| Message ID | 20220829170401.834298-10-konstantin.meskhidze@huawei.com (mailing list archive) |
|---|---|
| State | Handled Elsewhere |
| Headers | show |
| Series | Network support for Landlock | expand |
On 29/08/2022 19:03, Konstantin Meskhidze wrote: > This patch adds support of socket_bind() and socket_connect() hooks. > It's possible to restrict binding and connecting of TCP types of > sockets to particular ports. It's just basic idea of how Landlock I guess it's not a basic idea anymore. > could support network confinement. > > Signed-off-by: Konstantin Meskhidze <konstantin.meskhidze@huawei.com> > --- > > Changes since v6: > * Updates copyright. > * Refactors landlock_append_net_rule() and check_socket_access() > functions with landlock_id type. > > Changes since v5: > * Fixes some logic errors. > * Formats code with clang-format-14. > > Changes since v4: > * Factors out CONFIG_INET into make file. > * Refactors check_socket_access(). > * Adds helper get_port(). > * Adds CONFIG_IPV6 in get_port(), hook_socket_bind/connect > functions to support AF_INET6 family. > * Adds AF_UNSPEC family support in hook_socket_bind/connect > functions. > * Refactors add_rule_net_service() and landlock_add_rule > syscall to support network rule inserting. > * Refactors init_layer_masks() to support network rules. > > Changes since v3: > * Splits commit. > * Adds SECURITY_NETWORK in config. > * Adds IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET) if a kernel has no INET configuration. > * Adds hook_socket_bind and hook_socket_connect hooks. > > --- > security/landlock/Kconfig | 1 + > security/landlock/Makefile | 2 + > security/landlock/net.c | 161 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ > security/landlock/net.h | 26 ++++++ > security/landlock/setup.c | 2 + > security/landlock/syscalls.c | 59 ++++++++++++- > 6 files changed, 248 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) > create mode 100644 security/landlock/net.c > create mode 100644 security/landlock/net.h > > diff --git a/security/landlock/Kconfig b/security/landlock/Kconfig > index 8e33c4e8ffb8..10c099097533 100644 > --- a/security/landlock/Kconfig > +++ b/security/landlock/Kconfig > @@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ > config SECURITY_LANDLOCK > bool "Landlock support" > depends on SECURITY && !ARCH_EPHEMERAL_INODES > + select SECURITY_NETWORK > select SECURITY_PATH > help > Landlock is a sandboxing mechanism that enables processes to restrict > diff --git a/security/landlock/Makefile b/security/landlock/Makefile > index 7bbd2f413b3e..53d3c92ae22e 100644 > --- a/security/landlock/Makefile > +++ b/security/landlock/Makefile > @@ -2,3 +2,5 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK) := landlock.o > > landlock-y := setup.o syscalls.o object.o ruleset.o \ > cred.o ptrace.o fs.o > + > +landlock-$(CONFIG_INET) += net.o > \ No newline at end of file > diff --git a/security/landlock/net.c b/security/landlock/net.c > new file mode 100644 > index 000000000000..0d249ad619bf > --- /dev/null > +++ b/security/landlock/net.c > @@ -0,0 +1,161 @@ > +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only > +/* > + * Landlock LSM - Network management and hooks > + * > + * Copyright © 2022 Huawei Tech. Co., Ltd. > + * Copyright © 2022 Microsoft Corporation > + */ > + > +#include <linux/in.h> > +#include <linux/net.h> > +#include <linux/socket.h> > +#include <net/ipv6.h> > + #include "common.h" > +#include "cred.h" > +#include "limits.h" > +#include "net.h" #include "ruleset.h" > + > +int landlock_append_net_rule(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset, u16 port, > + u32 access_rights) Please constify all arguments, in this function and others. > +{ > + int err; > + const struct landlock_id id = { > + .key.data = port, > + .type = LANDLOCK_KEY_NET_PORT, > + }; > + BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(port) > sizeof(id.key.data)); > + > + /* Transforms relative access rights to absolute ones. */ > + access_rights |= LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_NET & > + ~landlock_get_net_access_mask(ruleset, 0); > + > + mutex_lock(&ruleset->lock); > + err = landlock_insert_rule(ruleset, id, access_rights); > + mutex_unlock(&ruleset->lock); > + > + return err; > +} > + > +static int check_socket_access(const struct landlock_ruleset *const domain, > + u16 port, access_mask_t access_request) > +{ > + bool allowed = false; > + layer_mask_t layer_masks[LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_NET] = {}; > + const struct landlock_rule *rule; > + access_mask_t handled_access; > + const struct landlock_id id = { > + .key.data = port, > + .type = LANDLOCK_KEY_NET_PORT, > + }; > + > + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!domain)) > + return 0; > + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(domain->num_layers < 1)) > + return -EACCES; > + > + rule = landlock_find_rule(domain, id); > + handled_access = init_layer_masks(domain, access_request, &layer_masks, > + LANDLOCK_KEY_NET_PORT); > + allowed = unmask_layers(rule, handled_access, &layer_masks, > + ARRAY_SIZE(layer_masks)); > + > + return allowed ? 0 : -EACCES; > +} > + > +static u16 get_port(const struct sockaddr *const address) > +{ > + /* Gets port value in host byte order. */ > + switch (address->sa_family) { > + case AF_UNSPEC: > + case AF_INET: { > + const struct sockaddr_in *const sockaddr = > + (struct sockaddr_in *)address; > + return ntohs(sockaddr->sin_port); > + } > +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) > + case AF_INET6: { > + const struct sockaddr_in6 *const sockaddr_ip6 = > + (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address; > + return ntohs(sockaddr_ip6->sin6_port); > + } > +#endif > + } > + WARN_ON_ONCE(1); > + return 0; > +} > + > +static int hook_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, > + int addrlen) > +{ > + const struct landlock_ruleset *const dom = > + landlock_get_current_domain(); > + > + if (!dom) > + return 0; > + > + /* Check if it's a TCP socket. */ > + if (sock->type != SOCK_STREAM) > + return 0; > + > + switch (address->sa_family) { > + case AF_UNSPEC: > + case AF_INET: > +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) > + case AF_INET6: > +#endif > + return check_socket_access(dom, get_port(address), > + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP); > + default: > + return 0; > + } > +} > + > +static int hook_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, > + int addrlen) > +{ > + const struct landlock_ruleset *const dom = > + landlock_get_current_domain(); > + > + if (!dom) > + return 0; > + > + /* Check if it's a TCP socket. */ > + if (sock->type != SOCK_STREAM) > + return 0; > + > + /* Check if the hook is AF_INET* socket's action. */ > + switch (address->sa_family) { > + case AF_INET: > +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) > + case AF_INET6: > +#endif > + return check_socket_access(dom, get_port(address), > + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP); > + case AF_UNSPEC: { > + u16 i; break line > + /* > + * If just in a layer a mask supports connect access, > + * the socket_connect() hook with AF_UNSPEC family flag > + * must be banned. This prevents from disconnecting already > + * connected sockets. > + */ > + for (i = 0; i < dom->num_layers; i++) { > + if (landlock_get_net_access_mask(dom, i) & > + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP) > + return -EACCES; > + } > + } > + } > + return 0; > +} > + > +static struct security_hook_list landlock_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = { > + LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_bind, hook_socket_bind), > + LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_connect, hook_socket_connect), > +}; > + > +__init void landlock_add_net_hooks(void) > +{ > + security_add_hooks(landlock_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(landlock_hooks), > + LANDLOCK_NAME); > +} > diff --git a/security/landlock/net.h b/security/landlock/net.h > new file mode 100644 > index 000000000000..2c63a8f1b258 > --- /dev/null > +++ b/security/landlock/net.h > @@ -0,0 +1,26 @@ > +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */ > +/* > + * Landlock LSM - Network management and hooks > + * > + * Copyright © 2022 Huawei Tech. Co., Ltd. > + */ > + > +#ifndef _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_NET_H > +#define _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_NET_H > + > +#include "common.h" > +#include "ruleset.h" > +#include "setup.h" > + > +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET) > +__init void landlock_add_net_hooks(void); > + > +int landlock_append_net_rule(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset, u16 port, > + u32 access_hierarchy); > +#else /* IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET) */ > +static inline void landlock_add_net_hooks(void) > +{ > +} > +#endif /* IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET) */ > + > +#endif /* _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_NET_H */ > diff --git a/security/landlock/setup.c b/security/landlock/setup.c > index f8e8e980454c..8059dc0b47d3 100644 > --- a/security/landlock/setup.c > +++ b/security/landlock/setup.c > @@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ > #include "fs.h" > #include "ptrace.h" > #include "setup.h" > +#include "net.h" > > bool landlock_initialized __lsm_ro_after_init = false; > > @@ -28,6 +29,7 @@ static int __init landlock_init(void) > landlock_add_cred_hooks(); > landlock_add_ptrace_hooks(); > landlock_add_fs_hooks(); > + landlock_add_net_hooks(); > landlock_initialized = true; > pr_info("Up and running.\n"); > return 0; > diff --git a/security/landlock/syscalls.c b/security/landlock/syscalls.c > index 641155f6f6f8..16880e951346 100644 > --- a/security/landlock/syscalls.c > +++ b/security/landlock/syscalls.c > @@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ > #include "cred.h" > #include "fs.h" > #include "limits.h" > +#include "net.h" > #include "ruleset.h" > #include "setup.h" > > @@ -74,7 +75,8 @@ static void build_check_abi(void) > { > struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr; > struct landlock_path_beneath_attr path_beneath_attr; > - size_t ruleset_size, path_beneath_size; > + struct landlock_net_service_attr net_service_attr; > + size_t ruleset_size, path_beneath_size, net_service_size; > > /* > * For each user space ABI structures, first checks that there is no > @@ -90,6 +92,11 @@ static void build_check_abi(void) > path_beneath_size += sizeof(path_beneath_attr.parent_fd); > BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(path_beneath_attr) != path_beneath_size); > BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(path_beneath_attr) != 12); > + > + net_service_size = sizeof(net_service_attr.allowed_access); > + net_service_size += sizeof(net_service_attr.port); > + BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(net_service_attr) != net_service_size); > + BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(net_service_attr) != 10); > } > > /* Ruleset handling */ > @@ -322,13 +329,54 @@ static int add_rule_path_beneath(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset, > return err; > } > > +static int add_rule_net_service(struct landlock_ruleset *ruleset, > + const void __user *const rule_attr) > +{ > +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET) > + struct landlock_net_service_attr net_service_attr; > + int res; > + u32 mask; > + > + /* Copies raw user space buffer, only one type for now. */ > + res = copy_from_user(&net_service_attr, rule_attr, > + sizeof(net_service_attr)); > + if (res) > + return -EFAULT; > + > + /* > + * Informs about useless rule: empty allowed_access (i.e. deny rules) > + * are ignored by network actions. > + */ > + if (!net_service_attr.allowed_access) > + return -ENOMSG; > + > + /* > + * Checks that allowed_access matches the @ruleset constraints > + * (ruleset->access_masks[0] is automatically upgraded to 64-bits). > + */ > + mask = landlock_get_net_access_mask(ruleset, 0); > + if ((net_service_attr.allowed_access | mask) != mask) > + return -EINVAL; > + > + /* Denies inserting a rule with port 0. */ > + if (net_service_attr.port == 0) > + return -EINVAL; > + > + /* Imports the new rule. */ > + return landlock_append_net_rule(ruleset, net_service_attr.port, > + net_service_attr.allowed_access); > +#else /* IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET) */ > + return -EAFNOSUPPORT; I think this is the right approach to return -EAFNOSUPPORT here instead of with landlock_create_ruleset() because if some network features are not available this means that they will be denied. Only allowing some exception (i.e. with a rule) would not make sense because it could work at the end. This should be explained in the documentation. Landlock libraries would have to handle this error type as not-an-error most of the time though, except when users want to be sure the running system support such network feature. Any though? > +#endif /* IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET) */ > +} > + > /** > * sys_landlock_add_rule - Add a new rule to a ruleset > * > * @ruleset_fd: File descriptor tied to the ruleset that should be extended > * with the new rule. > - * @rule_type: Identify the structure type pointed to by @rule_attr (only > - * LANDLOCK_RULE_PATH_BENEATH for now). > + * @rule_type: Identify the structure type pointed to by @rule_attr: > + * LANDLOCK_RULE_PATH_BENEATH or LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE. %LANDLOCK_RULE_PATH_BENEATH or %LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE. > * @rule_attr: Pointer to a rule (only of type &struct > * landlock_path_beneath_attr for now). > * @flags: Must be 0. > @@ -339,6 +387,8 @@ static int add_rule_path_beneath(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset, > * Possible returned errors are: > * > * - EOPNOTSUPP: Landlock is supported by the kernel but disabled at boot time; > + * - EAFNOSUPPORT: @rule_type is LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE but TCP/IP is not %EAFNOSUPPORT %LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE BTW, I'll send a patch soon to fix some documentation style inconsistency, including the missing "%" for defined values (e.g. errno). > + * supported by the running kernel; > * - EINVAL: @flags is not 0, or inconsistent access in the rule (i.e. > * &landlock_path_beneath_attr.allowed_access is not a subset of the rule's > * accesses); > @@ -374,6 +424,9 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE4(landlock_add_rule, const int, ruleset_fd, > case LANDLOCK_RULE_PATH_BENEATH: > err = add_rule_path_beneath(ruleset, rule_attr); > break; > + case LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE: > + err = add_rule_net_service(ruleset, rule_attr); > + break; > default: > err = -EINVAL; > break; > -- > 2.25.1 >
9/6/2022 11:08 AM, Mickaël Salaün пишет: > > On 29/08/2022 19:03, Konstantin Meskhidze wrote: >> This patch adds support of socket_bind() and socket_connect() hooks. >> It's possible to restrict binding and connecting of TCP types of >> sockets to particular ports. It's just basic idea of how Landlock > > I guess it's not a basic idea anymore. Got it. Will be fixed. > > >> could support network confinement. >> >> Signed-off-by: Konstantin Meskhidze <konstantin.meskhidze@huawei.com> >> --- >> >> Changes since v6: >> * Updates copyright. >> * Refactors landlock_append_net_rule() and check_socket_access() >> functions with landlock_id type. >> >> Changes since v5: >> * Fixes some logic errors. >> * Formats code with clang-format-14. >> >> Changes since v4: >> * Factors out CONFIG_INET into make file. >> * Refactors check_socket_access(). >> * Adds helper get_port(). >> * Adds CONFIG_IPV6 in get_port(), hook_socket_bind/connect >> functions to support AF_INET6 family. >> * Adds AF_UNSPEC family support in hook_socket_bind/connect >> functions. >> * Refactors add_rule_net_service() and landlock_add_rule >> syscall to support network rule inserting. >> * Refactors init_layer_masks() to support network rules. >> >> Changes since v3: >> * Splits commit. >> * Adds SECURITY_NETWORK in config. >> * Adds IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET) if a kernel has no INET configuration. >> * Adds hook_socket_bind and hook_socket_connect hooks. >> >> --- >> security/landlock/Kconfig | 1 + >> security/landlock/Makefile | 2 + >> security/landlock/net.c | 161 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ >> security/landlock/net.h | 26 ++++++ >> security/landlock/setup.c | 2 + >> security/landlock/syscalls.c | 59 ++++++++++++- >> 6 files changed, 248 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) >> create mode 100644 security/landlock/net.c >> create mode 100644 security/landlock/net.h >> >> diff --git a/security/landlock/Kconfig b/security/landlock/Kconfig >> index 8e33c4e8ffb8..10c099097533 100644 >> --- a/security/landlock/Kconfig >> +++ b/security/landlock/Kconfig >> @@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ >> config SECURITY_LANDLOCK >> bool "Landlock support" >> depends on SECURITY && !ARCH_EPHEMERAL_INODES >> + select SECURITY_NETWORK >> select SECURITY_PATH >> help >> Landlock is a sandboxing mechanism that enables processes to restrict >> diff --git a/security/landlock/Makefile b/security/landlock/Makefile >> index 7bbd2f413b3e..53d3c92ae22e 100644 >> --- a/security/landlock/Makefile >> +++ b/security/landlock/Makefile >> @@ -2,3 +2,5 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK) := landlock.o >> >> landlock-y := setup.o syscalls.o object.o ruleset.o \ >> cred.o ptrace.o fs.o >> + >> +landlock-$(CONFIG_INET) += net.o >> \ No newline at end of file >> diff --git a/security/landlock/net.c b/security/landlock/net.c >> new file mode 100644 >> index 000000000000..0d249ad619bf >> --- /dev/null >> +++ b/security/landlock/net.c >> @@ -0,0 +1,161 @@ >> +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only >> +/* >> + * Landlock LSM - Network management and hooks >> + * >> + * Copyright © 2022 Huawei Tech. Co., Ltd. >> + * Copyright © 2022 Microsoft Corporation >> + */ >> + >> +#include <linux/in.h> >> +#include <linux/net.h> >> +#include <linux/socket.h> >> +#include <net/ipv6.h> >> + > > #include "common.h" This include is in net.h one. > >> +#include "cred.h" >> +#include "limits.h" >> +#include "net.h" > > #include "ruleset.h" The same as above. > >> + >> +int landlock_append_net_rule(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset, u16 port, >> + u32 access_rights) > > Please constify all arguments, in this function and others. Ok. Thanks. > >> +{ >> + int err; >> + const struct landlock_id id = { >> + .key.data = port, >> + .type = LANDLOCK_KEY_NET_PORT, >> + }; >> + BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(port) > sizeof(id.key.data)); >> + >> + /* Transforms relative access rights to absolute ones. */ >> + access_rights |= LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_NET & >> + ~landlock_get_net_access_mask(ruleset, 0); >> + >> + mutex_lock(&ruleset->lock); >> + err = landlock_insert_rule(ruleset, id, access_rights); >> + mutex_unlock(&ruleset->lock); >> + >> + return err; >> +} >> + >> +static int check_socket_access(const struct landlock_ruleset *const domain, >> + u16 port, access_mask_t access_request) >> +{ >> + bool allowed = false; >> + layer_mask_t layer_masks[LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_NET] = {}; >> + const struct landlock_rule *rule; >> + access_mask_t handled_access; >> + const struct landlock_id id = { >> + .key.data = port, >> + .type = LANDLOCK_KEY_NET_PORT, >> + }; >> + >> + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!domain)) >> + return 0; >> + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(domain->num_layers < 1)) >> + return -EACCES; >> + >> + rule = landlock_find_rule(domain, id); >> + handled_access = init_layer_masks(domain, access_request, &layer_masks, >> + LANDLOCK_KEY_NET_PORT); >> + allowed = unmask_layers(rule, handled_access, &layer_masks, >> + ARRAY_SIZE(layer_masks)); >> + >> + return allowed ? 0 : -EACCES; >> +} >> + >> +static u16 get_port(const struct sockaddr *const address) >> +{ >> + /* Gets port value in host byte order. */ >> + switch (address->sa_family) { >> + case AF_UNSPEC: >> + case AF_INET: { >> + const struct sockaddr_in *const sockaddr = >> + (struct sockaddr_in *)address; >> + return ntohs(sockaddr->sin_port); >> + } >> +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) >> + case AF_INET6: { >> + const struct sockaddr_in6 *const sockaddr_ip6 = >> + (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address; >> + return ntohs(sockaddr_ip6->sin6_port); >> + } >> +#endif >> + } >> + WARN_ON_ONCE(1); >> + return 0; >> +} >> + >> +static int hook_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, >> + int addrlen) >> +{ >> + const struct landlock_ruleset *const dom = >> + landlock_get_current_domain(); >> + >> + if (!dom) >> + return 0; >> + >> + /* Check if it's a TCP socket. */ >> + if (sock->type != SOCK_STREAM) >> + return 0; >> + >> + switch (address->sa_family) { >> + case AF_UNSPEC: >> + case AF_INET: >> +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) >> + case AF_INET6: >> +#endif >> + return check_socket_access(dom, get_port(address), >> + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP); >> + default: >> + return 0; >> + } >> +} >> + >> +static int hook_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, >> + int addrlen) >> +{ >> + const struct landlock_ruleset *const dom = >> + landlock_get_current_domain(); >> + >> + if (!dom) >> + return 0; >> + >> + /* Check if it's a TCP socket. */ >> + if (sock->type != SOCK_STREAM) >> + return 0; >> + >> + /* Check if the hook is AF_INET* socket's action. */ >> + switch (address->sa_family) { >> + case AF_INET: >> +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) >> + case AF_INET6: >> +#endif >> + return check_socket_access(dom, get_port(address), >> + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP); >> + case AF_UNSPEC: { >> + u16 i; > > break line Do you mean adding empty line here? > >> + /* >> + * If just in a layer a mask supports connect access, >> + * the socket_connect() hook with AF_UNSPEC family flag >> + * must be banned. This prevents from disconnecting already >> + * connected sockets. >> + */ >> + for (i = 0; i < dom->num_layers; i++) { >> + if (landlock_get_net_access_mask(dom, i) & >> + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP) >> + return -EACCES; >> + } >> + } >> + } >> + return 0; >> +} >> + >> +static struct security_hook_list landlock_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = { >> + LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_bind, hook_socket_bind), >> + LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_connect, hook_socket_connect), >> +}; >> + >> +__init void landlock_add_net_hooks(void) >> +{ >> + security_add_hooks(landlock_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(landlock_hooks), >> + LANDLOCK_NAME); >> +} >> diff --git a/security/landlock/net.h b/security/landlock/net.h >> new file mode 100644 >> index 000000000000..2c63a8f1b258 >> --- /dev/null >> +++ b/security/landlock/net.h >> @@ -0,0 +1,26 @@ >> +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */ >> +/* >> + * Landlock LSM - Network management and hooks >> + * >> + * Copyright © 2022 Huawei Tech. Co., Ltd. >> + */ >> + >> +#ifndef _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_NET_H >> +#define _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_NET_H >> + >> +#include "common.h" >> +#include "ruleset.h" >> +#include "setup.h" >> + >> +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET) >> +__init void landlock_add_net_hooks(void); >> + >> +int landlock_append_net_rule(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset, u16 port, >> + u32 access_hierarchy); >> +#else /* IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET) */ >> +static inline void landlock_add_net_hooks(void) >> +{ >> +} >> +#endif /* IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET) */ >> + >> +#endif /* _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_NET_H */ >> diff --git a/security/landlock/setup.c b/security/landlock/setup.c >> index f8e8e980454c..8059dc0b47d3 100644 >> --- a/security/landlock/setup.c >> +++ b/security/landlock/setup.c >> @@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ >> #include "fs.h" >> #include "ptrace.h" >> #include "setup.h" >> +#include "net.h" >> >> bool landlock_initialized __lsm_ro_after_init = false; >> >> @@ -28,6 +29,7 @@ static int __init landlock_init(void) >> landlock_add_cred_hooks(); >> landlock_add_ptrace_hooks(); >> landlock_add_fs_hooks(); >> + landlock_add_net_hooks(); >> landlock_initialized = true; >> pr_info("Up and running.\n"); >> return 0; >> diff --git a/security/landlock/syscalls.c b/security/landlock/syscalls.c >> index 641155f6f6f8..16880e951346 100644 >> --- a/security/landlock/syscalls.c >> +++ b/security/landlock/syscalls.c >> @@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ >> #include "cred.h" >> #include "fs.h" >> #include "limits.h" >> +#include "net.h" >> #include "ruleset.h" >> #include "setup.h" >> >> @@ -74,7 +75,8 @@ static void build_check_abi(void) >> { >> struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr; >> struct landlock_path_beneath_attr path_beneath_attr; >> - size_t ruleset_size, path_beneath_size; >> + struct landlock_net_service_attr net_service_attr; >> + size_t ruleset_size, path_beneath_size, net_service_size; >> >> /* >> * For each user space ABI structures, first checks that there is no >> @@ -90,6 +92,11 @@ static void build_check_abi(void) >> path_beneath_size += sizeof(path_beneath_attr.parent_fd); >> BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(path_beneath_attr) != path_beneath_size); >> BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(path_beneath_attr) != 12); >> + >> + net_service_size = sizeof(net_service_attr.allowed_access); >> + net_service_size += sizeof(net_service_attr.port); >> + BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(net_service_attr) != net_service_size); >> + BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(net_service_attr) != 10); >> } >> >> /* Ruleset handling */ >> @@ -322,13 +329,54 @@ static int add_rule_path_beneath(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset, >> return err; >> } >> >> +static int add_rule_net_service(struct landlock_ruleset *ruleset, >> + const void __user *const rule_attr) >> +{ >> +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET) >> + struct landlock_net_service_attr net_service_attr; >> + int res; >> + u32 mask; >> + >> + /* Copies raw user space buffer, only one type for now. */ >> + res = copy_from_user(&net_service_attr, rule_attr, >> + sizeof(net_service_attr)); >> + if (res) >> + return -EFAULT; >> + >> + /* >> + * Informs about useless rule: empty allowed_access (i.e. deny rules) >> + * are ignored by network actions. >> + */ >> + if (!net_service_attr.allowed_access) >> + return -ENOMSG; >> + >> + /* >> + * Checks that allowed_access matches the @ruleset constraints >> + * (ruleset->access_masks[0] is automatically upgraded to 64-bits). >> + */ >> + mask = landlock_get_net_access_mask(ruleset, 0); >> + if ((net_service_attr.allowed_access | mask) != mask) >> + return -EINVAL; >> + >> + /* Denies inserting a rule with port 0. */ >> + if (net_service_attr.port == 0) >> + return -EINVAL; >> + >> + /* Imports the new rule. */ >> + return landlock_append_net_rule(ruleset, net_service_attr.port, >> + net_service_attr.allowed_access); >> +#else /* IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET) */ >> + return -EAFNOSUPPORT; > > I think this is the right approach to return -EAFNOSUPPORT here instead > of with landlock_create_ruleset() because if some network features are > not available this means that they will be denied. Only allowing some > exception (i.e. with a rule) would not make sense because it could work > at the end. This should be explained in the documentation. > > Landlock libraries would have to handle this error type as not-an-error > most of the time though, except when users want to be sure the running > system support such network feature. > > Any though? Yeah. I think the same - it's possible to create ruleset with network access attributes but if INET is not configured, it would be impossible to apply network rules and even try to call network syscalls corresponding applied attributes. Please could you explain more detailed about not-an-error handling logic? > > >> +#endif /* IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET) */ >> +} >> + >> /** >> * sys_landlock_add_rule - Add a new rule to a ruleset >> * >> * @ruleset_fd: File descriptor tied to the ruleset that should be extended >> * with the new rule. >> - * @rule_type: Identify the structure type pointed to by @rule_attr (only >> - * LANDLOCK_RULE_PATH_BENEATH for now). >> + * @rule_type: Identify the structure type pointed to by @rule_attr: >> + * LANDLOCK_RULE_PATH_BENEATH or LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE. > > %LANDLOCK_RULE_PATH_BENEATH or %LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE. > Got it. > >> * @rule_attr: Pointer to a rule (only of type &struct >> * landlock_path_beneath_attr for now). >> * @flags: Must be 0. >> @@ -339,6 +387,8 @@ static int add_rule_path_beneath(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset, >> * Possible returned errors are: >> * >> * - EOPNOTSUPP: Landlock is supported by the kernel but disabled at boot time; >> + * - EAFNOSUPPORT: @rule_type is LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE but TCP/IP is not > > %EAFNOSUPPORT > %LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE > > BTW, I'll send a patch soon to fix some documentation style > inconsistency, including the missing "%" for defined values (e.g. errno). > That would be great. Thanks. > >> + * supported by the running kernel; >> * - EINVAL: @flags is not 0, or inconsistent access in the rule (i.e. >> * &landlock_path_beneath_attr.allowed_access is not a subset of the rule's >> * accesses); >> @@ -374,6 +424,9 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE4(landlock_add_rule, const int, ruleset_fd, >> case LANDLOCK_RULE_PATH_BENEATH: >> err = add_rule_path_beneath(ruleset, rule_attr); >> break; >> + case LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE: >> + err = add_rule_net_service(ruleset, rule_attr); >> + break; >> default: >> err = -EINVAL; >> break; >> -- >> 2.25.1 >> > .
On 10/09/2022 22:28, Konstantin Meskhidze (A) wrote: > > > 9/6/2022 11:08 AM, Mickaël Salaün пишет: >> >> On 29/08/2022 19:03, Konstantin Meskhidze wrote: >>> This patch adds support of socket_bind() and socket_connect() hooks. >>> It's possible to restrict binding and connecting of TCP types of >>> sockets to particular ports. It's just basic idea of how Landlock >> >> I guess it's not a basic idea anymore. > > Got it. Will be fixed. >> >> >>> could support network confinement. >>> >>> Signed-off-by: Konstantin Meskhidze <konstantin.meskhidze@huawei.com> >>> --- >>> >>> Changes since v6: >>> * Updates copyright. >>> * Refactors landlock_append_net_rule() and check_socket_access() >>> functions with landlock_id type. >>> >>> Changes since v5: >>> * Fixes some logic errors. >>> * Formats code with clang-format-14. >>> >>> Changes since v4: >>> * Factors out CONFIG_INET into make file. >>> * Refactors check_socket_access(). >>> * Adds helper get_port(). >>> * Adds CONFIG_IPV6 in get_port(), hook_socket_bind/connect >>> functions to support AF_INET6 family. >>> * Adds AF_UNSPEC family support in hook_socket_bind/connect >>> functions. >>> * Refactors add_rule_net_service() and landlock_add_rule >>> syscall to support network rule inserting. >>> * Refactors init_layer_masks() to support network rules. >>> >>> Changes since v3: >>> * Splits commit. >>> * Adds SECURITY_NETWORK in config. >>> * Adds IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET) if a kernel has no INET configuration. >>> * Adds hook_socket_bind and hook_socket_connect hooks. >>> >>> --- >>> security/landlock/Kconfig | 1 + >>> security/landlock/Makefile | 2 + >>> security/landlock/net.c | 161 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ >>> security/landlock/net.h | 26 ++++++ >>> security/landlock/setup.c | 2 + >>> security/landlock/syscalls.c | 59 ++++++++++++- >>> 6 files changed, 248 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) >>> create mode 100644 security/landlock/net.c >>> create mode 100644 security/landlock/net.h >>> >>> diff --git a/security/landlock/Kconfig b/security/landlock/Kconfig >>> index 8e33c4e8ffb8..10c099097533 100644 >>> --- a/security/landlock/Kconfig >>> +++ b/security/landlock/Kconfig >>> @@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ >>> config SECURITY_LANDLOCK >>> bool "Landlock support" >>> depends on SECURITY && !ARCH_EPHEMERAL_INODES >>> + select SECURITY_NETWORK >>> select SECURITY_PATH >>> help >>> Landlock is a sandboxing mechanism that enables processes to restrict >>> diff --git a/security/landlock/Makefile b/security/landlock/Makefile >>> index 7bbd2f413b3e..53d3c92ae22e 100644 >>> --- a/security/landlock/Makefile >>> +++ b/security/landlock/Makefile >>> @@ -2,3 +2,5 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK) := landlock.o >>> >>> landlock-y := setup.o syscalls.o object.o ruleset.o \ >>> cred.o ptrace.o fs.o >>> + >>> +landlock-$(CONFIG_INET) += net.o >>> \ No newline at end of file >>> diff --git a/security/landlock/net.c b/security/landlock/net.c >>> new file mode 100644 >>> index 000000000000..0d249ad619bf >>> --- /dev/null >>> +++ b/security/landlock/net.c >>> @@ -0,0 +1,161 @@ >>> +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only >>> +/* >>> + * Landlock LSM - Network management and hooks >>> + * >>> + * Copyright © 2022 Huawei Tech. Co., Ltd. >>> + * Copyright © 2022 Microsoft Corporation >>> + */ >>> + >>> +#include <linux/in.h> >>> +#include <linux/net.h> >>> +#include <linux/socket.h> >>> +#include <net/ipv6.h> >>> + >> >> #include "common.h" > > This include is in net.h one. There is no use of it in net.h it should only be here. >> >>> +#include "cred.h" >>> +#include "limits.h" >>> +#include "net.h" >> >> #include "ruleset.h" > > The same as above. ruleset.h should be included both in net.h and net.c because it is used in both. >> >>> + >>> +int landlock_append_net_rule(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset, u16 port, >>> + u32 access_rights) >> >> Please constify all arguments, in this function and others. > > Ok. Thanks. >> >>> +{ >>> + int err; >>> + const struct landlock_id id = { >>> + .key.data = port, >>> + .type = LANDLOCK_KEY_NET_PORT, >>> + }; >>> + BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(port) > sizeof(id.key.data)); >>> + >>> + /* Transforms relative access rights to absolute ones. */ >>> + access_rights |= LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_NET & >>> + ~landlock_get_net_access_mask(ruleset, 0); >>> + >>> + mutex_lock(&ruleset->lock); >>> + err = landlock_insert_rule(ruleset, id, access_rights); >>> + mutex_unlock(&ruleset->lock); >>> + >>> + return err; >>> +} >>> + >>> +static int check_socket_access(const struct landlock_ruleset *const domain, >>> + u16 port, access_mask_t access_request) >>> +{ >>> + bool allowed = false; >>> + layer_mask_t layer_masks[LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_NET] = {}; >>> + const struct landlock_rule *rule; >>> + access_mask_t handled_access; >>> + const struct landlock_id id = { >>> + .key.data = port, >>> + .type = LANDLOCK_KEY_NET_PORT, >>> + }; >>> + >>> + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!domain)) >>> + return 0; >>> + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(domain->num_layers < 1)) >>> + return -EACCES; >>> + >>> + rule = landlock_find_rule(domain, id); >>> + handled_access = init_layer_masks(domain, access_request, &layer_masks, >>> + LANDLOCK_KEY_NET_PORT); >>> + allowed = unmask_layers(rule, handled_access, &layer_masks, >>> + ARRAY_SIZE(layer_masks)); >>> + >>> + return allowed ? 0 : -EACCES; >>> +} >>> + >>> +static u16 get_port(const struct sockaddr *const address) >>> +{ >>> + /* Gets port value in host byte order. */ >>> + switch (address->sa_family) { >>> + case AF_UNSPEC: >>> + case AF_INET: { >>> + const struct sockaddr_in *const sockaddr = >>> + (struct sockaddr_in *)address; >>> + return ntohs(sockaddr->sin_port); >>> + } >>> +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) >>> + case AF_INET6: { >>> + const struct sockaddr_in6 *const sockaddr_ip6 = >>> + (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address; >>> + return ntohs(sockaddr_ip6->sin6_port); >>> + } >>> +#endif >>> + } >>> + WARN_ON_ONCE(1); >>> + return 0; >>> +} >>> + >>> +static int hook_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, >>> + int addrlen) >>> +{ >>> + const struct landlock_ruleset *const dom = >>> + landlock_get_current_domain(); >>> + >>> + if (!dom) >>> + return 0; >>> + >>> + /* Check if it's a TCP socket. */ >>> + if (sock->type != SOCK_STREAM) >>> + return 0; >>> + >>> + switch (address->sa_family) { >>> + case AF_UNSPEC: >>> + case AF_INET: >>> +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) >>> + case AF_INET6: >>> +#endif >>> + return check_socket_access(dom, get_port(address), >>> + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP); >>> + default: >>> + return 0; >>> + } >>> +} >>> + >>> +static int hook_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, >>> + int addrlen) >>> +{ >>> + const struct landlock_ruleset *const dom = >>> + landlock_get_current_domain(); >>> + >>> + if (!dom) >>> + return 0; >>> + >>> + /* Check if it's a TCP socket. */ >>> + if (sock->type != SOCK_STREAM) >>> + return 0; >>> + >>> + /* Check if the hook is AF_INET* socket's action. */ >>> + switch (address->sa_family) { >>> + case AF_INET: >>> +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) >>> + case AF_INET6: >>> +#endif >>> + return check_socket_access(dom, get_port(address), >>> + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP); >>> + case AF_UNSPEC: { >>> + u16 i; >> >> break line > > Do you mean adding empty line here? yes >> >>> + /* >>> + * If just in a layer a mask supports connect access, >>> + * the socket_connect() hook with AF_UNSPEC family flag >>> + * must be banned. This prevents from disconnecting already >>> + * connected sockets. >>> + */ >>> + for (i = 0; i < dom->num_layers; i++) { >>> + if (landlock_get_net_access_mask(dom, i) & >>> + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP) >>> + return -EACCES; >>> + } >>> + } >>> + } >>> + return 0; >>> +} >>> + >>> +static struct security_hook_list landlock_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = { >>> + LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_bind, hook_socket_bind), >>> + LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_connect, hook_socket_connect), >>> +}; >>> + >>> +__init void landlock_add_net_hooks(void) >>> +{ >>> + security_add_hooks(landlock_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(landlock_hooks), >>> + LANDLOCK_NAME); >>> +} >>> diff --git a/security/landlock/net.h b/security/landlock/net.h >>> new file mode 100644 >>> index 000000000000..2c63a8f1b258 >>> --- /dev/null >>> +++ b/security/landlock/net.h >>> @@ -0,0 +1,26 @@ >>> +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */ >>> +/* >>> + * Landlock LSM - Network management and hooks >>> + * >>> + * Copyright © 2022 Huawei Tech. Co., Ltd. >>> + */ >>> + >>> +#ifndef _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_NET_H >>> +#define _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_NET_H >>> + >>> +#include "common.h" >>> +#include "ruleset.h" >>> +#include "setup.h" >>> + >>> +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET) >>> +__init void landlock_add_net_hooks(void); >>> + >>> +int landlock_append_net_rule(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset, u16 port, >>> + u32 access_hierarchy); >>> +#else /* IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET) */ >>> +static inline void landlock_add_net_hooks(void) >>> +{ >>> +} >>> +#endif /* IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET) */ >>> + >>> +#endif /* _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_NET_H */ >>> diff --git a/security/landlock/setup.c b/security/landlock/setup.c >>> index f8e8e980454c..8059dc0b47d3 100644 >>> --- a/security/landlock/setup.c >>> +++ b/security/landlock/setup.c >>> @@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ >>> #include "fs.h" >>> #include "ptrace.h" >>> #include "setup.h" >>> +#include "net.h" >>> >>> bool landlock_initialized __lsm_ro_after_init = false; >>> >>> @@ -28,6 +29,7 @@ static int __init landlock_init(void) >>> landlock_add_cred_hooks(); >>> landlock_add_ptrace_hooks(); >>> landlock_add_fs_hooks(); >>> + landlock_add_net_hooks(); >>> landlock_initialized = true; >>> pr_info("Up and running.\n"); >>> return 0; >>> diff --git a/security/landlock/syscalls.c b/security/landlock/syscalls.c >>> index 641155f6f6f8..16880e951346 100644 >>> --- a/security/landlock/syscalls.c >>> +++ b/security/landlock/syscalls.c >>> @@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ >>> #include "cred.h" >>> #include "fs.h" >>> #include "limits.h" >>> +#include "net.h" >>> #include "ruleset.h" >>> #include "setup.h" >>> >>> @@ -74,7 +75,8 @@ static void build_check_abi(void) >>> { >>> struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr; >>> struct landlock_path_beneath_attr path_beneath_attr; >>> - size_t ruleset_size, path_beneath_size; >>> + struct landlock_net_service_attr net_service_attr; >>> + size_t ruleset_size, path_beneath_size, net_service_size; >>> >>> /* >>> * For each user space ABI structures, first checks that there is no >>> @@ -90,6 +92,11 @@ static void build_check_abi(void) >>> path_beneath_size += sizeof(path_beneath_attr.parent_fd); >>> BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(path_beneath_attr) != path_beneath_size); >>> BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(path_beneath_attr) != 12); >>> + >>> + net_service_size = sizeof(net_service_attr.allowed_access); >>> + net_service_size += sizeof(net_service_attr.port); >>> + BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(net_service_attr) != net_service_size); >>> + BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(net_service_attr) != 10); >>> } >>> >>> /* Ruleset handling */ >>> @@ -322,13 +329,54 @@ static int add_rule_path_beneath(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset, >>> return err; >>> } >>> >>> +static int add_rule_net_service(struct landlock_ruleset *ruleset, >>> + const void __user *const rule_attr) >>> +{ >>> +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET) >>> + struct landlock_net_service_attr net_service_attr; >>> + int res; >>> + u32 mask; >>> + >>> + /* Copies raw user space buffer, only one type for now. */ >>> + res = copy_from_user(&net_service_attr, rule_attr, >>> + sizeof(net_service_attr)); >>> + if (res) >>> + return -EFAULT; >>> + >>> + /* >>> + * Informs about useless rule: empty allowed_access (i.e. deny rules) >>> + * are ignored by network actions. >>> + */ >>> + if (!net_service_attr.allowed_access) >>> + return -ENOMSG; >>> + >>> + /* >>> + * Checks that allowed_access matches the @ruleset constraints >>> + * (ruleset->access_masks[0] is automatically upgraded to 64-bits). >>> + */ >>> + mask = landlock_get_net_access_mask(ruleset, 0); >>> + if ((net_service_attr.allowed_access | mask) != mask) >>> + return -EINVAL; >>> + >>> + /* Denies inserting a rule with port 0. */ >>> + if (net_service_attr.port == 0) >>> + return -EINVAL; >>> + >>> + /* Imports the new rule. */ >>> + return landlock_append_net_rule(ruleset, net_service_attr.port, >>> + net_service_attr.allowed_access); >>> +#else /* IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET) */ >>> + return -EAFNOSUPPORT; >> >> I think this is the right approach to return -EAFNOSUPPORT here instead >> of with landlock_create_ruleset() because if some network features are >> not available this means that they will be denied. Only allowing some >> exception (i.e. with a rule) would not make sense because it could work >> at the end. This should be explained in the documentation. >> >> Landlock libraries would have to handle this error type as not-an-error >> most of the time though, except when users want to be sure the running >> system support such network feature. >> >> Any though? > > Yeah. I think the same - it's possible to create ruleset with network > access attributes but if INET is not configured, it would be impossible > to apply network rules and even try to call network syscalls > corresponding applied attributes. > > Please could you explain more detailed about not-an-error handling logic? It will depend on the best-effort level user space wants. Applications should already know by that time that there is no network support from the kernel. Günther, what do you think about that? >> >> >>> +#endif /* IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET) */ >>> +} >>> + >>> /** >>> * sys_landlock_add_rule - Add a new rule to a ruleset >>> * >>> * @ruleset_fd: File descriptor tied to the ruleset that should be extended >>> * with the new rule. >>> - * @rule_type: Identify the structure type pointed to by @rule_attr (only >>> - * LANDLOCK_RULE_PATH_BENEATH for now). >>> + * @rule_type: Identify the structure type pointed to by @rule_attr: >>> + * LANDLOCK_RULE_PATH_BENEATH or LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE. >> >> %LANDLOCK_RULE_PATH_BENEATH or %LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE. >> > Got it. >> >>> * @rule_attr: Pointer to a rule (only of type &struct >>> * landlock_path_beneath_attr for now). >>> * @flags: Must be 0. >>> @@ -339,6 +387,8 @@ static int add_rule_path_beneath(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset, >>> * Possible returned errors are: >>> * >>> * - EOPNOTSUPP: Landlock is supported by the kernel but disabled at boot time; >>> + * - EAFNOSUPPORT: @rule_type is LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE but TCP/IP is not >> >> %EAFNOSUPPORT >> %LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE >> >> BTW, I'll send a patch soon to fix some documentation style >> inconsistency, including the missing "%" for defined values (e.g. errno). >> > That would be great. Thanks. >> >>> + * supported by the running kernel; >>> * - EINVAL: @flags is not 0, or inconsistent access in the rule (i.e. >>> * &landlock_path_beneath_attr.allowed_access is not a subset of the rule's >>> * accesses); >>> @@ -374,6 +424,9 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE4(landlock_add_rule, const int, ruleset_fd, >>> case LANDLOCK_RULE_PATH_BENEATH: >>> err = add_rule_path_beneath(ruleset, rule_attr); >>> break; >>> + case LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE: >>> + err = add_rule_net_service(ruleset, rule_attr); >>> + break; >>> default: >>> err = -EINVAL; >>> break; >>> -- >>> 2.25.1 >>> >> .
diff --git a/security/landlock/Kconfig b/security/landlock/Kconfig index 8e33c4e8ffb8..10c099097533 100644 --- a/security/landlock/Kconfig +++ b/security/landlock/Kconfig @@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ config SECURITY_LANDLOCK bool "Landlock support" depends on SECURITY && !ARCH_EPHEMERAL_INODES + select SECURITY_NETWORK select SECURITY_PATH help Landlock is a sandboxing mechanism that enables processes to restrict diff --git a/security/landlock/Makefile b/security/landlock/Makefile index 7bbd2f413b3e..53d3c92ae22e 100644 --- a/security/landlock/Makefile +++ b/security/landlock/Makefile @@ -2,3 +2,5 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK) := landlock.o landlock-y := setup.o syscalls.o object.o ruleset.o \ cred.o ptrace.o fs.o + +landlock-$(CONFIG_INET) += net.o \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/security/landlock/net.c b/security/landlock/net.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..0d249ad619bf --- /dev/null +++ b/security/landlock/net.c @@ -0,0 +1,161 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only +/* + * Landlock LSM - Network management and hooks + * + * Copyright © 2022 Huawei Tech. Co., Ltd. + * Copyright © 2022 Microsoft Corporation + */ + +#include <linux/in.h> +#include <linux/net.h> +#include <linux/socket.h> +#include <net/ipv6.h> + +#include "cred.h" +#include "limits.h" +#include "net.h" + +int landlock_append_net_rule(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset, u16 port, + u32 access_rights) +{ + int err; + const struct landlock_id id = { + .key.data = port, + .type = LANDLOCK_KEY_NET_PORT, + }; + BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(port) > sizeof(id.key.data)); + + /* Transforms relative access rights to absolute ones. */ + access_rights |= LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_NET & + ~landlock_get_net_access_mask(ruleset, 0); + + mutex_lock(&ruleset->lock); + err = landlock_insert_rule(ruleset, id, access_rights); + mutex_unlock(&ruleset->lock); + + return err; +} + +static int check_socket_access(const struct landlock_ruleset *const domain, + u16 port, access_mask_t access_request) +{ + bool allowed = false; + layer_mask_t layer_masks[LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_NET] = {}; + const struct landlock_rule *rule; + access_mask_t handled_access; + const struct landlock_id id = { + .key.data = port, + .type = LANDLOCK_KEY_NET_PORT, + }; + + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!domain)) + return 0; + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(domain->num_layers < 1)) + return -EACCES; + + rule = landlock_find_rule(domain, id); + handled_access = init_layer_masks(domain, access_request, &layer_masks, + LANDLOCK_KEY_NET_PORT); + allowed = unmask_layers(rule, handled_access, &layer_masks, + ARRAY_SIZE(layer_masks)); + + return allowed ? 0 : -EACCES; +} + +static u16 get_port(const struct sockaddr *const address) +{ + /* Gets port value in host byte order. */ + switch (address->sa_family) { + case AF_UNSPEC: + case AF_INET: { + const struct sockaddr_in *const sockaddr = + (struct sockaddr_in *)address; + return ntohs(sockaddr->sin_port); + } +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) + case AF_INET6: { + const struct sockaddr_in6 *const sockaddr_ip6 = + (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address; + return ntohs(sockaddr_ip6->sin6_port); + } +#endif + } + WARN_ON_ONCE(1); + return 0; +} + +static int hook_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, + int addrlen) +{ + const struct landlock_ruleset *const dom = + landlock_get_current_domain(); + + if (!dom) + return 0; + + /* Check if it's a TCP socket. */ + if (sock->type != SOCK_STREAM) + return 0; + + switch (address->sa_family) { + case AF_UNSPEC: + case AF_INET: +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) + case AF_INET6: +#endif + return check_socket_access(dom, get_port(address), + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP); + default: + return 0; + } +} + +static int hook_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, + int addrlen) +{ + const struct landlock_ruleset *const dom = + landlock_get_current_domain(); + + if (!dom) + return 0; + + /* Check if it's a TCP socket. */ + if (sock->type != SOCK_STREAM) + return 0; + + /* Check if the hook is AF_INET* socket's action. */ + switch (address->sa_family) { + case AF_INET: +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) + case AF_INET6: +#endif + return check_socket_access(dom, get_port(address), + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP); + case AF_UNSPEC: { + u16 i; + /* + * If just in a layer a mask supports connect access, + * the socket_connect() hook with AF_UNSPEC family flag + * must be banned. This prevents from disconnecting already + * connected sockets. + */ + for (i = 0; i < dom->num_layers; i++) { + if (landlock_get_net_access_mask(dom, i) & + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP) + return -EACCES; + } + } + } + return 0; +} + +static struct security_hook_list landlock_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = { + LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_bind, hook_socket_bind), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_connect, hook_socket_connect), +}; + +__init void landlock_add_net_hooks(void) +{ + security_add_hooks(landlock_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(landlock_hooks), + LANDLOCK_NAME); +} diff --git a/security/landlock/net.h b/security/landlock/net.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..2c63a8f1b258 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/landlock/net.h @@ -0,0 +1,26 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */ +/* + * Landlock LSM - Network management and hooks + * + * Copyright © 2022 Huawei Tech. Co., Ltd. + */ + +#ifndef _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_NET_H +#define _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_NET_H + +#include "common.h" +#include "ruleset.h" +#include "setup.h" + +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET) +__init void landlock_add_net_hooks(void); + +int landlock_append_net_rule(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset, u16 port, + u32 access_hierarchy); +#else /* IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET) */ +static inline void landlock_add_net_hooks(void) +{ +} +#endif /* IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET) */ + +#endif /* _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_NET_H */ diff --git a/security/landlock/setup.c b/security/landlock/setup.c index f8e8e980454c..8059dc0b47d3 100644 --- a/security/landlock/setup.c +++ b/security/landlock/setup.c @@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ #include "fs.h" #include "ptrace.h" #include "setup.h" +#include "net.h" bool landlock_initialized __lsm_ro_after_init = false; @@ -28,6 +29,7 @@ static int __init landlock_init(void) landlock_add_cred_hooks(); landlock_add_ptrace_hooks(); landlock_add_fs_hooks(); + landlock_add_net_hooks(); landlock_initialized = true; pr_info("Up and running.\n"); return 0; diff --git a/security/landlock/syscalls.c b/security/landlock/syscalls.c index 641155f6f6f8..16880e951346 100644 --- a/security/landlock/syscalls.c +++ b/security/landlock/syscalls.c @@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ #include "cred.h" #include "fs.h" #include "limits.h" +#include "net.h" #include "ruleset.h" #include "setup.h" @@ -74,7 +75,8 @@ static void build_check_abi(void) { struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr; struct landlock_path_beneath_attr path_beneath_attr; - size_t ruleset_size, path_beneath_size; + struct landlock_net_service_attr net_service_attr; + size_t ruleset_size, path_beneath_size, net_service_size; /* * For each user space ABI structures, first checks that there is no @@ -90,6 +92,11 @@ static void build_check_abi(void) path_beneath_size += sizeof(path_beneath_attr.parent_fd); BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(path_beneath_attr) != path_beneath_size); BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(path_beneath_attr) != 12); + + net_service_size = sizeof(net_service_attr.allowed_access); + net_service_size += sizeof(net_service_attr.port); + BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(net_service_attr) != net_service_size); + BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(net_service_attr) != 10); } /* Ruleset handling */ @@ -322,13 +329,54 @@ static int add_rule_path_beneath(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset, return err; } +static int add_rule_net_service(struct landlock_ruleset *ruleset, + const void __user *const rule_attr) +{ +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET) + struct landlock_net_service_attr net_service_attr; + int res; + u32 mask; + + /* Copies raw user space buffer, only one type for now. */ + res = copy_from_user(&net_service_attr, rule_attr, + sizeof(net_service_attr)); + if (res) + return -EFAULT; + + /* + * Informs about useless rule: empty allowed_access (i.e. deny rules) + * are ignored by network actions. + */ + if (!net_service_attr.allowed_access) + return -ENOMSG; + + /* + * Checks that allowed_access matches the @ruleset constraints + * (ruleset->access_masks[0] is automatically upgraded to 64-bits). + */ + mask = landlock_get_net_access_mask(ruleset, 0); + if ((net_service_attr.allowed_access | mask) != mask) + return -EINVAL; + + /* Denies inserting a rule with port 0. */ + if (net_service_attr.port == 0) + return -EINVAL; + + /* Imports the new rule. */ + return landlock_append_net_rule(ruleset, net_service_attr.port, + net_service_attr.allowed_access); +#else /* IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET) */ + return -EAFNOSUPPORT; +#endif /* IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET) */ +} + /** * sys_landlock_add_rule - Add a new rule to a ruleset * * @ruleset_fd: File descriptor tied to the ruleset that should be extended * with the new rule. - * @rule_type: Identify the structure type pointed to by @rule_attr (only - * LANDLOCK_RULE_PATH_BENEATH for now). + * @rule_type: Identify the structure type pointed to by @rule_attr: + * LANDLOCK_RULE_PATH_BENEATH or LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE. * @rule_attr: Pointer to a rule (only of type &struct * landlock_path_beneath_attr for now). * @flags: Must be 0. @@ -339,6 +387,8 @@ static int add_rule_path_beneath(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset, * Possible returned errors are: * * - EOPNOTSUPP: Landlock is supported by the kernel but disabled at boot time; + * - EAFNOSUPPORT: @rule_type is LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE but TCP/IP is not + * supported by the running kernel; * - EINVAL: @flags is not 0, or inconsistent access in the rule (i.e. * &landlock_path_beneath_attr.allowed_access is not a subset of the rule's * accesses); @@ -374,6 +424,9 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE4(landlock_add_rule, const int, ruleset_fd, case LANDLOCK_RULE_PATH_BENEATH: err = add_rule_path_beneath(ruleset, rule_attr); break; + case LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE: + err = add_rule_net_service(ruleset, rule_attr); + break; default: err = -EINVAL; break;
This patch adds support of socket_bind() and socket_connect() hooks. It's possible to restrict binding and connecting of TCP types of sockets to particular ports. It's just basic idea of how Landlock could support network confinement. Signed-off-by: Konstantin Meskhidze <konstantin.meskhidze@huawei.com> --- Changes since v6: * Updates copyright. * Refactors landlock_append_net_rule() and check_socket_access() functions with landlock_id type. Changes since v5: * Fixes some logic errors. * Formats code with clang-format-14. Changes since v4: * Factors out CONFIG_INET into make file. * Refactors check_socket_access(). * Adds helper get_port(). * Adds CONFIG_IPV6 in get_port(), hook_socket_bind/connect functions to support AF_INET6 family. * Adds AF_UNSPEC family support in hook_socket_bind/connect functions. * Refactors add_rule_net_service() and landlock_add_rule syscall to support network rule inserting. * Refactors init_layer_masks() to support network rules. Changes since v3: * Splits commit. * Adds SECURITY_NETWORK in config. * Adds IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET) if a kernel has no INET configuration. * Adds hook_socket_bind and hook_socket_connect hooks. --- security/landlock/Kconfig | 1 + security/landlock/Makefile | 2 + security/landlock/net.c | 161 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ security/landlock/net.h | 26 ++++++ security/landlock/setup.c | 2 + security/landlock/syscalls.c | 59 ++++++++++++- 6 files changed, 248 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) create mode 100644 security/landlock/net.c create mode 100644 security/landlock/net.h -- 2.25.1