result_mask |= STATX_BTIME; stat->btime.tv_sec = BTRFS_I(inode)->i_otime.tv_sec; @@ -9102,6 +9106,8 @@ static int btrfs_getattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, stat->attributes |= STATX_ATTR_IMMUTABLE; if (bi_flags & BTRFS_INODE_NODUMP) stat->attributes |= STATX_ATTR_NODUMP; + if (bi_ro_flags & BTRFS_INODE_RO_VERITY) + stat->attributes |= STATX_ATTR_VERITY; stat->attributes_mask |= (STATX_ATTR_APPEND | STATX_ATTR_COMPRESSED | diff --git a/fs/btrfs/ioctl.c b/fs/btrfs/ioctl.c index 8007364f064d..c4e8f7df384b 100644 --- a/fs/btrfs/ioctl.c +++ b/fs/btrfs/ioctl.c @@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ #include <linux/uaccess.h> #include <linux/iversion.h> #include <linux/fileattr.h> +#include <linux/fsverity.h> #include "ctree.h" #include "disk-io.h" #include "export.h" @@ -107,6 +108,7 @@ static unsigned int btrfs_inode_flags_to_fsflags(struct btrfs_inode *binode) { unsigned int iflags = 0; u32 flags = binode->flags; + u32 ro_flags = binode->ro_flags; if (flags & BTRFS_INODE_SYNC) iflags |= FS_SYNC_FL; @@ -122,6 +124,8 @@ static unsigned int btrfs_inode_flags_to_fsflags(struct btrfs_inode *binode) iflags |= FS_DIRSYNC_FL; if (flags & BTRFS_INODE_NODATACOW) iflags |= FS_NOCOW_FL; + if (ro_flags & BTRFS_INODE_RO_VERITY) + iflags |= FS_VERITY_FL; if (flags & BTRFS_INODE_NOCOMPRESS) iflags |= FS_NOCOMP_FL; @@ -149,10 +153,12 @@ void btrfs_sync_inode_flags_to_i_flags(struct inode *inode) new_fl |= S_NOATIME; if (binode->flags & BTRFS_INODE_DIRSYNC) new_fl |= S_DIRSYNC; + if (binode->ro_flags & BTRFS_INODE_RO_VERITY) + new_fl |= S_VERITY; set_mask_bits(&inode->i_flags, - S_SYNC | S_APPEND | S_IMMUTABLE | S_NOATIME | S_DIRSYNC, - new_fl); + S_SYNC | S_APPEND | S_IMMUTABLE | S_NOATIME | S_DIRSYNC | + S_VERITY, new_fl); } /* @@ -5014,6 +5020,10 @@ long btrfs_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int return btrfs_ioctl_get_subvol_rootref(file, argp); case BTRFS_IOC_INO_LOOKUP_USER: return btrfs_ioctl_ino_lookup_user(file, argp); + case FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY: + return fsverity_ioctl_enable(file, (const void __user *)argp); + case FS_IOC_MEASURE_VERITY: + return fsverity_ioctl_measure(file, argp); } return -ENOTTY; diff --git a/fs/btrfs/super.c b/fs/btrfs/super.c index d07b18b2b250..e6c5968bd028 100644 --- a/fs/btrfs/super.c +++ b/fs/btrfs/super.c @@ -1353,6 +1353,9 @@ static int btrfs_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, sb->s_op = &btrfs_super_ops; sb->s_d_op = &btrfs_dentry_operations; sb->s_export_op = &btrfs_export_ops; +#ifdef CONFIG_FS_VERITY + sb->s_vop = &btrfs_verityops; +#endif sb->s_xattr = btrfs_xattr_handlers; sb->s_time_gran = 1; #ifdef CONFIG_BTRFS_FS_POSIX_ACL diff --git a/fs/btrfs/sysfs.c b/fs/btrfs/sysfs.c index 9d1d140118ff..e101a0bf392f 100644 --- a/fs/btrfs/sysfs.c +++ b/fs/btrfs/sysfs.c @@ -267,6 +267,9 @@ BTRFS_FEAT_ATTR_INCOMPAT(raid1c34, RAID1C34); #ifdef CONFIG_BTRFS_DEBUG BTRFS_FEAT_ATTR_INCOMPAT(zoned, ZONED); #endif +#ifdef CONFIG_FS_VERITY +BTRFS_FEAT_ATTR_COMPAT_RO(verity, VERITY); +#endif static struct attribute *btrfs_supported_feature_attrs[] = { BTRFS_FEAT_ATTR_PTR(mixed_backref), @@ -284,6 +287,9 @@ static struct attribute *btrfs_supported_feature_attrs[] = { BTRFS_FEAT_ATTR_PTR(raid1c34), #ifdef CONFIG_BTRFS_DEBUG BTRFS_FEAT_ATTR_PTR(zoned), +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_FS_VERITY + BTRFS_FEAT_ATTR_PTR(verity), #endif NULL }; diff --git a/fs/btrfs/verity.c b/fs/btrfs/verity.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..f24c1d88f66d --- /dev/null +++ b/fs/btrfs/verity.c @@ -0,0 +1,758 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 + +#include <linux/init.h> +#include <linux/fs.h> +#include <linux/slab.h> +#include <linux/rwsem.h> +#include <linux/xattr.h> +#include <linux/security.h> +#include <linux/posix_acl_xattr.h> +#include <linux/iversion.h> +#include <linux/fsverity.h> +#include <linux/sched/mm.h> +#include "ctree.h" +#include "btrfs_inode.h" +#include "transaction.h" +#include "disk-io.h" +#include "locking.h" + +/* + * Implementation of the interface defined in struct fsverity_operations. + * + * The main question is how and where to store the verity descriptor and the + * Merkle tree. We store both in dedicated btree items in the filesystem tree, + * together with the rest of the inode metadata. This means we'll need to do + * extra work to encrypt them once encryption is supported in btrfs, but btrfs + * has a lot of careful code around i_size and it seems better to make a new key + * type than try and adjust all of our expectations for i_size. + * + * Note that this differs from the implementation in ext4 and f2fs, where + * this data is stored as if it were in the file, but past EOF. However, btrfs + * does not have a widespread mechanism for caching opaque metadata pages, so we + * do pretend that the Merkle tree pages themselves are past EOF for the + * purposes of caching them (as opposed to creating a virtual inode). + * + * fs verity items are stored under two different key types on disk. + * The descriptor items: + * [ inode objectid, BTRFS_VERITY_DESC_ITEM_KEY, offset ] + * + * At offset 0, we store a btrfs_verity_descriptor_item which tracks the + * size of the descriptor item and some extra data for encryption. + * Starting at offset 1, these hold the generic fs verity descriptor. + * The latter are opaque to btrfs, we just read and write them as a blob for + * the higher level verity code. The most common descriptor size is 256 bytes. + * + * The merkle tree items: + * [ inode objectid, BTRFS_VERITY_MERKLE_ITEM_KEY, offset ] + * + * These also start at offset 0, and correspond to the merkle tree bytes. + * So when fsverity asks for page 0 of the merkle tree, we pull up one page + * starting at offset 0 for this key type. These are also opaque to btrfs, + * we're blindly storing whatever fsverity sends down. + */ + + +#define MERKLE_START_ALIGN 65536 +/* + * Compute the logical file offset where we cache the Merkle tree. + * + * @inode: the inode of the verity file + * + * For the purposes of caching the Merkle tree pages, as required by + * fs-verity, it is convenient to do size computations in terms of a file + * offset, rather than in terms of page indices. + * + * Use 64K to be sure it's past the last page in the file, even with 64k pages. + * That rounding operation itself can overflow loff_t, so we do it in u64 and + * check. + * + * Returns the file offset on success, negative error code on failure. + */ +static loff_t merkle_file_pos(const struct inode *inode) +{ + loff_t ret; + u64 sz = inode->i_size; + u64 rounded = round_up(sz, MERKLE_START_ALIGN); + + if (rounded > inode->i_sb->s_maxbytes) + return -EFBIG; + ret = rounded; + return ret; +} + +/* + * Drop all the items for this inode with this key_type. + * + * @inode: The inode to drop items for + * @key_type: The type of items to drop (VERITY_DESC_ITEM or + * VERITY_MERKLE_ITEM) + * + * Before doing a verity enable we cleanup any existing verity items. + * This is also used to clean up if a verity enable failed half way + * through. + * + * Returns number of dropped items on success, negative error code on failure. + */ +static int drop_verity_items(struct btrfs_inode *inode, u8 key_type) +{ + struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans; + struct btrfs_root *root = inode->root; + struct btrfs_path *path; + struct btrfs_key key; + int count = 0; + int ret; + + path = btrfs_alloc_path(); + if (!path) + return -ENOMEM; + + while (1) { + /* + * 1 for the item being dropped + */ + trans = btrfs_start_transaction(root, 1); + if (IS_ERR(trans)) { + ret = PTR_ERR(trans); + goto out; + } + + /* + * Walk backwards through all the items until we find one + * that isn't from our key type or objectid + */ + key.objectid = btrfs_ino(inode); + key.type = key_type; + key.offset = (u64)-1; + + ret = btrfs_search_slot(trans, root, &key, path, -1, 1); + if (ret > 0) { + ret = 0; + /* No more keys of this type, we're done */ + if (path->slots[0] == 0) + break; + path->slots[0]--; + } else if (ret < 0) { + btrfs_end_transaction(trans); + goto out; + } + + btrfs_item_key_to_cpu(path->nodes[0], &key, path->slots[0]); + + /* No more keys of this type, we're done */ + if (key.objectid != btrfs_ino(inode) || key.type != key_type) + break; + + /* + * This shouldn't be a performance sensitive function because + * it's not used as part of truncate. If it ever becomes + * perf sensitive, change this to walk forward and bulk delete + * items + */ + ret = btrfs_del_items(trans, root, path, path->slots[0], 1); + if (ret) { + btrfs_end_transaction(trans); + goto out; + } + count++; + btrfs_release_path(path); + btrfs_end_transaction(trans); + } + ret = count; + btrfs_end_transaction(trans); +out: + btrfs_free_path(path); + return ret; +} + +/* + * Drop all verity items + * + * @inode: the inode to drop verity items for. + * + * In most contexts where we are dropping verity items, we want to do it for all + * the types of verity items, not a particular one. + * + * Returns: 0 on success, negative error code on failure. + */ +int btrfs_drop_verity_items(struct btrfs_inode *inode) +{ + int ret; + + ret = drop_verity_items(inode, BTRFS_VERITY_DESC_ITEM_KEY); + if (ret < 0) + goto out; + ret = drop_verity_items(inode, BTRFS_VERITY_MERKLE_ITEM_KEY); + if (ret < 0) + goto out; + ret = 0; +out: + return ret; +} + + +/* + * Insert and write inode items with a given key type and offset. + * + * @inode: The inode to insert for. + * @key_type: The key type to insert. + * @offset: The item offset to insert at. + * @src: Source data to write. + * @len: Length of source data to write. + * + * Write len bytes from src into items of up to 1k length. + * The inserted items will have key <ino, key_type, offset + off> where + * off is consecutively increasing from 0 up to the last item ending at + * offset + len. + * + * Returns 0 on success and a negative error code on failure. + */ +static int write_key_bytes(struct btrfs_inode *inode, u8 key_type, u64 offset, + const char *src, u64 len) +{ + struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans; + struct btrfs_path *path; + struct btrfs_root *root = inode->root; + struct extent_buffer *leaf; + struct btrfs_key key; + unsigned long copy_bytes; + unsigned long src_offset = 0; + void *data; + int ret = 0; + + path = btrfs_alloc_path(); + if (!path) + return -ENOMEM; + + while (len > 0) { + /* + * 1 for the new item being inserted + */ + trans = btrfs_start_transaction(root, 1); + if (IS_ERR(trans)) { + ret = PTR_ERR(trans); + break; + } + + key.objectid = btrfs_ino(inode); + key.type = key_type; + key.offset = offset; + + /* + * Insert 2K at a time mostly to be friendly for smaller + * leaf size filesystems + */ + copy_bytes = min_t(u64, len, 2048); + + ret = btrfs_insert_empty_item(trans, root, path, &key, copy_bytes); + if (ret) { + btrfs_end_transaction(trans); + break; + } + + leaf = path->nodes[0]; + + data = btrfs_item_ptr(leaf, path->slots[0], void); + write_extent_buffer(leaf, src + src_offset, + (unsigned long)data, copy_bytes); + offset += copy_bytes; + src_offset += copy_bytes; + len -= copy_bytes; + + btrfs_release_path(path); + btrfs_end_transaction(trans); + } + + btrfs_free_path(path); + return ret; +} + +/* + * Read inode items of the given key type and offset from the btree. + * + * @inode: The inode to read items of. + * @key_type: The key type to read. + * @offset: The item offset to read from. + * @dest: The buffer to read into. This parameter has slightly tricky + * semantics. If it is NULL, the function will not do any copying + * and will just return the size of all the items up to len bytes. + * If dest_page is passed, then the function will kmap_local the + * page and ignore dest, but it must still be non-NULL to avoid the + * counting-only behavior. + * @len: Length in bytes to read. + * @dest_page: Copy into this page instead of the dest buffer. + * + * Helper function to read items from the btree. This returns the number + * of bytes read or < 0 for errors. We can return short reads if the + * items don't exist on disk or aren't big enough to fill the desired length. + * Supports reading into a provided buffer (dest) or into the page cache + * + * Returns number of bytes read or a negative error code on failure. + */ +static int read_key_bytes(struct btrfs_inode *inode, u8 key_type, u64 offset, + char *dest, u64 len, struct page *dest_page) +{ + struct btrfs_path *path; + struct btrfs_root *root = inode->root; + struct extent_buffer *leaf; + struct btrfs_key key; + u64 item_end; + u64 copy_end; + int copied = 0; + u32 copy_offset; + unsigned long copy_bytes; + unsigned long dest_offset = 0; + void *data; + char *kaddr = dest; + int ret; + + path = btrfs_alloc_path(); + if (!path) + return -ENOMEM; + + if (dest_page) + path->reada = READA_FORWARD; + + key.objectid = btrfs_ino(inode); + key.type = key_type; + key.offset = offset; + + ret = btrfs_search_slot(NULL, root, &key, path, 0, 0); + if (ret < 0) { + goto out; + } else if (ret > 0) { + ret = 0; + if (path->slots[0] == 0) + goto out; + path->slots[0]--; + } + + while (len > 0) { + leaf = path->nodes[0]; + btrfs_item_key_to_cpu(leaf, &key, path->slots[0]); + + if (key.objectid != btrfs_ino(inode) || + key.type != key_type) + break; + + item_end = btrfs_item_size_nr(leaf, path->slots[0]) + key.offset; + + if (copied > 0) { + /* + * Once we've copied something, we want all of the items + * to be sequential + */ + if (key.offset != offset) + break; + } else { + /* + * Our initial offset might be in the middle of an + * item. Make sure it all makes sense + */ + if (key.offset > offset) + break; + if (item_end <= offset) + break; + } + + /* desc = NULL to just sum all the item lengths */ + if (!dest) + copy_end = item_end; + else + copy_end = min(offset + len, item_end); + + /* Number of bytes in this item we want to copy */ + copy_bytes = copy_end - offset; + + /* Offset from the start of item for copying */ + copy_offset = offset - key.offset; + + if (dest) { + if (dest_page) + kaddr = kmap_local_page(dest_page); + + data = btrfs_item_ptr(leaf, path->slots[0], void); + read_extent_buffer(leaf, kaddr + dest_offset, + (unsigned long)data + copy_offset, + copy_bytes); + + if (dest_page) + kunmap_local(kaddr); + } + + offset += copy_bytes; + dest_offset += copy_bytes; + len -= copy_bytes; + copied += copy_bytes; + + path->slots[0]++; + if (path->slots[0] >= btrfs_header_nritems(path->nodes[0])) { + /* + * We've reached the last slot in this leaf and we need + * to go to the next leaf. + */ + ret = btrfs_next_leaf(root, path); + if (ret < 0) { + break; + } else if (ret > 0) { + ret = 0; + break; + } + } + } +out: + btrfs_free_path(path); + if (!ret) + ret = copied; + return ret; +} + +/* + * Rollback in-progress verity if we encounter an error. + * + * @inode: the inode verity had an error for + * + * We try to handle recoverable errors while enabling verity by rolling it + * back and just failing the operation, rather than having an fs level error no + * matter what. However, any error in rollback is unrecoverable. + * + * Returns 0 on success, negative error code on failure. + */ +static int rollback_verity(struct btrfs_inode *inode) +{ + struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans; + struct btrfs_root *root = inode->root; + int ret; + + ASSERT(inode_is_locked(&inode->vfs_inode)); + truncate_inode_pages(inode->vfs_inode.i_mapping, + inode->vfs_inode.i_size); + clear_bit(BTRFS_INODE_VERITY_IN_PROGRESS, &inode->runtime_flags); + ret = btrfs_drop_verity_items(inode); + if (ret) { + btrfs_handle_fs_error(root->fs_info, ret, + "failed to drop verity items in rollback %lu\n", + inode->vfs_inode.i_ino); + goto out; + } + /* + * 1 for updating the inode flag + */ + trans = btrfs_start_transaction(root, 1); + if (IS_ERR(trans)) { + ret = PTR_ERR(trans); + btrfs_handle_fs_error(root->fs_info, ret, + "failed to start transaction in verity rollback %lu\n", + inode->vfs_inode.i_ino); + goto out; + } + inode->ro_flags &= ~BTRFS_INODE_RO_VERITY; + btrfs_sync_inode_flags_to_i_flags(&inode->vfs_inode); + ret = btrfs_update_inode(trans, root, inode); + if (ret) { + btrfs_abort_transaction(trans, ret); + goto out; + } + btrfs_end_transaction(trans); +out: + return ret; +} + +/* + * Finalize making the file a valid verity file + * + * @inode: the inode to be marked as verity + * @desc: the contents of the verity descriptor to write (not NULL) + * @desc_size: the size of the verity descriptor + * + * Do the actual work of finalizing verity after successfully writing the Merkle + * tree: + * - write out the descriptor items + * - mark the inode with the verity flag + * - mark the ro compat bit + * - clear the in progress bit + * + * Returns 0 on success, negative error code on failure. + */ +static int finish_verity(struct btrfs_inode *inode, + const void *desc, size_t desc_size) +{ + struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans = NULL; + struct btrfs_root *root = inode->root; + struct btrfs_verity_descriptor_item item; + int ret; + + /* Write out the descriptor item */ + memset(&item, 0, sizeof(item)); + btrfs_set_stack_verity_descriptor_size(&item, desc_size); + ret = write_key_bytes(inode, + BTRFS_VERITY_DESC_ITEM_KEY, 0, + (const char *)&item, sizeof(item)); + if (ret) + goto out; + /* Write out the descriptor itself */ + ret = write_key_bytes(inode, + BTRFS_VERITY_DESC_ITEM_KEY, 1, + desc, desc_size); + if (ret) + goto out; + + /* + * 1 for updating the inode flag + */ + trans = btrfs_start_transaction(root, 1); + if (IS_ERR(trans)) { + ret = PTR_ERR(trans); + goto out; + } + inode->ro_flags |= BTRFS_INODE_RO_VERITY; + btrfs_sync_inode_flags_to_i_flags(&inode->vfs_inode); + ret = btrfs_update_inode(trans, root, inode); + if (ret) + goto end_trans; + clear_bit(BTRFS_INODE_VERITY_IN_PROGRESS, &inode->runtime_flags); + btrfs_set_fs_compat_ro(root->fs_info, VERITY); +end_trans: + btrfs_end_transaction(trans); +out: + return ret; + +} + +/* + * fsverity op that begins enabling verity. + * + * @filp: the file to enable verity on + * + * Begin enabling fsverity for the file. We drop any existing verity items + * and set the in progress bit. + * + * Returns 0 on success, negative error code on failure. + */ +static int btrfs_begin_enable_verity(struct file *filp) +{ + struct btrfs_inode *inode = BTRFS_I(file_inode(filp)); + int ret; + + ASSERT(inode_is_locked(file_inode(filp))); + + if (test_bit(BTRFS_INODE_VERITY_IN_PROGRESS, &inode->runtime_flags)) { + ret = -EBUSY; + goto out; + } + + ret = btrfs_drop_verity_items(inode); + if (ret) + goto out; + + set_bit(BTRFS_INODE_VERITY_IN_PROGRESS, &inode->runtime_flags); +out: + return ret; +} + +/* + * fsverity op that ends enabling verity. + * + * @filp: the file we are finishing enabling verity on + * @desc: the verity descriptor to write out (NULL in error conditions) + * @desc_size: the size of the verity descriptor (variable with signatures) + * @merkle_tree_size: the size of the merkle tree in bytes + * + * If desc is null, then VFS is signaling an error occurred during verity + * enable, and we should try to rollback. Otherwise, attempt to finish verity. + * + * Returns 0 on success, negative error code on error. + */ +static int btrfs_end_enable_verity(struct file *filp, const void *desc, + size_t desc_size, u64 merkle_tree_size) +{ + struct btrfs_inode *inode = BTRFS_I(file_inode(filp)); + int ret = 0; + int rollback_ret; + + ASSERT(inode_is_locked(file_inode(filp))); + + if (desc == NULL) + goto rollback; + + ret = finish_verity(inode, desc, desc_size); + if (ret) + goto rollback; + return ret; + + +rollback: + rollback_ret = rollback_verity(inode); + if (rollback_ret) + btrfs_err(inode->root->fs_info, + "failed to rollback verity items: %d", rollback_ret); + return ret; +} + +/* + * fsverity op that gets the struct fsverity_descriptor. + * + * @inode: the inode to get the descriptor of + * @buf: output buffer for the descriptor contents + * @buf_size: size of the output buffer. 0 to query the size. + * + * fsverity does a two pass setup for reading the descriptor, in the first pass + * it calls with buf_size = 0 to query the size of the descriptor, + * and then in the second pass it actually reads the descriptor off + * disk. + * + * Returns the size on success or a negative error code on failure. + */ +static int btrfs_get_verity_descriptor(struct inode *inode, void *buf, + size_t buf_size) +{ + u64 true_size; + int ret = 0; + struct btrfs_verity_descriptor_item item; + + memset(&item, 0, sizeof(item)); + ret = read_key_bytes(BTRFS_I(inode), BTRFS_VERITY_DESC_ITEM_KEY, + 0, (char *)&item, sizeof(item), NULL); + if (ret < 0) + return ret; + + if (item.reserved[0] != 0 || item.reserved[1] != 0) + return -EUCLEAN; + + true_size = btrfs_stack_verity_descriptor_size(&item); + if (true_size > INT_MAX) + return -EUCLEAN; + + if (!buf_size) + return true_size; + if (buf_size < true_size) + return -ERANGE; + + ret = read_key_bytes(BTRFS_I(inode), + BTRFS_VERITY_DESC_ITEM_KEY, 1, + buf, buf_size, NULL); + if (ret < 0) + return ret; + if (ret != true_size) + return -EIO; + + return true_size; +} + +/* + * fsverity op that reads and caches a merkle tree page. + * + * @inode: the inode to read a merkle tree page for + * @index: the page index relative to the start of the merkle tree + * @num_ra_pages: number of pages to readahead. Optional, we ignore it. + * + * The Merkle tree is stored in the filesystem btree, but its pages are cached + * with a logical position past EOF in the inode's mapping. + * + * Returns the page we read, or an ERR_PTR on error. + */ +static struct page *btrfs_read_merkle_tree_page(struct inode *inode, + pgoff_t index, + unsigned long num_ra_pages) +{ + struct page *page; + u64 off = (u64)index << PAGE_SHIFT; + loff_t merkle_pos = merkle_file_pos(inode); + int ret; + + if (merkle_pos < 0) + return ERR_PTR(merkle_pos); + if (merkle_pos > inode->i_sb->s_maxbytes - off - PAGE_SIZE) + return ERR_PTR(-EFBIG); + index += merkle_pos >> PAGE_SHIFT; +again: + page = find_get_page_flags(inode->i_mapping, index, FGP_ACCESSED); + if (page) { + if (PageUptodate(page)) + return page; + + lock_page(page); + /* + * We only insert uptodate pages, so !Uptodate has to be + * an error + */ + if (!PageUptodate(page)) { + unlock_page(page); + put_page(page); + return ERR_PTR(-EIO); + } + unlock_page(page); + return page; + } + + page = __page_cache_alloc(mapping_gfp_constraint(inode->i_mapping, ~__GFP_FS)); + if (!page) + return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); + + /* + * Merkle item keys are indexed from byte 0 in the merkle tree. + * they have the form: + * + * [ inode objectid, BTRFS_MERKLE_ITEM_KEY, offset in bytes ] + */ + ret = read_key_bytes(BTRFS_I(inode), + BTRFS_VERITY_MERKLE_ITEM_KEY, off, + page_address(page), PAGE_SIZE, page); + if (ret < 0) { + put_page(page); + return ERR_PTR(ret); + } + if (ret < PAGE_SIZE) + memzero_page(page, ret, PAGE_SIZE - ret); + + SetPageUptodate(page); + ret = add_to_page_cache_lru(page, inode->i_mapping, index, GFP_NOFS); + + if (!ret) { + /* Inserted and ready for fsverity */ + unlock_page(page); + } else { + put_page(page); + /* Did someone race us into inserting this page? */ + if (ret == -EEXIST) + goto again; + page = ERR_PTR(ret); + } + return page; +} + +/* + * fsverity op that writes a Merkle tree block into the btree. + * + * @inode: inode to write a Merkle tree block for + * @buf: Merkle tree data block to write + * @index: the index of the block in the Merkle tree + * @log_blocksize: log base 2 of the Merkle tree block size + * + * Note that the block size could be different from the page size, so it is not + * safe to assume that index is a page index. + * + * Returns 0 on success or negative error code on failure + */ +static int btrfs_write_merkle_tree_block(struct inode *inode, const void *buf, + u64 index, int log_blocksize) +{ + u64 off = index << log_blocksize; + u64 len = 1ULL << log_blocksize; + loff_t merkle_pos = merkle_file_pos(inode); + + if (merkle_pos < 0) + return merkle_pos; + if (merkle_pos > inode->i_sb->s_maxbytes - off - len) + return -EFBIG; + + return write_key_bytes(BTRFS_I(inode), BTRFS_VERITY_MERKLE_ITEM_KEY, + off, buf, len); +} + +const struct fsverity_operations btrfs_verityops = { + .begin_enable_verity = btrfs_begin_enable_verity, + .end_enable_verity = btrfs_end_enable_verity, + .get_verity_descriptor = btrfs_get_verity_descriptor, + .read_merkle_tree_page = btrfs_read_merkle_tree_page, + .write_merkle_tree_block = btrfs_write_merkle_tree_block, +}; diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/btrfs.h b/include/uapi/linux/btrfs.h index 22cd037123fa..d7d3cfead056 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/btrfs.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/btrfs.h @@ -288,6 +288,7 @@ struct btrfs_ioctl_fs_info_args { * first mount when booting older kernel versions. */ #define BTRFS_FEATURE_COMPAT_RO_FREE_SPACE_TREE_VALID (1ULL << 1) +#define BTRFS_FEATURE_COMPAT_RO_VERITY (1ULL << 2) #define BTRFS_FEATURE_INCOMPAT_MIXED_BACKREF (1ULL << 0) #define BTRFS_FEATURE_INCOMPAT_DEFAULT_SUBVOL (1ULL << 1) diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/btrfs_tree.h b/include/uapi/linux/btrfs_tree.h index ccdb40fe40dc..871d64fdc887 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/btrfs_tree.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/btrfs_tree.h @@ -118,6 +118,29 @@ #define BTRFS_INODE_REF_KEY 12 #define BTRFS_INODE_EXTREF_KEY 13 #define BTRFS_XATTR_ITEM_KEY 24 + +/* + * fs verity items are stored under two different key types on disk. + * The descriptor items: + * [ inode objectid, BTRFS_VERITY_DESC_ITEM_KEY, offset ] + * + * At offset 0, we store a btrfs_verity_descriptor_item which tracks the + * size of the descriptor item and some extra data for encryption. + * Starting at offset 1, these hold the generic fs verity descriptor. + * The latter are opaque to btrfs, we just read and write them as a blob for the + * higher level verity code. The most common descriptor size is 256 bytes. + * + * The merkle tree items: + * [ inode objectid, BTRFS_VERITY_MERKLE_ITEM_KEY, offset ] + * + * These also start at offset 0, and correspond to the merkle tree bytes. + * When fsverity asks for page 0 of the merkle tree, we pull up one page + * starting at offset 0 for this key type. These are also opaque to btrfs, + * we're blindly storing whatever fsverity sends down. + */ +#define BTRFS_VERITY_DESC_ITEM_KEY 36 +#define BTRFS_VERITY_MERKLE_ITEM_KEY 37 + #define BTRFS_ORPHAN_ITEM_KEY 48 /* reserve 2-15 close to the inode for later flexibility */ @@ -991,4 +1014,16 @@ struct btrfs_qgroup_limit_item { __le64 rsv_excl; } __attribute__ ((__packed__)); +struct btrfs_verity_descriptor_item { + /* size of the verity descriptor in bytes */ + __le64 size; + /* + * When we implement support for fscrypt, we will need to encrypt the + * Merkle tree for encrypted verity files. These 128 bits are for the + * eventual storage of an fscrypt initialization vector. + */ + __le64 reserved[2]; + __u8 encryption; +} __attribute__ ((__packed__)); + #endif /* _BTRFS_CTREE_H_ */