[RFC,2/2] KEYS: implement derived keys

Message ID	20240503221634.44274-3-ignat@cloudflare.com (mailing list archive)
State	New
Headers	show Received: from mail-lj1-f174.google.com (mail-lj1-f174.google.com [209.85.208.174]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id C82B24CDE0 for <keyrings@vger.kernel.org>; Fri, 3 May 2024 22:17:10 +0000 (UTC) From: Ignat Korchagin <ignat@cloudflare.com> To: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>, Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>, Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>, David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>, Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>, James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>, serge@hallyn.com, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: kernel-team@cloudflare.com, Ignat Korchagin <ignat@cloudflare.com> Subject: [RFC PATCH 2/2] KEYS: implement derived keys Date: Fri, 3 May 2024 23:16:34 +0100 Message-Id: <20240503221634.44274-3-ignat@cloudflare.com> In-Reply-To: <20240503221634.44274-1-ignat@cloudflare.com> References: <20240503221634.44274-1-ignat@cloudflare.com> Precedence: bulk MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
Series	TPM derived keys \| expand [RFC,0/2] TPM derived keys [RFC,1/2] tpm: add some algorithm and constant definitions from the TPM spec [RFC,2/2] KEYS: implement derived keys

diff --git a/security/keys/Kconfig b/security/keys/Kconfig index abb03a1b2a5c..62da9bff5f20 100644 --- a/security/keys/Kconfig +++ b/security/keys/Kconfig @@ -112,6 +112,22 @@ config USER_DECRYPTED_DATA If you are unsure as to whether this is required, answer N. +config DERIVED_KEYS + tristate "DERIVED KEYS" + depends on KEYS + depends on TCG_TPM + select CRYPTO + select CRYPTO_HMAC + select CRYPTO_SHA256 + select CRYPTO_KDF800108_CTR + help + This option provides support for deriving keys from a trust source + in the kernel. Derived keys are instantiated using a KDF with a seed + from a trust source, so are unique per system/trust source. These keys + can always be recovered as long as the trust source is available. + + If you are unsure as to whether this is required, answer N. + config KEY_DH_OPERATIONS bool "Diffie-Hellman operations on retained keys" depends on KEYS diff --git a/security/keys/Makefile b/security/keys/Makefile index 5f40807f05b3..84456cc5cc14 100644 --- a/security/keys/Makefile +++ b/security/keys/Makefile @@ -30,3 +30,4 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE) += keyctl_pkey.o obj-$(CONFIG_BIG_KEYS) += big_key.o obj-$(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS) += trusted-keys/ obj-$(CONFIG_ENCRYPTED_KEYS) += encrypted-keys/ +obj-$(CONFIG_DERIVED_KEYS) += derived-keys/ diff --git a/security/keys/derived-keys/Makefile b/security/keys/derived-keys/Makefile new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..5b85c16b6878 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/keys/derived-keys/Makefile @@ -0,0 +1,8 @@ +# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +# +# Makefile for derived keys +# + +obj-$(CONFIG_DERIVED_KEYS) += derived-keys.o +derived-keys-y += derived.o +derived-keys-y += tpm2_shash.o diff --git a/security/keys/derived-keys/derived.c b/security/keys/derived-keys/derived.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..8b28c1dbde2e --- /dev/null +++ b/security/keys/derived-keys/derived.c @@ -0,0 +1,226 @@ +#include <linux/module.h> +#include <linux/key-type.h> +#include <linux/file.h> +#include <linux/mm.h> +#include <linux/parser.h> +#include <keys/user-type.h> +#include <crypto/kdf_sp800108.h> +#include <keys/request_key_auth-type.h> + +#include "derived.h" +#include "../../integrity/ima/ima.h" + +#define MIN_KEY_SIZE 1 +#define MAX_KEY_SIZE 1024 + +enum { Opt_path, Opt_exe_csum, Opt_err }; + +static const match_table_t kdf_tokens = { + { Opt_path, "path" }, + { Opt_exe_csum, "csum" }, + { Opt_err, NULL } +}; + +static int get_current_exe_path(char *buf, size_t buf_len, char **path) +{ + struct file *exe_file = get_task_exe_file(current); + if (!exe_file) + return -EFAULT; + + *path = file_path(exe_file, buf, buf_len); + fput(exe_file); + + return IS_ERR(*path) ? PTR_ERR(*path) : 0; +} + +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA +static struct ima_digest_data *get_currect_exe_integrity(void) +{ + struct ima_iint_cache *iint; + struct file *exe_file = get_task_exe_file(current); + if (!exe_file) + return NULL; + + iint = ima_iint_find(file_inode(exe_file)); + fput(exe_file); + + return iint ? iint->ima_hash : NULL; +} +#endif + +static int tpm2_kdf_generate(int kdf_mix, u8 *out, size_t out_len) +{ + int ret; + struct kvec kbuf_iov[4]; + char *path; + kuid_t euid = current_euid(); + + struct crypto_shash *tpm2_hash = crypto_alloc_shash( + TPM2_HASH_IMPL_NAME, CRYPTO_ALG_INTERNAL, CRYPTO_ALG_INTERNAL); + if (IS_ERR(tpm2_hash)) + return PTR_ERR(tpm2_hash); + + kbuf_iov[0].iov_base = &out_len; + kbuf_iov[0].iov_len = sizeof(u32); + + kbuf_iov[1].iov_base = &euid; + kbuf_iov[1].iov_len = sizeof(euid); + + switch (kdf_mix) { + case Opt_path: + kbuf_iov[2].iov_base = "path"; + kbuf_iov[2].iov_len = sizeof("path"); + + path = kmalloc(PATH_MAX, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!path) { + ret = -ENOMEM; + goto free_hash; + } + + ret = get_current_exe_path(path, PATH_MAX, + (char **)&kbuf_iov[3].iov_base); + if (ret) { + kfree(path); + goto free_hash; + } + + kbuf_iov[3].iov_len = strlen(kbuf_iov[3].iov_base); + break; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA + case Opt_exe_csum: + kbuf_iov[2].iov_base = "csum"; + kbuf_iov[2].iov_len = sizeof("csum"); + + struct ima_digest_data *digest = get_currect_exe_integrity(); + if (!digest) { + ret = -EOPNOTSUPP; + goto free_hash; + } + + kbuf_iov[3].iov_base = digest->digest; + kbuf_iov[3].iov_len = digest->length; + break; +#endif + } + + ret = crypto_kdf108_ctr_generate(tpm2_hash, kbuf_iov, + ARRAY_SIZE(kbuf_iov), out, out_len); + switch (kdf_mix) { + case Opt_path: + kfree(path); + } + +free_hash: + crypto_free_shash(tpm2_hash); + return ret; +} + +static int derived_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) +{ + int ret; + char *opts, *cur, *opt; + int kdf_mix; + unsigned long keylen; + substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS]; + struct user_key_payload *upayload; + size_t optslen = prep->datalen; + + if (!prep->data || !prep->datalen) + return -EINVAL; + + opts = cur = kmalloc(optslen + 1, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!opts) + return -ENOMEM; + opts[optslen] = 0; + memcpy(opts, prep->data, optslen); + + opt = strsep(&cur, " \t"); + if (!opt) { + ret = -EINVAL; + goto free_opts; + } + + ret = kstrtoul(opts, 10, &keylen); + if (ret) + goto free_opts; + + if (keylen < MIN_KEY_SIZE || keylen > MAX_KEY_SIZE) { + ret = -EINVAL; + goto free_opts; + } + + if (!cur) { + ret = -EINVAL; + goto free_opts; + } + + kdf_mix = match_token(cur, kdf_tokens, args); + switch (kdf_mix) { +#ifndef CONFIG_IMA + case Opt_exe_csum: + ret = -EOPNOTSUPP; + goto free_opts; +#endif + case Opt_err: + ret = -EINVAL; + goto free_opts; + } + + upayload = kmalloc(sizeof(*upayload) + keylen, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!upayload) { + ret = -ENOMEM; + goto free_opts; + } + + ret = tpm2_kdf_generate(kdf_mix, upayload->data, keylen); + if (ret) + goto free_payload; + + prep->quotalen = keylen; + prep->payload.data[0] = upayload; + upayload->datalen = keylen; + goto free_opts; + +free_payload: + kfree(upayload); +free_opts: + kfree(opts); + return ret; +} + +static struct key_type key_type_derived = { + .name = "derived", + .preparse = derived_preparse, + .free_preparse = user_free_preparse, + .instantiate = generic_key_instantiate, + .revoke = user_revoke, + .destroy = user_destroy, + .describe = user_describe, + .read = user_read, +}; + +static int __init init_derived(void) +{ + int ret; + + ret = register_tpm2_shash(); + if (ret) + return ret; + + ret = register_key_type(&key_type_derived); + if (ret) + unregister_tpm2_shash(); + + return ret; +} + +static void __exit cleanup_derived(void) +{ + unregister_key_type(&key_type_derived); + unregister_tpm2_shash(); +} + +late_initcall(init_derived); +module_exit(cleanup_derived); + +MODULE_LICENSE("GPL"); diff --git a/security/keys/derived-keys/derived.h b/security/keys/derived-keys/derived.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..6f2910fb7afa --- /dev/null +++ b/security/keys/derived-keys/derived.h @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ +#define TPM2_HASH_IMPL_NAME "tpm2-hmac-internal" + +int register_tpm2_shash(void); +void unregister_tpm2_shash(void); diff --git a/security/keys/derived-keys/tpm2_shash.c b/security/keys/derived-keys/tpm2_shash.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..79b7fecd7753 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/keys/derived-keys/tpm2_shash.c @@ -0,0 +1,257 @@ +#include "derived.h" +#include <linux/tpm.h> +#include <linux/tpm_command.h> + +#include <crypto/internal/hash.h> +#include <crypto/sha2.h> + +/* create hierarchy with a custom unique value */ +#define TPM2_KERNEL_HIERARCHY "kernel" + +static struct tpm_chip *chip = NULL; + +static int tpm2_hash_init(struct shash_desc *desc) +{ + struct tpm_buf *buf = shash_desc_ctx(desc); + int ret = tpm_buf_init(buf, TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_HASH); + if (ret) + return ret; + + /* provisional size value for data size to be hashed */ + tpm_buf_append_u16(buf, 0); + + return 0; +} + +static int tpm2_hash_update(struct shash_desc *desc, const u8 *data, + unsigned int len) +{ + struct tpm_buf *buf = shash_desc_ctx(desc); + + tpm_buf_append(buf, data, len); + + if (buf->flags & TPM_BUF_OVERFLOW) { + tpm_buf_destroy(buf); + return -ENOMEM; + } + + return 0; +} + +static inline void tpm2_buf_append_null_auth(struct tpm_buf *buf) +{ + tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, 9); + tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, TPM2_RS_PW); + tpm_buf_append_u16(buf, 0); /* nonce len */ + tpm_buf_append_u8(buf, 0); /* attributes */ + tpm_buf_append_u16(buf, 0); /* hmac len */ +} + +static int tpm2_hmac_create_primary(u32 *handle) +{ + struct tpm_buf buf; + + int ret = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_CREATE_PRIMARY); + if (ret) + return ret; + + /* owner hierarchy */ + tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, TPM2_RH_OWNER); + + tpm2_buf_append_null_auth(&buf); + + /* tpm2 sensitive */ + tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, 4); + tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, 0); + tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, 0); + + /* tpm2 public */ + tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, 16 + sizeof(TPM2_KERNEL_HIERARCHY) - 1); + tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, TPM_ALG_KEYEDHASH); + tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, TPM_ALG_SHA256); + tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, TPM2_OA_FIXED_TPM | TPM2_OA_FIXED_PARENT | + TPM2_OA_SENSITIVE_DATA_ORIGIN | + TPM2_OA_USER_WITH_AUTH | + TPM2_OA_RESTRICTED | + TPM2_OA_SIGN); /* attr */ + tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, 0); /* auth policy */ + tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, TPM_ALG_HMAC); + tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, TPM_ALG_SHA256); + tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, + sizeof(TPM2_KERNEL_HIERARCHY) - 1); /* unique len */ + tpm_buf_append(&buf, TPM2_KERNEL_HIERARCHY, + sizeof(TPM2_KERNEL_HIERARCHY) - 1); /* unique */ + + /* outside info */ + tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, 0); + + /* pcr selection */ + tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, 0); + + if (buf.flags & TPM_BUF_OVERFLOW) { + ret = -ENOMEM; + goto free_buf; + } + + ret = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 4, + "create primary kernel hmac hierarchy"); + if (ret < 0) + goto free_buf; + + if (ret > 0) { + ret = tpm2_rc_value(ret) == TPM2_RC_OBJECT_MEMORY ? -ENOMEM : + -EPERM; + goto free_buf; + } + + *handle = be32_to_cpup((__be32 *)&buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE]); + +free_buf: + tpm_buf_destroy(&buf); + return ret; +} + +static int tpm2_sign(u32 handle, const u8 *tpm2b_digest, size_t digest_len, + const u8 *ticket, size_t ticket_len, u8 *out) +{ + struct tpm_buf buf; + + int ret = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_SIGN); + if (ret) + return ret; + + /* signing key handle */ + tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, handle); + + tpm2_buf_append_null_auth(&buf); + + /* digest to sign */ + tpm_buf_append(&buf, tpm2b_digest, digest_len); + + /* sig scheme */ + tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, TPM_ALG_HMAC); + tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, TPM_ALG_SHA256); + + /* validation (needed for restricted keys) */ + tpm_buf_append(&buf, ticket, ticket_len); + + if (buf.flags & TPM_BUF_OVERFLOW) { + ret = -ENOMEM; + goto free_buf; + } + + ret = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 4 + 2 + 2 + SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE, + "sign data"); + if (ret < 0) + goto free_buf; + + if (ret > 0) { + ret = tpm2_rc_value(ret) == TPM2_RC_OBJECT_MEMORY ? -ENOMEM : + -EPERM; + goto free_buf; + } + + /* check resp len */ + if (be32_to_cpup((__be32 *)&buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE]) != + 2 + 2 + SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE) { + ret = -EFAULT; + goto free_buf; + } + + memcpy(out, &buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE + 4 + 2 + 2], SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE); + memzero_explicit(&buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE + 4 + 2 + 2], + SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE); + +free_buf: + tpm_buf_destroy(&buf); + return ret; +} + +static int tpm2_hash_final(struct shash_desc *desc, u8 *out) +{ + u32 handle; + int ret; + size_t digest_len; + struct tpm_buf *buf = shash_desc_ctx(desc); + + /* adjust the input data length */ + *((__be16 *)&buf->data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE]) = + cpu_to_be16(tpm_buf_length(buf) - TPM_HEADER_SIZE - 2); + + tpm_buf_append_u16(buf, TPM_ALG_SHA256); + tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, TPM2_RH_OWNER); + + if (buf->flags & TPM_BUF_OVERFLOW) { + ret = -ENOMEM; + goto free_buf; + } + + ret = tpm_try_get_ops(chip); + if (ret) + goto free_buf; + + ret = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, buf, 2 + SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE, "hash data"); + if (ret < 0) + goto put_ops; + + if (ret > 0) { + ret = -EPERM; + goto put_ops; + } + + ret = tpm2_hmac_create_primary(&handle); + if (ret) + goto put_ops; + + digest_len = be16_to_cpup((__be16 *)&buf->data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE]) + 2; + ret = tpm2_sign(handle, &buf->data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE], digest_len, + &buf->data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE + digest_len], + tpm_buf_length(buf) - TPM_HEADER_SIZE - digest_len, + out); + + tpm2_flush_context(chip, handle); + +put_ops: + tpm_put_ops(chip); +free_buf: + tpm_buf_destroy(buf); + return ret; +} + +static struct shash_alg alg = { + .digestsize = SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE, + .init = tpm2_hash_init, + .update = tpm2_hash_update, + .final = tpm2_hash_final, + .descsize = sizeof(struct tpm_buf), + .base = { + .cra_name = "sha256", + .cra_driver_name = TPM2_HASH_IMPL_NAME, + .cra_priority = 0, + .cra_blocksize = SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE, + .cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_INTERNAL, + .cra_module = THIS_MODULE, + } +}; + +int register_tpm2_shash(void) +{ + int ret; + + chip = tpm_default_chip(); + if (!chip) + return -ENODEV; + + ret = crypto_register_shash(&alg); + if (ret) + put_device(&chip->dev); + + return ret; +} + +void unregister_tpm2_shash(void) +{ + crypto_unregister_shash(&alg); + if (chip) + put_device(&chip->dev); +}

[RFC,2/2] KEYS: implement derived keys

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