diff mbox series

[v5,2/5] userfaultfd: add /dev/userfaultfd for fine grained access control

Message ID 20220808175614.3885028-3-axelrasmussen@google.com (mailing list archive)
State Handled Elsewhere
Headers show
Series userfaultfd: add /dev/userfaultfd for fine grained access control | expand

Commit Message

Axel Rasmussen Aug. 8, 2022, 5:56 p.m. UTC 
Historically, it has been shown that intercepting kernel faults with
userfaultfd (thereby forcing the kernel to wait for an arbitrary amount
of time) can be exploited, or at least can make some kinds of exploits
easier. So, in 37cd0575b8 "userfaultfd: add UFFD_USER_MODE_ONLY" we
changed things so, in order for kernel faults to be handled by
userfaultfd, either the process needs CAP_SYS_PTRACE, or this sysctl
must be configured so that any unprivileged user can do it.

In a typical implementation of a hypervisor with live migration (take
QEMU/KVM as one such example), we do indeed need to be able to handle
kernel faults. But, both options above are less than ideal:

- Toggling the sysctl increases attack surface by allowing any
  unprivileged user to do it.

- Granting the live migration process CAP_SYS_PTRACE gives it this
  ability, but *also* the ability to "observe and control the
  execution of another process [...], and examine and change [its]
  memory and registers" (from ptrace(2)). This isn't something we need
  or want to be able to do, so granting this permission violates the
  "principle of least privilege".

This is all a long winded way to say: we want a more fine-grained way to
grant access to userfaultfd, without granting other additional
permissions at the same time.

To achieve this, add a /dev/userfaultfd misc device. This device
provides an alternative to the userfaultfd(2) syscall for the creation
of new userfaultfds. The idea is, any userfaultfds created this way will
be able to handle kernel faults, without the caller having any special
capabilities. Access to this mechanism is instead restricted using e.g.
standard filesystem permissions.

Acked-by: Nadav Amit <namit@vmware.com>
Acked-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Axel Rasmussen <axelrasmussen@google.com>
---
 fs/userfaultfd.c                 | 73 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
 include/uapi/linux/userfaultfd.h |  4 ++
 2 files changed, 61 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)

Comments

Mike Rapoport Aug. 11, 2022, 6:37 a.m. UTC | #1 
On Mon, Aug 08, 2022 at 10:56:11AM -0700, Axel Rasmussen wrote:
> Historically, it has been shown that intercepting kernel faults with
> userfaultfd (thereby forcing the kernel to wait for an arbitrary amount
> of time) can be exploited, or at least can make some kinds of exploits
> easier. So, in 37cd0575b8 "userfaultfd: add UFFD_USER_MODE_ONLY" we
> changed things so, in order for kernel faults to be handled by
> userfaultfd, either the process needs CAP_SYS_PTRACE, or this sysctl
> must be configured so that any unprivileged user can do it.
> 
> In a typical implementation of a hypervisor with live migration (take
> QEMU/KVM as one such example), we do indeed need to be able to handle
> kernel faults. But, both options above are less than ideal:
> 
> - Toggling the sysctl increases attack surface by allowing any
>   unprivileged user to do it.
> 
> - Granting the live migration process CAP_SYS_PTRACE gives it this
>   ability, but *also* the ability to "observe and control the
>   execution of another process [...], and examine and change [its]
>   memory and registers" (from ptrace(2)). This isn't something we need
>   or want to be able to do, so granting this permission violates the
>   "principle of least privilege".
> 
> This is all a long winded way to say: we want a more fine-grained way to
> grant access to userfaultfd, without granting other additional
> permissions at the same time.
> 
> To achieve this, add a /dev/userfaultfd misc device. This device
> provides an alternative to the userfaultfd(2) syscall for the creation
> of new userfaultfds. The idea is, any userfaultfds created this way will
> be able to handle kernel faults, without the caller having any special
> capabilities. Access to this mechanism is instead restricted using e.g.
> standard filesystem permissions.
> 
> Acked-by: Nadav Amit <namit@vmware.com>
> Acked-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
> Signed-off-by: Axel Rasmussen <axelrasmussen@google.com>

Acked-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>

> ---
>  fs/userfaultfd.c                 | 73 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
>  include/uapi/linux/userfaultfd.h |  4 ++
>  2 files changed, 61 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
diff mbox series

Patch

diff --git a/fs/userfaultfd.c b/fs/userfaultfd.c
index 1c44bf75f916..698e768d5c3d 100644
--- a/fs/userfaultfd.c
+++ b/fs/userfaultfd.c
@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ 
 #include <linux/security.h>
 #include <linux/hugetlb.h>
 #include <linux/swapops.h>
+#include <linux/miscdevice.h>
 
 int sysctl_unprivileged_userfaultfd __read_mostly;
 
@@ -415,13 +416,8 @@  vm_fault_t handle_userfault(struct vm_fault *vmf, unsigned long reason)
 
 	if (ctx->features & UFFD_FEATURE_SIGBUS)
 		goto out;
-	if ((vmf->flags & FAULT_FLAG_USER) == 0 &&
-	    ctx->flags & UFFD_USER_MODE_ONLY) {
-		printk_once(KERN_WARNING "uffd: Set unprivileged_userfaultfd "
-			"sysctl knob to 1 if kernel faults must be handled "
-			"without obtaining CAP_SYS_PTRACE capability\n");
+	if (!(vmf->flags & FAULT_FLAG_USER) && (ctx->flags & UFFD_USER_MODE_ONLY))
 		goto out;
-	}
 
 	/*
 	 * If it's already released don't get it. This avoids to loop
@@ -2052,20 +2048,11 @@  static void init_once_userfaultfd_ctx(void *mem)
 	seqcount_spinlock_init(&ctx->refile_seq, &ctx->fault_pending_wqh.lock);
 }
 
-SYSCALL_DEFINE1(userfaultfd, int, flags)
+static int new_userfaultfd(int flags)
 {
 	struct userfaultfd_ctx *ctx;
 	int fd;
 
-	if (!sysctl_unprivileged_userfaultfd &&
-	    (flags & UFFD_USER_MODE_ONLY) == 0 &&
-	    !capable(CAP_SYS_PTRACE)) {
-		printk_once(KERN_WARNING "uffd: Set unprivileged_userfaultfd "
-			"sysctl knob to 1 if kernel faults must be handled "
-			"without obtaining CAP_SYS_PTRACE capability\n");
-		return -EPERM;
-	}
-
 	BUG_ON(!current->mm);
 
 	/* Check the UFFD_* constants for consistency.  */
@@ -2098,8 +2085,62 @@  SYSCALL_DEFINE1(userfaultfd, int, flags)
 	return fd;
 }
 
+static inline bool userfaultfd_syscall_allowed(int flags)
+{
+	/* Userspace-only page faults are always allowed */
+	if (flags & UFFD_USER_MODE_ONLY)
+		return true;
+
+	/*
+	 * The user is requesting a userfaultfd which can handle kernel faults.
+	 * Privileged users are always allowed to do this.
+	 */
+	if (capable(CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
+		return true;
+
+	/* Otherwise, access to kernel fault handling is sysctl controlled. */
+	return sysctl_unprivileged_userfaultfd;
+}
+
+SYSCALL_DEFINE1(userfaultfd, int, flags)
+{
+	if (!userfaultfd_syscall_allowed(flags))
+		return -EPERM;
+
+	return new_userfaultfd(flags);
+}
+
+static int userfaultfd_dev_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static long userfaultfd_dev_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long flags)
+{
+	if (cmd != USERFAULTFD_IOC_NEW)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	return new_userfaultfd(flags);
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations userfaultfd_dev_fops = {
+	.open = userfaultfd_dev_open,
+	.unlocked_ioctl = userfaultfd_dev_ioctl,
+	.compat_ioctl = userfaultfd_dev_ioctl,
+	.owner = THIS_MODULE,
+	.llseek = noop_llseek,
+};
+
+static struct miscdevice userfaultfd_misc = {
+	.minor = MISC_DYNAMIC_MINOR,
+	.name = "userfaultfd",
+	.fops = &userfaultfd_dev_fops
+};
+
 static int __init userfaultfd_init(void)
 {
+	WARN_ON(misc_register(&userfaultfd_misc));
+
 	userfaultfd_ctx_cachep = kmem_cache_create("userfaultfd_ctx_cache",
 						sizeof(struct userfaultfd_ctx),
 						0,
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/userfaultfd.h b/include/uapi/linux/userfaultfd.h
index 7d32b1e797fb..005e5e306266 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/userfaultfd.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/userfaultfd.h
@@ -12,6 +12,10 @@ 
 
 #include <linux/types.h>
 
+/* ioctls for /dev/userfaultfd */
+#define USERFAULTFD_IOC 0xAA
+#define USERFAULTFD_IOC_NEW _IO(USERFAULTFD_IOC, 0x00)
+
 /*
  * If the UFFDIO_API is upgraded someday, the UFFDIO_UNREGISTER and
  * UFFDIO_WAKE ioctls should be defined as _IOW and not as _IOR.  In