Message ID | 20231228160744.1301-1-pchelkin@ispras.ru (mailing list archive) |
---|---|
State | Handled Elsewhere |
Headers | show |
Series | apparmor: avoid crash when parsed profile name is empty | expand |
On 12/28/23 08:07, Fedor Pchelkin wrote: > When processing a packed profile in unpack_profile() described like > > "profile :ns::samba-dcerpcd /usr/lib*/samba/{,samba/}samba-dcerpcd {...}" > > a string ":samba-dcerpcd" is unpacked as a fully-qualified name and then > passed to aa_splitn_fqname(). > > aa_splitn_fqname() treats ":samba-dcerpcd" as only containing a namespace. > Thus it returns NULL for tmpname, meanwhile tmpns is non-NULL. Later > aa_alloc_profile() crashes as the new profile name is NULL now. > > general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000000: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI > KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007] > CPU: 6 PID: 1657 Comm: apparmor_parser Not tainted 6.7.0-rc2-dirty #16 > Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.2-3-gd478f380-rebuilt.opensuse.org 04/01/2014 > RIP: 0010:strlen+0x1e/0xa0 > Call Trace: > <TASK> > ? strlen+0x1e/0xa0 > aa_policy_init+0x1bb/0x230 > aa_alloc_profile+0xb1/0x480 > unpack_profile+0x3bc/0x4960 > aa_unpack+0x309/0x15e0 > aa_replace_profiles+0x213/0x33c0 > policy_update+0x261/0x370 > profile_replace+0x20e/0x2a0 > vfs_write+0x2af/0xe00 > ksys_write+0x126/0x250 > do_syscall_64+0x46/0xf0 > entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0x76 > </TASK> > ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- > RIP: 0010:strlen+0x1e/0xa0 > > It seems such behaviour of aa_splitn_fqname() is expected and checked in > other places where it is called (e.g. aa_remove_profiles). Well, there > is an explicit comment "a ns name without a following profile is allowed" > inside. > > AFAICS, nothing can prevent unpacked "name" to be in form like > ":samba-dcerpcd" - it is passed from userspace. > > Deny the whole profile set replacement in such case and inform user with > EPROTO and an explaining message. > > Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org). > > Fixes: 04dc715e24d0 ("apparmor: audit policy ns specified in policy load") > Signed-off-by: Fedor Pchelkin <pchelkin@ispras.ru> thanks, I have pulled this into my tree Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> > --- > security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c | 4 ++++ > 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) > > diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c > index e0af1e9f40ee..70d448048773 100644 > --- a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c > +++ b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c > @@ -835,6 +835,10 @@ static struct aa_profile *unpack_profile(struct aa_ext *e, char **ns_name) > > tmpname = aa_splitn_fqname(name, strlen(name), &tmpns, &ns_len); > if (tmpns) { > + if (!tmpname) { > + info = "empty profile name"; > + goto fail; > + } > *ns_name = kstrndup(tmpns, ns_len, GFP_KERNEL); > if (!*ns_name) { > info = "out of memory";
diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c index e0af1e9f40ee..70d448048773 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c +++ b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c @@ -835,6 +835,10 @@ static struct aa_profile *unpack_profile(struct aa_ext *e, char **ns_name) tmpname = aa_splitn_fqname(name, strlen(name), &tmpns, &ns_len); if (tmpns) { + if (!tmpname) { + info = "empty profile name"; + goto fail; + } *ns_name = kstrndup(tmpns, ns_len, GFP_KERNEL); if (!*ns_name) { info = "out of memory";
When processing a packed profile in unpack_profile() described like "profile :ns::samba-dcerpcd /usr/lib*/samba/{,samba/}samba-dcerpcd {...}" a string ":samba-dcerpcd" is unpacked as a fully-qualified name and then passed to aa_splitn_fqname(). aa_splitn_fqname() treats ":samba-dcerpcd" as only containing a namespace. Thus it returns NULL for tmpname, meanwhile tmpns is non-NULL. Later aa_alloc_profile() crashes as the new profile name is NULL now. general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000000: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007] CPU: 6 PID: 1657 Comm: apparmor_parser Not tainted 6.7.0-rc2-dirty #16 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.2-3-gd478f380-rebuilt.opensuse.org 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:strlen+0x1e/0xa0 Call Trace: <TASK> ? strlen+0x1e/0xa0 aa_policy_init+0x1bb/0x230 aa_alloc_profile+0xb1/0x480 unpack_profile+0x3bc/0x4960 aa_unpack+0x309/0x15e0 aa_replace_profiles+0x213/0x33c0 policy_update+0x261/0x370 profile_replace+0x20e/0x2a0 vfs_write+0x2af/0xe00 ksys_write+0x126/0x250 do_syscall_64+0x46/0xf0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0x76 </TASK> ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- RIP: 0010:strlen+0x1e/0xa0 It seems such behaviour of aa_splitn_fqname() is expected and checked in other places where it is called (e.g. aa_remove_profiles). Well, there is an explicit comment "a ns name without a following profile is allowed" inside. AFAICS, nothing can prevent unpacked "name" to be in form like ":samba-dcerpcd" - it is passed from userspace. Deny the whole profile set replacement in such case and inform user with EPROTO and an explaining message. Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org). Fixes: 04dc715e24d0 ("apparmor: audit policy ns specified in policy load") Signed-off-by: Fedor Pchelkin <pchelkin@ispras.ru> --- security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)