@@ -863,6 +863,7 @@ static inline bool module_sig_ok(struct module *module)
{
return true;
}
+#define sig_enforce false
#endif /* CONFIG_MODULE_SIG */
int module_kallsyms_on_each_symbol(int (*fn)(void *, const char *,
@@ -162,3 +162,12 @@ static int module_enforce_rwx_sections(Elf_Ehdr *hdr, Elf_Shdr *sechdrs,
return 0;
}
#endif /* CONFIG_STRICT_MODULE_RWX */
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG
+int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info, int flags);
+#else /* !CONFIG_MODULE_SIG */
+static inline int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info, int flags)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif /* !CONFIG_MODULE_SIG */
@@ -23,7 +23,6 @@
#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
#include <linux/elf.h>
#include <linux/proc_fs.h>
-#include <linux/security.h>
#include <linux/seq_file.h>
#include <linux/syscalls.h>
#include <linux/fcntl.h>
@@ -124,28 +123,6 @@ static void module_assert_mutex_or_preempt(void)
#endif
}
-#ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG
-static bool sig_enforce = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE);
-module_param(sig_enforce, bool_enable_only, 0644);
-
-void set_module_sig_enforced(void)
-{
- sig_enforce = true;
-}
-#else
-#define sig_enforce false
-#endif
-
-/*
- * Export sig_enforce kernel cmdline parameter to allow other subsystems rely
- * on that instead of directly to CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE config.
- */
-bool is_module_sig_enforced(void)
-{
- return sig_enforce;
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(is_module_sig_enforced);
-
/* Block module loading/unloading? */
int modules_disabled = 0;
core_param(nomodule, modules_disabled, bint, 0);
@@ -2565,70 +2542,6 @@ static inline void kmemleak_load_module(const struct module *mod,
}
#endif
-#ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG
-static int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info, int flags)
-{
- int err = -ENODATA;
- const unsigned long markerlen = sizeof(MODULE_SIG_STRING) - 1;
- const char *reason;
- const void *mod = info->hdr;
- bool mangled_module = flags & (MODULE_INIT_IGNORE_MODVERSIONS |
- MODULE_INIT_IGNORE_VERMAGIC);
- /*
- * Do not allow mangled modules as a module with version information
- * removed is no longer the module that was signed.
- */
- if (!mangled_module &&
- info->len > markerlen &&
- memcmp(mod + info->len - markerlen, MODULE_SIG_STRING, markerlen) == 0) {
- /* We truncate the module to discard the signature */
- info->len -= markerlen;
- err = mod_verify_sig(mod, info);
- if (!err) {
- info->sig_ok = true;
- return 0;
- }
- }
-
- /*
- * We don't permit modules to be loaded into the trusted kernels
- * without a valid signature on them, but if we're not enforcing,
- * certain errors are non-fatal.
- */
- switch (err) {
- case -ENODATA:
- reason = "unsigned module";
- break;
- case -ENOPKG:
- reason = "module with unsupported crypto";
- break;
- case -ENOKEY:
- reason = "module with unavailable key";
- break;
-
- default:
- /*
- * All other errors are fatal, including lack of memory,
- * unparseable signatures, and signature check failures --
- * even if signatures aren't required.
- */
- return err;
- }
-
- if (is_module_sig_enforced()) {
- pr_notice("Loading of %s is rejected\n", reason);
- return -EKEYREJECTED;
- }
-
- return security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_MODULE_SIGNATURE);
-}
-#else /* !CONFIG_MODULE_SIG */
-static int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info, int flags)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-#endif /* !CONFIG_MODULE_SIG */
-
static int validate_section_offset(struct load_info *info, Elf_Shdr *shdr)
{
#if defined(CONFIG_64BIT)
@@ -11,9 +11,28 @@
#include <linux/module_signature.h>
#include <linux/string.h>
#include <linux/verification.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
#include <crypto/public_key.h>
#include "internal.h"
+static bool sig_enforce = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE);
+module_param(sig_enforce, bool_enable_only, 0644);
+
+/*
+ * Export sig_enforce kernel cmdline parameter to allow other subsystems rely
+ * on that instead of directly to CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE config.
+ */
+bool is_module_sig_enforced(void)
+{
+ return sig_enforce;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(is_module_sig_enforced);
+
+void set_module_sig_enforced(void)
+{
+ sig_enforce = true;
+}
+
/*
* Verify the signature on a module.
*/
@@ -43,3 +62,59 @@ int mod_verify_sig(const void *mod, struct load_info *info)
VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE,
NULL, NULL);
}
+
+int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info, int flags)
+{
+ int err = -ENODATA;
+ const unsigned long markerlen = sizeof(MODULE_SIG_STRING) - 1;
+ const char *reason;
+ const void *mod = info->hdr;
+
+ /*
+ * Require flags == 0, as a module with version information
+ * removed is no longer the module that was signed
+ */
+ if (flags == 0 &&
+ info->len > markerlen &&
+ memcmp(mod + info->len - markerlen, MODULE_SIG_STRING, markerlen) == 0) {
+ /* We truncate the module to discard the signature */
+ info->len -= markerlen;
+ err = mod_verify_sig(mod, info);
+ if (!err) {
+ info->sig_ok = true;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * We don't permit modules to be loaded into the trusted kernels
+ * without a valid signature on them, but if we're not enforcing,
+ * certain errors are non-fatal.
+ */
+ switch (err) {
+ case -ENODATA:
+ reason = "unsigned module";
+ break;
+ case -ENOPKG:
+ reason = "module with unsupported crypto";
+ break;
+ case -ENOKEY:
+ reason = "module with unavailable key";
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ /*
+ * All other errors are fatal, including lack of memory,
+ * unparseable signatures, and signature check failures --
+ * even if signatures aren't required.
+ */
+ return err;
+ }
+
+ if (is_module_sig_enforced()) {
+ pr_notice("Loading of %s is rejected\n", reason);
+ return -EKEYREJECTED;
+ }
+
+ return security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_MODULE_SIGNATURE);
+}
No functional change. This patch migrates additional module signature check code from core module code into kernel/module/signing.c. Signed-off-by: Aaron Tomlin <atomlin@redhat.com> --- include/linux/module.h | 1 + kernel/module/internal.h | 9 +++++ kernel/module/main.c | 87 ---------------------------------------- kernel/module/signing.c | 75 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 4 files changed, 85 insertions(+), 87 deletions(-)