| Message ID | 20220202193935.268777-6-vgoyal@redhat.com (mailing list archive) |
|---|---|
| State | New, archived |
| Headers | show |
| Series | virtiofsd: Add support for file security context at file creation | expand |
* Vivek Goyal (vgoyal@redhat.com) wrote: > Add capability to enable and parse security context as sent by client > and put into fuse_req. Filesystems now can get security context from > request and set it on files during creation. > > Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> > --- > tools/virtiofsd/fuse_common.h | 5 ++ > tools/virtiofsd/fuse_i.h | 7 +++ > tools/virtiofsd/fuse_lowlevel.c | 95 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- > 3 files changed, 106 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) > > diff --git a/tools/virtiofsd/fuse_common.h b/tools/virtiofsd/fuse_common.h > index 6f8a988202..bf46954dab 100644 > --- a/tools/virtiofsd/fuse_common.h > +++ b/tools/virtiofsd/fuse_common.h > @@ -377,6 +377,11 @@ struct fuse_file_info { > */ > #define FUSE_CAP_SETXATTR_EXT (1 << 29) > > +/** > + * Indicates that file server supports creating file security context > + */ > +#define FUSE_CAP_SECURITY_CTX (1ULL << 32) > + > /** > * Ioctl flags > * > diff --git a/tools/virtiofsd/fuse_i.h b/tools/virtiofsd/fuse_i.h > index 492e002181..a5572fa4ae 100644 > --- a/tools/virtiofsd/fuse_i.h > +++ b/tools/virtiofsd/fuse_i.h > @@ -15,6 +15,12 @@ > struct fv_VuDev; > struct fv_QueueInfo; > > +struct fuse_security_context { > + const char *name; > + uint32_t ctxlen; > + const void *ctx; > +}; > + > struct fuse_req { > struct fuse_session *se; > uint64_t unique; > @@ -35,6 +41,7 @@ struct fuse_req { > } u; > struct fuse_req *next; > struct fuse_req *prev; > + struct fuse_security_context secctx; > }; > > struct fuse_notify_req { > diff --git a/tools/virtiofsd/fuse_lowlevel.c b/tools/virtiofsd/fuse_lowlevel.c > index 83d29762a4..cd9ef97b3c 100644 > --- a/tools/virtiofsd/fuse_lowlevel.c > +++ b/tools/virtiofsd/fuse_lowlevel.c > @@ -886,11 +886,59 @@ static void do_readlink(fuse_req_t req, fuse_ino_t nodeid, > } > } > > +static int parse_secctx_fill_req(fuse_req_t req, struct fuse_mbuf_iter *iter) > +{ > + struct fuse_secctx_header *fsecctx_header; > + struct fuse_secctx *fsecctx; > + const void *secctx; > + const char *name; > + > + fsecctx_header = fuse_mbuf_iter_advance(iter, sizeof(*fsecctx_header)); > + if (!fsecctx_header) { > + return -EINVAL; > + } > + > + /* > + * As of now maximum of one security context is supported. It can > + * change in future though. > + */ > + if (fsecctx_header->nr_secctx > 1) { > + return -EINVAL; > + } > + > + /* No security context sent. Maybe no LSM supports it */ > + if (!fsecctx_header->nr_secctx) { > + return 0; > + } > + > + fsecctx = fuse_mbuf_iter_advance(iter, sizeof(*fsecctx)); > + if (!fsecctx) { > + return -EINVAL; > + } Are there any sanity checks to be done on fsecctx->size? > + name = fuse_mbuf_iter_advance_str(iter); > + if (!name) { > + return -EINVAL; > + } > + > + secctx = fuse_mbuf_iter_advance(iter, fsecctx->size); > + if (!secctx) { > + return -EINVAL; > + } > + > + req->secctx.name = name; > + req->secctx.ctx = secctx; > + req->secctx.ctxlen = fsecctx->size; It's OK to use the pointers into the iter here rather than take copies? > + return 0; > +} > + > static void do_mknod(fuse_req_t req, fuse_ino_t nodeid, > struct fuse_mbuf_iter *iter) > { > struct fuse_mknod_in *arg; > const char *name; > + bool secctx_enabled = req->se->conn.want & FUSE_CAP_SECURITY_CTX; > + int err; > > arg = fuse_mbuf_iter_advance(iter, sizeof(*arg)); > name = fuse_mbuf_iter_advance_str(iter); > @@ -901,6 +949,13 @@ static void do_mknod(fuse_req_t req, fuse_ino_t nodeid, > > req->ctx.umask = arg->umask; > > + if (secctx_enabled) { > + err = parse_secctx_fill_req(req, iter); > + if (err) { > + fuse_reply_err(req, -err); return ? > + } > + } > + > if (req->se->op.mknod) { > req->se->op.mknod(req, nodeid, name, arg->mode, arg->rdev); > } else { > @@ -913,6 +968,8 @@ static void do_mkdir(fuse_req_t req, fuse_ino_t nodeid, > { > struct fuse_mkdir_in *arg; > const char *name; > + bool secctx_enabled = req->se->conn.want & FUSE_CAP_SECURITY_CTX; > + int err; > > arg = fuse_mbuf_iter_advance(iter, sizeof(*arg)); > name = fuse_mbuf_iter_advance_str(iter); > @@ -923,6 +980,13 @@ static void do_mkdir(fuse_req_t req, fuse_ino_t nodeid, > > req->ctx.umask = arg->umask; > > + if (secctx_enabled) { > + err = parse_secctx_fill_req(req, iter); > + if (err) { > + fuse_reply_err(req, err); return ? > + } > + } > + > if (req->se->op.mkdir) { > req->se->op.mkdir(req, nodeid, name, arg->mode); > } else { > @@ -969,12 +1033,21 @@ static void do_symlink(fuse_req_t req, fuse_ino_t nodeid, > { > const char *name = fuse_mbuf_iter_advance_str(iter); > const char *linkname = fuse_mbuf_iter_advance_str(iter); > + bool secctx_enabled = req->se->conn.want & FUSE_CAP_SECURITY_CTX; > + int err; > > if (!name || !linkname) { > fuse_reply_err(req, EINVAL); > return; > } > > + if (secctx_enabled) { > + err = parse_secctx_fill_req(req, iter); > + if (err) { > + fuse_reply_err(req, err); return ? > + } > + } > + > if (req->se->op.symlink) { > req->se->op.symlink(req, linkname, nodeid, name); > } else { > @@ -1048,6 +1121,8 @@ static void do_link(fuse_req_t req, fuse_ino_t nodeid, > static void do_create(fuse_req_t req, fuse_ino_t nodeid, > struct fuse_mbuf_iter *iter) > { > + bool secctx_enabled = req->se->conn.want & FUSE_CAP_SECURITY_CTX; > + > if (req->se->op.create) { > struct fuse_create_in *arg; > struct fuse_file_info fi; > @@ -1060,6 +1135,15 @@ static void do_create(fuse_req_t req, fuse_ino_t nodeid, > return; > } > > + if (secctx_enabled) { > + int err; > + err = parse_secctx_fill_req(req, iter); > + if (err) { > + fuse_reply_err(req, err); > + return; > + } > + } > + > memset(&fi, 0, sizeof(fi)); > fi.flags = arg->flags; > fi.kill_priv = arg->open_flags & FUSE_OPEN_KILL_SUIDGID; > @@ -2016,6 +2100,9 @@ static void do_init(fuse_req_t req, fuse_ino_t nodeid, > if (flags & FUSE_SETXATTR_EXT) { > se->conn.capable |= FUSE_CAP_SETXATTR_EXT; > } > + if (flags & FUSE_SECURITY_CTX) { > + se->conn.capable |= FUSE_CAP_SECURITY_CTX; > + } > #ifdef HAVE_SPLICE > #ifdef HAVE_VMSPLICE > se->conn.capable |= FUSE_CAP_SPLICE_WRITE | FUSE_CAP_SPLICE_MOVE; > @@ -2155,8 +2242,14 @@ static void do_init(fuse_req_t req, fuse_ino_t nodeid, > outarg.flags |= FUSE_SETXATTR_EXT; > } > > + if (se->conn.want & FUSE_CAP_SECURITY_CTX) { > + /* bits 32..63 get shifted down 32 bits into the flags2 field */ > + outarg.flags2 |= FUSE_SECURITY_CTX >> 32; > + } > + > fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_DEBUG, " INIT: %u.%u\n", outarg.major, outarg.minor); > - fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_DEBUG, " flags=0x%08x\n", outarg.flags); > + fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_DEBUG, " flags2=0x%08x flags=0x%08x\n", outarg.flags2, > + outarg.flags); > fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_DEBUG, " max_readahead=0x%08x\n", outarg.max_readahead); > fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_DEBUG, " max_write=0x%08x\n", outarg.max_write); > fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_DEBUG, " max_background=%i\n", outarg.max_background); > -- > 2.34.1 >
On Thu, Feb 03, 2022 at 07:41:27PM +0000, Dr. David Alan Gilbert wrote: > * Vivek Goyal (vgoyal@redhat.com) wrote: > > Add capability to enable and parse security context as sent by client > > and put into fuse_req. Filesystems now can get security context from > > request and set it on files during creation. > > > > Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> > > --- > > tools/virtiofsd/fuse_common.h | 5 ++ > > tools/virtiofsd/fuse_i.h | 7 +++ > > tools/virtiofsd/fuse_lowlevel.c | 95 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- > > 3 files changed, 106 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) > > > > diff --git a/tools/virtiofsd/fuse_common.h b/tools/virtiofsd/fuse_common.h > > index 6f8a988202..bf46954dab 100644 > > --- a/tools/virtiofsd/fuse_common.h > > +++ b/tools/virtiofsd/fuse_common.h > > @@ -377,6 +377,11 @@ struct fuse_file_info { > > */ > > #define FUSE_CAP_SETXATTR_EXT (1 << 29) > > > > +/** > > + * Indicates that file server supports creating file security context > > + */ > > +#define FUSE_CAP_SECURITY_CTX (1ULL << 32) > > + > > /** > > * Ioctl flags > > * > > diff --git a/tools/virtiofsd/fuse_i.h b/tools/virtiofsd/fuse_i.h > > index 492e002181..a5572fa4ae 100644 > > --- a/tools/virtiofsd/fuse_i.h > > +++ b/tools/virtiofsd/fuse_i.h > > @@ -15,6 +15,12 @@ > > struct fv_VuDev; > > struct fv_QueueInfo; > > > > +struct fuse_security_context { > > + const char *name; > > + uint32_t ctxlen; > > + const void *ctx; > > +}; > > + > > struct fuse_req { > > struct fuse_session *se; > > uint64_t unique; > > @@ -35,6 +41,7 @@ struct fuse_req { > > } u; > > struct fuse_req *next; > > struct fuse_req *prev; > > + struct fuse_security_context secctx; > > }; > > > > struct fuse_notify_req { > > diff --git a/tools/virtiofsd/fuse_lowlevel.c b/tools/virtiofsd/fuse_lowlevel.c > > index 83d29762a4..cd9ef97b3c 100644 > > --- a/tools/virtiofsd/fuse_lowlevel.c > > +++ b/tools/virtiofsd/fuse_lowlevel.c > > @@ -886,11 +886,59 @@ static void do_readlink(fuse_req_t req, fuse_ino_t nodeid, > > } > > } > > > > +static int parse_secctx_fill_req(fuse_req_t req, struct fuse_mbuf_iter *iter) > > +{ > > + struct fuse_secctx_header *fsecctx_header; > > + struct fuse_secctx *fsecctx; > > + const void *secctx; > > + const char *name; > > + > > + fsecctx_header = fuse_mbuf_iter_advance(iter, sizeof(*fsecctx_header)); > > + if (!fsecctx_header) { > > + return -EINVAL; > > + } > > + > > + /* > > + * As of now maximum of one security context is supported. It can > > + * change in future though. > > + */ > > + if (fsecctx_header->nr_secctx > 1) { > > + return -EINVAL; > > + } > > + > > + /* No security context sent. Maybe no LSM supports it */ > > + if (!fsecctx_header->nr_secctx) { > > + return 0; > > + } > > + > > + fsecctx = fuse_mbuf_iter_advance(iter, sizeof(*fsecctx)); > > + if (!fsecctx) { > > + return -EINVAL; > > + } > > Are there any sanity checks to be done on fsecctx->size? May be we can check fsecctx->size is not 0. Also "man xattr" says... "The VFS imposes limitations that an attribute names is limited to 255 bytes and an attribute value is limited to 64 kB." We could probably check those limits. But if VFS decides to raise these limits at some time, then newer kernels will be broken if they decide to send longer security context with older virtiofsd. Very unlikely though. So if you prefer puttling limits of "255" on name and 64kB on size, I can do that. > > > + name = fuse_mbuf_iter_advance_str(iter); > > + if (!name) { > > + return -EINVAL; > > + } > > + > > + secctx = fuse_mbuf_iter_advance(iter, fsecctx->size); > > + if (!secctx) { > > + return -EINVAL; > > + } > > + > > + req->secctx.name = name; > > + req->secctx.ctx = secctx; > > + req->secctx.ctxlen = fsecctx->size; > > It's OK to use the pointers into the iter here rather than take copies? I see lookup() and setxattr() already do that. They pass "name" which is just a pointer into iter. My understanding is that req will not be freed. So iter and associated memory will continue to be valid. So it should be ok and not make copies. Are you concerned about something specific. Thanks Vivek > > > + return 0; > > +} > > + > > static void do_mknod(fuse_req_t req, fuse_ino_t nodeid, > > struct fuse_mbuf_iter *iter) > > { > > struct fuse_mknod_in *arg; > > const char *name; > > + bool secctx_enabled = req->se->conn.want & FUSE_CAP_SECURITY_CTX; > > + int err; > > > > arg = fuse_mbuf_iter_advance(iter, sizeof(*arg)); > > name = fuse_mbuf_iter_advance_str(iter); > > @@ -901,6 +949,13 @@ static void do_mknod(fuse_req_t req, fuse_ino_t nodeid, > > > > req->ctx.umask = arg->umask; > > > > + if (secctx_enabled) { > > + err = parse_secctx_fill_req(req, iter); > > + if (err) { > > + fuse_reply_err(req, -err); > > return ? > > > + } > > + } > > + > > if (req->se->op.mknod) { > > req->se->op.mknod(req, nodeid, name, arg->mode, arg->rdev); > > } else { > > @@ -913,6 +968,8 @@ static void do_mkdir(fuse_req_t req, fuse_ino_t nodeid, > > { > > struct fuse_mkdir_in *arg; > > const char *name; > > + bool secctx_enabled = req->se->conn.want & FUSE_CAP_SECURITY_CTX; > > + int err; > > > > arg = fuse_mbuf_iter_advance(iter, sizeof(*arg)); > > name = fuse_mbuf_iter_advance_str(iter); > > @@ -923,6 +980,13 @@ static void do_mkdir(fuse_req_t req, fuse_ino_t nodeid, > > > > req->ctx.umask = arg->umask; > > > > + if (secctx_enabled) { > > + err = parse_secctx_fill_req(req, iter); > > + if (err) { > > + fuse_reply_err(req, err); > return ? > > + } > > + } > > + > > if (req->se->op.mkdir) { > > req->se->op.mkdir(req, nodeid, name, arg->mode); > > } else { > > @@ -969,12 +1033,21 @@ static void do_symlink(fuse_req_t req, fuse_ino_t nodeid, > > { > > const char *name = fuse_mbuf_iter_advance_str(iter); > > const char *linkname = fuse_mbuf_iter_advance_str(iter); > > + bool secctx_enabled = req->se->conn.want & FUSE_CAP_SECURITY_CTX; > > + int err; > > > > if (!name || !linkname) { > > fuse_reply_err(req, EINVAL); > > return; > > } > > > > + if (secctx_enabled) { > > + err = parse_secctx_fill_req(req, iter); > > + if (err) { > > + fuse_reply_err(req, err); > return ? > > + } > > + } > > + > > if (req->se->op.symlink) { > > req->se->op.symlink(req, linkname, nodeid, name); > > } else { > > @@ -1048,6 +1121,8 @@ static void do_link(fuse_req_t req, fuse_ino_t nodeid, > > static void do_create(fuse_req_t req, fuse_ino_t nodeid, > > struct fuse_mbuf_iter *iter) > > { > > + bool secctx_enabled = req->se->conn.want & FUSE_CAP_SECURITY_CTX; > > + > > if (req->se->op.create) { > > struct fuse_create_in *arg; > > struct fuse_file_info fi; > > @@ -1060,6 +1135,15 @@ static void do_create(fuse_req_t req, fuse_ino_t nodeid, > > return; > > } > > > > + if (secctx_enabled) { > > + int err; > > + err = parse_secctx_fill_req(req, iter); > > + if (err) { > > + fuse_reply_err(req, err); > > + return; > > + } > > + } > > + > > memset(&fi, 0, sizeof(fi)); > > fi.flags = arg->flags; > > fi.kill_priv = arg->open_flags & FUSE_OPEN_KILL_SUIDGID; > > @@ -2016,6 +2100,9 @@ static void do_init(fuse_req_t req, fuse_ino_t nodeid, > > if (flags & FUSE_SETXATTR_EXT) { > > se->conn.capable |= FUSE_CAP_SETXATTR_EXT; > > } > > + if (flags & FUSE_SECURITY_CTX) { > > + se->conn.capable |= FUSE_CAP_SECURITY_CTX; > > + } > > #ifdef HAVE_SPLICE > > #ifdef HAVE_VMSPLICE > > se->conn.capable |= FUSE_CAP_SPLICE_WRITE | FUSE_CAP_SPLICE_MOVE; > > @@ -2155,8 +2242,14 @@ static void do_init(fuse_req_t req, fuse_ino_t nodeid, > > outarg.flags |= FUSE_SETXATTR_EXT; > > } > > > > + if (se->conn.want & FUSE_CAP_SECURITY_CTX) { > > + /* bits 32..63 get shifted down 32 bits into the flags2 field */ > > + outarg.flags2 |= FUSE_SECURITY_CTX >> 32; > > + } > > + > > fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_DEBUG, " INIT: %u.%u\n", outarg.major, outarg.minor); > > - fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_DEBUG, " flags=0x%08x\n", outarg.flags); > > + fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_DEBUG, " flags2=0x%08x flags=0x%08x\n", outarg.flags2, > > + outarg.flags); > > fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_DEBUG, " max_readahead=0x%08x\n", outarg.max_readahead); > > fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_DEBUG, " max_write=0x%08x\n", outarg.max_write); > > fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_DEBUG, " max_background=%i\n", outarg.max_background); > > -- > > 2.34.1 > > > -- > Dr. David Alan Gilbert / dgilbert@redhat.com / Manchester, UK >
diff --git a/tools/virtiofsd/fuse_common.h b/tools/virtiofsd/fuse_common.h index 6f8a988202..bf46954dab 100644 --- a/tools/virtiofsd/fuse_common.h +++ b/tools/virtiofsd/fuse_common.h @@ -377,6 +377,11 @@ struct fuse_file_info { */ #define FUSE_CAP_SETXATTR_EXT (1 << 29) +/** + * Indicates that file server supports creating file security context + */ +#define FUSE_CAP_SECURITY_CTX (1ULL << 32) + /** * Ioctl flags * diff --git a/tools/virtiofsd/fuse_i.h b/tools/virtiofsd/fuse_i.h index 492e002181..a5572fa4ae 100644 --- a/tools/virtiofsd/fuse_i.h +++ b/tools/virtiofsd/fuse_i.h @@ -15,6 +15,12 @@ struct fv_VuDev; struct fv_QueueInfo; +struct fuse_security_context { + const char *name; + uint32_t ctxlen; + const void *ctx; +}; + struct fuse_req { struct fuse_session *se; uint64_t unique; @@ -35,6 +41,7 @@ struct fuse_req { } u; struct fuse_req *next; struct fuse_req *prev; + struct fuse_security_context secctx; }; struct fuse_notify_req { diff --git a/tools/virtiofsd/fuse_lowlevel.c b/tools/virtiofsd/fuse_lowlevel.c index 83d29762a4..cd9ef97b3c 100644 --- a/tools/virtiofsd/fuse_lowlevel.c +++ b/tools/virtiofsd/fuse_lowlevel.c @@ -886,11 +886,59 @@ static void do_readlink(fuse_req_t req, fuse_ino_t nodeid, } } +static int parse_secctx_fill_req(fuse_req_t req, struct fuse_mbuf_iter *iter) +{ + struct fuse_secctx_header *fsecctx_header; + struct fuse_secctx *fsecctx; + const void *secctx; + const char *name; + + fsecctx_header = fuse_mbuf_iter_advance(iter, sizeof(*fsecctx_header)); + if (!fsecctx_header) { + return -EINVAL; + } + + /* + * As of now maximum of one security context is supported. It can + * change in future though. + */ + if (fsecctx_header->nr_secctx > 1) { + return -EINVAL; + } + + /* No security context sent. Maybe no LSM supports it */ + if (!fsecctx_header->nr_secctx) { + return 0; + } + + fsecctx = fuse_mbuf_iter_advance(iter, sizeof(*fsecctx)); + if (!fsecctx) { + return -EINVAL; + } + + name = fuse_mbuf_iter_advance_str(iter); + if (!name) { + return -EINVAL; + } + + secctx = fuse_mbuf_iter_advance(iter, fsecctx->size); + if (!secctx) { + return -EINVAL; + } + + req->secctx.name = name; + req->secctx.ctx = secctx; + req->secctx.ctxlen = fsecctx->size; + return 0; +} + static void do_mknod(fuse_req_t req, fuse_ino_t nodeid, struct fuse_mbuf_iter *iter) { struct fuse_mknod_in *arg; const char *name; + bool secctx_enabled = req->se->conn.want & FUSE_CAP_SECURITY_CTX; + int err; arg = fuse_mbuf_iter_advance(iter, sizeof(*arg)); name = fuse_mbuf_iter_advance_str(iter); @@ -901,6 +949,13 @@ static void do_mknod(fuse_req_t req, fuse_ino_t nodeid, req->ctx.umask = arg->umask; + if (secctx_enabled) { + err = parse_secctx_fill_req(req, iter); + if (err) { + fuse_reply_err(req, -err); + } + } + if (req->se->op.mknod) { req->se->op.mknod(req, nodeid, name, arg->mode, arg->rdev); } else { @@ -913,6 +968,8 @@ static void do_mkdir(fuse_req_t req, fuse_ino_t nodeid, { struct fuse_mkdir_in *arg; const char *name; + bool secctx_enabled = req->se->conn.want & FUSE_CAP_SECURITY_CTX; + int err; arg = fuse_mbuf_iter_advance(iter, sizeof(*arg)); name = fuse_mbuf_iter_advance_str(iter); @@ -923,6 +980,13 @@ static void do_mkdir(fuse_req_t req, fuse_ino_t nodeid, req->ctx.umask = arg->umask; + if (secctx_enabled) { + err = parse_secctx_fill_req(req, iter); + if (err) { + fuse_reply_err(req, err); + } + } + if (req->se->op.mkdir) { req->se->op.mkdir(req, nodeid, name, arg->mode); } else { @@ -969,12 +1033,21 @@ static void do_symlink(fuse_req_t req, fuse_ino_t nodeid, { const char *name = fuse_mbuf_iter_advance_str(iter); const char *linkname = fuse_mbuf_iter_advance_str(iter); + bool secctx_enabled = req->se->conn.want & FUSE_CAP_SECURITY_CTX; + int err; if (!name || !linkname) { fuse_reply_err(req, EINVAL); return; } + if (secctx_enabled) { + err = parse_secctx_fill_req(req, iter); + if (err) { + fuse_reply_err(req, err); + } + } + if (req->se->op.symlink) { req->se->op.symlink(req, linkname, nodeid, name); } else { @@ -1048,6 +1121,8 @@ static void do_link(fuse_req_t req, fuse_ino_t nodeid, static void do_create(fuse_req_t req, fuse_ino_t nodeid, struct fuse_mbuf_iter *iter) { + bool secctx_enabled = req->se->conn.want & FUSE_CAP_SECURITY_CTX; + if (req->se->op.create) { struct fuse_create_in *arg; struct fuse_file_info fi; @@ -1060,6 +1135,15 @@ static void do_create(fuse_req_t req, fuse_ino_t nodeid, return; } + if (secctx_enabled) { + int err; + err = parse_secctx_fill_req(req, iter); + if (err) { + fuse_reply_err(req, err); + return; + } + } + memset(&fi, 0, sizeof(fi)); fi.flags = arg->flags; fi.kill_priv = arg->open_flags & FUSE_OPEN_KILL_SUIDGID; @@ -2016,6 +2100,9 @@ static void do_init(fuse_req_t req, fuse_ino_t nodeid, if (flags & FUSE_SETXATTR_EXT) { se->conn.capable |= FUSE_CAP_SETXATTR_EXT; } + if (flags & FUSE_SECURITY_CTX) { + se->conn.capable |= FUSE_CAP_SECURITY_CTX; + } #ifdef HAVE_SPLICE #ifdef HAVE_VMSPLICE se->conn.capable |= FUSE_CAP_SPLICE_WRITE | FUSE_CAP_SPLICE_MOVE; @@ -2155,8 +2242,14 @@ static void do_init(fuse_req_t req, fuse_ino_t nodeid, outarg.flags |= FUSE_SETXATTR_EXT; } + if (se->conn.want & FUSE_CAP_SECURITY_CTX) { + /* bits 32..63 get shifted down 32 bits into the flags2 field */ + outarg.flags2 |= FUSE_SECURITY_CTX >> 32; + } + fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_DEBUG, " INIT: %u.%u\n", outarg.major, outarg.minor); - fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_DEBUG, " flags=0x%08x\n", outarg.flags); + fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_DEBUG, " flags2=0x%08x flags=0x%08x\n", outarg.flags2, + outarg.flags); fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_DEBUG, " max_readahead=0x%08x\n", outarg.max_readahead); fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_DEBUG, " max_write=0x%08x\n", outarg.max_write); fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_DEBUG, " max_background=%i\n", outarg.max_background);
Add capability to enable and parse security context as sent by client and put into fuse_req. Filesystems now can get security context from request and set it on files during creation. Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> --- tools/virtiofsd/fuse_common.h | 5 ++ tools/virtiofsd/fuse_i.h | 7 +++ tools/virtiofsd/fuse_lowlevel.c | 95 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 3 files changed, 106 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)