| Message ID | 20220204161251.241877-1-cohuck@redhat.com (mailing list archive) |
|---|---|
| State | New, archived |
| Headers | show |
| Series | docs: rstfy confidential guest documentation | expand |
On 2/4/22 13:12, Cornelia Huck wrote: > Also rstfy the documentation for AMD SEV, and link it. > > The documentation for PEF had been merged into the pseries doc, > fix the reference. Yeah, we forgot to fix/remove the existing papr-pef.txt reference after the changes we made. Thanks for fixing this up and making a new ref for it in the pseries doc. > > Signed-off-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com> > --- > MAINTAINERS | 2 +- > .../confidential-guest-support.rst} | 15 +-- > .../i386/amd-memory-encryption.rst} | 102 ++++++++++-------- > docs/system/index.rst | 1 + > docs/system/ppc/pseries.rst | 2 + > docs/system/target-i386.rst | 1 + > 6 files changed, 67 insertions(+), 56 deletions(-) > rename docs/{confidential-guest-support.txt => system/confidential-guest-support.rst} (77%) > rename docs/{amd-memory-encryption.txt => system/i386/amd-memory-encryption.rst} (62%) > > diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS > index 9814580975c5..8944fb561c0b 100644 > --- a/MAINTAINERS > +++ b/MAINTAINERS > @@ -408,7 +408,7 @@ M: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> > M: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com> > L: kvm@vger.kernel.org > S: Supported > -F: docs/amd-memory-encryption.txt > +F: docs/system/i386/amd-memory-encryption.rst > F: docs/system/i386/sgx.rst > F: target/i386/kvm/ > F: target/i386/sev* > diff --git a/docs/confidential-guest-support.txt b/docs/system/confidential-guest-support.rst > similarity index 77% > rename from docs/confidential-guest-support.txt > rename to docs/system/confidential-guest-support.rst > index 71d07ba57af8..0c490dbda2b7 100644 > --- a/docs/confidential-guest-support.txt > +++ b/docs/system/confidential-guest-support.rst > @@ -19,10 +19,10 @@ Running a Confidential Guest > > To run a confidential guest you need to add two command line parameters: > > -1. Use "-object" to create a "confidential guest support" object. The > +1. Use ``-object`` to create a "confidential guest support" object. The > type and parameters will vary with the specific mechanism to be > used > -2. Set the "confidential-guest-support" machine parameter to the ID of > +2. Set the ``confidential-guest-support`` machine parameter to the ID of > the object from (1). > > Example (for AMD SEV):: > @@ -37,13 +37,8 @@ Supported mechanisms > > Currently supported confidential guest mechanisms are: > > -AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) > - docs/amd-memory-encryption.txt > - > -POWER Protected Execution Facility (PEF) > - docs/papr-pef.txt > - > -s390x Protected Virtualization (PV) > - docs/system/s390x/protvirt.rst > +* AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) (see :doc:`i386/amd-memory-encryption`) > +* POWER Protected Execution Facility (PEF) (see :ref:`power-papr-protected-execution-facility-pef`) > +* s390x Protected Virtualization (PV) (see :doc:`s390x/protvirt`) > > Other mechanisms may be supported in future. > diff --git a/docs/amd-memory-encryption.txt b/docs/system/i386/amd-memory-encryption.rst > similarity index 62% > rename from docs/amd-memory-encryption.txt > rename to docs/system/i386/amd-memory-encryption.rst > index ffca382b5f5d..215946f813bb 100644 > --- a/docs/amd-memory-encryption.txt > +++ b/docs/system/i386/amd-memory-encryption.rst > @@ -1,3 +1,6 @@ > +AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) > +========================================= > + > Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) is a feature found on AMD processors. > > SEV is an extension to the AMD-V architecture which supports running encrypted > @@ -24,17 +27,18 @@ the hypervisor to satisfy the requested function. > > Launching > --------- > + > Boot images (such as bios) must be encrypted before a guest can be booted. The > -MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP ioctl provides commands to encrypt the images: LAUNCH_START, > -LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA, LAUNCH_MEASURE and LAUNCH_FINISH. These four commands > +``MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP`` ioctl provides commands to encrypt the images: ``LAUNCH_START``, > +``LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA``, ``LAUNCH_MEASURE`` and ``LAUNCH_FINISH``. These four commands > together generate a fresh memory encryption key for the VM, encrypt the boot > images and provide a measurement than can be used as an attestation of a > successful launch. > > -For a SEV-ES guest, the LAUNCH_UPDATE_VMSA command is also used to encrypt the > +For a SEV-ES guest, the ``LAUNCH_UPDATE_VMSA`` command is also used to encrypt the > guest register state, or VM save area (VMSA), for all of the guest vCPUs. > > -LAUNCH_START is called first to create a cryptographic launch context within > +``LAUNCH_START`` is called first to create a cryptographic launch context within > the firmware. To create this context, guest owner must provide a guest policy, > its public Diffie-Hellman key (PDH) and session parameters. These inputs > should be treated as a binary blob and must be passed as-is to the SEV firmware. > @@ -45,37 +49,37 @@ in bad measurement). The guest policy is a 4-byte data structure containing > several flags that restricts what can be done on a running SEV guest. > See KM Spec section 3 and 6.2 for more details. > > -The guest policy can be provided via the 'policy' property (see below) I approve the "(see below)" instances that you ended up removing. It sounded a bit redundant when used in the end of the sentence. Reviewed-by: Daniel Henrique Barboza <danielhb413@gmail.com> > +The guest policy can be provided via the ``policy`` property:: > > -# ${QEMU} \ > - sev-guest,id=sev0,policy=0x1...\ > + # ${QEMU} \ > + sev-guest,id=sev0,policy=0x1...\ > > Setting the "SEV-ES required" policy bit (bit 2) will launch the guest as a > -SEV-ES guest (see below) > +SEV-ES guest:: > > -# ${QEMU} \ > - sev-guest,id=sev0,policy=0x5...\ > + # ${QEMU} \ > + sev-guest,id=sev0,policy=0x5...\ > > The guest owner provided DH certificate and session parameters will be used to > establish a cryptographic session with the guest owner to negotiate keys used > for the attestation. > > -The DH certificate and session blob can be provided via the 'dh-cert-file' and > -'session-file' properties (see below) > +The DH certificate and session blob can be provided via the ``dh-cert-file`` and > +``session-file`` properties:: > > -# ${QEMU} \ > - sev-guest,id=sev0,dh-cert-file=<file1>,session-file=<file2> > + # ${QEMU} \ > + sev-guest,id=sev0,dh-cert-file=<file1>,session-file=<file2> > > -LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA encrypts the memory region using the cryptographic context > -created via the LAUNCH_START command. If required, this command can be called > +``LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA`` encrypts the memory region using the cryptographic context > +created via the ``LAUNCH_START`` command. If required, this command can be called > multiple times to encrypt different memory regions. The command also calculates > the measurement of the memory contents as it encrypts. > > -LAUNCH_UPDATE_VMSA encrypts all the vCPU VMSAs for a SEV-ES guest using the > -cryptographic context created via the LAUNCH_START command. The command also > +``LAUNCH_UPDATE_VMSA`` encrypts all the vCPU VMSAs for a SEV-ES guest using the > +cryptographic context created via the ``LAUNCH_START`` command. The command also > calculates the measurement of the VMSAs as it encrypts them. > > -LAUNCH_MEASURE can be used to retrieve the measurement of encrypted memory and, > +``LAUNCH_MEASURE`` can be used to retrieve the measurement of encrypted memory and, > for a SEV-ES guest, encrypted VMSAs. This measurement is a signature of the > memory contents and, for a SEV-ES guest, the VMSA contents, that can be sent > to the guest owner as an attestation that the memory and VMSAs were encrypted > @@ -85,27 +89,28 @@ Since the guest owner knows the initial contents of the guest at boot, the > attestation measurement can be verified by comparing it to what the guest owner > expects. > > -LAUNCH_FINISH finalizes the guest launch and destroys the cryptographic > +``LAUNCH_FINISH`` finalizes the guest launch and destroys the cryptographic > context. > > -See SEV KM API Spec [1] 'Launching a guest' usage flow (Appendix A) for the > +See SEV KM API Spec ([SEVKM]_) 'Launching a guest' usage flow (Appendix A) for the > complete flow chart. > > -To launch a SEV guest > +To launch a SEV guest:: > > -# ${QEMU} \ > - -machine ...,confidential-guest-support=sev0 \ > - -object sev-guest,id=sev0,cbitpos=47,reduced-phys-bits=1 > + # ${QEMU} \ > + -machine ...,confidential-guest-support=sev0 \ > + -object sev-guest,id=sev0,cbitpos=47,reduced-phys-bits=1 > > -To launch a SEV-ES guest > +To launch a SEV-ES guest:: > > -# ${QEMU} \ > - -machine ...,confidential-guest-support=sev0 \ > - -object sev-guest,id=sev0,cbitpos=47,reduced-phys-bits=1,policy=0x5 > + # ${QEMU} \ > + -machine ...,confidential-guest-support=sev0 \ > + -object sev-guest,id=sev0,cbitpos=47,reduced-phys-bits=1,policy=0x5 > > An SEV-ES guest has some restrictions as compared to a SEV guest. Because the > guest register state is encrypted and cannot be updated by the VMM/hypervisor, > a SEV-ES guest: > + > - Does not support SMM - SMM support requires updating the guest register > state. > - Does not support reboot - a system reset requires updating the guest register > @@ -114,35 +119,42 @@ a SEV-ES guest: > manage booting APs. > > Debugging > ------------ > +--------- > + > Since the memory contents of a SEV guest are encrypted, hypervisor access to > the guest memory will return cipher text. If the guest policy allows debugging, > then a hypervisor can use the DEBUG_DECRYPT and DEBUG_ENCRYPT commands to access > the guest memory region for debug purposes. This is not supported in QEMU yet. > > Snapshot/Restore > ------------------ > +---------------- > + > TODO > > Live Migration > ----------------- > +--------------- > + > TODO > > References > ------------------ > +---------- > > -AMD Memory Encryption whitepaper: > -https://developer.amd.com/wordpress/media/2013/12/AMD_Memory_Encryption_Whitepaper_v7-Public.pdf > +`AMD Memory Encryption whitepaper > +<https://developer.amd.com/wordpress/media/2013/12/AMD_Memory_Encryption_Whitepaper_v7-Public.pdf>`_ > > -Secure Encrypted Virtualization Key Management: > -[1] http://developer.amd.com/wordpress/media/2017/11/55766_SEV-KM-API_Specification.pdf > +.. [SEVKM] `Secure Encrypted Virtualization Key Management > + <http://developer.amd.com/wordpress/media/2017/11/55766_SEV-KM-API_Specification.pdf>`_ > > KVM Forum slides: > -http://www.linux-kvm.org/images/7/74/02x08A-Thomas_Lendacky-AMDs_Virtualizatoin_Memory_Encryption_Technology.pdf > -https://www.linux-kvm.org/images/9/94/Extending-Secure-Encrypted-Virtualization-with-SEV-ES-Thomas-Lendacky-AMD.pdf > - > -AMD64 Architecture Programmer's Manual: > - http://support.amd.com/TechDocs/24593.pdf > - SME is section 7.10 > - SEV is section 15.34 > - SEV-ES is section 15.35 > + > +* `AMD’s Virtualization Memory Encryption (2016) > + <http://www.linux-kvm.org/images/7/74/02x08A-Thomas_Lendacky-AMDs_Virtualizatoin_Memory_Encryption_Technology.pdf>`_ > +* `Extending Secure Encrypted Virtualization With SEV-ES (2018) > + <https://www.linux-kvm.org/images/9/94/Extending-Secure-Encrypted-Virtualization-with-SEV-ES-Thomas-Lendacky-AMD.pdf>`_ > + > +`AMD64 Architecture Programmer's Manual: > +<http://support.amd.com/TechDocs/24593.pdf>`_ > + > +* SME is section 7.10 > +* SEV is section 15.34 > +* SEV-ES is section 15.35 > diff --git a/docs/system/index.rst b/docs/system/index.rst > index 73bbedbc22d4..23e30e26e5e6 100644 > --- a/docs/system/index.rst > +++ b/docs/system/index.rst > @@ -34,3 +34,4 @@ or Hypervisor.Framework. > targets > security > multi-process > + confidential-guest-support > diff --git a/docs/system/ppc/pseries.rst b/docs/system/ppc/pseries.rst > index 569237dc0c8b..d9b65ad4e850 100644 > --- a/docs/system/ppc/pseries.rst > +++ b/docs/system/ppc/pseries.rst > @@ -224,6 +224,8 @@ nested. Combinations not shown in the table are not available. > .. [3] Introduced on Power10 machines. > > > +.. _power-papr-protected-execution-facility-pef: > + > POWER (PAPR) Protected Execution Facility (PEF) > ----------------------------------------------- > > diff --git a/docs/system/target-i386.rst b/docs/system/target-i386.rst > index 4daa53c35d8f..96bf54889a82 100644 > --- a/docs/system/target-i386.rst > +++ b/docs/system/target-i386.rst > @@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ Architectural features > i386/cpu > i386/kvm-pv > i386/sgx > + i386/amd-memory-encryption > > .. _pcsys_005freq: >
On 2/4/22 17:12, Cornelia Huck wrote: > Also rstfy the documentation for AMD SEV, and link it. > > The documentation for PEF had been merged into the pseries doc, > fix the reference. > > Signed-off-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com> Applied to ppc-7.0. Thanks, C.
diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS index 9814580975c5..8944fb561c0b 100644 --- a/MAINTAINERS +++ b/MAINTAINERS @@ -408,7 +408,7 @@ M: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> M: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com> L: kvm@vger.kernel.org S: Supported -F: docs/amd-memory-encryption.txt +F: docs/system/i386/amd-memory-encryption.rst F: docs/system/i386/sgx.rst F: target/i386/kvm/ F: target/i386/sev* diff --git a/docs/confidential-guest-support.txt b/docs/system/confidential-guest-support.rst similarity index 77% rename from docs/confidential-guest-support.txt rename to docs/system/confidential-guest-support.rst index 71d07ba57af8..0c490dbda2b7 100644 --- a/docs/confidential-guest-support.txt +++ b/docs/system/confidential-guest-support.rst @@ -19,10 +19,10 @@ Running a Confidential Guest To run a confidential guest you need to add two command line parameters: -1. Use "-object" to create a "confidential guest support" object. The +1. Use ``-object`` to create a "confidential guest support" object. The type and parameters will vary with the specific mechanism to be used -2. Set the "confidential-guest-support" machine parameter to the ID of +2. Set the ``confidential-guest-support`` machine parameter to the ID of the object from (1). Example (for AMD SEV):: @@ -37,13 +37,8 @@ Supported mechanisms Currently supported confidential guest mechanisms are: -AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) - docs/amd-memory-encryption.txt - -POWER Protected Execution Facility (PEF) - docs/papr-pef.txt - -s390x Protected Virtualization (PV) - docs/system/s390x/protvirt.rst +* AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) (see :doc:`i386/amd-memory-encryption`) +* POWER Protected Execution Facility (PEF) (see :ref:`power-papr-protected-execution-facility-pef`) +* s390x Protected Virtualization (PV) (see :doc:`s390x/protvirt`) Other mechanisms may be supported in future. diff --git a/docs/amd-memory-encryption.txt b/docs/system/i386/amd-memory-encryption.rst similarity index 62% rename from docs/amd-memory-encryption.txt rename to docs/system/i386/amd-memory-encryption.rst index ffca382b5f5d..215946f813bb 100644 --- a/docs/amd-memory-encryption.txt +++ b/docs/system/i386/amd-memory-encryption.rst @@ -1,3 +1,6 @@ +AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) +========================================= + Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) is a feature found on AMD processors. SEV is an extension to the AMD-V architecture which supports running encrypted @@ -24,17 +27,18 @@ the hypervisor to satisfy the requested function. Launching --------- + Boot images (such as bios) must be encrypted before a guest can be booted. The -MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP ioctl provides commands to encrypt the images: LAUNCH_START, -LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA, LAUNCH_MEASURE and LAUNCH_FINISH. These four commands +``MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP`` ioctl provides commands to encrypt the images: ``LAUNCH_START``, +``LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA``, ``LAUNCH_MEASURE`` and ``LAUNCH_FINISH``. These four commands together generate a fresh memory encryption key for the VM, encrypt the boot images and provide a measurement than can be used as an attestation of a successful launch. -For a SEV-ES guest, the LAUNCH_UPDATE_VMSA command is also used to encrypt the +For a SEV-ES guest, the ``LAUNCH_UPDATE_VMSA`` command is also used to encrypt the guest register state, or VM save area (VMSA), for all of the guest vCPUs. -LAUNCH_START is called first to create a cryptographic launch context within +``LAUNCH_START`` is called first to create a cryptographic launch context within the firmware. To create this context, guest owner must provide a guest policy, its public Diffie-Hellman key (PDH) and session parameters. These inputs should be treated as a binary blob and must be passed as-is to the SEV firmware. @@ -45,37 +49,37 @@ in bad measurement). The guest policy is a 4-byte data structure containing several flags that restricts what can be done on a running SEV guest. See KM Spec section 3 and 6.2 for more details. -The guest policy can be provided via the 'policy' property (see below) +The guest policy can be provided via the ``policy`` property:: -# ${QEMU} \ - sev-guest,id=sev0,policy=0x1...\ + # ${QEMU} \ + sev-guest,id=sev0,policy=0x1...\ Setting the "SEV-ES required" policy bit (bit 2) will launch the guest as a -SEV-ES guest (see below) +SEV-ES guest:: -# ${QEMU} \ - sev-guest,id=sev0,policy=0x5...\ + # ${QEMU} \ + sev-guest,id=sev0,policy=0x5...\ The guest owner provided DH certificate and session parameters will be used to establish a cryptographic session with the guest owner to negotiate keys used for the attestation. -The DH certificate and session blob can be provided via the 'dh-cert-file' and -'session-file' properties (see below) +The DH certificate and session blob can be provided via the ``dh-cert-file`` and +``session-file`` properties:: -# ${QEMU} \ - sev-guest,id=sev0,dh-cert-file=<file1>,session-file=<file2> + # ${QEMU} \ + sev-guest,id=sev0,dh-cert-file=<file1>,session-file=<file2> -LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA encrypts the memory region using the cryptographic context -created via the LAUNCH_START command. If required, this command can be called +``LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA`` encrypts the memory region using the cryptographic context +created via the ``LAUNCH_START`` command. If required, this command can be called multiple times to encrypt different memory regions. The command also calculates the measurement of the memory contents as it encrypts. -LAUNCH_UPDATE_VMSA encrypts all the vCPU VMSAs for a SEV-ES guest using the -cryptographic context created via the LAUNCH_START command. The command also +``LAUNCH_UPDATE_VMSA`` encrypts all the vCPU VMSAs for a SEV-ES guest using the +cryptographic context created via the ``LAUNCH_START`` command. The command also calculates the measurement of the VMSAs as it encrypts them. -LAUNCH_MEASURE can be used to retrieve the measurement of encrypted memory and, +``LAUNCH_MEASURE`` can be used to retrieve the measurement of encrypted memory and, for a SEV-ES guest, encrypted VMSAs. This measurement is a signature of the memory contents and, for a SEV-ES guest, the VMSA contents, that can be sent to the guest owner as an attestation that the memory and VMSAs were encrypted @@ -85,27 +89,28 @@ Since the guest owner knows the initial contents of the guest at boot, the attestation measurement can be verified by comparing it to what the guest owner expects. -LAUNCH_FINISH finalizes the guest launch and destroys the cryptographic +``LAUNCH_FINISH`` finalizes the guest launch and destroys the cryptographic context. -See SEV KM API Spec [1] 'Launching a guest' usage flow (Appendix A) for the +See SEV KM API Spec ([SEVKM]_) 'Launching a guest' usage flow (Appendix A) for the complete flow chart. -To launch a SEV guest +To launch a SEV guest:: -# ${QEMU} \ - -machine ...,confidential-guest-support=sev0 \ - -object sev-guest,id=sev0,cbitpos=47,reduced-phys-bits=1 + # ${QEMU} \ + -machine ...,confidential-guest-support=sev0 \ + -object sev-guest,id=sev0,cbitpos=47,reduced-phys-bits=1 -To launch a SEV-ES guest +To launch a SEV-ES guest:: -# ${QEMU} \ - -machine ...,confidential-guest-support=sev0 \ - -object sev-guest,id=sev0,cbitpos=47,reduced-phys-bits=1,policy=0x5 + # ${QEMU} \ + -machine ...,confidential-guest-support=sev0 \ + -object sev-guest,id=sev0,cbitpos=47,reduced-phys-bits=1,policy=0x5 An SEV-ES guest has some restrictions as compared to a SEV guest. Because the guest register state is encrypted and cannot be updated by the VMM/hypervisor, a SEV-ES guest: + - Does not support SMM - SMM support requires updating the guest register state. - Does not support reboot - a system reset requires updating the guest register @@ -114,35 +119,42 @@ a SEV-ES guest: manage booting APs. Debugging ------------ +--------- + Since the memory contents of a SEV guest are encrypted, hypervisor access to the guest memory will return cipher text. If the guest policy allows debugging, then a hypervisor can use the DEBUG_DECRYPT and DEBUG_ENCRYPT commands to access the guest memory region for debug purposes. This is not supported in QEMU yet. Snapshot/Restore ------------------ +---------------- + TODO Live Migration ----------------- +--------------- + TODO References ------------------ +---------- -AMD Memory Encryption whitepaper: -https://developer.amd.com/wordpress/media/2013/12/AMD_Memory_Encryption_Whitepaper_v7-Public.pdf +`AMD Memory Encryption whitepaper +<https://developer.amd.com/wordpress/media/2013/12/AMD_Memory_Encryption_Whitepaper_v7-Public.pdf>`_ -Secure Encrypted Virtualization Key Management: -[1] http://developer.amd.com/wordpress/media/2017/11/55766_SEV-KM-API_Specification.pdf +.. [SEVKM] `Secure Encrypted Virtualization Key Management + <http://developer.amd.com/wordpress/media/2017/11/55766_SEV-KM-API_Specification.pdf>`_ KVM Forum slides: -http://www.linux-kvm.org/images/7/74/02x08A-Thomas_Lendacky-AMDs_Virtualizatoin_Memory_Encryption_Technology.pdf -https://www.linux-kvm.org/images/9/94/Extending-Secure-Encrypted-Virtualization-with-SEV-ES-Thomas-Lendacky-AMD.pdf - -AMD64 Architecture Programmer's Manual: - http://support.amd.com/TechDocs/24593.pdf - SME is section 7.10 - SEV is section 15.34 - SEV-ES is section 15.35 + +* `AMD’s Virtualization Memory Encryption (2016) + <http://www.linux-kvm.org/images/7/74/02x08A-Thomas_Lendacky-AMDs_Virtualizatoin_Memory_Encryption_Technology.pdf>`_ +* `Extending Secure Encrypted Virtualization With SEV-ES (2018) + <https://www.linux-kvm.org/images/9/94/Extending-Secure-Encrypted-Virtualization-with-SEV-ES-Thomas-Lendacky-AMD.pdf>`_ + +`AMD64 Architecture Programmer's Manual: +<http://support.amd.com/TechDocs/24593.pdf>`_ + +* SME is section 7.10 +* SEV is section 15.34 +* SEV-ES is section 15.35 diff --git a/docs/system/index.rst b/docs/system/index.rst index 73bbedbc22d4..23e30e26e5e6 100644 --- a/docs/system/index.rst +++ b/docs/system/index.rst @@ -34,3 +34,4 @@ or Hypervisor.Framework. targets security multi-process + confidential-guest-support diff --git a/docs/system/ppc/pseries.rst b/docs/system/ppc/pseries.rst index 569237dc0c8b..d9b65ad4e850 100644 --- a/docs/system/ppc/pseries.rst +++ b/docs/system/ppc/pseries.rst @@ -224,6 +224,8 @@ nested. Combinations not shown in the table are not available. .. [3] Introduced on Power10 machines. +.. _power-papr-protected-execution-facility-pef: + POWER (PAPR) Protected Execution Facility (PEF) ----------------------------------------------- diff --git a/docs/system/target-i386.rst b/docs/system/target-i386.rst index 4daa53c35d8f..96bf54889a82 100644 --- a/docs/system/target-i386.rst +++ b/docs/system/target-i386.rst @@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ Architectural features i386/cpu i386/kvm-pv i386/sgx + i386/amd-memory-encryption .. _pcsys_005freq:
Also rstfy the documentation for AMD SEV, and link it. The documentation for PEF had been merged into the pseries doc, fix the reference. Signed-off-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com> --- MAINTAINERS | 2 +- .../confidential-guest-support.rst} | 15 +-- .../i386/amd-memory-encryption.rst} | 102 ++++++++++-------- docs/system/index.rst | 1 + docs/system/ppc/pseries.rst | 2 + docs/system/target-i386.rst | 1 + 6 files changed, 67 insertions(+), 56 deletions(-) rename docs/{confidential-guest-support.txt => system/confidential-guest-support.rst} (77%) rename docs/{amd-memory-encryption.txt => system/i386/amd-memory-encryption.rst} (62%)