diff mbox series

[v9,22/25] evm: Move to LSM infrastructure

Message ID 20240115181809.885385-23-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com (mailing list archive)
State New
Headers show
Series security: Move IMA and EVM to the LSM infrastructure | expand

Commit Message

Roberto Sassu Jan. 15, 2024, 6:18 p.m. UTC 
From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>

As for IMA, move hardcoded EVM function calls from various places in the
kernel to the LSM infrastructure, by introducing a new LSM named 'evm'
(last and always enabled like 'ima'). The order in the Makefile ensures
that 'evm' hooks are executed after 'ima' ones.

Make EVM functions as static (except for evm_inode_init_security(), which
is exported), and register them as hook implementations in init_evm_lsm().
Also move the inline functions evm_inode_remove_acl(),
evm_inode_post_remove_acl(), and evm_inode_post_set_acl() from the public
evm.h header to evm_main.c.

Unlike before (see commit to move IMA to the LSM infrastructure),
evm_inode_post_setattr(), evm_inode_post_set_acl(),
evm_inode_post_remove_acl(), and evm_inode_post_removexattr() are not
executed for private inodes.

Finally, add the LSM_ID_EVM case in lsm_list_modules_test.c

Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
 fs/attr.c                                     |   2 -
 fs/posix_acl.c                                |   3 -
 fs/xattr.c                                    |   2 -
 include/linux/evm.h                           | 113 -----------------
 include/uapi/linux/lsm.h                      |   1 +
 security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c             | 118 +++++++++++++++---
 security/security.c                           |  43 ++-----
 .../selftests/lsm/lsm_list_modules_test.c     |   3 +
 8 files changed, 116 insertions(+), 169 deletions(-)

Comments

Paul Moore Feb. 8, 2024, 3:18 a.m. UTC | #1 
On Jan 15, 2024 Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com> wrote:
> 
> As for IMA, move hardcoded EVM function calls from various places in the
> kernel to the LSM infrastructure, by introducing a new LSM named 'evm'
> (last and always enabled like 'ima'). The order in the Makefile ensures
> that 'evm' hooks are executed after 'ima' ones.

Let's add a comment to the Makefile about this so everyone knows not
to mix up the ordering, otherwise this looks good to me.

At some point I think we may want to introduce the concept of numerical
priorities to security_add_hooks() to add some additional granularity
beyond the LSM_ORDER_XXX priority, but that is something we can do
later.

Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>

> Make EVM functions as static (except for evm_inode_init_security(), which
> is exported), and register them as hook implementations in init_evm_lsm().
> Also move the inline functions evm_inode_remove_acl(),
> evm_inode_post_remove_acl(), and evm_inode_post_set_acl() from the public
> evm.h header to evm_main.c.
> 
> Unlike before (see commit to move IMA to the LSM infrastructure),
> evm_inode_post_setattr(), evm_inode_post_set_acl(),
> evm_inode_post_remove_acl(), and evm_inode_post_removexattr() are not
> executed for private inodes.
> 
> Finally, add the LSM_ID_EVM case in lsm_list_modules_test.c
> 
> Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
> ---
>  fs/attr.c                                     |   2 -
>  fs/posix_acl.c                                |   3 -
>  fs/xattr.c                                    |   2 -
>  include/linux/evm.h                           | 113 -----------------
>  include/uapi/linux/lsm.h                      |   1 +
>  security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c             | 118 +++++++++++++++---
>  security/security.c                           |  43 ++-----
>  .../selftests/lsm/lsm_list_modules_test.c     |   3 +
>  8 files changed, 116 insertions(+), 169 deletions(-)

--
paul-moore.com
Christian Brauner Feb. 9, 2024, 9:48 a.m. UTC | #2 
On Mon, Jan 15, 2024 at 07:18:06PM +0100, Roberto Sassu wrote:
> From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
> 
> As for IMA, move hardcoded EVM function calls from various places in the
> kernel to the LSM infrastructure, by introducing a new LSM named 'evm'
> (last and always enabled like 'ima'). The order in the Makefile ensures
> that 'evm' hooks are executed after 'ima' ones.
> 
> Make EVM functions as static (except for evm_inode_init_security(), which
> is exported), and register them as hook implementations in init_evm_lsm().
> Also move the inline functions evm_inode_remove_acl(),
> evm_inode_post_remove_acl(), and evm_inode_post_set_acl() from the public
> evm.h header to evm_main.c.
> 
> Unlike before (see commit to move IMA to the LSM infrastructure),
> evm_inode_post_setattr(), evm_inode_post_set_acl(),
> evm_inode_post_remove_acl(), and evm_inode_post_removexattr() are not
> executed for private inodes.
> 
> Finally, add the LSM_ID_EVM case in lsm_list_modules_test.c
> 
> Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
> ---
>  fs/attr.c                                     |   2 -
>  fs/posix_acl.c                                |   3 -
>  fs/xattr.c                                    |   2 -

Acked-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Stefan Berger Feb. 12, 2024, 6:26 p.m. UTC | #3 
On 1/15/24 13:18, Roberto Sassu wrote:
> From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
> 
> As for IMA, move hardcoded EVM function calls from various places in the
> kernel to the LSM infrastructure, by introducing a new LSM named 'evm'
> (last and always enabled like 'ima'). The order in the Makefile ensures
> that 'evm' hooks are executed after 'ima' ones.
> 
> Make EVM functions as static (except for evm_inode_init_security(), which
> is exported), and register them as hook implementations in init_evm_lsm().
> Also move the inline functions evm_inode_remove_acl(),
> evm_inode_post_remove_acl(), and evm_inode_post_set_acl() from the public
> evm.h header to evm_main.c.
> 
> Unlike before (see commit to move IMA to the LSM infrastructure),
> evm_inode_post_setattr(), evm_inode_post_set_acl(),
> evm_inode_post_remove_acl(), and evm_inode_post_removexattr() are not
> executed for private inodes.
> 
> Finally, add the LSM_ID_EVM case in lsm_list_modules_test.c
> 
> Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>

>   }
>   
> +static struct security_hook_list evm_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
> +	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setattr, evm_inode_setattr),
> +	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_post_setattr, evm_inode_post_setattr),
> +	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_copy_up_xattr, evm_inode_copy_up_xattr),
> +	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setxattr, evm_inode_setxattr),
> +	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_set_acl, evm_inode_set_acl),
> +	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_post_set_acl, evm_inode_post_set_acl),
> +	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_remove_acl, evm_inode_remove_acl),
> +	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_post_remove_acl, evm_inode_post_remove_acl),
> +	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_post_setxattr, evm_inode_post_setxattr),

nit: move this one up after inode_setxattr.

Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
diff mbox series

Patch

diff --git a/fs/attr.c b/fs/attr.c
index 38841f3ebbcb..b51bd7c9b4a7 100644
--- a/fs/attr.c
+++ b/fs/attr.c
@@ -16,7 +16,6 @@ 
 #include <linux/fcntl.h>
 #include <linux/filelock.h>
 #include <linux/security.h>
-#include <linux/evm.h>
 
 #include "internal.h"
 
@@ -502,7 +501,6 @@  int notify_change(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
 	if (!error) {
 		fsnotify_change(dentry, ia_valid);
 		security_inode_post_setattr(idmap, dentry, ia_valid);
-		evm_inode_post_setattr(idmap, dentry, ia_valid);
 	}
 
 	return error;
diff --git a/fs/posix_acl.c b/fs/posix_acl.c
index e3fbe1a9f3f5..ae67479cd2b6 100644
--- a/fs/posix_acl.c
+++ b/fs/posix_acl.c
@@ -26,7 +26,6 @@ 
 #include <linux/mnt_idmapping.h>
 #include <linux/iversion.h>
 #include <linux/security.h>
-#include <linux/evm.h>
 #include <linux/fsnotify.h>
 #include <linux/filelock.h>
 
@@ -1138,7 +1137,6 @@  int vfs_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
 	if (!error) {
 		fsnotify_xattr(dentry);
 		security_inode_post_set_acl(dentry, acl_name, kacl);
-		evm_inode_post_set_acl(dentry, acl_name, kacl);
 	}
 
 out_inode_unlock:
@@ -1247,7 +1245,6 @@  int vfs_remove_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
 	if (!error) {
 		fsnotify_xattr(dentry);
 		security_inode_post_remove_acl(idmap, dentry, acl_name);
-		evm_inode_post_remove_acl(idmap, dentry, acl_name);
 	}
 
 out_inode_unlock:
diff --git a/fs/xattr.c b/fs/xattr.c
index f891c260a971..f8b643f91a98 100644
--- a/fs/xattr.c
+++ b/fs/xattr.c
@@ -16,7 +16,6 @@ 
 #include <linux/mount.h>
 #include <linux/namei.h>
 #include <linux/security.h>
-#include <linux/evm.h>
 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
 #include <linux/export.h>
 #include <linux/fsnotify.h>
@@ -557,7 +556,6 @@  __vfs_removexattr_locked(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
 
 	fsnotify_xattr(dentry);
 	security_inode_post_removexattr(dentry, name);
-	evm_inode_post_removexattr(dentry, name);
 
 out:
 	return error;
diff --git a/include/linux/evm.h b/include/linux/evm.h
index 3faabdd47852..cb481eccc967 100644
--- a/include/linux/evm.h
+++ b/include/linux/evm.h
@@ -21,45 +21,6 @@  extern enum integrity_status evm_verifyxattr(struct dentry *dentry,
 					     void *xattr_value,
 					     size_t xattr_value_len,
 					     struct integrity_iint_cache *iint);
-extern int evm_inode_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
-			     struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr);
-extern void evm_inode_post_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
-				   struct dentry *dentry, int ia_valid);
-extern int evm_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
-			      struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
-			      const void *value, size_t size, int flags);
-extern void evm_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry,
-				    const char *xattr_name,
-				    const void *xattr_value,
-				    size_t xattr_value_len,
-				    int flags);
-extern int evm_inode_copy_up_xattr(const char *name);
-extern int evm_inode_removexattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
-				 struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name);
-extern void evm_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry,
-				       const char *xattr_name);
-static inline void evm_inode_post_remove_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
-					     struct dentry *dentry,
-					     const char *acl_name)
-{
-	evm_inode_post_removexattr(dentry, acl_name);
-}
-extern int evm_inode_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
-			     struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name,
-			     struct posix_acl *kacl);
-static inline int evm_inode_remove_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
-				       struct dentry *dentry,
-				       const char *acl_name)
-{
-	return evm_inode_set_acl(idmap, dentry, acl_name, NULL);
-}
-static inline void evm_inode_post_set_acl(struct dentry *dentry,
-					  const char *acl_name,
-					  struct posix_acl *kacl)
-{
-	return evm_inode_post_setxattr(dentry, acl_name, NULL, 0, 0);
-}
-
 int evm_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
 			    const struct qstr *qstr, struct xattr *xattrs,
 			    int *xattr_count);
@@ -94,80 +55,6 @@  static inline enum integrity_status evm_verifyxattr(struct dentry *dentry,
 }
 #endif
 
-static inline int evm_inode_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
-				    struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static inline void evm_inode_post_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
-					  struct dentry *dentry, int ia_valid)
-{
-	return;
-}
-
-static inline int evm_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
-				     struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
-				     const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static inline void evm_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry,
-					   const char *xattr_name,
-					   const void *xattr_value,
-					   size_t xattr_value_len,
-					   int flags)
-{
-	return;
-}
-
-static inline int  evm_inode_copy_up_xattr(const char *name)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static inline int evm_inode_removexattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
-					struct dentry *dentry,
-					const char *xattr_name)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static inline void evm_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry,
-					      const char *xattr_name)
-{
-	return;
-}
-
-static inline void evm_inode_post_remove_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
-					     struct dentry *dentry,
-					     const char *acl_name)
-{
-	return;
-}
-
-static inline int evm_inode_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
-				    struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name,
-				    struct posix_acl *kacl)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static inline int evm_inode_remove_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
-				       struct dentry *dentry,
-				       const char *acl_name)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static inline void evm_inode_post_set_acl(struct dentry *dentry,
-					  const char *acl_name,
-					  struct posix_acl *kacl)
-{
-	return;
-}
-
 static inline int evm_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
 					  const struct qstr *qstr,
 					  struct xattr *xattrs,
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/lsm.h b/include/uapi/linux/lsm.h
index b3b7fd699b63..33d8c9f4aa6b 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/lsm.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/lsm.h
@@ -63,6 +63,7 @@  struct lsm_ctx {
 #define LSM_ID_BPF		109
 #define LSM_ID_LANDLOCK		110
 #define LSM_ID_IMA		111
+#define LSM_ID_EVM		112
 
 /*
  * LSM_ATTR_XXX definitions identify different LSM attributes
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
index d35143179699..f65dbf3e9256 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
@@ -589,9 +589,9 @@  static int evm_protect_xattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
  * userspace from writing HMAC value.  Writing 'security.evm' requires
  * requires CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileges.
  */
-int evm_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
-		       const char *xattr_name, const void *xattr_value,
-		       size_t xattr_value_len, int flags)
+static int evm_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
+			      const char *xattr_name, const void *xattr_value,
+			      size_t xattr_value_len, int flags)
 {
 	const struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_data = xattr_value;
 
@@ -621,8 +621,8 @@  int evm_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
  * Removing 'security.evm' requires CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileges and that
  * the current value is valid.
  */
-int evm_inode_removexattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
-			  struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name)
+static int evm_inode_removexattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
+				 const char *xattr_name)
 {
 	/* Policy permits modification of the protected xattrs even though
 	 * there's no HMAC key loaded
@@ -672,9 +672,11 @@  static inline int evm_inode_set_acl_change(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
  * Prevent modifying posix acls causing the EVM HMAC to be re-calculated
  * and 'security.evm' xattr updated, unless the existing 'security.evm' is
  * valid.
+ *
+ * Return: zero on success, -EPERM on failure.
  */
-int evm_inode_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
-		      const char *acl_name, struct posix_acl *kacl)
+static int evm_inode_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
+			     const char *acl_name, struct posix_acl *kacl)
 {
 	enum integrity_status evm_status;
 
@@ -713,6 +715,24 @@  int evm_inode_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
 	return -EPERM;
 }
 
+/**
+ * evm_inode_remove_acl - Protect the EVM extended attribute from posix acls
+ * @idmap: idmap of the mount
+ * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry
+ * @acl_name: name of the posix acl
+ *
+ * Prevent removing posix acls causing the EVM HMAC to be re-calculated
+ * and 'security.evm' xattr updated, unless the existing 'security.evm' is
+ * valid.
+ *
+ * Return: zero on success, -EPERM on failure.
+ */
+static int evm_inode_remove_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
+				const char *acl_name)
+{
+	return evm_inode_set_acl(idmap, dentry, acl_name, NULL);
+}
+
 static void evm_reset_status(struct inode *inode)
 {
 	struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
@@ -761,9 +781,11 @@  bool evm_revalidate_status(const char *xattr_name)
  * __vfs_setxattr_noperm().  The caller of which has taken the inode's
  * i_mutex lock.
  */
-void evm_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
-			     const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len,
-			     int flags)
+static void evm_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry,
+				    const char *xattr_name,
+				    const void *xattr_value,
+				    size_t xattr_value_len,
+				    int flags)
 {
 	if (!evm_revalidate_status(xattr_name))
 		return;
@@ -782,6 +804,21 @@  void evm_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
 	evm_update_evmxattr(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value, xattr_value_len);
 }
 
+/**
+ * evm_inode_post_set_acl - Update the EVM extended attribute from posix acls
+ * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry
+ * @acl_name: name of the posix acl
+ * @kacl: pointer to the posix acls
+ *
+ * Update the 'security.evm' xattr with the EVM HMAC re-calculated after setting
+ * posix acls.
+ */
+static void evm_inode_post_set_acl(struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name,
+				   struct posix_acl *kacl)
+{
+	return evm_inode_post_setxattr(dentry, acl_name, NULL, 0, 0);
+}
+
 /**
  * evm_inode_post_removexattr - update 'security.evm' after removing the xattr
  * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry
@@ -792,7 +829,8 @@  void evm_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
  * No need to take the i_mutex lock here, as this function is called from
  * vfs_removexattr() which takes the i_mutex.
  */
-void evm_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name)
+static void evm_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry,
+				       const char *xattr_name)
 {
 	if (!evm_revalidate_status(xattr_name))
 		return;
@@ -808,6 +846,22 @@  void evm_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name)
 	evm_update_evmxattr(dentry, xattr_name, NULL, 0);
 }
 
+/**
+ * evm_inode_post_remove_acl - Update the EVM extended attribute from posix acls
+ * @idmap: idmap of the mount
+ * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry
+ * @acl_name: name of the posix acl
+ *
+ * Update the 'security.evm' xattr with the EVM HMAC re-calculated after
+ * removing posix acls.
+ */
+static inline void evm_inode_post_remove_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
+					     struct dentry *dentry,
+					     const char *acl_name)
+{
+	evm_inode_post_removexattr(dentry, acl_name);
+}
+
 static int evm_attr_change(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
 			   struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr)
 {
@@ -831,8 +885,8 @@  static int evm_attr_change(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
  * Permit update of file attributes when files have a valid EVM signature,
  * except in the case of them having an immutable portable signature.
  */
-int evm_inode_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
-		      struct iattr *attr)
+static int evm_inode_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
+			     struct iattr *attr)
 {
 	unsigned int ia_valid = attr->ia_valid;
 	enum integrity_status evm_status;
@@ -883,8 +937,8 @@  int evm_inode_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
  * This function is called from notify_change(), which expects the caller
  * to lock the inode's i_mutex.
  */
-void evm_inode_post_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
-			    int ia_valid)
+static void evm_inode_post_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
+				   struct dentry *dentry, int ia_valid)
 {
 	if (!evm_revalidate_status(NULL))
 		return;
@@ -901,7 +955,7 @@  void evm_inode_post_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
 		evm_update_evmxattr(dentry, NULL, NULL, 0);
 }
 
-int evm_inode_copy_up_xattr(const char *name)
+static int evm_inode_copy_up_xattr(const char *name)
 {
 	if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_EVM) == 0)
 		return 1; /* Discard */
@@ -1004,4 +1058,36 @@  static int __init init_evm(void)
 	return error;
 }
 
+static struct security_hook_list evm_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setattr, evm_inode_setattr),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_post_setattr, evm_inode_post_setattr),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_copy_up_xattr, evm_inode_copy_up_xattr),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setxattr, evm_inode_setxattr),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_set_acl, evm_inode_set_acl),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_post_set_acl, evm_inode_post_set_acl),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_remove_acl, evm_inode_remove_acl),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_post_remove_acl, evm_inode_post_remove_acl),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_post_setxattr, evm_inode_post_setxattr),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_removexattr, evm_inode_removexattr),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_post_removexattr, evm_inode_post_removexattr),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_init_security, evm_inode_init_security),
+};
+
+static const struct lsm_id evm_lsmid = {
+	.name = "evm",
+	.id = LSM_ID_EVM,
+};
+
+static int __init init_evm_lsm(void)
+{
+	security_add_hooks(evm_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(evm_hooks), &evm_lsmid);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+DEFINE_LSM(evm) = {
+	.name = "evm",
+	.init = init_evm_lsm,
+	.order = LSM_ORDER_LAST,
+};
+
 late_initcall(init_evm);
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index c07ad3c5f767..a44740640a9a 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -20,13 +20,13 @@ 
 #include <linux/kernel_read_file.h>
 #include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
 #include <linux/integrity.h>
-#include <linux/evm.h>
 #include <linux/fsnotify.h>
 #include <linux/mman.h>
 #include <linux/mount.h>
 #include <linux/personality.h>
 #include <linux/backing-dev.h>
 #include <linux/string.h>
+#include <linux/xattr.h>
 #include <linux/msg.h>
 #include <net/flow.h>
 
@@ -50,7 +50,8 @@ 
 	(IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_LOCKDOWN_LSM) ? 1 : 0) + \
 	(IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_BPF_LSM) ? 1 : 0) + \
 	(IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK) ? 1 : 0) + \
-	(IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IMA) ? 1 : 0))
+	(IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IMA) ? 1 : 0) + \
+	(IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EVM) ? 1 : 0))
 
 /*
  * These are descriptions of the reasons that can be passed to the
@@ -1740,10 +1741,6 @@  int security_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
 	if (!xattr_count)
 		goto out;
 
-	ret = evm_inode_init_security(inode, dir, qstr, new_xattrs,
-				      &xattr_count);
-	if (ret)
-		goto out;
 	ret = initxattrs(inode, new_xattrs, fs_data);
 out:
 	for (; xattr_count > 0; xattr_count--)
@@ -2235,14 +2232,9 @@  int security_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
 int security_inode_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
 			   struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr)
 {
-	int ret;
-
 	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
 		return 0;
-	ret = call_int_hook(inode_setattr, 0, idmap, dentry, attr);
-	if (ret)
-		return ret;
-	return evm_inode_setattr(idmap, dentry, attr);
+	return call_int_hook(inode_setattr, 0, idmap, dentry, attr);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_inode_setattr);
 
@@ -2307,9 +2299,7 @@  int security_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
 
 	if (ret == 1)
 		ret = cap_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags);
-	if (ret)
-		return ret;
-	return evm_inode_setxattr(idmap, dentry, name, value, size, flags);
+	return ret;
 }
 
 /**
@@ -2328,15 +2318,10 @@  int security_inode_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
 			   struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name,
 			   struct posix_acl *kacl)
 {
-	int ret;
-
 	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
 		return 0;
-	ret = call_int_hook(inode_set_acl, 0, idmap, dentry, acl_name,
-			    kacl);
-	if (ret)
-		return ret;
-	return evm_inode_set_acl(idmap, dentry, acl_name, kacl);
+	return call_int_hook(inode_set_acl, 0, idmap, dentry, acl_name,
+			     kacl);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -2389,14 +2374,9 @@  int security_inode_get_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
 int security_inode_remove_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
 			      struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name)
 {
-	int ret;
-
 	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
 		return 0;
-	ret = call_int_hook(inode_remove_acl, 0, idmap, dentry, acl_name);
-	if (ret)
-		return ret;
-	return evm_inode_remove_acl(idmap, dentry, acl_name);
+	return call_int_hook(inode_remove_acl, 0, idmap, dentry, acl_name);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -2432,7 +2412,6 @@  void security_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
 	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
 		return;
 	call_void_hook(inode_post_setxattr, dentry, name, value, size, flags);
-	evm_inode_post_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -2493,9 +2472,7 @@  int security_inode_removexattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
 	ret = call_int_hook(inode_removexattr, 1, idmap, dentry, name);
 	if (ret == 1)
 		ret = cap_inode_removexattr(idmap, dentry, name);
-	if (ret)
-		return ret;
-	return evm_inode_removexattr(idmap, dentry, name);
+	return ret;
 }
 
 /**
@@ -2699,7 +2676,7 @@  int security_inode_copy_up_xattr(const char *name)
 			return rc;
 	}
 
-	return evm_inode_copy_up_xattr(name);
+	return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(inode_copy_up_xattr);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_copy_up_xattr);
 
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/lsm/lsm_list_modules_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/lsm/lsm_list_modules_test.c
index 17333787cb2f..4d5d4cee2586 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/lsm/lsm_list_modules_test.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/lsm/lsm_list_modules_test.c
@@ -125,6 +125,9 @@  TEST(correct_lsm_list_modules)
 		case LSM_ID_IMA:
 			name = "ima";
 			break;
+		case LSM_ID_EVM:
+			name = "evm";
+			break;
 		default:
 			name = "INVALID";
 			break;