diff mbox series

[v1] xfs: fix sb write verify for lazysbcount

Message ID 20221022020345.GA2699923@ceph-admin (mailing list archive)
State Superseded, archived
Headers show
Series [v1] xfs: fix sb write verify for lazysbcount | expand

Commit Message

Long Li Oct. 22, 2022, 2:03 a.m. UTC
When lazysbcount is enabled, multiple threads stress test the xfs report
the following problems:

XFS (loop0): SB summary counter sanity check failed
XFS (loop0): Metadata corruption detected at xfs_sb_write_verify
	     +0x13b/0x460, xfs_sb block 0x0
XFS (loop0): Unmount and run xfs_repair
XFS (loop0): First 128 bytes of corrupted metadata buffer:
00000000: 58 46 53 42 00 00 10 00 00 00 00 00 00 28 00 00  XFSB.........(..
00000010: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ................
00000020: 69 fb 7c cd 5f dc 44 af 85 74 e0 cc d4 e3 34 5a  i.|._.D..t....4Z
00000030: 00 00 00 00 00 20 00 06 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 80  ..... ..........
00000040: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 81 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 82  ................
00000050: 00 00 00 01 00 0a 00 00 00 00 00 04 00 00 00 00  ................
00000060: 00 00 0a 00 b4 b5 02 00 02 00 00 08 00 00 00 00  ................
00000070: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0c 09 09 03 14 00 00 19  ................
XFS (loop0): Corruption of in-memory data (0x8) detected at _xfs_buf_ioapply
	+0xe1e/0x10e0 (fs/xfs/xfs_buf.c:1580).  Shutting down filesystem.
XFS (loop0): Please unmount the filesystem and rectify the problem(s)
XFS (loop0): log mount/recovery failed: error -117
XFS (loop0): log mount failed

The cause of the problem is that during the log recovery process, incorrect
icount and ifree are recovered from the log and fail to pass the size check
in xfs_validate_sb_write().

With lazysbcount is enabled, There is no additional lock protection for
reading m_ifree and m_icount in xfs_log_sb(), if other threads modifies
the m_ifree between the read m_icount and the m_ifree, this will make the
m_ifree larger than m_icount and written to the log. If we have an unclean
shutdown, this will be corrected by xfs_initialize_perag_data() rebuilding
the counters from the AGF block counts, and the correction is later than
log recovery. During log recovery, incorrect ifree/icount may be restored
from the log and written to the super block, since ifree and icount have
not been corrected at this time, the relationship between ifree and icount
cannot be checked in xfs_validate_sb_write().

So, don't check the size between ifree and icount in xfs_validate_sb_write()
when lazysbcount is enabled.

Fixes: 8756a5af1819 ("libxfs: add more bounds checking to sb sanity checks")
Signed-off-by: Long Li <leo.lilong@huawei.com>
---
 fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_sb.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

Comments

Darrick J. Wong Oct. 22, 2022, 2:14 a.m. UTC | #1
On Sat, Oct 22, 2022 at 10:03:45AM +0800, Long Li wrote:
> When lazysbcount is enabled, multiple threads stress test the xfs report
> the following problems:
> 
> XFS (loop0): SB summary counter sanity check failed
> XFS (loop0): Metadata corruption detected at xfs_sb_write_verify
> 	     +0x13b/0x460, xfs_sb block 0x0
> XFS (loop0): Unmount and run xfs_repair
> XFS (loop0): First 128 bytes of corrupted metadata buffer:
> 00000000: 58 46 53 42 00 00 10 00 00 00 00 00 00 28 00 00  XFSB.........(..
> 00000010: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ................
> 00000020: 69 fb 7c cd 5f dc 44 af 85 74 e0 cc d4 e3 34 5a  i.|._.D..t....4Z
> 00000030: 00 00 00 00 00 20 00 06 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 80  ..... ..........
> 00000040: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 81 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 82  ................
> 00000050: 00 00 00 01 00 0a 00 00 00 00 00 04 00 00 00 00  ................
> 00000060: 00 00 0a 00 b4 b5 02 00 02 00 00 08 00 00 00 00  ................
> 00000070: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0c 09 09 03 14 00 00 19  ................
> XFS (loop0): Corruption of in-memory data (0x8) detected at _xfs_buf_ioapply
> 	+0xe1e/0x10e0 (fs/xfs/xfs_buf.c:1580).  Shutting down filesystem.
> XFS (loop0): Please unmount the filesystem and rectify the problem(s)
> XFS (loop0): log mount/recovery failed: error -117
> XFS (loop0): log mount failed
> 
> The cause of the problem is that during the log recovery process, incorrect
> icount and ifree are recovered from the log and fail to pass the size check

Are you saying that the log contained a transaction in which ifree >
icount?

> in xfs_validate_sb_write().
> 
> With lazysbcount is enabled, There is no additional lock protection for
> reading m_ifree and m_icount in xfs_log_sb(), if other threads modifies
> the m_ifree between the read m_icount and the m_ifree, this will make the
> m_ifree larger than m_icount and written to the log. If we have an unclean
> shutdown, this will be corrected by xfs_initialize_perag_data() rebuilding
> the counters from the AGF block counts, and the correction is later than
> log recovery. During log recovery, incorrect ifree/icount may be restored
> from the log and written to the super block, since ifree and icount have
> not been corrected at this time, the relationship between ifree and icount
> cannot be checked in xfs_validate_sb_write().
> 
> So, don't check the size between ifree and icount in xfs_validate_sb_write()
> when lazysbcount is enabled.

Um, doesn't that neuter a sanity check on all V5 filesystems?

--D

> Fixes: 8756a5af1819 ("libxfs: add more bounds checking to sb sanity checks")
> Signed-off-by: Long Li <leo.lilong@huawei.com>
> ---
>  fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_sb.c | 2 +-
>  1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
> 
> diff --git a/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_sb.c b/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_sb.c
> index a20cade590e9..b4a4e57361e7 100644
> --- a/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_sb.c
> +++ b/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_sb.c
> @@ -245,7 +245,7 @@ xfs_validate_sb_write(
>  	if (xfs_buf_daddr(bp) == XFS_SB_DADDR && !sbp->sb_inprogress &&
>  	    (sbp->sb_fdblocks > sbp->sb_dblocks ||
>  	     !xfs_verify_icount(mp, sbp->sb_icount) ||
> -	     sbp->sb_ifree > sbp->sb_icount)) {
> +	     (!xfs_has_lazysbcount(mp) && sbp->sb_ifree > sbp->sb_icount))) {
>  		xfs_warn(mp, "SB summary counter sanity check failed");
>  		return -EFSCORRUPTED;
>  	}
> -- 
> 2.31.1
>
Long Li Oct. 22, 2022, 12:01 p.m. UTC | #2
On Fri, Oct 21, 2022 at 07:14:28PM -0700, Darrick J. Wong wrote:
> On Sat, Oct 22, 2022 at 10:03:45AM +0800, Long Li wrote:
> > When lazysbcount is enabled, multiple threads stress test the xfs report
> > the following problems:
> > 
> > XFS (loop0): SB summary counter sanity check failed
> > XFS (loop0): Metadata corruption detected at xfs_sb_write_verify
> > 	     +0x13b/0x460, xfs_sb block 0x0
> > XFS (loop0): Unmount and run xfs_repair
> > XFS (loop0): First 128 bytes of corrupted metadata buffer:
> > 00000000: 58 46 53 42 00 00 10 00 00 00 00 00 00 28 00 00  XFSB.........(..
> > 00000010: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ................
> > 00000020: 69 fb 7c cd 5f dc 44 af 85 74 e0 cc d4 e3 34 5a  i.|._.D..t....4Z
> > 00000030: 00 00 00 00 00 20 00 06 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 80  ..... ..........
> > 00000040: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 81 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 82  ................
> > 00000050: 00 00 00 01 00 0a 00 00 00 00 00 04 00 00 00 00  ................
> > 00000060: 00 00 0a 00 b4 b5 02 00 02 00 00 08 00 00 00 00  ................
> > 00000070: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0c 09 09 03 14 00 00 19  ................
> > XFS (loop0): Corruption of in-memory data (0x8) detected at _xfs_buf_ioapply
> > 	+0xe1e/0x10e0 (fs/xfs/xfs_buf.c:1580).  Shutting down filesystem.
> > XFS (loop0): Please unmount the filesystem and rectify the problem(s)
> > XFS (loop0): log mount/recovery failed: error -117
> > XFS (loop0): log mount failed
> > 
> > The cause of the problem is that during the log recovery process, incorrect
> > icount and ifree are recovered from the log and fail to pass the size check
> 
> Are you saying that the log contained a transaction in which ifree >
> icount?

Yes, this situation is possible. For example consider the following sequence:

 CPU0				    CPU1
 xfs_log_sb			    xfs_trans_unreserve_and_mod_sb
 ----------			    ------------------------------
 percpu_counter_sum(&mp->m_icount)
				    percpu_counter_add(&mp->m_icount, idelta)
				    percpu_counter_add_batch(&mp->m_icount,
						  idelta, XFS_ICOUNT_BATCH)
 percpu_counter_sum(&mp->m_ifree)

> 
> > in xfs_validate_sb_write().
> > 
> > With lazysbcount is enabled, There is no additional lock protection for
> > reading m_ifree and m_icount in xfs_log_sb(), if other threads modifies
> > the m_ifree between the read m_icount and the m_ifree, this will make the
> > m_ifree larger than m_icount and written to the log. If we have an unclean
> > shutdown, this will be corrected by xfs_initialize_perag_data() rebuilding
> > the counters from the AGF block counts, and the correction is later than
> > log recovery. During log recovery, incorrect ifree/icount may be restored
> > from the log and written to the super block, since ifree and icount have
> > not been corrected at this time, the relationship between ifree and icount
> > cannot be checked in xfs_validate_sb_write().
> > 
> > So, don't check the size between ifree and icount in xfs_validate_sb_write()
> > when lazysbcount is enabled.
> 
> Um, doesn't that neuter a sanity check on all V5 filesystems?

Yes, such modifications don't look like the best way, all sb write checks 
will be affect. Maybe it can increase the judgment of clean mount and reduce
the scope of influence, but this requires setting the XFS_OPSTATE_CLEAN after
re-initialise incore superblock counters, like this:

--- a/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_sb.c
+++ b/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_sb.c
@@ -242,10 +242,12 @@ xfs_validate_sb_write(
 	 * secondary superblocks, so allow this usage to continue because
 	 * we never read counters from such superblocks.
 	 */
+	bool check = !(xfs_has_lazysbcount(mp) && !xfs_is_clean(mp));
+
 	if (xfs_buf_daddr(bp) == XFS_SB_DADDR && !sbp->sb_inprogress &&
 	    (sbp->sb_fdblocks > sbp->sb_dblocks ||
 	     !xfs_verify_icount(mp, sbp->sb_icount) ||
-	     sbp->sb_ifree > sbp->sb_icount)) {
+	     (check && sbp->sb_ifree > sbp->sb_icount))) {
 		xfs_warn(mp, "SB summary counter sanity check failed");
 		return -EFSCORRUPTED;
 	}
diff --git a/fs/xfs/xfs_mount.c b/fs/xfs/xfs_mount.c
index e8bb3c2e847e..0637e5d01e72 100644
--- a/fs/xfs/xfs_mount.c
+++ b/fs/xfs/xfs_mount.c
@@ -535,6 +535,8 @@ xfs_check_summary_counts(
 			return error;
 	}
 
+	set_bit(XFS_OPSTATE_CLEAN, &mp->m_opstate);
+
 	return 0;
 }
> 
> --D
> 
> > Fixes: 8756a5af1819 ("libxfs: add more bounds checking to sb sanity checks")
> > Signed-off-by: Long Li <leo.lilong@huawei.com>
> > ---
> >  fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_sb.c | 2 +-
> >  1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
> > 
> > diff --git a/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_sb.c b/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_sb.c
> > index a20cade590e9..b4a4e57361e7 100644
> > --- a/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_sb.c
> > +++ b/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_sb.c
> > @@ -245,7 +245,7 @@ xfs_validate_sb_write(
> >  	if (xfs_buf_daddr(bp) == XFS_SB_DADDR && !sbp->sb_inprogress &&
> >  	    (sbp->sb_fdblocks > sbp->sb_dblocks ||
> >  	     !xfs_verify_icount(mp, sbp->sb_icount) ||
> > -	     sbp->sb_ifree > sbp->sb_icount)) {
> > +	     (!xfs_has_lazysbcount(mp) && sbp->sb_ifree > sbp->sb_icount))) {
> >  		xfs_warn(mp, "SB summary counter sanity check failed");
> >  		return -EFSCORRUPTED;
> >  	}
> > -- 
> > 2.31.1
> >
Dave Chinner Oct. 22, 2022, 9:16 p.m. UTC | #3
On Sat, Oct 22, 2022 at 08:01:25PM +0800, Long Li wrote:
> On Fri, Oct 21, 2022 at 07:14:28PM -0700, Darrick J. Wong wrote:
> > On Sat, Oct 22, 2022 at 10:03:45AM +0800, Long Li wrote:
> > > When lazysbcount is enabled, multiple threads stress test the xfs report
> > > the following problems:

We've had lazy sb counters for 15 years and just about every XFS
filesystem in production uses them, so providing us with some idea
of the scope of the problem and how to reproduce it would be greatly
appreciated.

What stress test are you running? What filesystem config does it
manifest on (other than lazysbcount=1)?  How long does the stress
test run for, and where/why does log recovery get run in this stress
test?

> > > XFS (loop0): SB summary counter sanity check failed
> > > XFS (loop0): Metadata corruption detected at xfs_sb_write_verify
> > > 	     +0x13b/0x460, xfs_sb block 0x0
> > > XFS (loop0): Unmount and run xfs_repair
> > > XFS (loop0): First 128 bytes of corrupted metadata buffer:
> > > 00000000: 58 46 53 42 00 00 10 00 00 00 00 00 00 28 00 00  XFSB.........(..
> > > 00000010: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ................
> > > 00000020: 69 fb 7c cd 5f dc 44 af 85 74 e0 cc d4 e3 34 5a  i.|._.D..t....4Z
> > > 00000030: 00 00 00 00 00 20 00 06 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 80  ..... ..........
> > > 00000040: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 81 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 82  ................
> > > 00000050: 00 00 00 01 00 0a 00 00 00 00 00 04 00 00 00 00  ................
> > > 00000060: 00 00 0a 00 b4 b5 02 00 02 00 00 08 00 00 00 00  ................
> > > 00000070: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0c 09 09 03 14 00 00 19  ................
> > > XFS (loop0): Corruption of in-memory data (0x8) detected at _xfs_buf_ioapply
> > > 	+0xe1e/0x10e0 (fs/xfs/xfs_buf.c:1580).  Shutting down filesystem.
> > > XFS (loop0): Please unmount the filesystem and rectify the problem(s)
> > > XFS (loop0): log mount/recovery failed: error -117
> > > XFS (loop0): log mount failed
> > > 
> > > The cause of the problem is that during the log recovery process, incorrect
> > > icount and ifree are recovered from the log and fail to pass the size check
> > 
> > Are you saying that the log contained a transaction in which ifree >
> > icount?
> 
> Yes, this situation is possible. For example consider the following sequence:
> 
>  CPU0				    CPU1
>  xfs_log_sb			    xfs_trans_unreserve_and_mod_sb
>  ----------			    ------------------------------
>  percpu_counter_sum(&mp->m_icount)
> 				    percpu_counter_add(&mp->m_icount, idelta)
> 				    percpu_counter_add_batch(&mp->m_icount,
> 						  idelta, XFS_ICOUNT_BATCH)
>  percpu_counter_sum(&mp->m_ifree)

What caused the xfs_log_sb() to be called? Very few things
actually log the superblock this way at runtime - it's generally
only logged directly like this when a feature bit changes during a
transaction (rare) or at a synchronisation point when everything
else is idle and there's no chance of a race like this occurring...

I can see a couple of routes to this occurring via feature bit
modification, but I don't see them being easy to hit or something
that would exist for very long in the journal. Hence I'm wondering
if there should be runtime protection for xfs_log_sb() to avoid
these problems....

> > > in xfs_validate_sb_write().
> > > 
> > > With lazysbcount is enabled, There is no additional lock protection for
> > > reading m_ifree and m_icount in xfs_log_sb(), if other threads modifies
> > > the m_ifree between the read m_icount and the m_ifree, this will make the
> > > m_ifree larger than m_icount and written to the log. If we have an unclean
> > > shutdown, this will be corrected by xfs_initialize_perag_data() rebuilding
> > > the counters from the AGF block counts, and the correction is later than
> > > log recovery. During log recovery, incorrect ifree/icount may be restored
> > > from the log and written to the super block, since ifree and icount have
> > > not been corrected at this time, the relationship between ifree and icount
> > > cannot be checked in xfs_validate_sb_write().
> > > 
> > > So, don't check the size between ifree and icount in xfs_validate_sb_write()
> > > when lazysbcount is enabled.
> > 
> > Um, doesn't that neuter a sanity check on all V5 filesystems?
>
> Yes, such modifications don't look like the best way, all sb write checks 
> will be affect. Maybe it can increase the judgment of clean mount and reduce
> the scope of influence, but this requires setting the XFS_OPSTATE_CLEAN after
> re-initialise incore superblock counters, like this:

I'm not sure that silencing the warning and continuing log recovery
with an invalid accounting state is the best way to proceed. We
haven't yet recovered unlinked inodes at the time this warning
fires. If ifree really is larger than icount, then we've got a
real problem at this point in log recovery.

Hence I suspect that we should be looking at fixing the runtime race
condition that leads to the problem, not trying to work around
inconsistency in the recovery code.

-Dave.
Darrick J. Wong Oct. 24, 2022, 4:07 a.m. UTC | #4
On Sun, Oct 23, 2022 at 08:16:13AM +1100, Dave Chinner wrote:
> On Sat, Oct 22, 2022 at 08:01:25PM +0800, Long Li wrote:
> > On Fri, Oct 21, 2022 at 07:14:28PM -0700, Darrick J. Wong wrote:
> > > On Sat, Oct 22, 2022 at 10:03:45AM +0800, Long Li wrote:
> > > > When lazysbcount is enabled, multiple threads stress test the xfs report
> > > > the following problems:
> 
> We've had lazy sb counters for 15 years and just about every XFS
> filesystem in production uses them, so providing us with some idea
> of the scope of the problem and how to reproduce it would be greatly
> appreciated.
> 
> What stress test are you running? What filesystem config does it
> manifest on (other than lazysbcount=1)?  How long does the stress
> test run for, and where/why does log recovery get run in this stress
> test?
> 
> > > > XFS (loop0): SB summary counter sanity check failed
> > > > XFS (loop0): Metadata corruption detected at xfs_sb_write_verify
> > > > 	     +0x13b/0x460, xfs_sb block 0x0
> > > > XFS (loop0): Unmount and run xfs_repair
> > > > XFS (loop0): First 128 bytes of corrupted metadata buffer:
> > > > 00000000: 58 46 53 42 00 00 10 00 00 00 00 00 00 28 00 00  XFSB.........(..
> > > > 00000010: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ................
> > > > 00000020: 69 fb 7c cd 5f dc 44 af 85 74 e0 cc d4 e3 34 5a  i.|._.D..t....4Z
> > > > 00000030: 00 00 00 00 00 20 00 06 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 80  ..... ..........
> > > > 00000040: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 81 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 82  ................
> > > > 00000050: 00 00 00 01 00 0a 00 00 00 00 00 04 00 00 00 00  ................
> > > > 00000060: 00 00 0a 00 b4 b5 02 00 02 00 00 08 00 00 00 00  ................
> > > > 00000070: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0c 09 09 03 14 00 00 19  ................
> > > > XFS (loop0): Corruption of in-memory data (0x8) detected at _xfs_buf_ioapply
> > > > 	+0xe1e/0x10e0 (fs/xfs/xfs_buf.c:1580).  Shutting down filesystem.
> > > > XFS (loop0): Please unmount the filesystem and rectify the problem(s)
> > > > XFS (loop0): log mount/recovery failed: error -117
> > > > XFS (loop0): log mount failed
> > > > 
> > > > The cause of the problem is that during the log recovery process, incorrect
> > > > icount and ifree are recovered from the log and fail to pass the size check
> > > 
> > > Are you saying that the log contained a transaction in which ifree >
> > > icount?
> > 
> > Yes, this situation is possible. For example consider the following sequence:
> > 
> >  CPU0				    CPU1
> >  xfs_log_sb			    xfs_trans_unreserve_and_mod_sb
> >  ----------			    ------------------------------
> >  percpu_counter_sum(&mp->m_icount)
> > 				    percpu_counter_add(&mp->m_icount, idelta)
> > 				    percpu_counter_add_batch(&mp->m_icount,
> > 						  idelta, XFS_ICOUNT_BATCH)
> >  percpu_counter_sum(&mp->m_ifree)
> 
> What caused the xfs_log_sb() to be called? Very few things
> actually log the superblock this way at runtime - it's generally
> only logged directly like this when a feature bit changes during a
> transaction (rare) or at a synchronisation point when everything
> else is idle and there's no chance of a race like this occurring...
> 
> I can see a couple of routes to this occurring via feature bit
> modification, but I don't see them being easy to hit or something
> that would exist for very long in the journal. Hence I'm wondering
> if there should be runtime protection for xfs_log_sb() to avoid
> these problems....

Maybe.  Or perhaps we sample m_i{count,free} until they come up with a
value that will pass the verifier, and only then log the new values to
the primary super xfs_buf?

> > > > in xfs_validate_sb_write().
> > > > 
> > > > With lazysbcount is enabled, There is no additional lock protection for
> > > > reading m_ifree and m_icount in xfs_log_sb(), if other threads modifies
> > > > the m_ifree between the read m_icount and the m_ifree, this will make the
> > > > m_ifree larger than m_icount and written to the log. If we have an unclean
> > > > shutdown, this will be corrected by xfs_initialize_perag_data() rebuilding
> > > > the counters from the AGF block counts, and the correction is later than
> > > > log recovery. During log recovery, incorrect ifree/icount may be restored
> > > > from the log and written to the super block, since ifree and icount have
> > > > not been corrected at this time, the relationship between ifree and icount
> > > > cannot be checked in xfs_validate_sb_write().
> > > > 
> > > > So, don't check the size between ifree and icount in xfs_validate_sb_write()
> > > > when lazysbcount is enabled.
> > > 
> > > Um, doesn't that neuter a sanity check on all V5 filesystems?
> >
> > Yes, such modifications don't look like the best way, all sb write checks 
> > will be affect. Maybe it can increase the judgment of clean mount and reduce
> > the scope of influence, but this requires setting the XFS_OPSTATE_CLEAN after
> > re-initialise incore superblock counters, like this:
> 
> I'm not sure that silencing the warning and continuing log recovery
> with an invalid accounting state is the best way to proceed. We
> haven't yet recovered unlinked inodes at the time this warning
> fires. If ifree really is larger than icount, then we've got a
> real problem at this point in log recovery.
> 
> Hence I suspect that we should be looking at fixing the runtime race
> condition that leads to the problem, not trying to work around
> inconsistency in the recovery code.

Agreed.  Higher level code shouldn't be storing garbage ifree/icount to
the primary superblock xfs_buf, period.

--D

> -Dave.
> -- 
> Dave Chinner
> david@fromorbit.com
Long Li Oct. 24, 2022, 5:06 a.m. UTC | #5
On Sun, Oct 23, 2022 at 08:16:13AM +1100, Dave Chinner wrote:
> On Sat, Oct 22, 2022 at 08:01:25PM +0800, Long Li wrote:
> > On Fri, Oct 21, 2022 at 07:14:28PM -0700, Darrick J. Wong wrote:
> > > On Sat, Oct 22, 2022 at 10:03:45AM +0800, Long Li wrote:
> > > > When lazysbcount is enabled, multiple threads stress test the xfs report
> > > > the following problems:
> 
> We've had lazy sb counters for 15 years and just about every XFS
> filesystem in production uses them, so providing us with some idea
> of the scope of the problem and how to reproduce it would be greatly
> appreciated.

Ok, here is my simplified script that could reproducer the bug:

#!/bin/bash

device=/dev/sda
testdir=/mnt/test
round=0

function fail()
{
	echo "$*"
	exit 1
}

while [ $round -lt 10000 ]
do
	echo "******* round $round ********"
	mkfs.xfs -f $device
	mkdir -p $testdir
	mount $device $testdir || fail "mount failed!"
	fsstress -d $testdir -l 0 -n 10000 -p 4 >/dev/null &
	sleep 4
	killall -w fsstress
	umount $testdir
	xfs_repair -e $device > /dev/null
	if [ $? -eq 2 ];then
		echo "ERR CODE 2: Dirty log exception encountered during repair."
		exit 1
	fi
	sleep 1
	round=$(($round+1))
done

> 
> What stress test are you running? What filesystem config does it
> manifest on (other than lazysbcount=1)?  How long does the stress
> test run for, and where/why does log recovery get run in this stress
> test?

I tested with the fsstress tool and used the default mount options. 
More configuration are as follows:

CONFIG_XFS_FS=y
CONFIG_XFS_SUPPORT_V4=y
CONFIG_XFS_QUOTA=y
CONFIG_XFS_POSIX_ACL=y
CONFIG_XFS_RT=y
CONFIG_XFS_DEBUG=y
CONFIG_XFS_ASSERT_FATAL=y

xfs_db> info
meta-data=/dev/sda               isize=512    agcount=4, agsize=65536 blks
         =                       sectsz=512   attr=2, projid32bit=1
	 =                       crc=1        finobt=1, sparse=1, rmapbt=0
	 =                       reflink=1
data     =                       bsize=4096   blocks=262144, imaxpct=25
	 =                       sunit=0      swidth=0 blks
naming   =version 2              bsize=4096   ascii-ci=0, ftype=1
log      =internal log           bsize=4096   blocks=2560, version=2
	 =                       sectsz=512   sunit=0 blks, lazy-count=1
realtime =none                   extsz=4096   blocks=0, rtextents=0

With the above test script, it will take several days to reproduce the bug.
If we add a delay in xfs_log_sb(), this will quickly reproduce the problem:

 	if (xfs_has_lazysbcount(mp)) {
 		mp->m_sb.sb_icount = percpu_counter_sum(&mp->m_icount);
+		udelay(2000);
 		mp->m_sb.sb_ifree = percpu_counter_sum(&mp->m_ifree);
 		mp->m_sb.sb_fdblocks = percpu_counter_sum(&mp->m_fdblocks);
 	}

> 
> > > > XFS (loop0): SB summary counter sanity check failed
> > > > XFS (loop0): Metadata corruption detected at xfs_sb_write_verify
> > > > 	     +0x13b/0x460, xfs_sb block 0x0
> > > > XFS (loop0): Unmount and run xfs_repair
> > > > XFS (loop0): First 128 bytes of corrupted metadata buffer:
> > > > 00000000: 58 46 53 42 00 00 10 00 00 00 00 00 00 28 00 00  XFSB.........(..
> > > > 00000010: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ................
> > > > 00000020: 69 fb 7c cd 5f dc 44 af 85 74 e0 cc d4 e3 34 5a  i.|._.D..t....4Z
> > > > 00000030: 00 00 00 00 00 20 00 06 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 80  ..... ..........
> > > > 00000040: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 81 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 82  ................
> > > > 00000050: 00 00 00 01 00 0a 00 00 00 00 00 04 00 00 00 00  ................
> > > > 00000060: 00 00 0a 00 b4 b5 02 00 02 00 00 08 00 00 00 00  ................
> > > > 00000070: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0c 09 09 03 14 00 00 19  ................
> > > > XFS (loop0): Corruption of in-memory data (0x8) detected at _xfs_buf_ioapply
> > > > 	+0xe1e/0x10e0 (fs/xfs/xfs_buf.c:1580).  Shutting down filesystem.
> > > > XFS (loop0): Please unmount the filesystem and rectify the problem(s)
> > > > XFS (loop0): log mount/recovery failed: error -117
> > > > XFS (loop0): log mount failed
> > > > 
> > > > The cause of the problem is that during the log recovery process, incorrect
> > > > icount and ifree are recovered from the log and fail to pass the size check
> > > 
> > > Are you saying that the log contained a transaction in which ifree >
> > > icount?
> > 
> > Yes, this situation is possible. For example consider the following sequence:
> > 
> >  CPU0				    CPU1
> >  xfs_log_sb			    xfs_trans_unreserve_and_mod_sb
> >  ----------			    ------------------------------
> >  percpu_counter_sum(&mp->m_icount)
> > 				    percpu_counter_add(&mp->m_icount, idelta)
> > 				    percpu_counter_add_batch(&mp->m_icount,
> > 						  idelta, XFS_ICOUNT_BATCH)
> >  percpu_counter_sum(&mp->m_ifree)
> 
> What caused the xfs_log_sb() to be called? Very few things
> actually log the superblock this way at runtime - it's generally
> only logged directly like this when a feature bit changes during a
> transaction (rare) or at a synchronisation point when everything
> else is idle and there's no chance of a race like this occurring...
> 
> I can see a couple of routes to this occurring via feature bit
> modification, but I don't see them being easy to hit or something
> that would exist for very long in the journal. Hence I'm wondering
> if there should be runtime protection for xfs_log_sb() to avoid
> these problems....
> 
> > > > in xfs_validate_sb_write().
> > > > 
> > > > With lazysbcount is enabled, There is no additional lock protection for
> > > > reading m_ifree and m_icount in xfs_log_sb(), if other threads modifies
> > > > the m_ifree between the read m_icount and the m_ifree, this will make the
> > > > m_ifree larger than m_icount and written to the log. If we have an unclean
> > > > shutdown, this will be corrected by xfs_initialize_perag_data() rebuilding
> > > > the counters from the AGF block counts, and the correction is later than
> > > > log recovery. During log recovery, incorrect ifree/icount may be restored
> > > > from the log and written to the super block, since ifree and icount have
> > > > not been corrected at this time, the relationship between ifree and icount
> > > > cannot be checked in xfs_validate_sb_write().
> > > > 
> > > > So, don't check the size between ifree and icount in xfs_validate_sb_write()
> > > > when lazysbcount is enabled.
> > > 
> > > Um, doesn't that neuter a sanity check on all V5 filesystems?
> >
> > Yes, such modifications don't look like the best way, all sb write checks 
> > will be affect. Maybe it can increase the judgment of clean mount and reduce
> > the scope of influence, but this requires setting the XFS_OPSTATE_CLEAN after
> > re-initialise incore superblock counters, like this:
> 
> I'm not sure that silencing the warning and continuing log recovery
> with an invalid accounting state is the best way to proceed. We
> haven't yet recovered unlinked inodes at the time this warning
> fires. If ifree really is larger than icount, then we've got a
> real problem at this point in log recovery.
> 
> Hence I suspect that we should be looking at fixing the runtime race
> condition that leads to the problem, not trying to work around
> inconsistency in the recovery code.
> 
> -Dave.
> -- 
> Dave Chinner
> david@fromorbit.com
Dave Chinner Oct. 24, 2022, 5:43 a.m. UTC | #6
On Sun, Oct 23, 2022 at 09:07:42PM -0700, Darrick J. Wong wrote:
> On Sun, Oct 23, 2022 at 08:16:13AM +1100, Dave Chinner wrote:
> > On Sat, Oct 22, 2022 at 08:01:25PM +0800, Long Li wrote:
> > > On Fri, Oct 21, 2022 at 07:14:28PM -0700, Darrick J. Wong wrote:
> > > > On Sat, Oct 22, 2022 at 10:03:45AM +0800, Long Li wrote:
> > > > > When lazysbcount is enabled, multiple threads stress test the xfs report
> > > > > the following problems:
> > 
> > We've had lazy sb counters for 15 years and just about every XFS
> > filesystem in production uses them, so providing us with some idea
> > of the scope of the problem and how to reproduce it would be greatly
> > appreciated.
> > 
> > What stress test are you running? What filesystem config does it
> > manifest on (other than lazysbcount=1)?  How long does the stress
> > test run for, and where/why does log recovery get run in this stress
> > test?
> > 
> > > > > XFS (loop0): SB summary counter sanity check failed
> > > > > XFS (loop0): Metadata corruption detected at xfs_sb_write_verify
> > > > > 	     +0x13b/0x460, xfs_sb block 0x0
> > > > > XFS (loop0): Unmount and run xfs_repair
> > > > > XFS (loop0): First 128 bytes of corrupted metadata buffer:
> > > > > 00000000: 58 46 53 42 00 00 10 00 00 00 00 00 00 28 00 00  XFSB.........(..
> > > > > 00000010: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ................
> > > > > 00000020: 69 fb 7c cd 5f dc 44 af 85 74 e0 cc d4 e3 34 5a  i.|._.D..t....4Z
> > > > > 00000030: 00 00 00 00 00 20 00 06 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 80  ..... ..........
> > > > > 00000040: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 81 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 82  ................
> > > > > 00000050: 00 00 00 01 00 0a 00 00 00 00 00 04 00 00 00 00  ................
> > > > > 00000060: 00 00 0a 00 b4 b5 02 00 02 00 00 08 00 00 00 00  ................
> > > > > 00000070: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0c 09 09 03 14 00 00 19  ................
> > > > > XFS (loop0): Corruption of in-memory data (0x8) detected at _xfs_buf_ioapply
> > > > > 	+0xe1e/0x10e0 (fs/xfs/xfs_buf.c:1580).  Shutting down filesystem.
> > > > > XFS (loop0): Please unmount the filesystem and rectify the problem(s)
> > > > > XFS (loop0): log mount/recovery failed: error -117
> > > > > XFS (loop0): log mount failed
> > > > > 
> > > > > The cause of the problem is that during the log recovery process, incorrect
> > > > > icount and ifree are recovered from the log and fail to pass the size check
> > > > 
> > > > Are you saying that the log contained a transaction in which ifree >
> > > > icount?
> > > 
> > > Yes, this situation is possible. For example consider the following sequence:
> > > 
> > >  CPU0				    CPU1
> > >  xfs_log_sb			    xfs_trans_unreserve_and_mod_sb
> > >  ----------			    ------------------------------
> > >  percpu_counter_sum(&mp->m_icount)
> > > 				    percpu_counter_add(&mp->m_icount, idelta)
> > > 				    percpu_counter_add_batch(&mp->m_icount,
> > > 						  idelta, XFS_ICOUNT_BATCH)
> > >  percpu_counter_sum(&mp->m_ifree)
> > 
> > What caused the xfs_log_sb() to be called? Very few things
> > actually log the superblock this way at runtime - it's generally
> > only logged directly like this when a feature bit changes during a
> > transaction (rare) or at a synchronisation point when everything
> > else is idle and there's no chance of a race like this occurring...
> > 
> > I can see a couple of routes to this occurring via feature bit
> > modification, but I don't see them being easy to hit or something
> > that would exist for very long in the journal. Hence I'm wondering
> > if there should be runtime protection for xfs_log_sb() to avoid
> > these problems....
> 
> Maybe.  Or perhaps we sample m_i{count,free} until they come up with a
> value that will pass the verifier, and only then log the new values to
> the primary super xfs_buf?

I suspect the simplest thing to do is this:

	mp->m_sb.sb_ifree = min_t(uint64_t, percpu_counter_sum(&mp->m_ifree),
				mp->m_sb.sb.icount);

That way ifree will never be logged as being greater than icount.
Neither icount or ifree will be accurate if we are racing with other
updates, but it will guarantee that what we write to the journal
won't trigger corruption warnings.

-Dave.
Long Li Oct. 24, 2022, 12:28 p.m. UTC | #7
On Mon, Oct 24, 2022 at 04:43:45PM +1100, Dave Chinner wrote:
> On Sun, Oct 23, 2022 at 09:07:42PM -0700, Darrick J. Wong wrote:
> > On Sun, Oct 23, 2022 at 08:16:13AM +1100, Dave Chinner wrote:
> > > On Sat, Oct 22, 2022 at 08:01:25PM +0800, Long Li wrote:
> > > > On Fri, Oct 21, 2022 at 07:14:28PM -0700, Darrick J. Wong wrote:
> > > > > On Sat, Oct 22, 2022 at 10:03:45AM +0800, Long Li wrote:
> > > > > > When lazysbcount is enabled, multiple threads stress test the xfs report
> > > > > > the following problems:
> > > 
> > > We've had lazy sb counters for 15 years and just about every XFS
> > > filesystem in production uses them, so providing us with some idea
> > > of the scope of the problem and how to reproduce it would be greatly
> > > appreciated.
> > > 
> > > What stress test are you running? What filesystem config does it
> > > manifest on (other than lazysbcount=1)?  How long does the stress
> > > test run for, and where/why does log recovery get run in this stress
> > > test?
> > > 
> > > > > > XFS (loop0): SB summary counter sanity check failed
> > > > > > XFS (loop0): Metadata corruption detected at xfs_sb_write_verify
> > > > > > 	     +0x13b/0x460, xfs_sb block 0x0
> > > > > > XFS (loop0): Unmount and run xfs_repair
> > > > > > XFS (loop0): First 128 bytes of corrupted metadata buffer:
> > > > > > 00000000: 58 46 53 42 00 00 10 00 00 00 00 00 00 28 00 00  XFSB.........(..
> > > > > > 00000010: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ................
> > > > > > 00000020: 69 fb 7c cd 5f dc 44 af 85 74 e0 cc d4 e3 34 5a  i.|._.D..t....4Z
> > > > > > 00000030: 00 00 00 00 00 20 00 06 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 80  ..... ..........
> > > > > > 00000040: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 81 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 82  ................
> > > > > > 00000050: 00 00 00 01 00 0a 00 00 00 00 00 04 00 00 00 00  ................
> > > > > > 00000060: 00 00 0a 00 b4 b5 02 00 02 00 00 08 00 00 00 00  ................
> > > > > > 00000070: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0c 09 09 03 14 00 00 19  ................
> > > > > > XFS (loop0): Corruption of in-memory data (0x8) detected at _xfs_buf_ioapply
> > > > > > 	+0xe1e/0x10e0 (fs/xfs/xfs_buf.c:1580).  Shutting down filesystem.
> > > > > > XFS (loop0): Please unmount the filesystem and rectify the problem(s)
> > > > > > XFS (loop0): log mount/recovery failed: error -117
> > > > > > XFS (loop0): log mount failed
> > > > > > 
> > > > > > The cause of the problem is that during the log recovery process, incorrect
> > > > > > icount and ifree are recovered from the log and fail to pass the size check
> > > > > 
> > > > > Are you saying that the log contained a transaction in which ifree >
> > > > > icount?
> > > > 
> > > > Yes, this situation is possible. For example consider the following sequence:
> > > > 
> > > >  CPU0				    CPU1
> > > >  xfs_log_sb			    xfs_trans_unreserve_and_mod_sb
> > > >  ----------			    ------------------------------
> > > >  percpu_counter_sum(&mp->m_icount)
> > > > 				    percpu_counter_add(&mp->m_icount, idelta)
> > > > 				    percpu_counter_add_batch(&mp->m_icount,
> > > > 						  idelta, XFS_ICOUNT_BATCH)
> > > >  percpu_counter_sum(&mp->m_ifree)
> > > 
> > > What caused the xfs_log_sb() to be called? Very few things
> > > actually log the superblock this way at runtime - it's generally
> > > only logged directly like this when a feature bit changes during a
> > > transaction (rare) or at a synchronisation point when everything
> > > else is idle and there's no chance of a race like this occurring...
> > > 
> > > I can see a couple of routes to this occurring via feature bit
> > > modification, but I don't see them being easy to hit or something
> > > that would exist for very long in the journal. Hence I'm wondering
> > > if there should be runtime protection for xfs_log_sb() to avoid
> > > these problems....
> > 
> > Maybe.  Or perhaps we sample m_i{count,free} until they come up with a
> > value that will pass the verifier, and only then log the new values to
> > the primary super xfs_buf?
> 
> I suspect the simplest thing to do is this:
> 
> 	mp->m_sb.sb_ifree = min_t(uint64_t, percpu_counter_sum(&mp->m_ifree),
> 				mp->m_sb.sb.icount);
> 
> That way ifree will never be logged as being greater than icount.
> Neither icount or ifree will be accurate if we are racing with other
> updates, but it will guarantee that what we write to the journal
> won't trigger corruption warnings.
> 

Agree with you, this is the simplest and cleanest fix method, there will
be no more impact. This can be fixed at the point where the problem occurs
rather than after the problem has occurred. I would like to resend a patch
and attach the reproduce script. Thanks for your advice.

> -Dave.
> -- 
> Dave Chinner
> david@fromorbit.com
>
diff mbox series

Patch

diff --git a/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_sb.c b/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_sb.c
index a20cade590e9..b4a4e57361e7 100644
--- a/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_sb.c
+++ b/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_sb.c
@@ -245,7 +245,7 @@  xfs_validate_sb_write(
 	if (xfs_buf_daddr(bp) == XFS_SB_DADDR && !sbp->sb_inprogress &&
 	    (sbp->sb_fdblocks > sbp->sb_dblocks ||
 	     !xfs_verify_icount(mp, sbp->sb_icount) ||
-	     sbp->sb_ifree > sbp->sb_icount)) {
+	     (!xfs_has_lazysbcount(mp) && sbp->sb_ifree > sbp->sb_icount))) {
 		xfs_warn(mp, "SB summary counter sanity check failed");
 		return -EFSCORRUPTED;
 	}