| Message ID | 20221201021948.9259-3-aik@amd.com (mailing list archive) |
|---|---|
| State | New, archived |
| Headers | show |
| Series | KVM: SEV: Enable AMD SEV-ES DebugSwap | expand |
On Thu, Dec 01, 2022, Alexey Kardashevskiy wrote: > AMD Milan introduces support for the swapping, as type 'B', Please make the changelog standalone, i.e. don't rely on the shortlog to provide context. "the swapping" is inscrutable without the shortlog. > of DR[0-3] and DR[0-3]_ADDR_MASK registers. It requires that > SEV_FEATURES[5] be set in the VMSA. Avoid pronouns in shortlogs, changelogs, and comments, as pronouns tend to be ambiguous. "Software can enable DebugSwap by setting SEV_FEATURE[5] in the VMSA." isn't much more effort to type. > > This requires the KVM to eliminate the intercept of #DB. However, Same here, e.g. does "this" mean that the architecture requires DB interception to be disabled to enable DebugSwap? > because of the infinite #DB loop DoS that a malicious guest can do, > it can only be eliminated based if CPUID Fn80000021_EAX[0] And "it" here. > (NoNestedDataBp) is set in the host/HV. > > This eliminates #DB intercept, DR7 intercept for SEV-ES/SEV-SNP guest. > This saves DR[0-3] / DR[0-3]_ADDR_MASK in the host save area before VMRUN. > This sets SEV_FEATURES[5] in VMSA. And all of these "this". Assuming "this" means "this patch", rewrite these sentences to be commands that state what changes are being done. > Signed-off-by: Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@amd.com> > --- > arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h | 1 + > arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h | 18 +++++++++++----- > arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 22 +++++++++++++++++++- > arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 6 ++++-- > 4 files changed, 39 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h > index 0361626841bc..373a0edda588 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h > +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h > @@ -273,6 +273,7 @@ enum avic_ipi_failure_cause { > #define AVIC_HPA_MASK ~((0xFFFULL << 52) | 0xFFF) > #define VMCB_AVIC_APIC_BAR_MASK 0xFFFFFFFFFF000ULL > > +#define SVM_SEV_FEAT_DEBUG_SWAP BIT(5) > > struct vmcb_seg { > u16 selector; > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h > index 199a2ecef1ce..4d75b14bffab 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h > @@ -83,6 +83,7 @@ enum { > struct kvm_sev_info { > bool active; /* SEV enabled guest */ > bool es_active; /* SEV-ES enabled guest */ > + bool debug_swap; /* SEV-ES Debug swap enabled */ > unsigned int asid; /* ASID used for this guest */ > unsigned int handle; /* SEV firmware handle */ > int fd; /* SEV device fd */ > @@ -388,6 +389,7 @@ static inline bool vmcb12_is_intercept(struct vmcb_ctrl_area_cached *control, u3 > > static inline void set_dr_intercepts(struct vcpu_svm *svm) > { > + struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(svm->vcpu.kvm)->sev_info; > struct vmcb *vmcb = svm->vmcb01.ptr; > > if (!sev_es_guest(svm->vcpu.kvm)) { > @@ -407,20 +409,26 @@ static inline void set_dr_intercepts(struct vcpu_svm *svm) > vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR6_WRITE); > } > > - vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR7_READ); > - vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR7_WRITE); > + if (!sev->debug_swap) { > + vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR7_READ); > + vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR7_WRITE); > + } > > recalc_intercepts(svm); > } > > static inline void clr_dr_intercepts(struct vcpu_svm *svm) > { > + struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(svm->vcpu.kvm)->sev_info; > struct vmcb *vmcb = svm->vmcb01.ptr; > > vmcb->control.intercepts[INTERCEPT_DR] = 0; > > - /* DR7 access must remain intercepted for an SEV-ES guest */ > - if (sev_es_guest(svm->vcpu.kvm)) { > + /* > + * DR7 access must remain intercepted for an SEV-ES guest unless > + * the DebugSwap feature is set Please explain _why_. > + */ > + if (sev_es_guest(svm->vcpu.kvm) && !sev->debug_swap) { > vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR7_READ); > vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR7_WRITE); > } > @@ -677,7 +685,7 @@ int sev_handle_vmgexit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); > int sev_es_string_io(struct vcpu_svm *svm, int size, unsigned int port, int in); > void sev_es_vcpu_reset(struct vcpu_svm *svm); > void sev_vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u8 vector); > -void sev_es_prepare_switch_to_guest(struct sev_es_save_area *hostsa); > +void sev_es_prepare_switch_to_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct sev_es_save_area *hostsa); > void sev_es_unmap_ghcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm); > > /* vmenter.S */ > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c > index efaaef2b7ae1..fac8b48e3162 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c > @@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ > #include <asm/pkru.h> > #include <asm/trapnr.h> > #include <asm/fpu/xcr.h> > +#include <asm/debugreg.h> > > #include "mmu.h" > #include "x86.h" > @@ -253,6 +254,7 @@ static int sev_guest_init(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp) > if (asid < 0) > goto e_no_asid; > sev->asid = asid; > + sev->debug_swap = sev->es_active && Enabling DebugSwap should be guarded with a module param so that the admin can disable the feature if necessary. And then the per-vCPU variable goes away. > kvm_cpu_cap_get(KVM_X86_FEATURE_NO_NESTED_DATA_BP); kvm_cpu_cap_has(). And use X86_FEATURE_* directly, which is the whole point of the __feature_translate() shenanigans. > > ret = sev_platform_init(&argp->error); > if (ret) > @@ -564,6 +566,7 @@ static int sev_launch_update_data(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp) > static int sev_es_sync_vmsa(struct vcpu_svm *svm) > { > struct sev_es_save_area *save = svm->sev_es.vmsa; > + struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(svm->vcpu.kvm)->sev_info; > > /* Check some debug related fields before encrypting the VMSA */ > if (svm->vcpu.guest_debug || (svm->vmcb->save.dr7 & ~DR7_FIXED_1)) > @@ -604,6 +607,9 @@ static int sev_es_sync_vmsa(struct vcpu_svm *svm) > save->xss = svm->vcpu.arch.ia32_xss; > save->dr6 = svm->vcpu.arch.dr6; > > + if (sev->debug_swap) > + save->sev_features |= SVM_SEV_FEAT_DEBUG_SWAP; Resurrecting my objection to "AP Creation NAE event"[*], what happens if a hypervisor supports GHCB_HV_FT_SNP_AP_CREATION but not DebugSwap? IIUC, a guest can corrupt host DRs by enabling DebugSwap in the VMSA of an AP vCPU, e.g. the CPU will load zeros on VM-Exit if the host hasn't stuffed the host save area fields. KVM can obviously just make sure to save its DRs if hardware supports DebugSwap, but what if DebugSwap is buggy and needs to be disabled? And what about the next feature that can apparently be enabled by the guest? [*] https://lore.kernel.org/all/YWnbfCet84Vup6q9@google.com
On 2/12/22 04:37, Sean Christopherson wrote: > On Thu, Dec 01, 2022, Alexey Kardashevskiy wrote: >> AMD Milan introduces support for the swapping, as type 'B', > > Please make the changelog standalone, i.e. don't rely on the shortlog to provide > context. "the swapping" is inscrutable without the shortlog. > >> of DR[0-3] and DR[0-3]_ADDR_MASK registers. It requires that >> SEV_FEATURES[5] be set in the VMSA. > > Avoid pronouns in shortlogs, changelogs, and comments, as pronouns tend to be > ambiguous. "Software can enable DebugSwap by setting SEV_FEATURE[5] in the VMSA." > isn't much more effort to type. > >> >> This requires the KVM to eliminate the intercept of #DB. However, > > Same here, e.g. does "this" mean that the architecture requires DB interception > to be disabled to enable DebugSwap? > >> because of the infinite #DB loop DoS that a malicious guest can do, >> it can only be eliminated based if CPUID Fn80000021_EAX[0] > > And "it" here. > >> (NoNestedDataBp) is set in the host/HV. >> >> This eliminates #DB intercept, DR7 intercept for SEV-ES/SEV-SNP guest. >> This saves DR[0-3] / DR[0-3]_ADDR_MASK in the host save area before VMRUN. >> This sets SEV_FEATURES[5] in VMSA. > > And all of these "this". Assuming "this" means "this patch", rewrite these > sentences to be commands that state what changes are being done. > >> Signed-off-by: Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@amd.com> >> --- >> arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h | 1 + >> arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h | 18 +++++++++++----- >> arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 22 +++++++++++++++++++- >> arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 6 ++++-- >> 4 files changed, 39 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) >> >> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h >> index 0361626841bc..373a0edda588 100644 >> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h >> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h >> @@ -273,6 +273,7 @@ enum avic_ipi_failure_cause { >> #define AVIC_HPA_MASK ~((0xFFFULL << 52) | 0xFFF) >> #define VMCB_AVIC_APIC_BAR_MASK 0xFFFFFFFFFF000ULL >> >> +#define SVM_SEV_FEAT_DEBUG_SWAP BIT(5) >> >> struct vmcb_seg { >> u16 selector; >> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h >> index 199a2ecef1ce..4d75b14bffab 100644 >> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h >> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h >> @@ -83,6 +83,7 @@ enum { >> struct kvm_sev_info { >> bool active; /* SEV enabled guest */ >> bool es_active; /* SEV-ES enabled guest */ >> + bool debug_swap; /* SEV-ES Debug swap enabled */ >> unsigned int asid; /* ASID used for this guest */ >> unsigned int handle; /* SEV firmware handle */ >> int fd; /* SEV device fd */ >> @@ -388,6 +389,7 @@ static inline bool vmcb12_is_intercept(struct vmcb_ctrl_area_cached *control, u3 >> >> static inline void set_dr_intercepts(struct vcpu_svm *svm) >> { >> + struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(svm->vcpu.kvm)->sev_info; >> struct vmcb *vmcb = svm->vmcb01.ptr; >> >> if (!sev_es_guest(svm->vcpu.kvm)) { >> @@ -407,20 +409,26 @@ static inline void set_dr_intercepts(struct vcpu_svm *svm) >> vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR6_WRITE); >> } >> >> - vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR7_READ); >> - vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR7_WRITE); >> + if (!sev->debug_swap) { >> + vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR7_READ); >> + vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR7_WRITE); >> + } >> >> recalc_intercepts(svm); >> } >> >> static inline void clr_dr_intercepts(struct vcpu_svm *svm) >> { >> + struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(svm->vcpu.kvm)->sev_info; >> struct vmcb *vmcb = svm->vmcb01.ptr; >> >> vmcb->control.intercepts[INTERCEPT_DR] = 0; >> >> - /* DR7 access must remain intercepted for an SEV-ES guest */ >> - if (sev_es_guest(svm->vcpu.kvm)) { >> + /* >> + * DR7 access must remain intercepted for an SEV-ES guest unless >> + * the DebugSwap feature is set > > Please explain _why_. > >> + */ >> + if (sev_es_guest(svm->vcpu.kvm) && !sev->debug_swap) { >> vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR7_READ); >> vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR7_WRITE); >> } >> @@ -677,7 +685,7 @@ int sev_handle_vmgexit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); >> int sev_es_string_io(struct vcpu_svm *svm, int size, unsigned int port, int in); >> void sev_es_vcpu_reset(struct vcpu_svm *svm); >> void sev_vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u8 vector); >> -void sev_es_prepare_switch_to_guest(struct sev_es_save_area *hostsa); >> +void sev_es_prepare_switch_to_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct sev_es_save_area *hostsa); >> void sev_es_unmap_ghcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm); >> >> /* vmenter.S */ >> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c >> index efaaef2b7ae1..fac8b48e3162 100644 >> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c >> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c >> @@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ >> #include <asm/pkru.h> >> #include <asm/trapnr.h> >> #include <asm/fpu/xcr.h> >> +#include <asm/debugreg.h> >> >> #include "mmu.h" >> #include "x86.h" >> @@ -253,6 +254,7 @@ static int sev_guest_init(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp) >> if (asid < 0) >> goto e_no_asid; >> sev->asid = asid; >> + sev->debug_swap = sev->es_active && > > Enabling DebugSwap should be guarded with a module param so that the admin can > disable the feature if necessary. And then the per-vCPU variable goes away. > >> kvm_cpu_cap_get(KVM_X86_FEATURE_NO_NESTED_DATA_BP); > > kvm_cpu_cap_has(). > > And use X86_FEATURE_* directly, which is the whole point of the __feature_translate() > shenanigans. > >> >> ret = sev_platform_init(&argp->error); >> if (ret) >> @@ -564,6 +566,7 @@ static int sev_launch_update_data(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp) >> static int sev_es_sync_vmsa(struct vcpu_svm *svm) >> { >> struct sev_es_save_area *save = svm->sev_es.vmsa; >> + struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(svm->vcpu.kvm)->sev_info; >> >> /* Check some debug related fields before encrypting the VMSA */ >> if (svm->vcpu.guest_debug || (svm->vmcb->save.dr7 & ~DR7_FIXED_1)) >> @@ -604,6 +607,9 @@ static int sev_es_sync_vmsa(struct vcpu_svm *svm) >> save->xss = svm->vcpu.arch.ia32_xss; >> save->dr6 = svm->vcpu.arch.dr6; >> >> + if (sev->debug_swap) >> + save->sev_features |= SVM_SEV_FEAT_DEBUG_SWAP; > > Resurrecting my objection to "AP Creation NAE event"[*], what happens if a hypervisor > supports GHCB_HV_FT_SNP_AP_CREATION but not DebugSwap? IIUC, a guest can corrupt > host DRs by enabling DebugSwap in the VMSA of an AP vCPU, e.g. the CPU will load > zeros on VM-Exit if the host hasn't stuffed the host save area fields. > > KVM can obviously just make sure to save its DRs if hardware supports DebugSwap, > but what if DebugSwap is buggy and needs to be disabled? IIUC KVM will have to save DRs somewhere (not in the host save area) and restore on vmexit and enable intercepts for DR accesses. btw buggy how? I cannot imagine but can you? :) SEV-ES/SNP so relies on this swapping, hard to imagine just DebugSwap being that broken... > And what about the next > feature that can apparently be enabled by the guest? > [*] https://nam11.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Flore.kernel.org%2Fall%2FYWnbfCet84Vup6q9%40google.com&data=05%7C01%7CAlexey.Kardashevskiy%40amd.com%7C73c50a32d6eb4dd8e76c08dad3c2cd04%7C3dd8961fe4884e608e11a82d994e183d%7C0%7C0%7C638055130890406019%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C3000%7C%7C%7C&sdata=0I4WhDhwve4%2FHebrIk2h4MYbrmlCNiif4bDNLpY7DcU%3D&reserved=0
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h index 0361626841bc..373a0edda588 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h @@ -273,6 +273,7 @@ enum avic_ipi_failure_cause { #define AVIC_HPA_MASK ~((0xFFFULL << 52) | 0xFFF) #define VMCB_AVIC_APIC_BAR_MASK 0xFFFFFFFFFF000ULL +#define SVM_SEV_FEAT_DEBUG_SWAP BIT(5) struct vmcb_seg { u16 selector; diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h index 199a2ecef1ce..4d75b14bffab 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h @@ -83,6 +83,7 @@ enum { struct kvm_sev_info { bool active; /* SEV enabled guest */ bool es_active; /* SEV-ES enabled guest */ + bool debug_swap; /* SEV-ES Debug swap enabled */ unsigned int asid; /* ASID used for this guest */ unsigned int handle; /* SEV firmware handle */ int fd; /* SEV device fd */ @@ -388,6 +389,7 @@ static inline bool vmcb12_is_intercept(struct vmcb_ctrl_area_cached *control, u3 static inline void set_dr_intercepts(struct vcpu_svm *svm) { + struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(svm->vcpu.kvm)->sev_info; struct vmcb *vmcb = svm->vmcb01.ptr; if (!sev_es_guest(svm->vcpu.kvm)) { @@ -407,20 +409,26 @@ static inline void set_dr_intercepts(struct vcpu_svm *svm) vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR6_WRITE); } - vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR7_READ); - vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR7_WRITE); + if (!sev->debug_swap) { + vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR7_READ); + vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR7_WRITE); + } recalc_intercepts(svm); } static inline void clr_dr_intercepts(struct vcpu_svm *svm) { + struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(svm->vcpu.kvm)->sev_info; struct vmcb *vmcb = svm->vmcb01.ptr; vmcb->control.intercepts[INTERCEPT_DR] = 0; - /* DR7 access must remain intercepted for an SEV-ES guest */ - if (sev_es_guest(svm->vcpu.kvm)) { + /* + * DR7 access must remain intercepted for an SEV-ES guest unless + * the DebugSwap feature is set + */ + if (sev_es_guest(svm->vcpu.kvm) && !sev->debug_swap) { vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR7_READ); vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR7_WRITE); } @@ -677,7 +685,7 @@ int sev_handle_vmgexit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); int sev_es_string_io(struct vcpu_svm *svm, int size, unsigned int port, int in); void sev_es_vcpu_reset(struct vcpu_svm *svm); void sev_vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u8 vector); -void sev_es_prepare_switch_to_guest(struct sev_es_save_area *hostsa); +void sev_es_prepare_switch_to_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct sev_es_save_area *hostsa); void sev_es_unmap_ghcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm); /* vmenter.S */ diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c index efaaef2b7ae1..fac8b48e3162 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c @@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ #include <asm/pkru.h> #include <asm/trapnr.h> #include <asm/fpu/xcr.h> +#include <asm/debugreg.h> #include "mmu.h" #include "x86.h" @@ -253,6 +254,7 @@ static int sev_guest_init(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp) if (asid < 0) goto e_no_asid; sev->asid = asid; + sev->debug_swap = sev->es_active && kvm_cpu_cap_get(KVM_X86_FEATURE_NO_NESTED_DATA_BP); ret = sev_platform_init(&argp->error); if (ret) @@ -564,6 +566,7 @@ static int sev_launch_update_data(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp) static int sev_es_sync_vmsa(struct vcpu_svm *svm) { struct sev_es_save_area *save = svm->sev_es.vmsa; + struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(svm->vcpu.kvm)->sev_info; /* Check some debug related fields before encrypting the VMSA */ if (svm->vcpu.guest_debug || (svm->vmcb->save.dr7 & ~DR7_FIXED_1)) @@ -604,6 +607,9 @@ static int sev_es_sync_vmsa(struct vcpu_svm *svm) save->xss = svm->vcpu.arch.ia32_xss; save->dr6 = svm->vcpu.arch.dr6; + if (sev->debug_swap) + save->sev_features |= SVM_SEV_FEAT_DEBUG_SWAP; + pr_debug("Virtual Machine Save Area (VMSA):\n"); print_hex_dump_debug("", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, 16, 1, save, sizeof(*save), false); @@ -3010,8 +3016,10 @@ void sev_es_vcpu_reset(struct vcpu_svm *svm) sev_enc_bit)); } -void sev_es_prepare_switch_to_guest(struct sev_es_save_area *hostsa) +void sev_es_prepare_switch_to_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct sev_es_save_area *hostsa) { + struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(vcpu->kvm)->sev_info; + /* * As an SEV-ES guest, hardware will restore the host state on VMEXIT, * of which one step is to perform a VMLOAD. KVM performs the @@ -3027,6 +3035,18 @@ void sev_es_prepare_switch_to_guest(struct sev_es_save_area *hostsa) /* MSR_IA32_XSS is restored on VMEXIT, save the currnet host value */ hostsa->xss = host_xss; + + /* The DebugSwap SEV feature does Type B swaps of DR[0-3] */ + if (sev->debug_swap) { + hostsa->dr0 = native_get_debugreg(0); + hostsa->dr1 = native_get_debugreg(1); + hostsa->dr2 = native_get_debugreg(2); + hostsa->dr3 = native_get_debugreg(3); + hostsa->dr0_addr_mask = get_dr_addr_mask(0); + hostsa->dr1_addr_mask = get_dr_addr_mask(1); + hostsa->dr2_addr_mask = get_dr_addr_mask(2); + hostsa->dr3_addr_mask = get_dr_addr_mask(3); + } } void sev_vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u8 vector) diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c index ce362e88a567..ee0e56521d26 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c @@ -1173,6 +1173,7 @@ static void init_vmcb(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) struct vmcb *vmcb = svm->vmcb01.ptr; struct vmcb_control_area *control = &vmcb->control; struct vmcb_save_area *save = &vmcb->save; + struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(vcpu->kvm)->sev_info; svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CR0_READ); svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CR3_READ); @@ -1189,7 +1190,8 @@ static void init_vmcb(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) set_exception_intercept(svm, UD_VECTOR); set_exception_intercept(svm, MC_VECTOR); set_exception_intercept(svm, AC_VECTOR); - set_exception_intercept(svm, DB_VECTOR); + if (!sev->debug_swap) + set_exception_intercept(svm, DB_VECTOR); /* * Guest access to VMware backdoor ports could legitimately * trigger #GP because of TSS I/O permission bitmap. @@ -1461,7 +1463,7 @@ static void svm_prepare_switch_to_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) struct sev_es_save_area *hostsa; hostsa = (struct sev_es_save_area *)(page_address(sd->save_area) + 0x400); - sev_es_prepare_switch_to_guest(hostsa); + sev_es_prepare_switch_to_guest(vcpu, hostsa); } if (tsc_scaling)
AMD Milan introduces support for the swapping, as type 'B', of DR[0-3] and DR[0-3]_ADDR_MASK registers. It requires that SEV_FEATURES[5] be set in the VMSA. This requires the KVM to eliminate the intercept of #DB. However, because of the infinite #DB loop DoS that a malicious guest can do, it can only be eliminated based if CPUID Fn80000021_EAX[0] (NoNestedDataBp) is set in the host/HV. This eliminates #DB intercept, DR7 intercept for SEV-ES/SEV-SNP guest. This saves DR[0-3] / DR[0-3]_ADDR_MASK in the host save area before VMRUN. This sets SEV_FEATURES[5] in VMSA. Signed-off-by: Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@amd.com> --- arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h | 1 + arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h | 18 +++++++++++----- arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 22 +++++++++++++++++++- arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 6 ++++-- 4 files changed, 39 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)