| Message ID | e7dd2cb0f4eef391566e1e60f05136244a288693.1662420177.git.sweettea-kernel@dorminy.me (mailing list archive) |
|---|---|
| State | Superseded |
| Headers | show |
| Series | btrfs: add fscrypt integration | expand |
On Mon, Sep 05, 2022 at 08:35:35PM -0400, Sweet Tea Dorminy wrote: > From: Omar Sandoval <osandov@osandov.com> > > These ioctls allow encryption to be set up. > > Signed-off-by: Omar Sandoval <osandov@osandov.com> > Signed-off-by: Sweet Tea Dorminy <sweettea-kernel@dorminy.me> > --- > fs/btrfs/ioctl.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ > 1 file changed, 28 insertions(+) > > diff --git a/fs/btrfs/ioctl.c b/fs/btrfs/ioctl.c > index 708e514aca25..ea1c14b26206 100644 > --- a/fs/btrfs/ioctl.c > +++ b/fs/btrfs/ioctl.c > @@ -5457,6 +5457,34 @@ long btrfs_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int > return btrfs_ioctl_get_fslabel(fs_info, argp); > case FS_IOC_SETFSLABEL: > return btrfs_ioctl_set_fslabel(file, argp); > + case FS_IOC_SET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY: { > + if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION)) > + return -EOPNOTSUPP; > + if (sb_rdonly(fs_info->sb)) > + return -EROFS; > + /* > + * If we crash before we commit, nothing encrypted could have > + * been written so it doesn't matter whether the encrypted > + * state persists. > + */ > + btrfs_set_fs_incompat(fs_info, FSCRYPT); > + return fscrypt_ioctl_set_policy(file, (const void __user *)arg); > + } > + case FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY: > + return fscrypt_ioctl_get_policy(file, (void __user *)arg); > + case FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY_EX: > + return fscrypt_ioctl_get_policy_ex(file, (void __user *)arg); > + case FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY: > + return fscrypt_ioctl_add_key(file, (void __user *)arg); > + case FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY: > + return fscrypt_ioctl_remove_key(file, (void __user *)arg); > + case FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY_ALL_USERS: > + return fscrypt_ioctl_remove_key_all_users(file, > + (void __user *)arg); > + case FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_KEY_STATUS: > + return fscrypt_ioctl_get_key_status(file, (void __user *)arg); > + case FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_NONCE: > + return fscrypt_ioctl_get_nonce(file, (void __user *)arg); I've looked what ext4 does for the ioctls and there's a check before each case if the feature is supported, do we need something like that as well? > case FITRIM: > return btrfs_ioctl_fitrim(fs_info, argp); > case BTRFS_IOC_SNAP_CREATE: > -- > 2.35.1
diff --git a/fs/btrfs/ioctl.c b/fs/btrfs/ioctl.c index 708e514aca25..ea1c14b26206 100644 --- a/fs/btrfs/ioctl.c +++ b/fs/btrfs/ioctl.c @@ -5457,6 +5457,34 @@ long btrfs_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int return btrfs_ioctl_get_fslabel(fs_info, argp); case FS_IOC_SETFSLABEL: return btrfs_ioctl_set_fslabel(file, argp); + case FS_IOC_SET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY: { + if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION)) + return -EOPNOTSUPP; + if (sb_rdonly(fs_info->sb)) + return -EROFS; + /* + * If we crash before we commit, nothing encrypted could have + * been written so it doesn't matter whether the encrypted + * state persists. + */ + btrfs_set_fs_incompat(fs_info, FSCRYPT); + return fscrypt_ioctl_set_policy(file, (const void __user *)arg); + } + case FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY: + return fscrypt_ioctl_get_policy(file, (void __user *)arg); + case FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY_EX: + return fscrypt_ioctl_get_policy_ex(file, (void __user *)arg); + case FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY: + return fscrypt_ioctl_add_key(file, (void __user *)arg); + case FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY: + return fscrypt_ioctl_remove_key(file, (void __user *)arg); + case FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY_ALL_USERS: + return fscrypt_ioctl_remove_key_all_users(file, + (void __user *)arg); + case FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_KEY_STATUS: + return fscrypt_ioctl_get_key_status(file, (void __user *)arg); + case FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_NONCE: + return fscrypt_ioctl_get_nonce(file, (void __user *)arg); case FITRIM: return btrfs_ioctl_fitrim(fs_info, argp); case BTRFS_IOC_SNAP_CREATE: